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**NATO
NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT,
ROMANIAN APPROACH**



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Foreword

“NATO New Strategic Concept, Romanian Approach” is a book and a study that offers some guidelines, debates proceeding, positions and arguments for the future Romanian mandate in the debate regarding the future Strategic Concept, but also some ideas to the Group of Experts of the Secretary General for drafting the Strategic Concept. It also helps the member states, partners and interested countries to realize the complexity of positions and issues, the concerns inside the Romanian society but also in the partner countries, all influencing the position of Romania.

The policy paper that reunifies the whole texts of the book and the debates during this project is offering **five premisses, nine fundamentals, six ballances, five principal interests** of Romania for the Strategic Concept. These are the main findings of the project and the result of the research conducted during six month.

The **five premisses** for the debate are:

1. **We all need NATO:** so the changes in the Strategic Concept and the debate itself are designed to enforce, transform and adapt NATO in order to better fulfill its objectives and tasks. The process or the results could harm what we have achieved, the organization or the capacity of fulfilling its tasks.
2. **Credibility and legitimacy of the Alliance:** the two components of the good governance inside the alliance, with the requested transparency and the needed qualified access to NATO core documents are supported by the debate and the process of obtaining a new strategic concept. We need a new strategic concept because the world has changed and is changing nowadays, so the Alliance should adapt to the new realities. And the debate is healthy because we can all see the perception, needs

and position of our respective populations and our allies' ones on the main issues, their concerns, the ones of our Allies and give legitimacy to our decision makers and to the Alliance itself.

3. **Not questioning existing and adopted decisions:** the political and negotiation process for obtaining the consensus in the NATO documents in summits, ministerial meetings and meeting with partner countries, either in NRC, NUC, NGC, in the EAPC or in 28+1 format, with the Global Partners or in ISAF format are forms of *acquis* we take as granted and we do not revise except if strong proofs are showing us that such documents are in an opposition with the fundamental values, principles, objectives of the Alliance, are harming the transatlantic link, the peace and stability or are contrary to the principles of the UN Chart.
4. **Maximum effectiveness, maximum benefits, minimum costs:** The new Strategic Concept is a public diplomacy instrument, a consensual instrument design to be use in all the member countries: in that respect, the result and form of the New Strategic Concept should give as much instruments, reasons and arguments to each member state for obtaining the domestic support for NATO's existence, activity and policies, with the less costs for each member country in the same respect.
5. **Indivisibility of security, unity and solidarity** in all forms for the member states is key to the sustainability of the Alliance, to its effectiveness and credibility, as well as to its main strategic instrument, deterrence, both nuclear and conventional.

The **nine fundamentals** are:

1. NATO fundamentals

- Reaffirmed values, objectives and obligations of the Washington Treaty which unite Europe with the United States
- Adherence to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. Objectives and strategy

- NATO – essential transatlantic forum for security consultations among Allies.
- Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and collective defense, based on the indivisibility of Allied security

- Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities
- Reinforcing arms control and promoting nuclear and conventional disarmament

3. Vision and instruments

- Vision: Europe whole and free
- Task: better address today's threats and to anticipate tomorrow's risks
- Instrument: NATO's enlargement the instrument, with an historic success
- NATO's open door policy: all European democracies, sharing the values of our Alliance, willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, can contribute to common security and stability.

4. Threats and challenges:

- Global threats: terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, proliferation of their means of delivery and cyber attacks.
- Challenges: energy security, climate change, instability emanating from fragile and failed states
- Interdependence: Our security is increasingly tied to that of other regions, due to the objective process of globalization.

5. Directions of NATO's transformation and adaptation:

- Improve our ability to better meet the security challenges
- Three important areas continuously addressed with an integrated response and equal interest: the Alliance territory, emerge at strategic distance or closer to home.
- Solidarity: Allies must share risks and responsibilities equitably.
- Suitable instruments and resources: capabilities more flexible and deployable, quick and effective response, wherever needed, more cost-effective.
- Priority: strengthen NATO's capacity to play an important role in crisis management and conflict resolution, where our interests are involved.

6. Cooperation and integrated response:

- Strengthen cooperation with other international actors: the United Nations, European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and African Union
- A comprehensive approach to meet new challenges
- Combining more effectively civilian and military capabilities.
- Key priority: helping the Afghan Government to build a democratic, secure and stable country that will never again harbor terrorists who threaten international security.

7. European pillar:

- A stronger and more capable European defense
- Support for strengthening EU's capabilities and capacity to address common security challenges.
- Non-EU Allies fullest involvement possible is important
- NATO-EU relationship a functioning strategic partnership, mutually reinforcing and complementary.

8. Global Partnerships:

- Developed relationships with all partners with a joint commitment to cooperative security, both in our neighbourhood and beyond.
- Partners in a community of shared values and responsibilities.

9. Russia

- Openness for a strong, cooperative partnership between NATO and Russia
- Respect for all the principles of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and the 2002 Rome Declaration
- Ready to work with Russia to address the common challenges we face.

The **profile assumed by Romania** during this debate, described above as a **consensus-generating ally with creative and balanced approaches**. The concept of the **Alliance of balances** embraced by Romania has **six balances**:

1. **Trans-Atlantic balance**: a balanced distribution of responsibilities, contribution and resources and a better synchronization of the

modernization rhythms of capabilities between North Atlantic and European allies.

2. **Balance between the Allies:** reaffirming the consensus rule for the decisions taken inside the Alliance, avoiding the use of veto but supporting solidarity, cohesion and effective work between the allies, but also a **balanced representation** of all the allies in the decision making, executive and working bodies of the Alliance at all levels.
3. **Balanced perception of security risks:** between new challenges and old challenges, territorial defense and expeditionary forces, operations at the strategic distance and operations against risks and threats in the vicinity, regional and global threats and risks, actual and future risks.
4. **Balance between the Alliances responsibilities and objectives,** territorial defense, expeditionary capabilities, response to new threats.
5. **Balance in the allocation of capabilities of the Alliance,** for tackling security challenges with direct impact on NATO's territory, appeared at the strategic distance or near the allied territory.
6. **Balance between the level of ambition** of the Alliance and its **real possibilities** of fulfilling them, meaning political will, resources, sharing burden and roles with other security organizations.

In the Romanian position elaborated and proposed, we have identified **five main interests**:

1. **Pragmatism and values in NATO**

The balanced position of Romania between pragmatism, interest and values, which should be **pragmatism limited by our values**. This means to take a kind of neo-liberal approach, where the target is its interest and the pragmatic fulfilling of NATO role and objectives, but limited by the set of common values that the member countries and allies are sharing. The fact that the first paragraph of the Declaration on Alliance Security is mentioning the values, objectives and obligations is a good step forward to argument and support this way of addressing things in the new Strategic Concept.

It is the same with the relation with Russia, we have to realize and cooperate where we can, with an open door policy, but at the same time to **engage and check** at every moment the behavior and actions of Russia toward NATO, its neighbours and its own citizens.

2. **A special accent regarding the threats in the vicinity**

The new Strategic Concept is a good opportunity for Romania and other countries for making the right accents to its own interests, coming from the Western Balkans, Black Sea and Eastern neighbourhood, meaning addressing **threats in the vicinity**. We have to mention terrorism, proliferation of WMD and their means of sending to the target (missiles), energy insecurity, protection of the routes for energy supply, piracy, etc are **challenges and threats** we should respond to. If we are taking also the weak and failed states and the threats coming from this instability **at the borders of the Alliance** – refugees, migration, trafficking of weapons, etc – we have a big picture that will support our angle of view which is not aimed at over-exposing this type of threats, but to give them an **equal space and position** in order of being considered by the Alliance. We need to find in the new Strategic Concept the definition, in a balanced way, of two **types of missions**, territorial defense and expeditionary forces, with two different paths, operations at a **strategic distance** and operations for tackling threats and challenges **in the vicinity**.

Romania sees a **continuous approach** between the three components – that should be mentioned equally in the new Strategic Concept as it has been done in the Declaration of Alliance Security. The meaning is that the national interests (and the Alliance ones consequently) linked with defense and security are achieved through the **defense of the territory**, and means to tackle threats and challenges at a strategic distance or in the vicinity, but also the participation in operations at a strategic distance are helping to **keep the threats away from the national territory** and to prepare and **train the army in combat conditions** that will help in improving the country's and Alliance **deterrence capacity** through the fact that its army did take part in real operations during the war.

3. **Prioritization of the threats and challenges to be addressed**

In the debate regarding **regional versus global NATO**, with a balanced approach of Romania, the Allies have to take in consideration **Article 5** and the way of acting accordingly, the credibility of the Alliance in that line, the relationship between **national interests and Alliance**

interests, and prioritization linked to cost or consequences for the Alliance. These issues should be addressed, as well in the **partnership** key and in the **relations with Russia**.

It is sure that we do not need **NATO as a tool box**, good and useful for all threats and challenges where we do not have other instruments, because NATO has a clear task and objectives, being made for specific purposes. It is also clear that NATO cannot do everything, because of the means, resources and capabilities. This is the place where we should talk about **prioritization of the tasks** and the way of addressing such a challenge. **NATO cannot address everything**, but the Alliance should **think and plan** for every one of those threats and challenges, in all the fields of interest together with relevant regional and global institutions and agencies. With this, a suitable role could be found in every problem, and the efficiency of NATO should be discussed through the **“right institution, right time, right task”** concept of the approach.

4. **Post conflict reconstruction and nation building capabilities**

Here is an important task that Afghanistan, Iraq, but also Kosovo and Bosnia Herzegovina has told us. The **lessons learnt** should come back from the history and help us deal with a better result with those issues in the future. In that respect, we did realize with the PRT-Provincial Reconstruction Teams, that the **reconstruction, conciliation, and settlement** stages of a conflict should begin simultaneously. This comes from the fact that those processes had proved to be mutually self-potentiated ones, so that reconstruction and conciliation are processes that should begin at the moments that peace keeping or peace enforcement or combat troops are on the ground, if possible already imbedded with the combat troops. Those processes are helping the settlement of the conflicts. Moreover, this is also helping another task that came with the human rights and responsibility for each human life: R2P, **the responsibility to protect** civilians and population.

This task open the way for a unique cooperation between **military and civilian** capabilities, soldiers with police officers, public administration experts, civil emergency instruments, democratization and rule of law capabilities, trainers in human rights and media, humanitarian aid and

health assistance alike, state or private own capabilities, governmental and non-governmental expertise at the same time, in the same place, in an **hostile environment**. This opens the door for new capabilities needed in the alliance framework, but also on national interest.

There is the place to think if the failed state/weak state threat or challenges linked to this type of threat, separatism and other type of similar threat and challenges are not well served by a **joint military-civilian capability of state building**, able to install in any type of environment **an administration** as such **ready to act** and **able to begin in real time the state building** in the space of its responsibility, with all the instruments needed for that matter. The very existence of Afghanistan as an operation could serve for **training this capability** which could be used afterwards in all the places where it will be required. This is a direction where Romania could contribute, develop and have an added value and an issue that deserves fighting for in the new Strategic Concept.

5. **Energy security beyond critical infrastructure protection**

Talking about **energy security**, we have to refer on what has been achieved and the way forward. NATO has embraced the part linked more to what we call **critical and energy infrastructure protection** but not much more. In Europe, there are two approaches to the definition and solution of energy security, meaning free access to **alternative sources and to alternative routes** for energy supply, for a part of the EU and NATO countries, and **interdependence** for another part of the European and NATO countries. In the first part, we are talking about the need to have alternative sources and alternative routes in order **to avoid energy disruption** and political, strategic and security conditionality, affecting even the normal life and capacity of a country to defend and protect its security, on the other part the solution is seen as being **engaging the producer and the transit countries** in order to **interconnect their interest** to those of the consumers and to grant that their interests are observed.

Coming back to NATO, we have several steps already covered. At the Bucharest summit, an important progress has been achieved by defining

the areas where NATO will engage the field of **energy security** and let to a special evaluation the task of finding other fields where NATO could be involved. We are talking already about information and intelligence fusion and sharing, projecting stability, advancing international and regional cooperation, supporting consequence management and, for sure, supporting the protection of critical infrastructure, on land, under the water, wherever this infrastructure is build. Energy security is a major component and we think that the Alliance should definitely consider the possibility of **using the military force for defending its economic interests in the energy supply field**, in strict conditions but in a symmetric approach.

For Romania, the **Wider Black Sea Region** is the first importance and in this respect, this region should be considered with its particular relevance on energy security in Europe, related to both **protecting the energy infrastructure** and **providing and securing the resources**. These issues should be addressed, as well in the **partnership** key and in the **relations with Russia**.

FIRST PART

NATO's New Strategic Concept. Romanian Approach

POLICY PAPER

*Julian Chifu**

Chapter I

Methodology, Premises and Background of the Study

The present study is the result of a full and comprehensive program conducted by the Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Center Bucharest with the support of the financial support of NATO PDD, the East-East Program of the Soros Foundation, and Black Sea Trust of the German Marshall Found. The program took place between July and November 2009 and included four workshops and an international conference (see Annexes) as well as the present policy paper.

Program and methodology

In the consultation, exploratory and preparative period, we had the full support and participation of the Euro-Atlantic Council Romania, the National Defense College, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense. The four debates have been organized in cooperation with those four institutions according to very strict programs. At these debates, we had welcomed through VCR the presentations of NATO officials like the NATO Deputy Secretary General, Ambassador Claudio Bisogniero, Admiral Gianpaolo di Paola, Chairmen of NATO Military Committee and Antonio Ortiz, Policy Adviser, Policy Planning.

* Julian Chifu teaches Conflict analysis and Decision in Crisis at the National School for Political and Administrative Studies in Bucharest and is director of the Centre for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning, Bucharest. This material is the result of contributions from collaborators of the CPCEW, with the special mention of Gilda Truica, of the European Institute of Romania.

The final international conference held on 22-24 of October benefited from the presence of Dr. Jamie Shea, Director for Policy Planning, NATO International Staff and representatives from allied countries, the partner and neighbour countries. The purpose of the conference was to test Romanian positions and ideas and to get the inputs, concerns and ideas of our neighbour countries, of the partner countries and NATO's officials. The ideas came from the academic community, the civic society, the expert community, the officials and the young generation of scholars and students.

Moving to the methodology used for our policy paper, we undertook the gathering of the premises and principles that should guide the debates and elaboration of the new NATO strategic concept, as well as the basic premises already agreed during NATO's Strasburg and Kehl summit that launched the process of reflection of the new Strategic Concept, especially the provisions of the Declaration on Alliance Security which was the reference document and starting point in these debates.

The next stage was meant to gather the different issues and a comprehensive agenda on the debates linked to NATO and the new Strategic Concept, using the Alliance and Romanian's documents and researches. The result was a list of themes of debate, with alternatives and arguments. This was the most important component of our policy paper, because it is useful for every researcher and official to see a comprehensive approach to the substance and content of this debate in Romania.

The next step was the assessment of the Romanian security and strategic interests regarding the NATO strategic concept debate. We are focusing not on all the issues presented, but only on those that are directly interesting Romanian strategic profile, in accordance with what we know and appreciate as being those choices. The arguments of those choices are there, as well as more profound ones in the text that follow the policy paper.

Last but not least, we are addressing in the last part of our policy paper the commitment oriented approach, which is the one that we are recommending and advocating for. Consistent with this type of approach, we are trying to underline Romania's priorities in this field in order to substantiate and legitimate its positions through changes, actions and initiatives undertaken domestically, in the security sector and complementary fields, in order to be credible when supporting one or another option, position in a particular issue.

At the end of the day, we have a full assessment on the debates in Romania regarding the new NATO Strategic Concept, the positions that should be embraced in a neo-liberal key– a theoretical and pragmatic approach, limited by the respect for the common values - with the recommendations issued for Romania's position and internal needed changes to prove the adaptation to the future documents and positions that we are supporting during the debate.

The present policy paper is, by no means, replacing the official Romanian internal official debate and our task is not to elaborate the Romanian mandate. This task belongs to our officials which will adapt the general assessment and positions to their profile in the negotiations, the flexibility of the issues proposed, the negotiability of those positions and the limits imposed by the diplomatic game and grouping for obtaining several common elements in the future Strategic Concept. But our policy paper can play a guiding role for this purpose and can help our officials, as well as our allies and partners, in understanding the content and rational of such positions that Romania will embrace during the negotiations.

The content of the study

The present study is a comprehensive one, covering all the moments of the project. In the forefront we have the policy paper, with the assessment, the analysis of the positions according to Romanian national security interest and the commitment oriented provisions needed to support, enforce and gave credibility to our positions. They do not have the form of recommendations but more the one of guidelines to think about. The last part comprises the general NATO official roadmap, positions and documents about the technical steps in adopting the new strategic concept.

Than we have two basic studies involving the main issues regarding NATO's evolution in the last years and the basic motivations of the point in the agenda. Here we are focusing on the changes that intervene in the international environment in the last period and the way forward, trying also to underscore the trends of evolution of the international community and the way NATO should adapt, as well as a comprehensive paper and approach to the NATO-EU and NATO-ESDP relations now and in the future.

These two comprehensive studies are followed by some of the presentations and points made during the conference. We have some 19 papers more or less elaborated from our main speakers or discussants from Romania, the allied countries or the partner and neighbour countries, both expert and NGO approach and the official positions expressed during the debate. We can also find some basic presentations debated during the workshops.

The next part refers to the positions undertaken during the NGO and young experts' debate. Our colleagues covered the main issues debated with the respective positions presented and criticized during those debates. Last but not least, we do have the annexes on the content, agenda and participants of the international conference and of the four workshops undertaken during this program, coordinated by our Center.

Accepted Premises for the policy paper

As for the **premises**, we are using some criteria, underlined as follows. The idea was not to limit the free thinking or to create boundaries to the expressed positions – we can see this by the content of the presentations included in this study – but more to organize the debate, to obtain some peaces of effectiveness in this debate and to avoid contradictions between the finding of the study and the purpose of the study, analyzing a position of Romania in the debate and negotiations for the New NATO Strategic Concept. As a result, we have the following premises and principles to be observed by the acceptable proposals for NATO adaptation, transformation and changes:

1. **We all need NATO:** so the changes in the Strategic Concept and the debate itself are designed to enforce, transform and adapt NATO in order to better fulfill its objectives and tasks. The process or the results could harm what we have achieved, the organization or the capacity of fulfilling its tasks.
2. **Credibility and legitimacy of the Alliance:** the two components of the **good governance** inside the alliance, with the requested transparency and the needed qualified access to NATO core documents are supported

by the debate and the process of obtaining a new strategic concept. **We need a new strategic concept** because the world has changed and is changing nowadays, so the Alliance should adapt to the new realities. And **the debate is healthy** because we can all see the perception, needs and position of our respective populations and our allies' ones on the main issues, their concerns, the ones of our Allies and give legitimacy to our decision makers and to the Alliance itself.

3. Not questioning **existing** and **adopted decisions**: the political and negotiation process for obtaining the consensus in the NATO documents in summits, ministerial meetings and meeting with partner countries, either in NRC, NUC, NGC, in the EAPC or in 28+1 format, with the Global Partners or in ISAF format are forms of *acquis* we take as granted and we do not revise except if strong proofs are showing us that such documents are in an opposition with the **fundamental values, principles, objectives of the Alliance**, are **harming the transatlantic link, the peace and stability** or are **contrary to the principles of the UN Chart**.
4. **Maximum effectiveness, maximum benefits, minimum costs**: The new Strategic Concept is a **public diplomacy instrument**, a consensual instrument design to be use in all the member countries: in that respect, the result and form of the New Strategic Concept should give as much instruments, reasons and arguments to each member state for obtaining the domestic support for NATO's existence, activity and policies, with the less costs for each member country in the same respect.
5. **Indivisibility of security, unity and solidarity** in all forms for the member states are key to the sustainability of the Alliance, to its effectiveness and credibility, as well as to its main strategic instrument, **deterrence**, both nuclear and conventional.

In this respect, for the purpose of elaborating the new Strategic Concept, the **Declaration on Alliance Security** adopted at the Strasburg-Kehl NATO summit is the most important document, already accepted by the member states, a **reference document** and a **starting point** for all the debates

related to the future NATO Strategic Concept. In this respect, we will observe **the following fundamentals**:

1. NATO fundamentals

- Reaffirmed **values, objectives and obligations** of the Washington Treaty which unite Europe with the United States
- Adherence to the **purposes and principles** of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. Objectives and strategy

- NATO – **essential transatlantic forum for security consultations** among Allies.
- Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and **collective defense**, based on the **indivisibility of Allied security**
- **Deterrence**, based on an appropriate **mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities**
- Reinforcing **arms control** and promoting **nuclear and conventional disarmament**

3. Vision and instruments

- Vision: Europe whole and free
- **Task: better address today's threats and to anticipate tomorrow's risks**
- **Instrument: NATO's enlargement** the instrument, with an historic success
- NATO's **open door policy: all European democracies, sharing the values** of our Alliance, **willing and able to assume** the responsibilities and obligations of membership, **can contribute to common security and stability.**

4. Threats and challenges:

- **Global threats:** terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, proliferation of their means of delivery and cyber attacks.

- **Challenges:** energy security, climate change, instability emanating from fragile and failed states
- **Interdependence:** Our security is increasingly tied to that of other regions, due to the objective process of globalization.

5. Directions of NATO's transformation and adaptation:

- Improve our ability to **better meet the security challenges**
- Three important areas continuously addressed with an integrated response and equal interest: the **Alliance territory**, emerge at **strategic distance or closer to home**.
- **Solidarity:** Allies must share risks and responsibilities equitably.
- **Suitable instruments and resources:** capabilities more flexible and deployable, quick and effective response, wherever needed, more cost-effective.
- **Priority:** strengthen NATO's capacity to play an important role in **crisis management** and **conflict resolution**, where our interests are involved.

6. Cooperation and integrated response:

- Strengthen cooperation with other international actors: the United Nations, European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and African Union
- **A comprehensive approach** to meet new challenges
- Combining more effectively **civilian and military capabilities**.
- **Key priority:** helping the Afghan Government **to build a democratic, secure and stable country** that will never again harbor terrorists which threaten international security.

7. European pillar:

- A stronger and more capable European defense
- Support for strengthening EU's capabilities and capacity to address common security challenges.
- Non-EU Allies fullest involvement possible is important
- NATO-EU relationship a functioning strategic partnership, mutually reinforcing and complementary.

8. Global Partnership:

- Developed relationships with **all partners** with a joint commitment to cooperative security, both in our neighbourhood and beyond.
- Partners in a community of shared values and responsibilities.

9. Russia

- **Openness** for a **strong, cooperative partnership between NATO and Russia**
- **Respect** for **all the principles** of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and the 2002 Rome Declaration
- Ready to work with Russia to address **the common challenges** we face.

Chapter II

Themes and agenda for the debate on the New NATO Strategic Concept

We did try to evaluate the issues discussed in the framework of the debate for a new NATO Strategic Concept. For that matter we took some alternative sources: the agenda presented by the former Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the seminar on the 7th of July launching the debate on the new strategic concept, the themes discussed at the four official Expert Group seminars, the Romanian themes of debate used during the project – a result of a negotiation between our proposed agenda, the official Romanian agenda and NATO PDD input – the Romanian Military contribution as well as the ideas that came from the Romanian research assessment on the future of NATO. The bases of departure should be the Declaration on Alliance Security adopted in Strasburg-Kehl. The results are the following:

1. Themes from the strategic concept seminar, 7th of July Launching NATO's New Strategic Concept debate

Conceptual debates:

- Strategic international environment and challenges for NATO
- Strengths and weaknesses of NATO: old wounds of the Iraq conflict
- Evolution and adaptation of NATO instead of a clear definition of objectives and future roles (George Bernard Shaw: all the big truths begin with a blasphemy). The necessity is no longer at stake.
- NATO a tool box: taxi company responding to needs and calls versus existing and defining tasks (the issue is not what NATO could do, but what NATO should do)
- **Not adapting missions to our needs and capacities, but defining needs and capacities adapted to the really important challenges for our security. That is the definition of the main theme of the New Strategic Concept.**

- The New Strategic Concept is decided because a strong NATO is the one where debates do happen with good solutions that make the cohesion and solidarity, not avoiding those debates. Democracy, public support, accountability and responsibility, good governance in this field.

Principles and enforcement:

- Collective defense, Article 5, main accent, Partnerships, Equal sharing of the burdens inside the Alliance and solidarity – basic principles agreed. The terrorist attack became an issue for activating Article 5, not only direct attack on the territory.
- Other new conditions should be added in the future as well as other kind of **NATO collective responses** for other scenarios of classic threats – terrorism and proliferation – and threats less easy identifiable like energy security, cyber defense, threats linked to climate change, weak and failed states, access and division of the international resources like the water.
- From **security of the states** to **security of the persons** – **human security** and **responsibility to protect** – UN Chart

Means already settled:

- From peace keeping to peace enforcement
- Challenges of the counter insurrection
- International cooperation
- Comprehensive approach

Operations:

- Military operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan.
- Intervention after the support of the international community
- Military capabilities needed in order to avoid to ethnical cleansing campaigns or blocking terrorist insurrections
- NATO cannot be defined only by its operations. Its activities are not only resumed to Afghanistan and Afghanistan is not only NATO. Linking NATO to a specific operation makes its credibility in danger as it happens every time as a new operation is launched
- Operations are still important, but normative aspects are following: non proliferation treaties, arms control regime, confidence building

measures, transparency between countries, training international law enforcement agents for fighting terrorism and proliferation, common anti piracy legislation are complementary instruments. Balance between defense and diplomacy.

Transatlantic consensus

- Real and true consensus establish a real solidarity, burden sharing and cost sharing, a real base for the Alliance
- The debate should arrive at a conclusion for a sustainable, long term document, supporting NATO's decisions.
- A common approach to threat perception between the allies
- Global versus regional NATO, regionalisation of the Alliance
- Influence of the last attack - terrorism, piracy proliferation, cyber attack, migration
- Relation with Russia between opportunities and security issues
- Afghanistan threat versus “making the good think for the wrong purposes” (TS Eliot).
- Not uniformity or conformity, but a democratic organisation, with vivid debates, but with reflections of the interests of 28 countries of the Alliance
- The question of **choice and prioritization** of the threats: Not too many particular threats at the same time, useful for all purposes, but not specialized in any direction. Distinction between real threat and perceived threat. The accent on the threats the most urgent which concern all the countries of the Alliance
- Cases where NATO will play a major role, and cases where it will only help and support

NATO purpose and objectives:

- The population do not know what for NATO
- Knowing the actions, but not the link with the principal and fundamental objective of the Alliance - common defense and facing together common security threats - and their particular interests
- Knowing the role but not understanding the usefulness of the Alliance
- Communication, but also a lack of formal mission statement of the Alliance in the 21-st century proving why we still need NATO, what is its added value

- Not just a shopping list of real or potential challenges, nor just an elegant description of the world but to provide detailed guidance to NATO governments on the political and military policies and get public support

2. *Proposals of the Secretary General:*

- **No distinction between security at home and security abroad** (impact of the globalization)
 - Article 5 can apply outside NATO territory as much as inside.
 - Not just to make our populations secure, but feel secure
- **Article 5 collective defense commitments** taken seriously - not just on paper but through planning and exercises as well as having the necessary capabilities to call on in crisis situations.
 - The threats to our security today lie mainly outside Europe-reinforcing ISAF
 - Reassuring Allies who feel less secure than others in their immediate neighbourhood: **unity, indivisibility, solidarity**
- **Transformation and new NATO Reform and efficiency:** where and how NATO needs to transform its forces - both for Article 5 and non-Article 5 missions.
 - Capabilities and equipment that are not **directly linked to our operations**
 - Defense planning and capabilities better linked to lessons learned
 - A new NATO doctrine on counter-insurgency
 - **Capabilities** increasingly expensive and the financial crisis: to do more, not less, **in common** funding of operations - transport aircraft, helicopters or intelligence or reconnaissance assets.
- **Type of forces:** the balance between land, air and naval forces. **Growth of naval dimension rapidly** focus on piracy, the High North, maritime energy transportation networks, prevention of clandestine transfers of missile technology and weapons of mass destruction.

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- **Look at our level of ambition** of the Alliance. Is it still the right one?

 - **Avoiding crisis and interventions where we can.** NATO is good at responding after the fact; but it is not so good at anticipation and prevention.
 - **Better in consulting** about deteriorating situations and potential flash points
 - Improving our overall quality of **political consultations** and debate.
 - Share much more intelligence in the Alliance
 - Have **more political discussion** of – and action on – the many **good analyses** that the civil and military experts in NATO HQ

 - **New Generation of Partnerships.** Continued growth of NATO's partnerships - Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean Dialogue, or the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
 - Getting the best value out of our partnerships
 - Cooperating on other challenges: energy security, proliferation, cyber, terrorism

 - **NATO-Russia relationship - a mature relationship**
 - **Restart** the NATO-Russia cooperation in the Mediterranean and Afghanistan
 - **Re-launch:** character of our relations, define NATO's essential interests and objectives and unify our thinking
 - **To articulate common differences** but also **common interests**
 - To encourage and organize **real cooperation.**
 - Relation **broad and multi-faceted.**
 - One of the most delicate but important debating topics

 - **NATO-EU relations**
 - Our missions, our memberships, our geographical areas of interest, our capabilities are increasingly overlapping
 - Our definition of the security challenges and the means to tackle them is also increasingly a shared

- NATO-EU relationship has become more pragmatic, a true strategic partnership
- A much better job of combining the **complementary assets** of NATO and the EU.
- They should work together where necessary, not just where they can.

3. The themes of the four official Expert Group Seminars

One seminar will look at **NATO's core tasks and functions**:

- The meaning of collective defense and deterrence in today's environment;
- How to confront a broader spectrum of threats to our populations;
- NATO's role in disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation.

Another seminar will look at **NATO as a part of a network of security actors** in:

- Contributing to global civil and military crisis management
- NATO's likely tasks with a view to enhancing cooperation with international organizations and NGOs.

A third seminar will look at **NATO and the Euro-Atlantic security environment**:

- NATO's role in building security in the Euro-Atlantic area,
- Enlargement
- NATO's partnerships
- Relations with Russia.

A fourth seminar will look at **forces and capabilities**:

- Defense planning and transformation.
- Procurement at a time of increased financial constraints – that requires flexibility and prioritization.

4. Themes and issues address in the Romanian debate

Panel 1: Adapting NATO's strategic concept in order to address the 21st century challenges. NATO multi-tasking?

Focus points:

- Sharing security burdens inside NATO while preserving trans-Atlantic partnership and solidarity;

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- The meaning of Article 5: balance between conventional and asymmetric threats
 - Balancing the collective defense, operations in vicinity and the need for actions at a strategic distance, executing collective defense while pursuing “out of area” operations
 - Terrorism and WMD proliferation: the role of missile defense, disarmament and non-proliferation;
 - Increasing NATO’s role in dealing with cross-border threats and challenges

Panel 2: Managing challenges and opportunities in NATO’s wider neighbourhood. Partnership network as investment in transatlantic and international security. The relevance of NATO’s critical neighbourhoods: the Balkans and the wider Black Sea region.

Focus points:

- The need to build circles of stability in the Balkans - Black Sea-Caucasus – Central Asia; the Mediterranean region – Middle East – Afghanistan
- What is the role for neighbourhood/regional instability in the future Strategic Concept?
- The right mix of NATO policies and instruments: partnerships, enlargement; reforms; cooperation and dialogue;
- The role of partnerships in a broad sense (including partners across the globe);
- Working with Russia in the 21st century;
- Working with other organizations (UN, EU, UA, others);
- Working with emerging powers (China, India);
- NATO building security capacities (the role of NATO’s partnerships with Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq)

Panel 3: Balancing NATO’s focus between collective/territorial defense and the need to be effective at strategic distance

Focus points:

- Article 5 for the 21st century;

- Contingency planning for the new members;
- The value of the NRF;
- Striking the right balance between Article 5/Non Article 5 operations; Capabilities and resource requirements
- Conceptualizing Afghanistan in the new strategic concept (NATO's role in stabilization and reconstruction missions).

Panel 4: New threats: Energy Security, Cyber Defense, And Critical Infrastructure Protection

Focus points:

1. Energy security: the right mix of policies, instruments and partners;
2. Critical infrastructure protection and NATO role
3. Cyber-Defense;
4. NATO's role in maritime security and protection of sea lines of communications

5. *Romanian Military Debate*

A. Military policy bodies

- Common understanding and implications of the existence and the application of Article 5.
- Article 5 linked with the threats to be faced: terrorism, proliferation of the WMD, granting energy security, climate changes, protection of the cyber space, critical infrastructure protection
- Significance of common defense, links of this main mission and the security of the Alliance – expeditionary forces, crisis response missions
- Maintaining the credibility of Article 5 and explaining the strict conditions of using it.

Prioritization of the tasks

- The prioritization of tasks is needed because of the limitation of resources, comparing to the “standard” rules of resources for a maximum level of operational needs for facing all the possible situations that are
- **A hierarchy of priorities and tasks** of the Alliance should be put in place – assuming **the risk of the bad choices** versus the credibility of the Alliance and assuming commitments that could be fulfilled

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- **Assesment of the performances of the member states** and balancing the **equal sharing of responsibilities** between nations.

Relations with Russia

- Major concern and dilema within the HQ, international staff and inside the nations
- Unique partnership with Russia – the NRC – and allies that are seeing Article 5 as being associated with Russia. The Russian Georgian war worsened the divergences.
- Choice: common values or common interests? Should it be a red line and where?
- Should we plan for a possible aggression from Russia?
- How much Russia should be involved in NATO's decisions

Main issues to be solved by the NSC:

- Fundamental tasks of the Alliance in the security field
- NATO's commitments in the globalization era
- Transatlantic cohesion
- NATO-EU relation
- NATO's partnerships
- Transformation: **structures, forces and capabilities**.
- As a result, military body should make the operational planning, resource planning and elaborate suitable strategies

B. Romanian HQ approach

- NATO world **policeman or observer**, monitoring the environment, early warning and prevention, less action
- **Unlimited responsibilities in a limited space** versus **limited responsibilities in an unlimited space**
- Balance between strategic planning for **territorial defense** and **expeditionary forces**

Needed changes

- Efficiency: Avoiding bureaucracy through a **nuanced consensus** for taking decisions
- **Solidarity** in the commitments and participation in operations

- **Collective response** against terrorism, cyber defense, energy security, climate change and critical infrastructure protection in transborder areas

Collective defense effectiveness-prioritization:

- Collective defense must remain **the core mission of NATO**(according to Romanian Defense Strategy)
- **Conflict prevention** and **solidarity** as key factors
- **Military operations** depending on **capabilities, forces at the disposal** of the Alliance and **opportunity**-security situation of the allies requires that
- Enlargement of the collective defense application to **cyber attacks** and **disruption of the energy flow – collective answers**, not always military actions
- Granting all allies that they will not be obliged to face those challenges by themselves
- New understanding of **Article 5**: when it is active, conditions and time frame – because of the new aspects and **globalization of threats** and **challenges without borders**
- Need to address **collective security** when defending **common values and interests**
- The principle of **equal sharing of the burdens**
- Collective defense should provide the **response capacity** against present dangers and threats to the security
- Balanced approach to collective defense for **expeditionary forces** and **national interests**
- Suitable forces and capabilities for **the full range of military operations** home and abroad, from peace keeping to combat actions
- **Collective defense** is the main task, crisis response and operations out of area are designed according to the **existing forces and capabilities** and **the collective security needs**

The New Strategic Concept must:

- Clearly establish the aim, the objectives and functions of the Alliance
- Define **challenges and threats** to the Alliance's security
- Indicate the instruments and capabilities needed
- Define the steps for applying the Article 5

- Establish engagement rules, principles of Collective defense and cooperation insight NATO
- **Cooperation with EU** in the field of security planning for **avoiding duplication** in the process of building capabilities.

Non Article 5 operations

- Coordinating actions with the international community in a non-Article 5 crisis regarding:
 - Coordinated **planning and assesment** and **intelligence sharing**
 - Synchronizing military activities with multiple actors and collaboration
 - **Common strategic objectives** and **coherent strategy**
 - The **credibility** of international force against the rebels
 - Getting the **support and confidence of population.**
 - The **power of the media** and **strategic communication**

Territorial defense and the operations “out of area”

- Expeditionary operations with maintainance of needed forces for territorial defense
- Respect to **national security interests** of the small countries
- Right balance with **national interests first**, than Alliance interests

Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

- Ballistic missile are an important threat to the territory and population of NATO states
- Common **anti-ballistic missile program** was conceived exactly for the **territorial and collective defense**
- Principles of **indivisibility of the security** and **collective solidarity** for vulnerable countries in this field
- **Engaging Russia** in this field, for the needed cooperation for the security of the Black Sea

Maritime security

- A key element of the **Global security and stability**
 - Strategic importance of the **maritime communication lines** - 90% of the international trade

- Disruption of **energy flows, terrorism, WMD proliferation, migration**
- **Complementary role** to international civil agencies and maritime authorities, law enforcement agencies
- Defining **maritime missions** which require **collective response**
- **Strategic interests** of the Alliance from the maritime security perspectives
 - **Territorial integrity** of the maritime space of member countries
 - Protection of the population, installations, goods and **critical infrastructure protection** in the maritime area
 - Preventing the proliferation of WMD
 - Protecting **critical and energy infrastructure**
 - **Freedom of navigation and access to surface and water resources**
- Tackling current and future **threats**
 - Stability in the **Arctic region**
 - **Migration** due to an increase level of the sea
 - **Natural disasters**
 - **Lack of resources**
 - **Raising of the competition for resources**
- Cooperation and information sharing with **international organizations**
– **ONU, EU, IMO**

Military elements which should be included

- Viable form of a **rapid reaction force**, integrated with EU needs, avoiding duplications
- **New threats – new priorities- new tasks** flexible and adapted to **priorities**, established with regard to:
 - **Most likely threats** for the Alliance at least for the next decade
 - **Prioritization** on already identified threats as: terrorism, proliferation, failed states, cyber attacks, energetic security, piracy and climate change
 - Conditions for enabling the application of Article 5
- **Vision for the future NATO:**
 - common defense of the allies, **indivisibility** of their security
 - **exporting security** worldwide
 - **building global security**

- Avoiding blockages for NATO activities:
 - Lack of **common perception** of threats and risks
 - Incapacity of **allocating enough resources** for operations (EU lack of public support for NATO operations, lack of political will)
 - Possible **US selective disengagement** from EU security issues

Main developping lines and fieds:

Operational field:

- **Reanalyzing Article 5** for a common understanding of the conditions and time frame for enacting it
- Clarifying the balance between **collective defense** and **collective security**
- An **unique perception** of **common risks** in operations
- **Participation** to operations at a strategic distance with units and/or **financial compensations**
- Balancing **Article 5** and **non Article 5 operations**

Capacities and transformation

- **Granting capabilities** needed in order to react to the **predictable risks and threats**
- Needed capabilities for reaction in **crisis situation**
- **Integrated operations** with other organisations/international actors
- Deterrence and strategic instruments for a **convincing political tool**
- **Strategic communication** in crisis
- Cost oriented comand and control operationalization
- **Coordinated Response force** with EU demands, in a NATO preparedness and traning style

Partnerships

- Cooperation with the **international actors** – UN, EU, OSCE
- Re-establishing **cooperative relations** with Russia
- **Partnerships** – PfP, ID, MD, ICI
- **Global partners:** Increasing interaction with non-member states and others international actors
- Developing the relation with **EU/ESDP** for a better cooperation in complementary conditions – based on the fact that the forces are the same, the troops are the same, deficits are the same, so the **priorities should be harmonized**

The Alliance is perceived as an organisation with **impressive resources**. In the context of an increasing complexity of the Global security environment, **the problem of capabilities** will become one of the main factors to have a great **influence** on Alliance's credibility.

It is obvious that **the rhythm and adapting capacity** of the Alliance to the international environment (political, military, security, economic) must be maintained and also sustained. The Alliance would have **to define the new priorities** in a changing security environment.

At the same time with the process of developing the new strategic concept, the member states will have to judge **the role of the Alliance as a whole**, not only in a symbolic, but also in a **functional** way.

There are **two conceptions** regarding the future role of NATO. One considers that the **Alliance should remain regional**, in essence dealing with collective defense missions (Article 5) while the other points out the strenghten of **the Global role of NATO**, underlining the fact that ignoring the Global dimension would be the end of the Alliance. There are also **common points** and **balanced approach** between those two positions: collective defense missions are the main subject on the agenda of supporters of NATO globalisation while global problems appear on the supporters of the regional dimension side.

6. Issues already settled in the Declaration on Alliance Security

As we have mentioned in the principles used in order to make the analysis, since we have the Declaration of Alliance Security Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg / Kehl on 4 April 2009, the provisions mentioned are a component of the *acquis* of the Alliance, so there is no sense to get back on the same issues again. The declaration helps us to establish the common position on 10 of the main issues adopted at the last summit:

– Fundamentals of NATO

- The values, objectives and obligations of the Washington Treaty
- Transatlantic link Europe with the United States and Canada
- The purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

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- **General objectives, strategy and means**
 - Transatlantic forum for **security consultations** among Allies
 - Article 5 and **collective defense**
 - The **indivisibility of Allied security**
 - **Strategy**: deterrence, based on nuclear and conventional capabilities
 - **Means**: reinforcing arms control and promoting nuclear and conventional disarmament

 - **Development of the organization: vision and enlargement policy**
 - Vision: a Europe whole and free
 - **Policy**: NATO's enlargement - an historic success, NATO's open door policy
 - **Condition for accession**:
 - European democracies
 - Share the values of our Alliance
 - Willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership
 - Whose inclusion can contribute to common security and stability.

 - **Developments of the objectives, cooperation, integration**
 - New, increase **global threats**:
 - Terrorism
 - Proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery
 - Cyber attacks
 - Other **challenges**:
 - Energy security
 - Climate change
 - Weak and failed states
 - **Interdependence**: security is increasingly tied to that of other regions.

 - **Mission statement**
 - a. Improve our ability to meet the **security challenges** we face that impact directly
 - On **Alliance territory** – territorial defense
 - Emerge at **strategic distance** – expeditionary forces

- Or **closer to home** – operations in the vicinity
 - b. **Solidarity, indivisibility of security, common defense**: sharing risks and responsibilities equitably
 - c. Capabilities more **flexible** and **deployable**, so we can respond **quickly and effectively, wherever needed**
 - d. A leaner and more **cost-effective organization**
 - e. **New capacity**: important role in **crisis management** and **conflict resolution**
- **Global cooperation**
Partners: international actors – UN, EU, OSCE, African Union
Purpose: to deliver a **comprehensive approach**, combining civilian and military capabilities more effectively.
Mission in Afghanistan: helping the Afghan Government and its people to build a democratic, secure and stable country that will never again harbour terrorists who threaten Afghan and international security.
- **NATO-EU(ESDP)**
- A stronger and more capable European defense
 - Welcomes EU efforts to strengthen its capabilities and its capacity to address common security challenges
 - NATO-EU relationship – truly functioning strategic partnership mutually reinforcing and complementary.
- **Partnerships**
- Joint commitment to **cooperative security** with all our partners, both in our neighbourhood and beyond
 - Partners are key in implementing the vision of a **community of shared values and responsibilities**.
 - Value the **support of our partners** to operations and missions.
- **NATO-Russia relation**
- A **strong, cooperative partnership** between NATO and Russia
 - **Respect for all the principles** of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and the 2002 Rome Declaration
 - **Ready to work with Russia** to address the **common challenges**

– **NATO transformation: guiding lines**

- To better address today's threats
- To anticipate tomorrow's risks

7. Rationalizing the issues – alternative options

The most important ones:

- **NATO as the main organization for defense and security or seen as one of the options for security or, as well, as a historical tool that link countries and less a defense and security tool.**
- **In this respect, the second alternatives are between defense alliance or alliance for security also. Article 5 should remain at the level of common defense or should it be extended to common security.**
- Pragmatism and values in NATO/values and interests
 - Territorial defense-expeditionary forces
 - Threats at a strategic distance-in the vicinity
 - New and old threats and challenges
 - Deterrence-operations
 - Prevention, early warning-combat operations- post-conflict operations, crisis management, post-conflict reconstruction
- Solidarity and unity, cohesion versus “big guys” or “Concert of Powers” approach:
 - Decisions taken altogether or taken by the “big powers”
 - Consensual approach or imposing the decisions taken in small circles of the “big guys” than imposed to the small countries, new allies, countries with less contribution to NATO's operations
- Prioritization of the threats and challenges to be addressed
 - Regional versus global
 - Globalization versus regionalization of the Alliance
 - Tool box or partnership with purpose/tool box or box with all tools
 - Prioritizing the tasks: cost oriented-consequence oriented
- Post conflict reconstruction and nation building capabilities
 - Military-civilian capabilities of NATO or only military approach
 - Post-conflict reconstruction and state building: common capabilities versus sharing tasks with other organizations

- Energy security beyond critical infrastructure protection
 - Definition of Energy security: alternative sources and routes versus interdependence between producers, transport countries and consumers
 - Where to use military power: only critical infrastructure protection, reaction to the use of military power against economic/energy interests or use of power for granting access to resources.
- US and NATO:
 - US lead NATO versus EU balancing the decision
 - US engaged in Europe versus US out of Europe
 - How US sees NATO: most important alliance or one of its international tools/unilateralism first or multilateralism first
- Relevance of Article 5
 - Cornerstone or historic and symbolic role
 - Theoretical and symbolic but unaplicable or applicable
 - Undefined conditions for accessing it or clear definition and conditions
 - Easy to access if needed or complicated conditions to enable it
 - Automatic consequence or unbinding for the Allies
 - Quick reaction or medium term as technical time to apply it
- Legitimate use of force:
 - Self defense versus crisis management
 - UN Security Council Authorisation or non-limited acces to the tool
 - Preemption versus prevention in the use of force
 - The war and military force or the use of law enforcement agencies and organized crime against terrorism
- Balances in the Alliance
 - US first or a balanced distribution of responsibilities, contribution and resources and a better synchronization of the modernization rhythms of capabilities between North Atlantic and European allies.
 - US military contribution and EU paying for operations and its own share
 - Balanced representation or main countries first approach in the decision making, executive and working bodies of the Alliance at all levels

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- Perception of threats and risks: between new challenges and old challenges, territorial defense and expeditionary forces, operations at the strategic distance and operations against risks and threats in the vicinity, regional and global threats and risks, actual and future risks.
 - Responsibilities and objectives and not enough capabilities and resources, matching the level of ambition and possibilities
 - Solidarity, unity and cohesion in the Alliance
 - Common perception of threats and challenges or differences of views
 - Alliance interests or national interests first
 - Regionalization, groupings, New and Old Europe plus the US, Europe and North America, or one Alliance
 - Common capabilities and forces or national interoperable forces committed in a case by case way
 - Military forces open to all operations and mission or national caveats, common command and control or national command prevailing
 - Enlargement
 - Open door or stopping the enlargement Eastern
 - Decision of the Alliance or “not to bother Russia” approach
 - Privileging common decisions or using veto unilateral blockages (Macedonia)
 - Getting willing countries on board sooner or observing the rules and strict provisions of the Alliance
 - Waiting for the process to be completed by the countries or supporting the transformation and guiding the aspirant country
 - Relations with Russia
 - Cooperative/confrontational approach
 - “Russia first”, Russia has a word or ignoring Russia in NATO decisions
 - Partner, enemy or complex relation with all aspects
 - Threat or not a threat for NATO countries
 - Ignoring Russia behavior inside and in the post soviet space, pragmatism and NATO’s interests or using NATO values and principles when assessing Russia’s laws, norms strategies
 - Engaging Russia, involving Russia or relying on Russia

Chapter III

Romanian Security Interests and the new NATO Strategic Concept

1. Romanian Security Interests and NATO

Romania is designing its security establishment on a four track approach:

- strategic partnership with the US
- membership in NATO
- membership in the EU
- a designed network of **strategic partnerships** – Poland, Turkey, Sweden, **partnerships for Europe** – France, Poland, **economic partnerships** – Azerbaijan, Germany, Austria, South Korea.

The commandments of its approach are:

- **More action with more efficient use of resources**
- **Integrated approach: foreign policy, security and defense**

We believe in an integrated approach to foreign policy, security and defense. The integrated approach is a European model, which we find in the Treaty of Lisbon and that economic and financial crisis that we are crossing is an effective solution in spending resources. In the context of an increasingly complicated international environment, we want more action with the most efficient use of resources.

By security we understand the three levels approach - the national, societal and human level, that of the individual. The individual shall prevail and collective levels to address matters to the extent that serve the needs of Romanians – citizens, taxpayers and holders of sovereignty. Security is viewed in a complex form, with the military, political, economic, social and environmental components, as well as new modern dimensions of energy security, cyber security, granting critical infrastructure protection, access to water or food.

Citizens security and safety, the purpose of Romania's security policy

The tax paying, national sovereignty bearing citizen is Romania's security policy's main purpose. Budgetary allotments in this field will have to abide the priority list established in this principle. Individual safety at home, on the street, at the work place and wherever the citizen lives or travels is the fundamental concern of foreign security and defense policy. There is a role of the state's institutions to defend property, individual liberty and respecting his rights.

We consider as serious crimes, that threaten the fundamental safety of the citizen, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, people trafficking, organized crime and armed weapons assault, all of these being among the states' priorities. The safety of children in schools, around school and on their way home is the priority of the neighbourhood police. Subordinate to local public administrations, the police has to take on attribution concerning public order and citizen safety, while the National Police will handle serious crime, organized crime, arms, drugs, people trafficking, money laundering.

The central and local administration have to pay special attention through the Inspectorate for emergency situations, in the forefront of assistance services for citizens in case of civil and medical emergencies. At the same time, we consider it necessary to develop and professionalize central and local administrative institutions in managing crisis and we support the creation of a national system for preparing and assisting in crisis decision making.

Concerning the citizens security, we support the essential component of protecting the citizens' economic right, including the right to work based on individual capacity and equal access to opportunities and correct and equal retribution for his contribution to adding value to the society, in a regulated and non-discriminatory labour market. We need the contribution of every citizens, their qualified, hired work, best suited to their profile, qualities and aspirations.

We consider poverty, regional and status gaps as well as social alienation insecurity factors and of great concern to our society. Equally limited

equalitarian retribution can alienated top experts from the public sphere to where ever they choose, whether in private companies or abroad due, to the low level of attractiveness for state paid jobs.

Romania's security option

Romania has chosen, nearly two decades ago, the Western Europe and modern approach for its security. From this point of view, our choice is based on two pillars, a one Euro-Atlantic and a European one, with value equal for Romanian security.

NATO is a wide spread political-military alliance, the most relevant at global level, offering major opportunities for consulting with allies on security, a common defense in the face of any external attack and a unique capacity to deter any such military operations against Romania . We believe that Article 5 should remain the cornerstone of the Alliance, with extending the definition of collective defense to energy, free access to resources cyber defense and defense of critical energy infrastructure.

Fulfilling responsibilities undertaken by Romania in the **NATO** Defense planning project is our political commitment to raising the Alliance's strategic relevance, fundamental for a firm and stable relation, that should be complementary to the EU's security instruments.

We need to value the place, capabilities and our country's strategic weight in the Alliance, the contributions of foreign operations under NATO, through proportional representation in Alliance structures. We consider it useful to identify some niche capabilities, at military, operational, diplomatic and intelligence level, as added value from Romania useful to the Alliance and recognized as such.

Participation by rotation of military forces in external operations at strategic distance or nearby, is a mandatory National Defense Component for training in real combat conditions. The Romanian Army must equally participate in this form of training, to determine growth in combat preparedness of the entire quota under arms, equipped with modern weapons suited to missions that require them.

Romania's position at the Alliance borders is a reality that requires an added value in itself. We support the effective use of resources to equip the NATO procurement through joint projects and sharing in the Alliance, some categories of capabilities.

The Strategic Partnership with the U.S. is an essential component of Romania's position within trans-Atlantic structures. The Strategic Partnership is an essential tool for developing capabilities and using US experience. The Strategic partnership requires a review and extension in the areas of cooperation for reducing threats and increasing quality of **technology transfer** – required in the position of a border country and to introduce a **dimension of education and transfer of know-how** – organization, methods of administration and curriculum design in education and training in areas of the importance for Romania and NATO, by building these capabilities in Romania at the highest global standards.

2. Romania's expectations from NATO

In this respect, Romania expects that **NATO exists with an improved visibility and role** in the region and the world and involving suitable resources to ensure the **credibility** of its assumed role, objectives and tasks and for acting whenever it is necessary, with an accent for the **effectiveness and efficiency** of the means allocated, a **shared responsibility** between member states proving **solidarity, unity, coherence and indivisibility** of the Alliance. Moreover, Romania attaches a huge importance for the **integrated response using** the suitable means of diplomacy, intelligence and security, including military means. **Conflict prevention and early warning** are as important as the response to threats and challenges, as it is the case of **crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction**.

The development of the Strategic Concept should not be a process of re-invention, but one of **refinement and adaptation to the new security challenges**. It will not affect the basic principles and functions of the Alliance – **collective defense, transatlantic link, the indivisibility of security, Allied solidarity** – as settled by the Washington Treaty.

Romanian basic philosophy for NATO in the future is **a strong and sustainable transatlantic Alliance with both political powers and military “muscles”, able to properly deal with the challenges of the 21st Century.**

Expanding and strengthening NATO’s **partnership network**, including the Euro-Atlantic Partnership is part of this vision. NATO’s ability to project coherent demarches and a proper image in **the extended neighbourhood of the Alliance** helps in finding solutions – for example in the Western Balkans – to the “unfinished business” that still carries potential for generating instability.

Major stakes pursued by Romania with respect to the strategic thinking on NATO’s wider neighbourhood refer inter alia to **the preservation of values, principles and commitments** as basis for NATO’s cooperation with partners. They also refer to the continuation of **the “open door” policy** with emphasis on compliance with membership criteria. Also to strengthening NATO’s partnerships and cooperation with the EU, UN, and the OSCE and to specific contributions to the building of defense and security institutions of states and/or organizations.

As a general assessment, we could say that Romania shaped the profile of a **consensus-generating ally with balanced approaches**, interested in drawing the attention of the Alliance on **developments in its immediate vicinity**, particularly in the Western Balkans and the wider Black Sea region. Romania believes that NATO should continue to improve and demonstrate more clearly its ability to meet emerging challenges on and beyond Alliance territory, including **at the borders of the Organization.**

NATO enlargement to countries of Central and Eastern Europe was a remarkable success for the transatlantic Alliance. It proved to be a very powerful tool to **stabilize regions, encourage reforms and consolidate Europe.** Due to this process, NATO continues to play a special role in unifying a continent divided for nearly half a century. And that is why NATO should continue **to promote tailored partnerships** to foster greater stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area.

Romania believes that the problem of “**global NATO versus regional NATO**“ is only a false dilemma. In terms of geography, the main security challenges for NATO originate from its **wide neighbourhood**, from the former Soviet space to the Western Balkans, the Mediterranean and the broader Middle East. And that makes peace and stability in the wider Black Sea region and the Western Balkans essentials to the entire Euro-Atlantic security.

The Black Sea region is part of the European project of consolidating stability throughout Europe through democracy, cooperation and integration. It is an indispensable component of the Euro-Atlantic community of security, democracy and prosperity. It is also important in terms of **diversification of energy sources and transport routes**. Furthermore, it has also an important stake for the new approach on **missile defense**. Substantiating Alliance’s added value in managing **new challenges** (energy security, maritime security, arms control, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missile defense) means also a more secure and stable Black Sea area, and an increased security in the Euro-Atlantic environment.

Romania has no interest in remaining the Eastern border of the West. Instead, we are determined to act as a catalyst of regional cooperation and Euro-Atlantic engagement in this region. Romania’s goal is to have a secure, democratic and prosperous Wider Black Sea Area at its borders. We believe that such a perspective is of regional and European interest and that it is something worth striving for.

The process of upgrading NATO’s Strategic Concept provides an opportunity for underscoring the profile of NATO’s partnerships and for highlighting the need for NATO to contribute **more to strengthening security in its neighbourhood** - the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, the wider Black Sea-Caspian region, Central Asia, Mediterranean and others.

This is the reason why Romania will adopt - during the upcoming debates - an **active and balanced stance**, a **creative and consensus-building posture**, which will reflect Romania’s specific interests, including those related to **the security of its immediate neighbourhood**. We intend to play

a constructive role in the conceptual debates on the future role of the Alliance due to a special expertise resulting from our location at the Alliance borders with the Western Balkans and the Black Sea-Caucasus-Caspian regions.

Romania strongly supports a consistent policy of strengthening and developing **NATO partnerships**, with a special emphasis on the Euro-Atlantic Partnership, while encouraging **NATO's proficient involvement** in the Western Balkans and the wider Black Sea-Caspian region. Beyond the attention given to NATO-Russia relations, we are also interested in **substantiating the distinctive partnerships with Georgia and Ukraine**, as well as the relationships with interested countries of the former Soviet space and the Western Balkans. Consideration should be given as well to **NATO's relationship with the Republic of Moldova**.

Romania is convinced that the Alliance will continue **to pay right and proper attention to its wide neighbourhood** and Romania will make every effort to support this strategic process.

3. Opinions and expectation of new EU and NATO members for NATO and the ESDP

- Obvious **warranties of solidarity in terms of security and defense**, both at NATO and EU level, within normal limits, fields and with a credible presentation.
- **US presence in the European security** scaffolding and counselling the transatlantic relation. For some countries that have emerged from the space of limited sovereignty of socialism and the Soviet state, the U.S. image, credibility and proven capabilities are very needed and expected, both for their leaders and their population, even if there is enough realism and responsibility to understand the **limited capabilities and interests of the United States**, but also **the costs**, that each member must assume for the benefit of Washington's constant presence in the defense and security of Europe

- **The lack of contradictions** between the US and major European partners, but also **EU coherence** in actions concerning security and defense
- **Avoiding duplicating resources** for NATO and EU from members of both organisations
- The **coherence and efficiency** of NATO and EU actions for European protection and security
- A reduction in the **bureaucracy excess** at EU institutional level
- An expertise, **planning and capabilities transfer** from NATO to the EU on the dimensions that the Union lacks
- A coherent agreement of **sharing responsibilities** between organisations
- Unifying training, arming and calibres, procedures and typologies for reacting between the capabilities at the disposal of both organisations
- Solving the blocking relations between the EU and NATO, from the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus triangle
- Eliminating **singular veto situation on major Alliance decisions** like Greece's position on Macedonia.

The NATO and EU new member states will look for a suitable answer to the following questions and concerns:

What are the military capabilities that should be shared and how?
What should the strategic directions of development of weapons be?

- The security relevance of NATO and the EU
- The relevance, solid and credible armed forces, at least within NATO
- Identifying the capability and added value niche for the EU concerning European security
- Appropriate formulas for making common decisions
- Collaboration, dialogue and common or complementary capabilities in energy security, with special attention for critical energy infrastructure.

What are the implications of NATO enlargement on the EU? Does NATO enlargement necessarily mean EU enlargement (cases of Ukraine and Georgia)?

What should the relation with the Russian Federation be like?

For that last point, we have some tailored answers, according to the expectances of those states. The relation with the Russian Federation is a key point in European and **transatlantic cohesion**. There have been numerous studies where European states were categorized according to the different types of relations they had with Russia. From the “old” and “new” Europe, a more crude way of categorizing, similar to the transatlantic one that “Americans are from Mars, Europeans are from Venus”, we moved on to categories like “goodwill” and “retractile” with nuances like “pragmatically goodwill” and “pragmatically retractile” in relations with Russia.

EU member states have different approaches of the relations with the Russian Federation. There are practically two ways of approaching it, from the different angles of security solutions, including energy security:

- **Russia’s approach, interdependency** as a solution
- **Punishing Russia, isolating it and blocking all relations** except economic ones.

The purely cooperative or purely confrontational approach is too simplistic, too schematic and does not give enough instruments to approach Russia. This is why some experts propose a more refined approach:

- **Cooperation**, in most of the fields that define the relation with the Russian Federation, not only in economics and trade, but also in issues of security, such as terrorism, non-proliferation etc.
- **Competition**, in some matters concerning economics, political solutions, strategic issues, especially concerning states in the East, in **democratisation and respecting human rights**, in matters relating to **values of the Alliance**.
- **Confrontation in several directions**

The Russian Federation’s refined approach can lead to developing **a set of instruments** for each topic, in any area, whether cooperation, competition

or confrontational. With the sum of these instruments at its disposal, both the EU and every member state, or NATO itself, approaching the Russian Federation could be more effective.

4. Romanian Options for the main alternative issues debated

Let us now look at Romania's Options for the main alternative issues debated in the framework of the new Strategic Concept. These are linked to **the profile assumed by Romania** during this debate, described above as a **consensus-generating ally** with creative and **balanced approaches**. **The concept** of the Romanian approach to the new Strategic Concept is the so-called **Alliance of balances**.

The **Alliance of balances** is the result of a **realist approach**, as well as an **adapted approach**, fitting the existing context, NATO's role and its objectives. In the debate about **regional or global NATO**, the choice is not an Alliance with global responsibilities, but a trans-Atlantic Alliance able to respond to threats and to generate security at both the euro-Atlantic and global levels. Consequently, the Alliance of balances has **six main balances**:

- **Trans-Atlantic balance**: a balanced distribution of responsibilities, contribution and resources and a better synchronization of the modernization rhythms of capabilities between North Atlantic and European allies.
- **Balance between the Allies**: reaffirming the consensus rule for the decisions taken inside the Alliance, avoiding the use of veto but supporting solidarity, cohesion and effective work between the allies, but also a **balanced representation** of all the allies in the decision making, executive and working bodies of the Alliance at all levels.
- **Balanced perception of security risks**: between new challenges and old challenges, territorial defense and expeditionary forces, operations at the strategic distance and operations against risks and threats in the vicinity, regional and global threats and risks, actual and future risks.
- **Balance between the Alliances responsibilities and objectives**, territorial defense, expeditionary capabilities, response to new threats.

- **Balance in the allocation of capabilities of the Alliance**, for tackling security challenges with direct impact on NATO's territory, appeared at the strategic distance or near the allied territory.
- **Balance between the level of ambition** of the Alliance and its **real possibilities** of fulfilling them, meaning political will, resources, sharing burden and roles with other security organizations.

Romania is also prepared to put some accents in its position during the negotiations in several fields:

- **Indivisibility** of the allies' security, solidarity and cohesion of the Alliance.
- References on NATO's role as **transatlantic consultation forum**.
- Extended NATO influence in **the vicinity of the Alliance**, through positive evolutions in the security field, an **open door policy** in the enlargement field – with **prudent approach** to their democratic track record and public support for a **sustainable evolution** towards and inside NATO and an accent for the **political conditions** in a future enlargement wave, and the **NATO support** for countries preparing to join the Alliance
- **Instability in the extended vicinity** of the Alliance – Balkans, Black Sea, Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East, Mediterranean area, Great North
- Extending and consolidating **the partnership network** of the Alliance, including EAPC framework, **NATO as a trainer** for the defense and security of other states or for other organizations, introducing the **system of values, principles and commitments** as a bases for the partnerships.
- Consolidating **Alliance's role** for the security of the EU and of the World, based on the **comprehensive approach** principle, through a consolidated EU-NATO relation, **protecting NATO's role** in the future discussion and negotiations about Europe's security, strategic relations with the UN and other regional organizations.
- Building a **relation with Russia** based on a **balance between principles and pragmatism**, a partnership base on an "engage and check" mechanism, able to lead to concrete and real cooperation, but also to control its offensive policy, on a bases of values, principles and commitments for that cooperation.

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- Substantiating the Alliance’s added value for **managing the new challenges** – energy and cyber security, maritime security, arm control, terrorism, proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery
 - Realizing a **missile defense shield** that would cover the entire territory of the Alliance
 - Amplifying **intelligence sharing** at the level of the Alliance
 - Cooperation in **civil emergencies** management
 - Suitable **management of the resources**, through functional and effective mechanisms such as common finance of the operations, where it is possible, granting capabilities and troops for the operations, multinational and common capability pools.
 - Reconsider and **privileging Article 3 provisions** of the Washington Treaty, regarding the support for certain states including **economical support** for ensuring that they develop needed capabilities for resisting to an armed attack
 - NAC should be involved in the process of debating and adopting the Strategic Concept at all levels, including the final option of fine-tuning at the end.

Some issues must be developed and we are assuming, for ourselves, five points in this debate:

- In NATO, **Article 5** is approached from two perspectives:
 - **Minimalist**: it was not applied until the 11th of September 2001, at the request of the US, therefore it is not used. Moreover, since the Baltic States do not have self-defense capabilities, it would also be advisable to avoid its application or to use it in very strict conditions. Further more, the technical application of Article 5 requires a minimum of three weeks for active common defense and troops on the ground. This approach sends the core of NATO’s collective defense in a state of ridiculousness.
 - **Extended**: even the NATO Secretary General proposed that the reinterpretation of Article 5 in the context of new threats like **cyber-defense and energy security** in NATO understanding – the protection of critical energy infrastructure on land or under water. The reaction for this support is that the idea of defense is becoming diluted, goes too much into matters of security and that NATO is not an international organization for collective security, but for collective defense, and by dilution “**more**” could in fact be “**less**”.

Usually when we talk about reforming a system and an organization and speeches cover such a wide range, the rule is to **go back to one's origins**, so this would be **reinforcing Article 5**, with its original meaning of collective territorial defense of its members. This does not mean cancelling out of area operations, but on the contrary, it means that these elements are useful for maintaining war away from the Alliance states' territories and preparing troops in real fighting and combat conditions.

- NATO must assume, more and more, a component that affects both Romania, Poland, but also Nordic states, which is trans-border risks and threats. As a state at **the border of the Alliance**, we have an extra task of **defending Alliance frontiers**, this meaning defense against threats such as:
 - Ballistic missiles,
 - **Weapons of mass destruction proliferation**, which would be brought and used in Alliance space through carriers missiles or through trafficking and smuggling systems of materials with double usage.
 - **Fighting terrorism**, tied to people trafficking – including terrorists, weapons necessary for terrorist operations, drug trafficking necessary for financing said operations.

From this point of view, we see as useful the specific consideration of **three types of tasks** for the Alliance: strategic distance operations, territorial defense operations and operations in the vicinity, meant to fight this type of threats as well as military threats in the immediate vicinity of Alliance borders. The focus on operations in Alliance vicinity is necessary to underline the preoccupation, interest and the need to counter trans-border threats, in the space borderline of the Alliance

- **Solidarity within the Alliance**, in keeping sovereignty in national defense planning. From this point of view it is useful that the New Strategic Concept of the Alliance contains a **clear phrasing of these elements of solidarity** in external and territorial defense operations.

Solidarity is quantifiable through all three dimensions and is considered to be **proportional with the states' economic and military capacity**. The contribution is calculated in absolute value, so states have the right to choose the actions and operations that they participate to. On the other hand, we are against conditioning the type and geographical space of missions where some member states can participate (Caveats). We saw in the case of Germany in Afghanistan that the Taliban and Al Qaeda terrorist attacks spare no one, and insurgents will always look for the most vulnerable spots where there is no disposition for a proportional response, to take action. **In the face of terrorism, no one is spared or bypassed.**

- **Enlargement.** Romania should advocate for NATO explicitly maintaining the topic of **Open doors policy** for states that want to join the Alliance, first of all for Ukraine and Georgia, with which the Alliance has intricate formulas for reform. Of course, the actual acceptance has to take place once the solicitant reached Alliance states and has warranties for full integration in the Alliance, with the conditions stipulated in the Washington Treaty, namely insuring self defense and the ability to contribute to the defense and security of the Alliance. Also admitting a new member does not in any case depend only on **respecting accession conditions** and the exclusive decision of current members of the Alliance. **No third party** can influence the relation between NATO and a potential future member, but only the **expressed will, achievements and reform of its security system** at Alliance standards can.

- **The relation with Russia.** The Russian Federation is an important actor at euro-Atlantic level and NATO's cooperation with Moscow must take place based on the principles of the Rome Treaty and in the framework established when founding the **NATO Russia Council**. NATO is not a threat to Russia, and Moscow collaboration in issues like Afghanistan, fighting terrorism, nuclear proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and anti missile defense is useful for the Alliance and help in **consolidating mutual security**.

In this institutional framework we can discuss Russian proposals and preoccupations concerning the Alliance. On the other hand, Russia is not a member of the Alliance so it **cannot have a veto in Alliance's policies**, including the enlargement policy. Moreover, Romania should plead for the observance of the values which are the cornerstone of the Alliance, including the rules of the UN Charter and of the founding documents of the OSCE, organization in which both NATO allies and Russia are members.

We propose that the New Strategic Concept shall explicitly mention the **principle of equal state sovereignty**, independence, territorial integrity, peaceful resolution of the conflicts and the right to fight back in case of an attack. No form of **limited sovereignty, special rights and spheres of influence** at the European level is acceptable.

5. Romanian's position – fundamental interests

For defining Romania's position and fundamental interests, we propose a **five point approach** with suitable argumentation and solid base for the future negotiations.

- Pragmatism and values in NATO
- A special accent for the threats in the vicinity
- Prioritization of the threats and challenges to be addressed
- Post conflict reconstruction and nation building capabilities
- Energy security beyond critical infrastructure protection

This five steps approach can be **the core of the concept** embraced by Romania for addressing the negotiations on the new Strategic Concept. In front of these five points we privileging **the five premises** presented in the methodological part, aimed at insuring that NATO position, objectives and cohesion are not harmed by the negotiations during the process of elaborating the Strategic Concept. We also accept the profile designed for Romania's position during the negotiations, of a **consensus-generating ally** with **balanced approaches**, with the **6 types of balances** already presented above.

A. Pragmatism and values in NATO

In this respect, there is a full dispute about the “**Alliance of values**” versus “**pragmatic alliance** for fulfilling the objectives”. The economical and financial crisis that hit most of the allies had **reshape priorities** in those countries and defense was the first one to be cut at the chapter expenses. It happens with Romania, too, and this had an important impact especially in the countries that already had problems of credibility, political will and public support for allocating funds for defense and security matters.

But if we agree in taking the **pragmatic stance**, it would mean to use all the means in order **to fulfill the objectives** of the Alliance with **the smallest costs**, meaning the most **efficiently** possible. Our public will applaud such a choice, but how much will this option help us?

For instance, in Afghanistan, maybe the cooperation on the ground with Russia will help us. It will be **less costly** in money, political and symbolic costs (going together at war will block a lot of criticism), but at what costs? How much do we have to pay for that matter, in symbolic, political, strategic and financial costs? Yes, we are talking about a route of access, about sharing intelligence, but there are **limits**, also pragmatic.

In the same issue, maybe we could use the help of Iran. It is a neighbour, it has its own interests in the region, Tehran knows well the territory and maybe better the enemy than ourselves. But could we take this approach just for saving money and our soldier’s life? At what costs? Tolerating a **radical Islamic country with nuclear weapons**, a country that wants to erase from the face of the Earth Israel, who supports a lot of terrorist groups in the Middle East, who can control the oil in the region, is it a small price to pay for the sake of **efficiency, cost savings and pragmatism**?

The same goes about talking about our **interests** and the debate about **values**. Those who talk about **pragmatism** talk about **interests first**, meaning that we can forget about the poor democracy and the level of human rights and rule of law in Russia, just for the sake of saving our interest in energy supply. We have to forget about the Russian aggression in Georgia, or call it otherwise, pretending that “Georgia has its share of the

blame” in this war just for the sake of good partnership with Moscow? There are countries in NATO who believe that **Russia could be a threat** for their own sovereignty, national integrity and their independence, especially after the Russia-Georgian war, and the unity and solidarity of the Alliance should respond to those concerns, too.

This lead us to the explanation of the balanced position of Romania, who should be **pragmatism limited by our values**. I am talking about a kind of neo-liberal approach, where the target is its **interest** and the **pragmatic fulfilling** of NATO role and objectives, but **limited** by the set of **common values** that the member countries and allies are sharing. The fact that the first paragraph of the Declaration on Alliance Security is mentioning the **values, objectives and obligations** is a good step forward to argument and support this way of addressing things in the new Strategic Concept.

It is the same with the relation with Russia, we have to realize and **cooperate where we can**, with an open door policy, but at the same time Russia is maintaining plans, interests and actions that are **harming the Alliance and the member countries** – Foreign policy strategy, military doctrine, the federal law on Defense, the doctrine of using nuclear weapons, military relations with Iran, etc.

Defining **NATO as an enemy**, planning to interven in member or partner countries in order to **defend Russian’s interests** wherever they are, protecting pragmatic military trade interest are not the grounds for a completely cooperative approach, but those of a more nuanced, multilevel, multi-track approach, with **huge cooperative openness**, but also place of **real competition** and issues where our position are in **direct conflict**.

B. A special accent regarding the threats in the vicinity

Here too, we are referring to the points and arguments already mentioned in the Declaration on Alliance security, using the fourth paragraph – threats old and new, need to prevent and have a system of early warning – and the fifth paragraph, which states that NATO should improve its ability of meeting security challenges to its **territory**, coming from **strategic**

distance or **closer to home**. In this respect, the new Strategic Concept is a good opportunity for Romania and other countries for making the right accents to its own interests, coming from the Western Balkans, Black Sea and Eastern neighbourhood, meaning addressing **threats in the vicinity**.

As we have seen, since the former Strategic Concept, in 1999, the geography has lost most of its importance since globalization has brought a possibility for the enemy to project its force and use its capabilities at a **strategic distance**. We can accept this, as we have to accept that the **threats to our territory** – described in Article 5 of territorial defense – are still a concern. Last but not least, the threats and challenges coming from our **vicinity**, “closer to home” as the Declaration states, should be an equal concern.

In this respect, we have to mention terrorism, proliferation of WMD and their means of sending to the target (missiles), energy insecurity, protection of the routes for energy supply, piracy, etc are **challenges and threats** we should respond to. If we are taking also the weak and failed states and the threats coming from this instability **at the borders of the Alliance** – refugees, migration, trafficking of weapons, etc – we have a big picture that will support our angle of view who is not aimed at over-exposing this type of threats, but to give them an **equal space and position** in order to be considered by the Alliance.

So we need to find in the new Strategic Concept the definition, in a balanced way, of two **types of missions**, territorial defense and expeditionary forces, with two different paths, operations at a **strategic distance** and operations for tackling threats and challenges **in the vicinity**. In this respect, Romania sees a **continuous approach** between the three components – that should be mentioned equally in the new Strategic Concept as it has been done in the Declaration of Alliance Security.

The meaning is that the national interests (and the Alliance ones consequently) linked with defense and security are achieved through the **defense of the territory**, and means to tackle threats and challenges at a strategic distance or in the vicinity, but also the participation in operations

at a strategic distance are helping to **keep the threats away from the national territory** and to prepare and **train the army in combat conditions** that will help in improving the country's and Alliance **deterrence capacity** through the fact that its army did take part in real operations during the war.

For sure, another issue already discussed is present here. **The indivisibility of the security** of the Alliance, the **solidarity and unity** in front of the common threats and challenges has to put enough resources in order to tackle those threats and challenges in the vicinity and protecting the Alliance borders. We need to have **common pool of resources and capabilities** helping the countries situated at the NATO border to deal with those challenges (as it is the case with strategic transport common capabilities situated in Budapest, an experience that could be used).

We are talking here about **countries at the NATO borders** like the Eastern flank, but also the northern flank – Canada, the US, Norway – or the Southern flank – Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, Greece – who should take the burden of blocking threats to the Alliance linked with the vicinity. Talking about the solidarity, unity and indivisibility of the Alliance defense and security, we have to realize that **NATO already has such a mission, Active Endeavour**, which is dealing with the Southern flank. Why not assuming the same type of need for all the borders of the Alliance, in the specific conditions that they have.

We are talking also about modernizing the concepts of **“new missions, new capabilities, new threats/challenges”**. These should also be addressed by the new look and the fact that **territorial defense** should be put back in place, with a possible enlargement and modernization of its means – talking cyber defense and energy security – and those **threats in the vicinity** and such operations should arrive in their equal foot as those linked to operations at a strategic distance.

Here we have the full debate on **Article 5**, and we have above some way of addressing it, extending its meaning and establishing clear rules of acting accordingly, on the **energy security** treated beyond the critical infrastructure protection and the role of NATO – our fifth point here–

missile defense (subject already addressed) or participation to the Alliance missions, with **shared responsibilities** and burden between the allies. Here is the place also to discuss, in the same scheme, the **maritime defense** and piracy.

C. Prioritization of the threats and challenges to be addressed

Here is another important point of debate, with very clear interest for Romania. We are talking here about the debate regarding **regional versus global NATO**, with an equal balanced approach of Romania, again about how much the Allies take in consideration **Article 5** and the way of acting accordingly, the credibility of the Alliance in that line, the relationship between **national interests and Alliance interests**, and **prioritization linked to cost or consequences** for the Alliance. These issues should be addressed, as well in the **partnership** key and in the **relations with Russia**.

Yes, there are a lot of threats and challenges, old and new. The National Security Advisor of President Obama, the general James Jones, stated and presented the need for the Alliance **to adapt on the run** to new threats and challenges. This should be a capability that we have to create for the alliance, **a system of quick adaptation** to such perspectives. In the field of challenges the Alliance should, at least, think about the role it should assume are, according to the American official: nuclear proliferation and moreover, nuclear terrorism, drug-terrorism symbiosis, crisis and economic failure, energy supplies used as a weapon for political, strategic of security purposes, used in negotiations for control and persuading the “partners”, climate changes and energy related policies, energy and regional/local conflicts and unrests –Black Sea Region especially, maritime piracy, unconventional races for conventional arm race, destabilizing countries and regions with implications in transport routes and tourism.

It is sure that we do not need **NATO as a tool box**, good and useful for all threats and challenges were we do not have other instruments, because NATO has a clear task and objectives, being made for specific purposes. It is also clear that NATO cannot do everything, because of the means, resources and capabilities. This is the place where we should talk about **prioritization of the tasks** and the way of addressing such a challenge.

NATO cannot address everything, but the Alliance should **think and plan** for every one of those threats and challenges, in all the fields of interest together with relevant regional and global institutions and agencies. With this, a suitable role could be found in every problem, and the efficiency of NATO should be discussed through the “**right institution, right time, right task**” concept of the approach.

Talking about **efficiency**, there are two schools of thinking how to address the threats and challenges when you are always going to have less means than necessary for everything. It is sure that you would need to cut some of them, usually the ones with **less probability** to happen. Here is the usual **cost-oriented approach**, when the only limit is the amount of resources needed and the efficiency of the allocation for each of those threats and challenges.

But this is a simplistic view, and, in real life, every puts the decision maker in a bad position of explaining why, for a specific case, **the costs have driven him to ignore a threat** which was present and lead to a lot of victims and symbolic costs. These are the lessons learnt from 9/11. That is why the other school tried to address the things in a **consequence oriented** way. This approach made the decision makers allocate the money for the threats and challenges the most visible, with the hugest impact to the population.

Here too, some side effects are very visible: to rely on the **most visible threats** and the ones perceived the most by our public means, sometimes, to rely on the most visible ones and touching through the media. This leads to populism and governing with the eyes on the media and on the polls, another bad choice. That is why, here again, Romania should plead for a **balanced approach: efficiency limited by the impact and consequences**. This is a fine line that the Alliance should find its way. But this does not mean that efficiency is a replacement for **correct and responsible allocation** of means, resources and capabilities by each country, and here too, the debate on solidarity, indivisibility and unity comes back, with the request of a **proportional contribution** to alliances' needs.

As we have said before, there is a place of talking about **regional or global NATO**, with the result of a regional alliance with global reach versus global alliance with regional agenda. The balanced approach should give equal attention to both agendas, without **regionalizing NATO** and its agenda or moving too far from the original objectives of common defending the allies. **The national interests** should and will prevail in the decisions of the alliance but the existence and the effectiveness of the Alliance is also a national interest for all the member countries, and **the cohesion is a must** for **the credibility of the Alliance** that we all are cherishing.

And we have again the **Article 5**, which is the link and cornerstone of the Alliance, so the rules of applying Article 5 should be very clear, explained in the spirit of the Washington Treaty, and **applicable to all the NATO member countries**. According to the original 5 point premises of our study, quoted in the methodological part above, we have to take as granted the Alliance in the form that we have now, and to prepare for defending it no matter which country is at stake. If this is not the case, we cannot fulfill the objective or we have hesitations when such a moment comes, **the credibility** and the very existence of the Alliance is at stake.

D. Post conflict reconstruction and nation building capabilities

Here is an important task that Afghanistan, Iraq, but also Kosovo and Bosnia Herzegovina has told us. The **lessons learnt** should come back from the history and help us deal with a better result with those issues in the future. Only lately, the Afghanistan strategy, as the Iraqi one before it, has made a theory and relied on **theoretical grounds**. In this respect, we have seen, in Afghanistan, for instance, that the old Johan Galtung model of solving conflicts (used first in the conditions of the cold war) is no longer of some help, or if you want, his curve has been slightly modified by the reality of the speed of the society and the complexity of the today conflicts. In that respect, we did realize with the PRT-Provincial Reconstruction Teams, that the **reconstruction, conciliation, and settlement** stages of a conflict should begin simultaneously. This comes from the fact that those processes had proved to be mutually self-potentiated ones, so that reconstruction and conciliation are processes that should begin at the

moments that peace keeping or peace enforcement or combat troops are on the ground, if possible already imbedded with the combat troops. Those processes are helping the settlement of the conflicts. Moreover, this is also helping another task that came with the human rights and responsibility for each human life: R2P, **the responsibility to protect** civilians and population.

This task open the way for a unique cooperation between **military and civilian** capabilities, soldiers with police officers, public administration experts, civil emergency instruments, democratization and rule of law capabilities, trainers in human rights and media, humanitarian aid and health assistance alike, state or private own capabilities, governmental and non-governmental expertise at the same time, in the same place, in an **hostile environment**. This opens the door for new capabilities needed in the alliance framework, but also on national interest.

There is the place to think if the failed state/weak state threat or challenges linked to this type of threat, separatism and other type of similar threat and challenges are not well served by **a joint military-civilian capability of state building**, able to install in any type of environment **an administration** as such **ready to act** and **able to begin in real time the state building** in the space of its responsibility, with all the instruments needed for that matter. The very existence of Afghanistan as an operation could serve for **training this capability** who could be used afterwards in all the places where it will be required. This is a direction were Romania could contribute, develop and have an added value and an issue that deserves fighting for in the new Strategic Concept.

E. Energy security beyond critical infrastructure protection

Here is another vital point for Romania, even though there are several critics that claim – in NATO and the EU - that our country has no **legitimacy and credibility** of addressing those issues since it is one of the less dependent on imports of energy supplies. The reply to such claims is that the **energy is not an unfinished** resource and that in a mater of 15-20, 30 years at most, if there is no change in the sources of energy and the humanity will still depend on oil and gas Romania will be in the same situation as other states are already. The second response is that **the**

weaknesses of our allies are NATO's weaknesses as a whole and are our own weaknesses. That is why the subject should be in the forefront of our legitimate interests.

Talking about **energy security**, we have to refer on what has been achieved and the way forward. NATO has embraced the part linked more to what we call **critical and energy infrastructure protection** but not much more. A completely different approach is the one of the US which gave to its army the task of maintaining the **free access to energy resources**, so that the energy flows without blockages, and at **a suitable price**.

In Europe, there are two approaches to the definition and solution of energy security, meaning free access to **alternative sources and to alternative routes** for energy supply, for a part of the EU and NATO countries, and **interdependence** for another part of the European and NATO countries. In the first part, we are talking about the need to have alternative sources and alternative routes in order **to avoid energy disruption** and political, strategic and security conditionality, affecting even the normal life and capacity of a country to defend and protect its security, on the other part the solution is seen as being **engaging the producer and the transit countries** in order to **interconnect their interest** to those of the consumers and to grant that their interests are observed.

Coming back to NATO, we have several steps already covered. At the Bucharest summit, an important progress has been achieved by defining the areas where NATO will engage the field of **energy security** and let to a special evaluation the task of finding other fields where NATO could be involved. We are talking already about information and intelligence fusion and sharing, projecting stability, advancing international and regional cooperation, supporting consequence management and, for sure, supporting the protection of critical infrastructure, on land, under the water, wherever this infrastructure is build.

Those tasks are already linked with the **threats in the vicinity** presented above, **maritime security** and **Article 5**, as we have seen above. And nuanced positions could help developing the fields and areas where NATO

can have an added value in energy security. Several non-papers in that area have been circulated for the purpose of a common understanding and political agreeable solution for all NATO countries. At the Bucharest summit, Poland and Romania presented the non-paper ***“Energy security: possible Deliverables for the Bucharest Summit”*** and the US presented their own paper in this respect. And Romania is still supporting a **more ambitious approach to energy security**.

Important progress has been made also with the endorsement of ***The Report on relevant issues and activities regarding energy security*** and a new evaluation is suppose to be done with respect to NATO’s role in the field of energy security with a view to the 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon. This evaluation should be oriented towards the future, trying to predict **future threats and challenges** in the field where NATO could come with an added value, with options and recommendations for further refining and improving NATO’s role in the field.

If we have to refer to the ***“The Russian National Security Strategy until 2020”*** approved in May 2009, we have to consider the fact that this official document presenting the guiding lines of the Russian Federation future planning, strategies and capabilities are referring to **the possibility of using the military force for defending economic interests**. In that respect, energy security is a major component and we think that the Alliance should definitely consider the possibility of **using the military force for defending its economic interests in the energy supply field**, in strict conditions but in a symmetric approach.

For Romania, the **Wider Black Sea Region** is of first importance and in this respect, this region should be consider with its particular relevance on energy security in Europe, related to both **protecting the energy infrastructure** and **providing and securing the resources**. These issues should be addressed, as well in the **partnership** key and in the **relations with Russia**.

Chapter IV

Looking inside the box: a commitment oriented approach

In this part of the policy paper we are going to look inside of the situation of Romania, its way of fulfilling the **existing commitments** taken when entering NATO and who it should react in order to get the **legitimacy** for asking for the allies support for the approaches and issues it want to introduce inside the new Strategic Concept. We are talking about **a commitment oriented approach**, identifying the changes and improvements Romania should take inside the country, by itself, in order to support its **credibility** and **legitimacy** in demanding those ideas inside the new Strategic Concept. We are referring strictly to the **five main interests** for the strategic concept.

1. Pragmatism limited by our values

This means, for Romania, to approach the sensitive issues for the Alliance in coordination, with direct compatibility and cohesive way with its allies, sharing information afterwards, without provoking sensibilities and reactions of the allies, in a consensus building behavior.

This goes without saying that in the relation with Russia, we have to realize and **cooperate where we can**, with an open door policy, but at the same being cautious in the bilateral relations for not creating problems to our allies and to the alliance and to avoid teasing Russia or harming NATO and Russia's relations. At the same time, we have to react at any law, norm, statement and gesture of Russia that is against the common principles of cooperation stated in the NATO-Russia founding act, or values against NATO's core ones.

Russia should be listened to, but should not have a vote or a veto in the Alliance decision making structures. The Russia first approach is as complicated as ignoring Russia, but it is easier to watch inside the arguments to see if it is a real and legitimate concern or a marginal perception, blockage oriented for the alliance. The Alliance should not use

its capacities and creative strength in order to find always ways to respect Russia's interests when this comes into conflict with our interest and specially with NATO's core values.

2. A special accent for the threats in the vicinity

For being credible for this part, Romania should first respect its own commitments in the capacity building part and acquisition of the needed technique in order to protect itself for the main threats, than for defending NATO's borders.

Second, Romania should have a proportionate and even above the medium participation to operations out of area, at a strategic distance, for enforcing its contribution and position inside NATO and having the legitimacy to claim for solidarity in tackling threats in the vicinity. For that matter, its participation to the other mission in the vicinity, like the Operation Active Endeavour, should be a priority.

Romania should have its own program and actions oriented towards energy security, as defined by the National Security Strategy, and to prepare capabilities to defend NATO's border from the air, the sea and the ground. Common pool of capabilities should be embraced in the fields were the costs of such an approach is prohibitive.

Cyber defense should be a basic concern and capabilities should be put in place for a comprehensive approach engaging civilian agencies from the Ministry of Communication and information technology, the Special Telecommunications Service and the intelligence and military bodies tackling with respective parts of the cyber defense. Exchange of good practices, international cooperation and experience should be welcomed and integrated by Romanian specialized agencies.

Maritime defense and maritime security is of first importance for Romania. Someone could talk about the unbalanced capabilities that the countries littoral at the Black Sea have, with Russia and Turkey dominating the picture and Ukraine coming in third. Accepting that a real battle in the sea is

hardly going to happen, Romania should have capabilities to defend its territorial waters and to cooperate in this field with other countries of the Alliance. A survey of the capabilities put in place in the Black Sea by other actors should be also of first importance, with a consecutive reaction in balancing the defense capabilities in this field. Once those capabilities will be in place, they could be used in anti-piracy NATO operations.

Anti-ballistic missile defense is another concern since Romania is under the range of an attack from missiles coming from Iran. The indivisibility of defense should enable NATO to have an integrated system defending all its territory and Romania is interesting in getting the capabilities important for protecting its territory and citizens from this type of threat.

3. Prioritization of the threats and challenges to be addressed

Here is another important point of debate, with very clear interest for Romania. We are talking about the regional versus global approach, with an equal balanced approach of Romania, about how much the Allies take in consideration **Article 5** and the way of acting accordingly, the credibility of the Alliance in that line, the relationship between **national interests and Alliance interests**, and **prioritization linked to cost or consequences** for the Alliance. These issues should be addressed, as well in the **partnership** key and in the **relations with Russia**.

Romania is supporting the unity and common capabilities of the Alliance, with a balanced approach for threats to Alliance's territory, coming from strategic distance or from the vicinity. But this allows other type of specific arrangements and strategic partnerships inside the Alliance to enforce the common approach of these partners to the commonly perceived threats in the region.

The indivisibility of the Alliance security and common defense should lead to planning for threats at the Eastern border of the Alliance, and to common and equal security for all the states at the border of the Alliance. The procedure of planning for different type of threats and challenges, as well as for the specific geographic zones should be applied to this region too.

Nuclear proliferation and moreover, nuclear terrorism, drug-terrorism symbiosis, crisis and economic failure, energy supplies used as a weapon for political, strategic of security purposes, used in negotiations for control and persuading the “partners”, climate changes and energy related policies, energy and regional/local conflicts and unrests –Black Sea Region especially, maritime piracy, unconventional races for conventional arm race, destabilizing countries and regions with implications in transport routes and tourism, all are threats and challenges that Romania is considering for being addressed inside NATO or with NATO’s support by the involved countries.

The main stance of Romania in the prioritization field has been already underlined in the third chapter above. But this is not an excuse for not allocating suitable resources for the defense. In this respect, Romania should come back to the 2 percents share of the budget for the Ministry of Defense and up to 2,38 % through state guarantees for the military acquisitions and procurement. The effectiveness and efficiency of the procurement should be improved in order to prove to the citizens and tax payers that the money is correctly spent.

Populism, governing with the eyes on the polls or with the eyes on the media, conflicts and splits in the society should be of first importance and Romania should reject these as threats to the national security. Regaining and enforcing societal cohesion, obtaining the public support for a professional Government, designating ministers and persons in public positions should be de-politicized and competence-oriented, and this process should be assumed by all the parties. The education system should be improved in order to produce the needed and well trained human personal for all the needs of the society.

4. Post-conflict reconstruction and nation building capabilities

Here is an important task that Romania should assume for its own. At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs some post-conflict reconstruction capabilities are on the process of being formed, and the monitoring mission in Georgia was of good help. A training center for operations using both military and

civilian personal is already in place at the Defense Academy, and training courses could be found at the Diplomatic Academy, when or a full master degree program in Conflict Analysis and Decision making in crisis already exists at the International Relations and European Integration Department of the National School for Political and Administrative Studies.

The need for a post-graduated school or a national institution granting the capacity for training all officials at different levels for a professional decision making in crisis, with a research and methodological component should be of first importance for rationalizing and taking the best use of these experiences in Romania, and the National Defense College could be a suitable place for these kind of studies.

For Afghanistan, Romania should take over a PRT and train its personal to face a state building and post-conflict reconstruction operation in those conditions, a capability civilian-military, the way it was described above, in the third chapter.

5. Energy security beyond critical infrastructure protection

For having the credibility and legitimacy to demand more than critical infrastructure protection for energy security, Romania should first change its own national provisions allowing the military to intervene when its economic or energy interests are harmed, when threats to the deliveries, to the transportation lines or sources countries are at risk. In this respect, Romania itself should have bilateral and strategic relationships with producers and transport countries and help them getting close and enter NATO for ensuring its own energy security.

That is a constant position that Romania embraced the one of supporting Ukraine and Georgia in making the suitable transformation and get access in the Alliance, and the same interest is proved for the Republic of Moldova. And the support for sovereignty, integrity and independence of those states are also supported by the Alliance as a whole since Bucharest summit.

For the critical infrastructure part, Romania should make its own national plans and assessments and protect in real terms its own infrastructure at the national level, with the suitable means, including military ones when requested. This type of plan can show the interest and concern, as well as the legitimacy in demanding this type of approach at the Alliance level.

Chapter V

Background on the New Strategic Concept NATO official documents

1. NATO and the new Strategic Concept

What is NATO's New Strategic Concept?

At their Summit in Strasbourg / Kehl on 3 and 4 April 2009, NATO's Heads of State and Government tasked the Secretary General to develop a new NATO Strategic Concept. This exercise should be completed by the time of NATO's next Summit, which is expected to take place towards the end of 2010. The Summit also tasked the Secretary General to convene and lead a broad based group of qualified experts who will lay the ground for the new Strategic Concept. This will be done with the active involvement of NATO's highest decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC).

Why does NATO need a new Strategic Concept?

A sound transatlantic consensus on NATO's roles and missions and on its strategy to deal with security challenges is essential if NATO is to function optimally. The Strategic Concept is the core NATO document that establishes and reflects this transatlantic consensus. Clearly, as the security environment that NATO has to deal with changes, so the Alliance's Strategic Concept has to be periodically updated. The current Concept dates from 1999, a time when NATO had 19 members compared to the 28 it has today and when NATO's focus was very much on challenges within Europe or on Europe's periphery.

Clearly the new Strategic Concept, which must be elaborated and approved by all 28 current Allies, has to take account not only of the way in which security challenges have evolved, such as the new emphasis on proliferation, failed states, piracy, energy supplies, terrorism and climate change, but also of how NATO has adapted and transformed in the last decade to be able to better tackle these challenges. The new Strategic Concept will therefore not be only an analytical document. It will need also

to give specific guidance to NATO governments on how they need to further transform the Alliance and their own national defense structures and capabilities to be successful in meeting NATO's core tasks in the 21st century. The Strategic Concept must also give public opinion in the Alliance countries and beyond a clear sense of why NATO still matters and how in many ways it is helping to make them more secure.

How would a Strategic Concept be developed?

The process leading to the new Strategic Concept will be an inclusive one. All Allies, from the largest to the smallest, will be actively consulted and involved. Moreover, the process should engage partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, as well as partners cross the globe. The process should also be transparent and engage other key international actors such as the EU and the UN as well as NGOs and all those in the strategic community who believe they have something useful to contribute and expertise to offer. Finally, an interactive dialogue with the broader public is encouraged via this special web module run by NATO's Public Diplomacy Division.

The Group of Experts will begin its work in early September and will divide its activities into two phases. The first phase, to run from September to mid-February, will be devoted to engaging the broader strategic community and policy makers in a dialogue on the challenges facing the Alliance. It will be called the reflection phase and will be organised around a series of four seminars devoted to different topics of relevance to the new Strategic Concept which will be held in NATO countries.

The second phase will involve the Group of Experts travelling to each NATO capital to present the results of the Group's internal deliberations and preliminary conclusions directly to NATO governments with a view to receiving initial comment and feedback. This will be known as the consultation phase.

The Group of Experts will meet periodically with the Secretary General, who has overall authority over the Group's work, and with the North

Atlantic Council and other stakeholders at NATO Headquarters. The Group of Experts will also meet in private session to advance its own thinking. After the completion of the reflection and consultation phases the work of the Group of Experts will be finished. The Secretary General will take the process forward by presenting his report, taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the Group of Experts, to the Allies. On the basis of the reactions and political guidance that he receives from Allies, the Secretary General will then prepare the first draft of the new Strategic Concept for negotiation among Allies during the late summer and autumn 2010 and in the run-up to the next NATO Summit.

Once the text has been approved by Heads of State and Government at this Summit it will henceforth become NATO's new Strategic Concept.

2. A Roadmap for the New Strategic Concept

At the NATO Summit in Strasbourg/Kehl on 4 April 2009, Heads of State and Government (HoSG) tasked the Secretary General to develop a new NATO Strategic Concept. This exercise should be completed by the time of NATO's next Summit which is expected to take place in Lisbon in late 2010. The Summit also tasked the Secretary General to convene and lead a broad based group of qualified experts who will lay the ground for the new Strategic Concept. This will be done with the active involvement of the North Atlantic Council (NAC).

Guiding principles

NATO's current strategic concept dates back to 1999. A sound transatlantic consensus on a new NATO strategy is an indispensable element of the Alliance's strategic adaptation. The Strategic Concept is a central piece of NATO's *acquis*. Politically, it occupies a place second only to the Washington Treaty.

This calls for an *inclusive and participatory approach* from the biggest to the smallest Ally. Moreover, the process should engage Partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative as well as partners across the globe. Furthermore, the process should be *transparent* and engage other key

international actors such as the EU and UN as well as other types of NATO interlocutors, like NGOs. Finally, an interactive dialogue with the broader public is encouraged. To this end, this website dedicated to the process leading to the new Strategic Concept has been established.

The Group of Experts

In order to facilitate the working process, the Secretary General has today appointed a broad based Group of Experts. The 12 group members have been appointed in their personal capacities. The Group of Experts includes a broad spectrum of large and small NATO members and offers a balanced combination of insiders and outsiders, including from the private sector, think tanks and the academic community. Dr. Madeleine Albright, former US Secretary of State, will chair the Group of Experts with Mr. Jeroen van der Veer, former CEO in Royal Dutch Shell, as vice-chair. To ensure close coordination between the Group of Experts and NATO Headquarters, the Secretary General has designated a small NATO team lead by Dr. Jamie Shea, head of Policy Planning Unit, to function as a secretariat and staff support.

A three-phased approach

The process leading to a new Strategic Concept will have three distinct phases: a reflection phase through a series of seminars; a consultation phase with allied capitals; and a drafting and final negotiation phase.

Reflection phase:

A series of seminars hosted by individual allies will take place in order to enhance the strategic debate. The seminars will engage all stakeholders and relevant players – Permanent Representatives, Military Representatives, NATO Strategic Commands, the Military Committee, officials from capitals, strategic thinkers and partners as appropriate. Each seminar will cover a specific aspect of the Strategic Concept.

One seminar will look at NATO's core tasks and functions: the meaning of collective defense and deterrence in today's environment; how to confront a broader spectrum of threats to our populations; NATO's role in disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation.

Another seminar will look at NATO as a part of a network of security actors in contributing to global civil and military crisis management and NATO's likely tasks with a view to enhancing cooperation with international organisations and NGOs.

A third seminar will look at NATO and the Euro-Atlantic security environment: NATO's role in building security in the Euro-Atlantic area, enlargement and NATO's partnerships including relations with Russia.

A fourth seminar will look at forces and capabilities, including defense planning and transformation. It will also look at procurement at a time of increased financial constraints – that requires flexibility and prioritisation.

The Group of Experts may also, as appropriate, explore other relevant topics.

The Group of Experts will start its work on 4 September when the Secretary General convenes an informal meeting with NAC for an initial exchange of views. The Group of Experts will meet periodically with the Secretary General and will submit a progress report in time for the Foreign Ministers meeting in December 2009.

Consultation phase:

Following the seminars, experts will visit Allied capitals to discuss their findings and proposals with governments and, where possible, parliamentary committees. Public outreach events could be organized on these occasions by the capitals concerned.

In April 2010 the Group of Experts should present their analysis and recommendations to the Secretary General.

Based on the experts' analysis and recommendations and Allies' initial reactions the Secretary General will produce his own report on elements in a new Strategic Concept. It will be submitted to governments and – before the summer holiday – the Secretary General will collect political guidance on the drafting of the new Strategic Concept.

Drafting and final negotiation phase:

After the summer 2010 the Secretary General will prepare his draft of the concept, and he will meet with Permanent Representatives to discuss the evolving drafts. Finally, the Secretary General will present his Strategic Concept text to the NATO summit expected to be held in the autumn of 2010. After approval by HoSG it henceforth becomes NATO's new Strategic Concept.

3. Declaration on Alliance Security**Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg / Kehl on 4 April 2009**

We, the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, met today in Strasbourg and Kehl to celebrate the 60th anniversary of our Alliance. We have reaffirmed the values, objectives and obligations of the Washington Treaty which unite Europe with the United States and Canada, and have provided our transatlantic community with an unprecedented era of peace and stability. We have also reaffirmed our adherence to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

NATO continues to be the essential transatlantic forum for security consultations among Allies. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and collective defense, based on the indivisibility of Allied security, are, and will remain, the cornerstone of our Alliance. Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy. NATO will continue to play its part in reinforcing arms control and promoting nuclear and conventional disarmament in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as non-proliferation efforts.

NATO's enlargement has been an historic success in bringing us closer to our vision of a Europe whole and free. NATO's door will remain open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and whose inclusion can contribute to common security and stability.

Today, our nations and the world are facing new, increasingly global threats, such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and cyber attacks. Other challenges such as energy security, climate change, as well as instability emanating from fragile and failed states, may also have a negative impact on Allied and international security. Our security is increasingly tied to that of other regions.

We will improve our ability to meet the security challenges we face that impact directly on Alliance territory, emerge at strategic distance or closer to home. Allies must share risks and responsibilities equitably. We must make our capabilities more flexible and deployable so we can respond quickly and effectively, wherever needed, as new crisis emerge. We must also reform the NATO structures to create a leaner and more cost-effective organization. We will strengthen NATO's capacity to play an important role in crisis management and conflict resolution where our interests are involved.

We aim to strengthen our cooperation with other international actors, including the United Nations, European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and African Union, in order to improve our ability to deliver a comprehensive approach to meeting these new challenges, combining civilian and military capabilities more effectively. In our operations today in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, our armed forces are working alongside many other nations and organisations. In Afghanistan, our key priority, we are committed to helping the Afghan Government and its people to build a democratic, secure and stable country that will never again harbour terrorists who threaten Afghan and international security.

NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defense and welcomes the European Union's efforts to strengthen its capabilities and its capacity to address common security challenges. Non-EU Allies make a significant contribution to these efforts in which their fullest involvement possible is important, as agreed. We are determined to ensure that the NATO-EU relationship is a truly functioning strategic partnership as agreed by NATO and by the EU. Our efforts should be mutually reinforcing and complementary.

We will develop our relationships with all our partners, both in our neighbourhood and beyond, with whom we have a joint commitment to cooperative security. Our partners are key in enabling us to implement our vision of a community of shared values and responsibilities. We value the support that many of our partners bring to our operations and missions.

A strong, cooperative partnership between NATO and Russia, based on respect for all the principles of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and the 2002 Rome Declaration, best serves security in the Euro-Atlantic area. We stand ready to work with Russia to address the common challenges we face.

We are committed to renovating our Alliance to better address today's threats and to anticipate tomorrow's risks. United by this common vision of our future, we task the Secretary General to convene and lead a broad-based group of qualified experts, who in close consultation with all Allies will lay the ground for the Secretary General to develop a new Strategic Concept and submit proposals for its implementation for approval at our next summit. The Secretary General will keep the Council in permanent session involved throughout the process.

SECOND PART

Debates

SECTION I

NATO AND THE BIG ISSUES OF THE NSC

Chapter I

**Adapting NATO to the changing International
System/Arena**

Julian Chifu

Changing the nature of International Relations?

Excepting the current assessments of the international security environment, one cannot ignore a deeper situation that questions not only the situation and the changes in the security environment, but also the deeper change in the nature of international relations, of its rules, its norms, the actors and their characteristics, the mechanism used by these actors and their goals on an international scale.

What would be the premises for talking about the 8th of August, the day Georgia was invaded by Russia, but also the Opening day of the Summer Olympics in Beijing, as a new 9/11 and the changing nature of international relations?

Arguments

Supporters of the theory that we are at the beginning of a change in international relations also state the New World Order, necessary because the system has entered a type of chaos that contains numerous threats:

- No major change took place after the Russian-Georgian war, but we all realised that NATO and the euro-atlantic area do not have the necessary instruments to get Russia to follow a certain policy or to bring it to a *status quo ante* if it got sidetracked. There are no methods so we are dealing with a crisis of methods at an international scale.
- At the same time we are dealing with a crisis of principles, a moral crisis because all the rules pertaining to international law that were broken by Russia were previously broken by the West, with its broad meaning.
- At EU and NATO level, when a joint decision is made, it reflects the common denominator of the views of Member States, which is very low and indicates a major institutional crisis
- The three crisis pertain to the international relations and international law crisis.
- West-aphalian peace or the UN with its charter, or the Helsinki Conference with its principles of security in Europe would not, according to this way of thinking, be valid: sovereignties are not equal, the rule of non intervention in internal affairs, the rule of non-use of force for conflict resolution are not abided by, self-determination for peoples is not respected but extended to minorities and other strange identity types, the actors are no longer states but groupes, minorities, people, the world is different.
- The rules of non-proliferation are no longer respected either, after the last nuclear technology transfer from the US to India.

There are two possibilities: The first would be to try to go back to the order we lost – which would not be possible because the Helsinki Conference, for example, could not take place again and the consensus could not be reached by compromise without the bipolar order. The second would be reaching a New World Order, or at least a European one. We are not dealing with the end of the Unipolar Order – even if it was not effective it was never accepted unanimously and was assumed in nuances by the US – but with a disorder where power, military force, military instruments, *sui generis*, whatever works, no rules and without taking responsibility for actions.

This is why it would be necessary to find restrictions and rules for using force, not letting ourselves go with the flow, but participating in building the new order. It is obvious that until an agreement that implies responsibility is achieved we will go through new crisis, human and state tragedies. An international conference is needed for governing intervention, the situation of new players, etc. All those interested must attend this conference, in order to decide what to do with non-state actors – whether it is the media, companies, people – rights, duties and responsibilities must be attributed. The mechanism should give a check and balance solution.

Counter-arguments

There are a couple of counter-arguments which plead for the lack of a tearing apart in the international system on the 8th of August. There are those who see NATO's and the European Union's capability to limit and put out the conflict as a definitive elimination of the use of force, after this experience, but the argument is based on a scenarion of non-escalation the conflict through the presence of NATO ships in the Black Sea and the non-transmission of this conflict in the Ukraine-Krimeea and the Republic of Moldova-Transnistria. And such a scenario has yet to be validated.

Moreover, in case we accept the non-escalation scenario in the Russian-American or Russia-NATO geopolitical dispute, using force or other instruments repetitively by Russia, to re-state its hegemony in the region is a clear signal of a shifting paradigm and a period of instability and conflict until a rearrangement of the institutional raports in international relations, that will reflect both the current force balance and Russia's will and aspiration to come back to the forefront.

At this time, no solution in Georgia is immediately evident, we do not know what a withdrawral means and if international peace-keeping forces will be brought on the field. Thus even this step contributes to the real arguments concerning a change in the nature of international relations.

In any case, we believe that the West – both the US and NATO, the EU or its individual members – as well as the other international actors are fully aware of the threat that Russia represents for the peace and stability of the current system, as its position as a super power and its use of force to get recognition of prerogatives demanded in post-soviet space are being

questioned. Moreover, we consider that the international system is moving towards a new period of turbulence, on top of the one introduced by the non-state actors in asymmetrical format, after 9/11, a turbulence that reintroduces open conflict and using force between actors with major military capabilities, which is why Russia's approach will be multi-layered, with levels of communication and cooperation, of competition and of confrontation and conflict. For each and every one of these levels every major actor will develop adequate formulas and instruments of approaching Russia, thus in every serious actors' toolkit we will find all the types of instruments for approaching Russia on different levels. In this new way of arranging the pieces of the GO board, every pre-positioned piece will have its importance and will be an added value asset for allies and partners, and thus every country will prove useful for a certain level of approaching Russia.

Also, this perspective will certainly lead to the need for decisional, instrumental and institutional coherence both in the transatlantic relation – who this way will fill the last cracks in NATO and EU foundations. Introducing a Common Foreign Policy for the EU and a capable and consistent defense, comparable to that of NATO is becoming a mutually acknowledged necessity for both institutions.

And in the case of an expansion of the conflict, the escalation can lead to a acknowledgement of the situation by a player that has left the system and must be bordered, limited in these actions and brought to a state of stability. So the final consequences of this “system change” or even that of the nature of the international system are hard to identify and either way it is too early to give a final verdict on the matter.

The idea that there is no change in the World Order also proclaims the fact that the nature of international relations is the same, the magnitude of the changes is reduced to the simple change by transformation and we are not dealing with a revolution, with a change in the continental plates that will affect the entire system but just with changes that maintain the same rules and the same actors: moreover, biased conclusions about the change in the nature of international relations would only arise because of the mass media, which puts at the corner stone of everything ratings and advertising,

so not necessarily the truth. If there is no blood it is not on which is why the changing world order, the fall of the former world order, the change in the nature of international relations is so intensely publicised.

- There are changes, structural ones, changes in the way major actors work, actors who move by the same rules, with the same reasons and the same principles – cooperation, competition and conflict/confrontation as part of the game.
- The world remains westphalian, where the states are the main actors, that do as much as their power permits, can rightfully take international law, whose origin can be traced in the major actors' actions, where they need it,
- Russia wants to regain its strategic, nuclear, political and military power status.
- The US is rearranging its power but unipolarism died in the middle of the 90s, if it ever existed. And in the case of the Gulf wars, and in Afghanistan a large coalition was in place, so any wish to extend unipolarism was rejected by everybody, foremost by the US which do not want and have never wanted such a responsibility.
- The states continue to work with one another through the prism of power and their own capabilities.

Changing the new security strategies

Of course no one has time for the theoreticians to discover the meaning and the answer to the question: are we dealing with a change in the nature of international relations that was brought on by the cold war? Pragmatically and objectively both states and actors reacted by revising security strategies based on an approach that is imposed in the logic of western evaluation and planning. Thus the new strategies must take into account the coexistence of the models, concurring interpretations and conceptions, so that they can preempt reactions based on perceptions generated by actor following a different theory. Consequently we consider the following theories to be valid:

- **The world is unipolar**, from the security and military point of view. In this case the undisputed superpower is the US who invested double the amount spent by all other states on its military budget for military research, both scientific and technological. The world is unipolar and

from the point of view of the **values and the model** towards which all citizens, from states that have grown accustomed to this way and standard of life, aspire to, as liberal democracy is defining for the West – and that includes the US and Europe, but also Japan, Australia or South Korea as states that have embraced the same set of values and have a high level of development and standard of living

- **The world is uni-multipolar, with an anarchic periphery. Uni-multipolar** because the US does not act as a superpower but based on a series of regional power and also because the West itself is very multipolar and irregular in terms of solutions and options. It is precisely internal intergovernmental institutional democracy that make Western multipolarity a reality.
- **The world is in post-transition as a force of instability.** This theory claims that the transition is over and what we have now is a final post-transitional situation which is unstable, being a risky society that a great number of citizens have adapted to, especially young people of up to 40, who no longer tie themselves to immutable means by contracting long term credits, who do not assume perennial identities and loyalties but only pragmatic and temporary ones, who live in rentals, are ready to change their work place overnight and are adaptable to the new safer and more profitable environment, true global citizens who are not affected by the credit crunch because they do not want houses, do not tie themselves to things, are very active and mobile, and choose the best space given by two coordinates: minimum risk or maximum amount of opportunities, according to individual characteristics. Those who are family oriented and view security as a living condition move towards the areas with a minimum amount of risk. Those who are adventurous, pragmatical and who to gain head to the areas that have the most opportunities, which are not necessarily the safest. This new category fundamentally influences the security of any state, a realist actor called to adapt to a post-modern world.

Taking into account all three ways of looking at the world is necessary to create a strategy adaptable to the current situation.

It is obvious that in the system we have second generation actors – the bipolar world – who orientate their reality according to the bipolar model which brings them to situations that they do not understand and

consequently cannot react to. This is because judgement is no longer a black and white dichotomy but a leveled affair, according to interests, that leads to changing alliances and different opposite sides for every topic discussed – a reflex of the democratisation taking place in the contemporary world and of the extreme pragmatism of states, called to satisfy the needs of their own citizens.

In the contemporary world we cannot contest the coexistence of protostate actors, pseudo-state structures based on clans, extended families and other roots from before nations or peoples were formed who have not yet reached modernism. This reality is especially present in Africa but also in some regions of Asia and even Latin America. The approach of a state or of the international community as a whole must take into account the stage of development of the actors and its perceptions.

Transatlantic relations and global governance

The origins of transatlanticism. From the Soviet threat to global challenges

The problem of transatlantic relations is one of the most studied areas of international relations, whether the point of view is chosen with the help of the analytical instrument used by historians, experts in international trade, foreign policy advisors, theoreticians and representatives of political philosophy, experts in global security or in international law. The history of transatlantic relations was shaped in the bipolar era that succeeded the Second World War and reached its peak built on cooperation and mutual interests in turning the democratic world against soviet ideology expansion in the Cold War era

After half a century, the topic of declining transatlantic relations made its way to a debate agenda that does not have a linear trajectory, is detached and mostly academic and leaves behind the theoretical inputs of diverse visions on the future of the euro-atlantic partnership. The topic of decline reaffirmed itself of the stage of international relations controversies by taking the critical dynamic of the events that generated the decline itself. More than the slow, progressive tear between two strategic visions concerning world order, the American and the European one, the split had a critical, sudden and dramatic moment, in 2003, after the start of the war in Iraq.

Although predictable, the tipping point of the decline of the transatlantic alliance was all the more dramatic because of the speed with which it passed beyond more or less temperate debates behind closed diplomatic doors and into the media spotlight and into the public opinion's eye, from both the US and the EU member states, thus generating real anti-american or anti-european streaks and not least producing splits between European countries. Once an outsider, *the unique European voice* turned out to be unconvincing, an obvious symptom of the irregular character of the Union's divided foreign policy. Brought to an intergovernmental level, the debates related to the critical phase that transatlantic relations are going through, concerning the relevance, force, effectiveness of this alliance have brought to the forefront the divide between the old and the new Europe, between core-states of the European constructions – France and Germany on the one side, who were joined by Great Britain and Spain, thus opting to support interventionist american side in the Iraq issue.

The start of the Iraq war, in the context of the fight against terrorism, reestablishing peace in the Middle East and democratizing the Arab world was the most sensitive element in the divergences relating to transatlantic relations. The stage of dissent was completed by the tasks concerning the Kyoto protocol and the International Penal Court, talks which on the whole have slowed down the tryout to set an agenda for converning euroatlantic interests and moreover, have burdened the efforts to define a viable transatlantic strategy to approach these common challenges.

In such a critical point, the question related to the future of the transatlantic relations, the need, importance and efficiency of this partnership is ever so legitimate. *It is still possible to make-up a common European answer to the current challenges on the world scene.* The history of the transatlantic partnership traces, in a way, the direction towards the right answer. The key to this partnership has always been *complementarity*. It is a premise response to a question-excuse. The transatlantic relationship has always been a necessary partnership and not a cooperation based on substantial affinities. The key to this partnership with a history of over half a century was, as mentioned above, complementarity. Balance and efficiency depend on how complementarity partners accept the legitimacy of the differences that separate them and set common interests before national interests or the

union to which they belong. As long as the most important challenges on the global stage are global threats it is essential to be able to count on the consistency of American and European responses to these challenges if not their unitary character.

At the origin of the Cold War, the central element of this complementarity was, in essence, the consolidation of a common front against soviet expansion, rebuilding the European continent after the Second World War with the American support that was part of the US missionary project to protect the vulnerable territory beyond the Atlantic which shared, structurally speaking, the values of democracy. From the “Truman doctrine” to the Marshall plan – as fundamental elements of American comitment towards European reconstruction over a century ago – and until the EU27 system of today, the virtues of transatlanticism built of complementarity had a much larger echo than in the times of crisis that have marked the evolution of relations between the US and Europe.

Appealing to the memory of the postwar crisis and the value of U.S. support, there are still many political scientists, analysts and even American political leaders who argue the vehemence of criticism that is linked to European position in that, on grounds of membership is a relatively mingled Union policy, especially in economically strong , the Europeans have forgotten that this Union project and its evolution would not have been possible without support and without U.S. military protection under the NATO umbrella. Forcing this key historical duplication, the name of the President GW Bush and his foreign policy strategy was even associated with those of his HS Truman. Moral duty to confront “evil“ wherever it could be found – the impoundment Soviet threat to security and American way of life (Truman, March 1947, message to Congress), the combat of the terrorist threat (Bush after the attacks of September 11, 2001) – was, indeed, raised with an almost messianic declarational patheticism.

Still the contexts are diferent as are the threats and thus, the actual nature of American interventionism, the answers to these challenges and fundamentally disctinct. The ideological father of *Containment* strategy, G. F. Kennan insisted from the very beggining that power should not be perceived as a *military* threat.

The content of the threat identified by Kennan in trends of expansion of the communist world was a political-ideological one. The fight against the intrusion of communist ideology in the sphere of democratic countries was understood by American politicians as a general conflict between good and evil. The weapons of the Soviet forces were those posed by military potential, but consisted of “the art“ of exploiting the weaknesses of liberal democratic societies and “speculating what is bad rather than good in human nature“. While any military intervention at that time was considered by Kennan as counterproductive and ineffective, he suggested an induction tactic among Soviet elites to the idea that excessive expansion of their influence could result in attracting the U.S. military in neighbouring areas exposed to Soviet control. Kennan speculated, in fact, Soviet sensitivity to so-called logic of force to generate the Russians tend to withdraw quickly before armed threat.

After nearly sixty years, the different ways in which we report to the logic of force, understood as military intervention, give rise to a new paradigm for investigating the dynamics of the transatlantic phenomenon. There is, on the one hand, a different placement of the “enemy“ (if we take the issues of terrorism) against the logic of force, at least at the psychological level. A radical mind perceives military threat as a challenge and automatically rejects the alternative of withdrawal, opting to sacrifice, pulling back and attacking.

On the other hand, separate reporting to the logic of force is one of the fundamental causes of differences that emerged in transatlantic relations in the early 21st century. After the U.S. attack on September 11, 2001, American strategic view of global security was focused on the benefits of military intervention exacerbated as the ultimate option in countering terrorism. The shock transferring a “war“ which defies any attempt of localization, a conflict that was driving the whole world built on values of democracy and freedom around it and straight into the heart of the American continent, was the decisive moment that marked the entry of U.S. foreign policy in an era which we call a *force diplomacy* era.

On the European side of the Atlantic, the old coalition of Europe continued to express its option for a multilateralist approach centered on a peaceful

strategic culture, to provide long term benefits of diplomatic negotiations in international organizations, to invoke the constraints of law and to call on technical more subtle persuasion (even based on economic sanctions) in exchange for coercion. The European response to the same global challenges facing the U.S. is therefore built on a vision that emphasizes the power of diplomacy.

This diagnostic of division that marked the transatlantic relations in the aftermath of the Iraq is , in our opinion, the key element that caused the Euro-Atlantic community to divide itself, without shading all the incompatibility that led to these trade-offs, such as : some differences of perception on current global threats, gaps between military resources and capabilities, distinctive emphasis placed on values, religion, all causing a gradual deepening of the differences that emerged in terms of strategies to tackle the global issues. Most elements of incompatibility will be further developed in the pages of this work. What we have designated as separate reporting to the logic of force particularly looks at the area of global security that we propose to stress upon. Different visions of U.S. and EU concerning the security challenges on the agenda are those that have brought to the forefront the great theoretical dispute of “unilateralism versus multilateralism “. Redefining the dual concept in relation to current developments on the international scene and identifying and analyzing the costs and benefits of indiscriminately applying one or the other of the two principles in the sphere of foreign policy decisions were the basis of trials of experts on transatlantic issues to investigate, explain and, if possible, outline scenarios and recommendations to overcome transatlantic disagreements.

But before deepening the topic of declining transatlantic relations and the causes that generated tensions between the two sides we consider is necessary to clarify what we mean by “**relationship / partnership / transatlantic community**“, to identify the poles of this report, to more accurately portray the preferences, reactions and positions of actors investigated regarding current developments in international relations.

Europe and America: between different profiles, values and interests

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet system were interpreted cvasiunanimously as reaching effects of the promotion of common transatlantic international values of democracy, human rights, economic liberalism and the success of multilateral cooperation to ensure security. Theorists of the transatlantic ‘crisis’ generally relate to the historical background of transatlantic cooperation as a marker for detection of key questions on the nature of disagreements arising after the Iraqi crisis, the substance of their temporary or structural, context, but also how to harmonize the two views on the new world order.

The basic question whose answer may lead to other problems of the transatlantic partnership being clarified is ontological in nature and can be formulated as follows: Do we still have a *transatlantic community*? Former French Foreign Minister Jean François-Poncet believes that the strength of transatlantic relations depends on the one hand, on the extent to which existing or emerging incompatibilities in the two systems of values, one American and one European, will result in undermining the Euro-Atlantic Partnership. On the other hand, by looking at the relations between the two actors from a neorealist perspective, this partnership is not an end in itself, relations between states are not essentially based on partial or complete sharing of values but on common interests which issues directions of cooperation between state actors were analyzed. Only after investigating the nature of the discrepancies occurred on the set of values and private interests may we try to formulate a conclusion relating to reviving transatlantic relations.

The antagonist painting between America and Europe is quite complex and illustrative. We should focus on several attempts of portrayal of “Europeanism“ and “Americanism“ in the light of attempts to find a “common political mentality ”. Walter B. Scolombe brings to the forefront a “lithany of contrasts” that captures a patriotic, conservative, religious, capitalistic, entrepreneurial, individualistic America that assumes an exceptional destiny, is innovative, inclined to technology, unilateralist, willing and able to use military force whenever necessary, despite international opinion and constraints and rules of international law. Europe, by contrast, is in

Scolombe opinion progressive, secular-oriented social values (if not socialist), limited, culturally closed, carefull and not very able to use military force and attached to multilateralism in decision-making processes.

Of course, each of these features is debatable and has at least one key flaw of ultra-simplifying outlining contrasts, in addition to undeniable American bias, moreover, explainable for a holder of numerous senior positions in the Department of Defense of the U.S. The vision presented by U.S. official is very close to the famous view exposed in July 2002 by the American specialist in security studies Robert Kagan in the article *Power and Weakness*.

By launching highly controversial ideas, subject to a heated debate, Robert Kagan proposes an approach to fundamental differences between Europe and the U.S. based on the concept of power, but he reduce it to the sense of military force. In any dispute about power - the efficacy of power, morality, power or use of this opportunity - the American vision is essentially antagonistic to the European view from Kagan's point of view. Simplifying the thesis that he supports, Europeans share the weak psychology, refusing to use force just because they do not have the tools necessary to impose this way, and Americans opt for being the strong, because they hold the supremacy of military power and conviction that the logic of force leads to rapid and reliable results.

Many of the ideas addressed by the author's approach portrait are almost undeniable. It was not necessarily the means of presentation of the models of Kagan that were criticized by scholars of international relations, but rather the premise of his approach, seeking to anchor and justify his vision by reducing the size of the issue to military power.

"Europe goes beyond power in a closed world, of laws and rules, cooperation and transnational negotiation. It enter the post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, a kind of Kantian eternal peace. The United States, however, remain immersed in history, exercising its power in an anarchic Hobbesian world where international law is not credible and where security, protection and promotion of liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military power. This is why in most

international and strategic issues of today's world, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus”.

The unilateralism that characterises U.S. foreign policy is motivated by the need for the U.S. to be free from all constraints of international rules, to have room to maneuver to directly and quickly address any kind of threat, coercing its opponent and not persuading it. Unilateralism is directly related to American exceptionalism, as the US has the moral duty to confront “evil“ because it is the only power able to eliminate it.

The European approach, more complex, nuanced and sophisticated, is based on an indirect and subtle influence on the soft dimension of power rather than the hard power. The European Union is built on a strategic culture of negotiation, cooperation and economic exchanges. The European project has a visionary dimension, relying on long-term results, slower, but inducing reforms from within a society (state or region), with its active participation. The very principle behind the expansion of EU accession is a voluntary act and not the result of external constraints. For Europeans multilateralism requires a culture of alliance and consensus achieved beyond the barrier posed by diversity, through a joint effort of moderation of national pride.

That is why we believe that European reluctance to use force and opting for diplomatic negotiation tools is not evidence of weakness. On the contrary. Dealing with “evil“ to transform it is infinitely more difficult than removing it. Sure, and here Kagan is right, there are situations in which diplomatic and economic ties instruments (whether incentives, whether sanctions) are completely inapplicable, and the only solution is to resort to force. Kagan goes further with analysis of different approaches to the idea of power in US and European foreign policy. Modern European foreign policy is based on what he calls modern European strategic culture and is characterized by a conscious rejection of the European past marked by war generated by the clash of national egoism and hegemonic ambitions. Refusing to use military force, the Europeans are basically trying to forget the past. Not incidentally, Kagan cites the famous speech of Joschka Fischer at Humboldt University in Berlin: “The key concept of Europe after 1945 was and still is rejecting the European balance of power principle and the hegemonic ambitions of

individual states which occurred after Peace of Westphalia in 1648”. In the same context, Fischer points out that the new Europe was made possible by the two major historic decisions, “the U.S. decision to remain in Europe“ and “France and Germany’s decision to respect the principle of integration, starting with economic cooperation”.

We will try to counterbalance the series of critical references by opposing to the two pro-American visions of US EU antagonisms a set of features which distinguish the European spirit and aim to bring more clarity on “common European policy mentality“, as they appear in an article by two European philosophers, Jacques Derrida and Jürgen Habermas. Six major distinctive features can be extracted from that article: secularization and suspicion towards “transgression of the border between politics and religion“; confidence in the states’ “guidance and organizational capabilities“ and skepticism about the achievements of the market; the lack of “optimistic expectations, naively built on technological progress; “preference for“ social security guarantees of the welfare state and for regulation based on solidarity “; a low degree of tolerance towards the use of force, the aspiration towards an“ international order governed by law, support for multilateralism and mutual limitation of sovereignty”.

There are views that Europeans’ attempts to build an identity in contrast to American identity demonstrates not only the ambition of recovering independence in thought and action, a unitary“spiritual shape“ (Habermas, Strauss-Kahn), preserved despite the diversity and European dissonances. As Timothy Garton Ash states, an elitist idea of a Europe as Not America – defended with the gun of Habermas’ “philosophical density“ and reinforced by the “hyperbolized political eloquence“ of the former French finance minister Dominique Strauss-Kahn – starts from the premise that Europe is different from America, that differentiation tones give a higher profile in relation to the U.S. profile and, therefore, it is possible and desirable that the European identity is built based on these differences (elements of superiority). The “Europe as Not-American“ philosophy can also lead to conclusions regarding the vulnerability of European identity, which cannot get a pronounced profile by any other means than by reference to particular features of Americanism and sometimes even opposing them.

The two profiles investigated are distinctly illustrated in different examples of transatlantic literature. A possible recap of these contradicting peculiarities might be presented thus:

Europe

Peaceful tendencies
 multilateralism
 internationalism
 soft power
 Civilian power
 liberalism
 sustainable development
 universal
 post-modern
 Welfare attitude
 comunitary
 state confidence
 Social liberalism
 Progressive
 Secular
 Modesty
 Pragmatism
 Risk aversion
 Facing the past

America

War like tendencies support for
 Preference for unilateralism
 Nationalism
 hard power
 Military power
 Realism
 Consumerism
 Provincial
 Modern
 Materialism
 Individually
 Self confidence
 Social conservatism
 Orthodox
 Religious
 Ambition
 Utopia
 Risk tolerance
 Facing the future

Despite all these differences, the western pro-american orientation – rooted in the mentality of Europeans during the Cold War and reflected at the level of economic, political or social thinking – had a major impact not only on the way Europeans reacted to international events but was, above all, an essential element of the process of constructing a European identity. Much of the success registered on an economic and social level in the European Union were associated and explained on the proximity to the United States of America, sometimes being interpreted as effects of the duplication of the American social paradigm. The viability of the euroatlantic project is, above all, a political priority that targets the consolidation of the *transatlantic security community* started with the creation of NATO on the principles of liberalism, mainly: collective identity based on common values; economic interdependency based on common material interests; common ideas; a joint network of common institutions.

Within this transatlantic community whose system of values – although rooted in the same liberal tradition of illuminism – received distinct tones on each of the two shores of the Atlantic as the European partner reached, in parallel with the expansion process, a degree of economic, political and institutional integration that imposed the need for the EU to reposition itself both in its relation with the US as well as on the international stage. There is, on the one hand, the Union's heightened interest to participate, alongside the US, in the process of defining the international agenda, by overcoming its traditional junior partner status in setting priorities on this agenda. On the other hand, the global agenda challenges are, through their transnational character, prone to intergovernmental partnerships, based on a multilateral institutional mechanism for international or regional cooperation.

Engaging the U.S. and the EU in resolving a current international problem is therefore essential way by opening a new chapter in transatlantic relations and overcoming past disagreements. In a speech in Paris in February 2005 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice signals US availability to “cooperate with Europe in our common agenda” and mentions the fact that “Europe has to be prepared to work with America to make freedom the global principle of governing in the 21st century”.

According to the U.S. official, the agenda of US-EU cooperation is already extensive, as is the ongoing process of identifying new elements and common interests: “We agree on the threats we face today: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, organized crime and underdeveloped states. “Several months later, European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso said in turn in a speech in Washington DC: “If America gives more attention to Europe today it is due, I think, to the fact that we tried hard to make them listen. If America defines becoming more EU-US relations in light of what we can do together to promote democracy and freedom, this is a consequence of the fact that we have already shown that we have results on the international scene.”

All these threats to global security are, in fact, raised not only within the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), they are mentioned in the European Security Strategy, and their importance is confirmed by the UN High Level Panel on the well-known Report “A more secure world: our shared responsibility.” Beyond international security threats, common challenges

of the global agenda now facing the two actors are linked to environmental degradation, reducing greenhouse gas emissions, energy resources and limiting the pandemic risk. These points on the international agenda may be addressed more effectively in a collective manner, thereby increasing the chances of settlement, than if they remain targets of unilateral initiatives, separated, taken by major international players. This step is based on the idea of “**global governance**”.

Global governance: premises, definitions, institutional elements

Global Governance is a relatively recent concept used in the problems of international relations, its reputation is due to theoretical developments and international trends that have intensified academic debates on the idea of “globalization” and its context, renewing global order. The changes facing the international economic environment and policy changes aimed at accelerating the rise in the international order established was bipolar. There are many views on the categories of factors that had a major impact on the processes of reorganization of international economical and political contexts that were due also rethink global power relations. Two of these “mega-trends” are **demographic changes** affecting the world heterogeneously and the second is **globalization**.

Concerning **globalization**, this process is determined by the explosion of scientific and technological innovations in various fields such as production, transport and communication, reducing time and space limits and increasing phenomenon of inter-networking and global interdependence. The effects are both positive and negative pendulating between opportunities and risks of globalization on the economy. Economical crisis that have surfaced in the last decade in Latin American countries, Asia or Russia highlight vulnerabilities associated with economic connections becoming stronger, the risks extend financial crisis from one continent to another, and reduced capacity of the institutions national and international to anticipate and prevent such a global crisis. The positive effects of globalization, while beneficial, are found distributed in different parts of the world and create a disparity that attracts even more attention to the need to impose new rules for reforming and increasing the efficiency of global governance.

The original meaning of “globalization“ has a neutral substrate characteristic to concepts used to describe objectively, certain processes, such as in this case, the processes resulting from the technological revolution. For example, Charles Doran presented globalization as something that “is at the crossroads of information technology and global economy“. This can be quantified in terms of intensity, coverage, volume and value of international transactions in the global sphere of information, finance, commerce and administration. A substantial increase in the rate of these transactions has been seen in the last decade and, therefore, their level is a measurable manifestation of globalization.”

From a concept of economic origin, the term came to acquire, after 2001, as Z. Brzezinski argues, political and emotional overtones, with contradictory meanings. Beyond the idea of globalization associated with the onset of an age of international openness, transparency and cooperation, the time has come for it to be synonymous with “moral obtuseness and indifference to social injustice, which are accused of the richest countries in the world and, in particular, U.S. “ According to Brzezinski meanings of globalization serve everyone, as definitions for certain empirical realities or normative. For some, the concept reflects what exists objectively diagnosing global transformations, others define what should or should not exist, making use of it to display a preference doctrine (sentence) or substantiation of counterarguments against it (antithesis), and for many analysts the concept of globalization is the strength of political and cultural criticism aimed at attacking the legitimacy of the current global hierarchy.

Precisely by the nature of multidimensional and contradictory implications, globalization is a major factor influencing international developments not only economic, but political and cultural. Although we will not pay particular attention to the cultural dimension of globalization, we note that a world characterized by excessive interconnection does not automatically become more homogeneous, both cultural homogenization and fragmentation, even alienation, the effects so often encountered in the context globalization. Depending on endogenous factors such as cultural, social, political or economic influence of different companies side pressures

of globalization, the trends may oscillate between contamination and cultural confrontation, can lead to conflicts between value systems or controversy concerning, for example, ethical implications of scientific progress, particularly in biotechnology and its effects on the environment. We mention these issues precisely because the cultural impact of globalization is interdependent with its effects on national and international political sphere. At this level, reactions induced by globalization can take various forms of political and economic nationalism, encourage activism and religious fundamentalist movements can result in different protests coming from the non-state actors (civil society, NGOs, transnational networks , lobby groups, etc.), whose potential to influence the domestic policy or foreign governmental actors is increasing.

Therefore, in a global context of increasingly higher complexity, heterogeneous and interdependent, whose developments are difficult to predict, which - in addition - no longer has a center of international political system built on the principle of confrontation East versus West, globalization is considered by many authors as the most important factor to influence international politics. The challenges of the global agenda require coordinated responses, collective, made in an effective global governance system, in which “power“ cannot be understood solely on the basis of economical, political or military variables, its size, but must be redefined as “ the power to attract and maintain international consensus “.

The effects of globalisation must be mastered or, put differently, governed. The global agenda, although defined from a sector point of view, is in its turn characterised by interferences that show up between global governance on an economic level (through laws, rules, elements of stability and predictability of the markets), concerning development aid, the environment, migration, energy, global security (confronted with new transnational, subnational and overnational assymetric threats) etc. The efficiency of global governing depends a great deal on the power and interest balance and the whether or not it will be reached between the great international powers and between these powers and the the diversity of non-state actors that influence the reconfiguration of the international system.

What is global governance?

The approach by which states, together with other international actors actively cooperate to resolve problems on the global agenda is a possible definition, in the broad sense of global governance. The concept of “governance“ is often associated with the very concept of “management“ in order to avoid possible confusion between the idea of global governance and that of world government in the sense that term is used to describe that form of institutional organization with the executive role in a state. A report from the Commission on Global Governance of the United Nations formalized to some extent this concept within international decision makers defining it as: “the suite of ways in which individuals public and private institutions shall manage the common affairs, ongoing process of cooperation and compromise between different and conflicting interests, including official institutions and regimes endowed with executive powers, and various informal arrangements agreed by the people and institutions or perceived to be useful“.

Before gaining the reputation enjoyed by thoroughly analysed concepts pertaining to International Relations, the term “governance“ was used by James Rosenau to describe how to regulate the relations of interdependence in the absence of control exercised by political authority. This idea of lack of global political supreme courts is emphasized in the definition of Adil Hajam of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy: Global governance is global process management in the absence of world government.” Management involves the idea of action, organization or supervision and, as mentioned above, does not refer to the question of creating centralised international institutions. It is, moreover, the common element of the various definitions that have endorsed the idea of global governance: the absence of a single political authority. It is also completely eliminates the appearance of the traditional separation of national-level international decision-making and recognizing the role non-state actors, including civil society.

Rosenau’s definition is based on the idea of substituting the supreme importance of states in international relations by the rule of relations between individuals, companies, those relationships described by Keohane

and Nye as “transnational“. There are changes occurring in the international system because, among other things, the phenomenon of fragmentation of identity, simultaneously with that of integration (frigmigration)“ as reactions to globalization.

Another type of conceptualisation of global governance stresses the practical dimension of coordination mechanisms that are controlled by the implications of the globalization process: “In general terms, global governance refers to systems of international rules, policies and coordination mechanisms that are designed to manage multiple implications of globalization.”

We will focus on two approaches to theoretical investigation of the idea of global governance that emerge, one that draws focus to the link between global issues, global goals and their concerted approach and the other by building explanatory substance to the concept of “power“, one of the key concepts of International Relations.

Martin Ortega offers a definition of global governance based on the idea of managing global issues and tracking global objectives through concerted efforts of states and other international actors. In addition to global challenges involving the need for a collective approach (environmental degradation, climate change, peacekeeping and security, combating terrorism, poverty and underdeveloped states, organized crime, etc..), identifying global targets is a defining aspect of global governance. Whether it concerns the strengthening and promotion of international principles, to promote democracy, human rights protection, crisis management and peacekeeping, the availability of states to divide their efforts between the pursuit of national interests and identify, that is only targeting the global targets in 20th century, after the Second World War. A set of broad objectives was included, for example, in the United Nations Charter, but their success was limited during the Cold War, given the deep disagreements among the permanent members of UN Security Council. Only after the overall objectives of the 1990 agenda were set the agenda was clearly defined and monitored with great consistency.

Referring to the concerted efforts of state and non-state actors is also very relevant to include the prerequisite of international cooperation under the multilateral system, to solve problems that cannot be addressed individually by states, with unilateral instruments. This is generally the argument or multilateralism, a concept which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. Concerted efforts occur as defined by Thomas G. Weiss: “collective efforts to identify, understand and solve global problems whose solution exceeds the capacity of individual states”. All these networks of mechanisms of cooperation and coordination (horizontal - between states and international organizations, but also vertical - between national and international institutions and citizens), and the interferences between different areas covered by the act of global governance (security, economy, environment, transport, etc..) complicate attempts to examine this concept based on traditional notions of international relations, such as legitimacy, representation or leadership.

Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall believe that normative views on global governance - that promote understanding this concept as an alternative organization of relations between state and non-state actors in the international arena without strong emphasis on the idea of power - are somewhat limited. The absence of political authority (power center) is not equivalent to absence of power role in global governance. The two authors provide a definition of global governance based on the significance of institutional power, one of the four types of power covered by them in taxonomic picture of this concept: direct power, compulsory power, institutional power, structural power and power production. More relevant in this context is the institutional power and the productive power, both practiced on the indirect route. Institutional power operates through various institutional arrangements, decision-making processes or other informal means, diffused to influence agenda setting and decisions on items on the agenda. Productive power is exercised in the social processes associated with defining and changing identities, the meanings or rules of conduct in the context of international relations.

Based on these aspects of power, global governance can be understood according to the scale proposed by Barnett and Duvall, as a form of institutional power exercised on a formal or informal level, and in order to

coerce other states and global actors (such as multinational corporations) through the creation of institutional mechanisms for regulation and setting standards to be met. Decisions in the context of global governance are based on cooperation and consensus.

For example, the European Union and United States practice the institutional power and productive power. Either through multilateral institutions or international financial institutions, the G8 or United Nations Security Council. Questions about how to exercise these types of power and results of cooperation between the two actors in international institutions should be made from, first, the fundamental dilemma of global governance effectiveness in the current international context. There are authors who seem to link skepticism with the existence of global governance that acts as a pure theoretical construct. Such dilemmas are raised by the fact that, despite the presence on the international scene of institutions with a universal vocation through which global governance can be exercised act until now, the most important global issues - especially those relating to international security - have been addressed rather fragmented, either on the basis of unilateral decisions, or through flexible forms of cooperation, such as, for example, the controversial “Coalitions of the willing“ mobilized by the U.S. for the global war on terror.

Developments on the international scene that generated the pessimism of such visions of global governance stalemate, and even the multilateralism “crisis“, bring to the forefront two fundamental issues. On the one hand, the question of reform of international institutions (particularly the UN) to respond to new global challenges and, on the other hand, highlight the clash of strategic vision to re-issue the international system shared by the most powerful global actors - the EU and the U.S.. We will discuss in more detail in another section of the paper how the transatlantic partners report to the opportunities and constraints involved in global governance but , when we operate with other relevant conceptual distinctions such as the dichotomy of “unilateralism-multilateralism“ . What is noteworthy in this context is that the chances of effective global governance depend both on how the U.S. will take a constructive position of global leadership and the extent to which the EU will be able to take a proactive stance in promoting those values and principles that may influence the reconfiguration of the international political system based on multilateralism.

Institutional aspects

The effectiveness of global governance thus depends on the credibility of the multilateral approach to global issues on the agenda of the institutions, organizations and international systems with a universal vocation, that is the institutional infrastructure of global governance. In addition to bilateralism, regional multilateralism (the foundation of the European integration project, as well as other types of regional alliances with a lesser degree of integration), minilateralism (applied ever more frequently in collective security, but also at the economic level), we can talk about global multilateralism, which is key to the success of what was previously defined as global governance. All types contribute to multilateralism but the efficiency of global governance, given its multidimensional elements of cooperation and interference processes vertical, horizontal or cross. Development of international organizations as a result of processes of institutionalization of coordination mechanisms between international actors and to the identification of permanent ways of interaction and interconnection within intergovernmental or non-state actors can lead to strengthening the role and legitimacy of the institutional infrastructure global governance.

There are, on the one hand, renowned stage actors of global governance, international institutions that operate globally, both politically and economically: the United Nations (UN), World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. On the other hand, less formal intergovernmental alliances like the G8 or the World Economic Forum are increasingly more visible. We should not ignore the influence of non-state actors such as the Global Pact, the International Labor Organization, private associations (International Chamber of Commerce), nongovernmental organizations, some political movements or transnational religious organizations, financial markets, multinationals etc.

The period immediately after 1990 is often considered “the revival of multilateralism“, given a series of developments that led to the strengthening of certain international or regional organizations or the creation of new international regimes. The Cold War brought with it a certain revival – but an insufficient one – the United Nations Security

Council. Also the number and the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions has grown. At regional level, simultaneous processes of enlargement and economical and political integration that crossed the European Union have helped strengthen its role on the international scene, especially with the creation of its foreign policy and security dimension in 1992. A number of regional conflicts have brought with it the international community's efforts to restore peace and stability in various areas such as Central America, Balkans, Middle East and Southeast Asia. In 1995 the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was transformed into the World Trade Organization. The Kyoto Protocol on the environment was adopted in 1997 and in 1998 the Rome Statute on the establishment and operation of the International Criminal Court was adopted.

All these events, processes, international agreements and institutional developments can be regarded as consequences of the success of multi-lateral negotiation approaches and historical and institutional opportunities for the exercise of global governance based on the principle of multi-lateralism.

The unilateralism-multilateralism report: contradiction, causality or flexibility? Europe, America and selective multi-lateralism

1. Bilateralism or paralelism for bilateral relations under the cover of multilateralis

When we set out to analyze developments in transatlantic relations and to anticipate some of their prospects we face to a certain extent the captivity of a layered, heterogeneous and strategic scale of cooperation and coherence between the fluctuations of foreign policy visions of the two actors, the U.S. and the EU. The relationship between transatlantic poles is very difficult to penetrate by the "lens" of bilateralism, given the fragmented views of foreign policy, sometimes incompatible, expressed by Member States of the European Union, backed by the mixture of intergovernmentalism and currently characterizing supranationalising the Union's foreign policy, outlining it with a fragmented external profile on the international scene. The limits of the bilateral institutional framework and the difficulty of

accurately circumscribing players of the reports/ partnership / transatlantic community have direct implications on attempts to capture more accurately the preferences, interests, reactions and their positions regarding major issues on the global agenda today.

2. The international context and the emergence of global governance

The challenge arising from shortages in the bilateralism paradigm is added, as mentioned, to the requirement of placing this work in an angle of integrated analysis that transcends the Transatlantic and the background projects it on the ongoing efforts to redefine the global order. The end of bipolarism and the East-West division axis diversifies the typology of power relations between international state actors, complicating the classic pattern of monolithic configuration of alliances built on the principle of bending before a single, identifiable threat (the expansion of Soviet ideology). First, the current international system is marked by elements of unipolar, nonpolarity, multipolarity or complicating the algorithm for calculating the costs and benefits option for solution states multilateral cooperation, especially when the issue is freedom of action of a superpower that has the privilege of military rule, such as American power. Furthermore, international developments influenced both the political and the economical and cultural globalization, which tends to substitute the principle of East-West confrontation as a key element of impact in shaping relations among states. Moreover, in the context of globalization, issues on the international agenda are of unpredictable, interdependent and transnational actors making by both state and non-state of coordinated responses, collective, in an effective system of governance overall. Overall efficiency of the government's credibility depends on its normative dimension, that of approval and compliance with international regulations sets universal vocation to underpin the current functioning of global governance organizations with aspirations embracing both the composition and the tasks undertaken (United Nations, World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund).

Recovering the convergence of the transatlantic vision in the hierarchy of global issues and their approaches may stimulate efforts to reform and strengthen the infrastructure of global governance facing a number of

difficulties both in terms of legitimacy and the institutional and decision-making. The very notion of global governance is to be made by critics of multilateralism as key test of relevance, since in the view of this side of theorists of international relations, multilateral cooperation within international organizations such as the United Nations system “reduces“ the voluntary restraint margins, using a certain way of binding instruments of international legitimacy as artifices of inertia. Therefore, although the concept of global governance is very current and exciting in the theoretical approaches of international relations and multilateral cooperation key institutions operating in the global arena, in a more or less effective way than a half a century ago, their slowness, their partially outdated character and the delaying of recent reform initiatives have led to the shaping of an agenda of global governance that might actually start from the 2010-2012 .

3. *Multilateralism - instrument or purpose?*

The range of theoretical instruments that can be used when analysing the possibilities of redefining the transatlantic partnership based on the common goal of ensuring a new global leadership, and thus shaping a common agenda of priorities to reflect the challenges, interests, opportunities and the availability of the U.S. and the European Union to find a *modus operandi* focused on addressing them in a concerted manner brings to the forefront the issue of “lateralisms“ in the context of international cooperation. The theoretical dispute “*unilateralism versus multilateralism*“ was triggered after the onset of the conflict in Iraq and the shaping of the well-known picture of transatlantic censorship, on the background of a myth of antagonism between a unilateral America and a multilateral Europe, essentially built on the too straightforward and tainted, due to a contextual simplicism, illustrations offered by foreign policy commentators on both sides of the Atlantic.

Understanding the idea of global governance is closely related to clearly defining the principle of multilateralism as the cornerstone concept of building international regimes and organizations, institutional structures that provide an organized framework with claims of predictability in terms of multilateral cooperation between actors global system. In the context of trying to expose the general definitions of multilateralism as a principle of

organization and various forms of multilateral cooperation as a means of institutionalization of multilateralism we faced the third category of challenges mentioned in the initial considerations: those strictly theoretical. Although there is a common academic conglomerate of definitions agreed upon concerning the poles of the unilateralism-multilateralism relationship, there is not a unitary view regarding the impact of the two types of approach to international issues, on the efficiency of global government and the priorities that were successful or not. This theoretically identified aspect transpires, in fact, from the interpretation of views expressed by European and US officials.

When the Secretary General of the European Union, Javier Solana, says that “we Europeans are instinctively multilateralists and we wish the U.S. to be more open to multilateral solutions“, the European leaders’ option to shift global cooperation towards multilateral institutions of global governance is obvious. On the other hand, the views expressed by U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice - “multilateral agreements should not be considered ends in themselves“ - places alternatives of multilateral cooperation in a range of scenarios that should not be generalized, since “ the performances of multilateralism do not justify the universal solution label for any type of threat to be countered at the international level. However the profoundly normative difference of “multilateralism as an end in itself“ cannot be equaled with rejecting the idea of international cooperation and unconditionally assuming a unilateralist vision on global issues by the US. Moreover, neither can the assumption of multilateralism by Europeans instinctively substantiate the myth of absolute fidelity to the approach of European multilateralist foreign policy. The solution for the multilateralist or unilateralist option is naturally expressed in terms of a pragmatic calculation of costs and benefits of cooperation, in which the instinctive preferences can be overturned by some particular circumstances. Obvious discrepancies that undermine the soundness of the multilateralist argument as an end in itself can be seen between the *theory of multilateralism* and the way transatlantic actors respect multilateral constraints.

Part of those supporting American unilateralism is generally tempted to associate the sentence of multilateralism as an end in itself European vision, based on the idea that the project of European integration is essentially a

very advanced model of multilateral cooperation, which seeks European partners to promote it globally. There is another camp of the defenders of unilateralism, which, in contrast, see the European integration project as a Community-wide exhaustion of resources available to multilateral EU states, which in turn affects its unilateral ways of manifesting the organizations of global governance, particularly economic ones, where the commission has the right to negotiate on areas of exclusive jurisdiction, doing so focused primarily on promoting European interests. This category of critics that frowns upon European impulses to self-proclaim themselves “champions of multilateralism” accuses old members of the EI of opportunism, hypocrisy and giving privilege to the forms of *à la carte* multilateralism, that they consider unacceptable when the US decide to stay outside of a framework of cooperation promoted by European states (the case of unilateralism by omission reflected in the rejection of the Kyoto protocol).

Among EU countries, Germany is probably the state showing the most profound devotion to all paradigms of multilateralism, promoting a foreign policy centered on the idea of negotiation and the reluctance to use military force. In Germany today multilateralism is perceived almost as an end in itself, an organizing principle behind a world based on the rule (Verrechtlichung), which – some authors consider – shows up in the low interest shown by Germans to investigate risks and threats related to the scope of collective security (terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc.). If, however, we discuss certain EU policies, about the new energy security or the suitability of a project like North Stream in the idea of mandatory consultation of affected parties, we find in Germany an actor that can act unilaterally to defend its own interests. Pushing multilateralism to extremes would raise major questions and call into question even the fundamental ideas and concepts such as sovereignty or freedom of states to decide their options in different areas.

There are more or less restrictive definitions of multilateralism, the idea of flexibility in meeting certain constraints imposed by multilateral rules risk undermining, under this view, the very essence of multilateral cooperation. For example, J. Caporaso presents multilateralism as a form of organization which asks of participants to give up short-term benefits, avoid the

temptation to define their interests solely as national interests and also requires the renunciation of ad-hoc coalitions and policies based on temporary constellations of interests. However, the attitudes of transatlantic actors in relation to multilateral solutions are rather ambivalent, as both U.S. and European Union selectively address the multilateral or unilateral approach. Scenarios of what some authors call “selective multilateralism“ help mitigating the perception of costs associated with the partially binding nature of multilateral cooperation that substantiating the vision of multilateralism as a tool for promoting national interests and international cooperation to meet global targets , in order to exploit global opportunities, or share responsibilities of international risk control.

By promoting a multilateral foreign policy, states are faced with as John G. Ruggie says, with a *trade-off* between reaching objectives and asserting national interest – both possible in the context of a concerted approach – on the one hand, and accepting the constraints and conditions involving the participation in such multilateral cooperation frameworks, on the other. A relatively close vision is shared by Joseph S. Nye Jr, placing the costs of multilateralism in the category of those “investments“ that are recoverable through long-term benefits obtained through collective approaches to international problems. The thesis of multilateralism as a tool lies in the fact that theoretically states, key players in the existing forms of multilateral cooperation and state institutions, acting according to targets and interests define and pursue their calling in various ways selected from a wider set of instruments, including that of participation in different alliances, coalitions or international regimes. Based on the calculations of each protagonist of international organizations or multilateral arrangements, this mean may be used or ignored. In game theory, cooperative attitude is a way of expressing of interest and defining the expectations relating to the interests of other participants in the game, while the remaining stake is enhancing one’s potential gain. Cooperation means are, in instrumentalist theories, forms of adjusting their policies according to the preferences of others.

The idea of multilateralism as a means to an end gives an arbitrary note gives some to international cooperation, involving therefore the freedom to participate in scenarios of cooperation – either in international organizations with a universal vocation, be it the ad hoc coalition, or in the context of

compliance with agreements or treaties covering a particular area of cooperation - but excluding the right to choose the unilateralist approach. It can be materialized through unilateral decision to initiate actions outside the existing international regulatory frameworks, thus independent of the courts decision of multilateralism, or the decision to opt-out in relation to certain multilateral regimes. Instrumentalist vision confers legitimacy of both unilateralism and multilateralism, given the relativization of both foreign policy approaches and placing them in the area of mediation between preferences and preferences derived absolute actors participating in the “lateralism game”.

Define the two terms on the background of instrumental considerations generates a separation of the types of reports that customize the conceptual pair of unilateralism-multilateralism, making possible the coexistence of antagonistic relations, causal and sometimes more flexible, by a subjective overturn of the meanings of both concepts. Thus, as will be detailed in subsequent pages of this work, the report is mitigated, as first hand unilateralism proves to be a catalyst for the creation of multilateral coalitions and therefore being reassessed as a tool of multilateralism.

European unilateralism

Beyond the straightforward episodes of unilateralism on certain international issues promoted by some EU members such as the previously discussed case of France, there are many views that identify an element of ambivalence in the profile of the Union regarding the propensity for unilateralism or multilateralism in global negotiations. Although in statements and at the programmatic level the multilateralism option – both at the level of the Community and at a global level – is crystal clear, some authors consider that the EU focus on strengthening multilateralism has led to a kind of “structural unilateralism”, reflected in its means of interaction with other parts of the international system. Van Oudenharen believes that the entire history of European integration was based on a slightly hypocritical and opportunistic manner to develop and implement Community policies, which defines the contrasting behaviour of Union in the community and abroad. The internal decisional pattern, based on the prevailing consensus method, differs from that used in the external

relations, including – says Van Oudenharen – in the negotiation process for EU accession: “externally, the EU has gained a reputation linked to its take-it-or-leave-it style of negotiation.”

There is a continuing tension between the self-defining of the Union as a global inherent multilateralist and its ambition to strengthen its external identity drawing a line of demarcation that contributes to the increased profile with the help of instruments, from extra-European perspective, can be perceived to be delivered unilateraliste. For example, along the steps to strengthen the internal market and common agricultural policy, European Commission dismissed without any hesitation, existing multilateral rules and, legally, with greater authority, if they contravened the imperatives European project. In the 60 and 70 The European Commission started to preferential trade arrangements with former European colonies whose legality was questionable in the context of GATT, but that Brussels has refused to submit to an examination of formal multilateral, confirming their legal nature on the basis a unilateral mechanism of “self-certification“. Also, in 80 years, in discussions on the single market project, the European Commission argued against any criticism on the scenario of a “fortress Europe“, but has shown on numerous occasions to abrogate unilaterally determine certain pre-existing obligations to multilateral and goals (for example, where much publicized the new banana import regime, successfully challenged in the WTO by several Latin American countries). Development of CFSP and ESDP project itself was initially regarded with reticence, especially the U.S., as an unilateralist initiative to developments that NATO had to adapt and readjust several times. Finally, critics of the Union’s self-labelling as multilateral identified certain elements of unilateralism even in European law, given the support from the European Court of Justice for claims expressed by the European Commission that Member States should abandon or renegotiate some treaties with third parties that include clauses incompatible with the founding treaties or other directives or regulations.

Van Oudenharen’s comments on the unilateralism of EU positions in international negotiations on particular areas of Community competence is partly supported, where inflexibility in support of certain interests of the EU is synonymous with unilateralism. The same can be said about the

association and negotiation take-it-or-leave-it style applied by the Union's to external relations within arrangements negotiated with the candidates. However, accession to the European Union is a voluntary act. Meeting criteria for opening negotiations and the subsequent acceptance of technical and political constraints, along with internal reform efforts in preparation for the adoption and application of the *acquis communautaire* are part of this difficult accession "ritual" that each actor at the negotiating table has to face. The principle of conditionality can be viewed as an expression of unilateralism and multilateralism. Unilateralism lies in the unequal positions in a standard process of negotiation: the Union is defining conditions, and the candidate countries have to meet them. The *acquis communautaire* is not negotiable, and candidate states are required (with certain transitional periods and derogations which were received by candidates in the first wave of enlargement and, informally, for states that joined later) is a necessary condition of integration. Precisely to prevent any shocks accession candidate countries come across a comprehensive internal reform is part of the preparation for accession to the Union. Therefore, long-term analysis of the restrictive and difficult path of integration of EU countries is not only marked by the elements of a unilateral approach concerning the technique of absorption of new states. It can be seen as a way of testing and preparing candidates to "play" the European game reap the benefits of accession alongside the costs.

In any club, alliance or international organization expansion towards new countries take place through selective, multilateral or bilateral negotiations, the original border between the "ins" and "outs" always placing aspirants in an inferior position and the unilateralist, discriminatory, unequal or rigid behaviour of countries within that club is often observed.

Unilateralism, an equally acceptable alternative in a unipolar or multipolar world

The defenders of unilateralism are found in American schools of thought which explain and is explained by the fact that the U.S. received the label of both "champion of multilateralism", but also that of "champions of unilateralism". The thesis that supports the legitimacy and efficiency of a

unilateralist approach to foreign policy of a superpower is set against the background of the unipolar vision of the international system and starts from the premise of a multipolar global order.

The author of the famous and controversial essay on unilateralism as the natural and fundamental option for a hegemonic power to settle major issues of a unipolar anarchic world, Robert Kagan, considers that the support of members states for multilateral institutions and rules of cooperation is disproportional to the power of those countries. Because Kagan's thesis has already been commented in a previous chapter, in the context of illustrating the antagonistic profiles of Europe and America, we will limit here to mention that, in Kagan's view, powerful states tend to avoid the constraints of international rules, as opposed to poor countries' inclination to indulge and escape under the umbrella of multilateral diplomacy. Great powers, like the European countries in the 18th century or the USA today, "more often fear the rules could constrain their power more than they do anarchy, despite that their power still manages to provide security and prosperity." The idea refers to both the U.S. assuming a special role to allow the defense of national interests and an active contribution to solving global problems, but also refers to the risk that inaction could have, as we developed in another context, bureaucracy and inefficiency of multilateral rules governing international institutions.

However, as Charles Krauthammer, another ardent advocate of the unilateralist option, says: "The virtue of unilateralism is not only in that it allows the action, but that it forces it!" A strong argument for the use of the unilateralist solution when needed is related to the need to respond quickly to confront and combat the current global threats, in other words, is related to the prevailing mantra that "the end justifies the means".

When reaching, in turn, "the special role of America in the World" Krauthammer particularly emphasizes the idea of a hegemonic force – even if the unilateralist concerted action is not possible – to bring a new coalition to revitalize the old coalition between states, managing to escape from the captivity induced by inertia or the absence of a decision taken at the multilateral level. Another interesting argument that defends uni-

lateralism is introduced in this manner and that is the “*road opening role*“ of unilateralism:

“The great coalitions are not created by the superpowers begging support from allies. They are started by raising a position and inviting others to join. What even pragmatic realists fail to understand is that unilateralism is the surest way to multilateralism.” (...). As I learned from the experience of the Gulf War, the U.S. attitude of being a proactive leadership – and even that willingness to act unilaterally if necessary – is one that has mobilized the coalition for the Gulf War. Without Bush senior’s statement on Kuwait – This will not stand! – and without the clear indication that America is prepared to act alone if necessary, it would not have been possible to create this wonderful coalition that now, retrospectively, is so much applauded and illustrated as a model of multilateralism.”

Krauthammer generally uses historical examples related to defense and security (the Gulf War, the latest conflict in Iraq), where the choice of U.S. unilateralism has led rather to various forms of unilateralism coalitions that were smaller, more flexible (Coalitions of the willing). Indeed, such collective actions are consistent with the broad sense of multilateralism (that cooperation between more than two states), but not the normative dimension with universalist aspirations: international compliance, generalizing principles of conduct and what Caporaso called the constraint of abandoning ad hoc coalitions and policies based on situational requirements or temporary constellations of interests. The argument of unilateralism being the road opener to multilateralism (within the meaning of selective multilateralism or unilateralism) reveals some ambiguities arising from the degree of expansion of multilateral international cooperation (European multilateralism – the EU, transatlantic multilateralism – NATO global multilateralism – the UN, WTO etc.) or the interpretation of the legitimacy of multilateralism on a gradual scale: a collective action taken by a limited group of countries has less legitimacy than a concerted approach approved by a court agreed that possesses global vocation such as that of the United Nations Security Council?

If such a grid is not applied and supported and the idea of diversity and the legitimacy of all types of international cooperation based on multilateral

principles and rules is accepted and assumed by all Member States (in more than two) involved in cooperation or another, then the only category of unilateral action subject to criticism or interpreted as incompatible with the idea of multilateralism would be undertaken by a state in an isolated manner and in absolute contradiction to all internationally agreed rules.

The boundary between unilateralism and multilateralism is very often quite vague, especially the idea of unilateralism and multilateralism that does not refer to the decision-making and voting rules applied, but the whole institutional edifice of international cooperation which includes both the decision and its implementation. If the U.S. unilaterally decided to ignore the decision of some multilateral international body, then introducing another form of multilateralism, can be accused of breach of the principles of multilateralism practiced only within the UN, but not absolute opacity to the idea of collective action in the context another form, parallel, multilateral international cooperation through which believe they can better fight a global threat (ie terrorism). The theme of terrorism in the context of broader issues of global security will be included in specific chapter on this issue.

Most of the American visions which defend unilateralism are built around the idea of inefficient practices within the UN multilateral approach and the risks involved in self-limitation in case the action is not unanimous or at least accepted by the majority depending on the voting rules applied.

“Certainly a state acts in concert with others if possible. It is better that others join it. Nobody plans to be unilateralist. Unilateralism simply means that someone who cannot allow himself to be the prisoner of other’s will. In 2003, the choice was between a broad coalition and a narrow one, but not between a coalition, however limited, and none. There were serious arguments against the war in Iraq, but the fact that the France was not part of the coalition was not one of them.”

According to true realist tradition, like Robert Kagan, Krauthammer believes that power is the sole arbitrator and purpose tool that can be defined as a system of international relations: “In an international system without sovereignty, without a police court, without protection - where

power is the sole arbiter, and history has endowed us with an unprecedented power - we must be vigilant in preserving that power and the freedom to use it.”

Trying to answer - on the basis of visions presented over time by some of the major schools of thought in international relations (isolationism, liberal internationalism, realism, democratic globalism) - the key questions related to the kind of foreign policy that should be adopted by a unipolar superpower, the renowned American publicist Charles Krauthammer opts for directions suggested by the vision of democratic globalism, which is adjusted with a filter of thought rooted in the neorealist soil. The act of doctrinal conversion gives birth to a realist conception of democratic rhetoric and tempers universalist aspirations of democratic globalism. In his view, democratic realism must be targeted and limited, based on a “belief“ part elitist, part realistic: “We are friends to all, but we come ashore only where it really counts.”

Governing global security

The alternative of multilateral cooperation in international organizations is already investigated in detail, starting from the premises of a “force of attraction“ of multilateralism as an option for negotiation at the intergovernmental level and continuing difficulties encountered models of multilateralism. Among the challenges facing the current forms of institutionalization of multilateral cooperation at international level we find: systemic or structural challenges arising from the reconfiguration of global order and relating to the state-centred paradigm, regulatory challenges that have to do with the legitimacy, transparency and efficiency decision-making processes and mechanisms of international organizations and “hegemonic challenges“ under the new distribution of global power and impact of U.S. economic and military supremacy on a reconfiguration of the international system which does not exclude the alternative inclusion of multilateralism in the toolbox as a counterweight to American preeminence worldwide.

While in all the 27 EU Member States, the view on multilateralism is multifaceted and not very homogeneous in terms of basic objectives that underpin the multilateral approach to global issues, the idea of “effective

multilateralism“ is found - in the Union’s external strategy elements - as the ultimate option for European foreign policy. Furthermore, unilateralism as a mechanism of last resort, when a multilateral approach is impracticable or ineffective, seems to be the strategy recommended by most Americans and the U.S. agreed in general. The recipe for selective multilateralism, in other words, the scenarios of “à la carte“ multilateralism best defines transatlantic preferences of both players accepting the constraints of participation in current forms of international cooperation.

The concept of global governance, addressed mainly in the context of commercial or financial relations can be defined and analyzed in terms of international security, but integrating it into a grid that goes beyond theoretical premises of the neorealist vision of international relations is necessary. According to Elke Krahmman, Krahmman the concept of global security governance is based on an initial premise that state actors are no longer the only essential sources of threat to international security. Terrorism, international crime, proliferation are equally important, as otherwise stated in the 1995 report of the Commission on Global Governance. Therefore, the same report concludes: “Global security must be extended from its traditional orientation to the security of states, so as to include security of people and the planet.“ The premise is closely linked to the results of recent studies on security Global risks which reveals that the likelihood of interstate conflagration in decline, in turn has greatly increased risk of internal conflicts and transnational threats

A second prerequisite which enables interoperability of the global security concept of governance refers to the fact that - given the complex nature of current threats, domestic or transnational - resources of the member states and effective national security policy arrangements are limited and sometimes outdated, especially when it comes to countering a transnational threat. Therefore, the tasks subsumed in broader security issues are handled largely by organizations and regional or global security alliances, and a number of private or nongovernmental actors in the area involved in the humanitarian assistance, the human rights situation, refugees protection or military training.

The premise of reducing costs through shared responsibilities deserves, also referred to that support, in turn, it supports the chance of effective global governance in the security area. State monopoly in preserving national security or international interests is less pronounced, especially in the current neo-liberal rule in the sphere of values and norms of global governance, such as for example privatization or market orientation.

Summarizing the substance of the premises that enable a better understanding of global security governance concept, we can delineate four features of this approach to international security issues:

1. Intergovernmental collective approach within the global or regional security emphasizes mutual trust and therefore decrease the risk of conflict between states;
2. Multilateral cooperation in the global security governance area requires the involvement of state actors and non-state actors
3. Concerted management of international security challenges sometimes lead to a cyclical, structurally neutral (“Coalitions of the willing“), more flexible coalition configuration reflecting the heterogeneity of interests and capabilities of stakeholders, coalitions acting in parallel with the Old Testament more stable, but structurally antagonistic;
4. The overall project involves coordination of security multilateralism in the area of security relations among states based on the rules that govern and limit the use of force.

The alternative to mainstream multilateralism: a solution?

The US from inefficiency of multilateralism to unilateralism

Almost paradoxically, the history of the concept of multilateralism and international regimes based on diplomacy through multilateral negotiations begins with U.S. willingness to promote the virtues of global multilateralism. The universality of values, collective security, international institutions, humanitarian law, etc. have their origin, like the League of Nations, forerunner of the UN body, in wilsonian idealism. Certainly, in terms of doctrine, the roots of a current thought school that best affirmed itself in the substance of American 20th century “liberalism“ is found in German philosophy from the Enlightenment period. Kant’s political philosophy, namely idealistic-rationalistic speculation linked the “eternal

peace“ rational international conditions (the three items “final“ behind them, have inspired initiatives in creating international peace organizations, the networks of transnational cooperation and the decision to include topics such as human rights protection and defense of democratic values in the international agenda. The influence of Kantian philosophy is reflected accordingly in U.S. initiatives on the foundation of organizations like the League of Nations, the United Nations and especially in the visionary project of European construction

After WWII, the U.S. helped create and strengthen international organizations and multilateral institutions such as the UN and its specialized agencies, global economic governance institutions - the Bretton Woods Institutions (IMF, World Bank) and GATT, NATO — alliance based on the principle of collective security. They also inspired the creation of the OECD, the G7, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The idea of substituting the relations of force with collective bargaining steps on a set of rules of law, institutions and procedures is one of the constitutional legacies of the largest democracy in the world.

U.S. estrangement from international rules and institutions - say some critics of U.S. foreign policy - has been gradual, giving the first signs of skepticism about the idea of containment of Washington’s political autonomy in the late 60s and early 70s, with the dollar crisis, during the Nixon administration. It can be said that the option of tilting U.S. unilateralism and supporting a multilateral order was continuous and constant, as the U.S. choosing between a path and the other based on cost-benefit calculation and the impact of reducing unilateral opportunities and accepting the constraints imposed by international regulations.

Contrary to Robert Kagan’s thesis on the inherent and inevitable attraction between the world superpower’s unilateralism and self-decision, U.S. administrations have not yet opted to promote a principled unilateral foreign policy. Realistically assessing the costs and benefits of employment in the “institutional bargain“ of multilateralism where the arbitrary exercise of power is limited each participating partner in the game setup international order. As Joseph S. Nye Jr, stated by multilateralism entails certain costs, but over time the benefits outweigh the costs and the concerted approach proves to be the best way to achieve long-term objectives, “a good investment for the future of U.S.”

The most important mutations occurred after the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the unipolar era dominated by U.S. supremacy. Initial priorities announced by the U.S. presidential administrations (G. Bush, B. Clinton and GW Bush) placed in the forefront of their agenda of foreign policy efforts the need to improve relations with the UN and other international organizations. George Bush, for example, obtained the support of the United Nations Security Council for the Gulf War in 1991, and the Initiative in December 1992 to participate with troops in a humanitarian intervention in Somalia.

The onset of President Clinton's coming into office had in the background the same commitment to what Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called assertive multilateralism, ensuring the success of ratifying the treaty on the establishment of WTO and taking the U.S. decision to engage in military raids under NATO command in Bosnia, after 1994, and Kosovo (1999). The opening towards international organizations was followed by internal challenges related to hostilities. Republican Congress and its reluctance to UN members, but external circumstances as well, hijacked the multilateralist ambitions of the U.S. President. Among the "failure" of the Clinton administration's multilateralist agenda includes the decision not to sign the Convention banning anti-personnel mines in 1996, the decision not to send to the Senate the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, failed efforts to ratify the Test Ban Treaty on nuclear weapons and last-minute signing of the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court.

The clear reorientation of U.S. foreign policy to tackle international problems unilaterally occurred with the inauguration of GW Bush's term in January 2001. The internal context had also a major impact on the adversity of most of the Presidents' advisers (despite the opening of the values of multilateralism manifested by former Secretary of State Colin Powell) to the idea of coercion U.S. freedom to act and the full observance of international commitments. External partners and in particular promoters of European multilateralism assisted the U.S. withdrawal from the negotiations on biological weapons, those related to child rights, to cancel the signing of the Treaty on the International Criminal Court and the abandonment of the Kyoto Protocol, extremely popular in Europe. The mixture of unilateralist and multilateralist options continued to mark

progress during Bush jr's White House mandate: to obtain support United Nations Security Council for war in Afghanistan, the successful launch of new negotiations in the WTO Doha in November 2001. Even the Iraqi episode – which was the origin of major international disputes on unilateralism-multilateralism, – debuted on the world stage as U.S. availability to fund the alternative collective confrontation of terrorist threat. In late 2002, the United Nations Security Council approved the resolution on resuming weapons inspections related to Iraq and warned Iraq of consequences if they were disobedient in this matter. Unable to obtain Security Council approval for the use of force, because France and Russia vetoed – not NATO but the U.S. has abdicated the multilateralist belief and sought flexible solutions to make the mobilization of those states willing to take part in the scenario of unilateralist collective confrontation of terrorism under the aegis of the so-called “Coalitions of the willings“. The diplomatic inflection occurred shortly before 9/11 has set the direction of action of the Republican team, amid an emerging political strategy refocused on national interest.

“À la carte” multilateralism

The election campaign for U.S. presidential elections, especially in 2004, brought back on the agenda of public debate the pros and cons of a redefinition of the U.S. position according to a strategy of prevailing unilateralism or multilateralism. The American vision of multilateralism as a tool and not as an end in itself appears to be structural rather than enhanced by the background of political circumstances related to the doctrinal direction of the White House team. Multilateral mechanisms are useful only when they can promote the American national interest. Therefore, in cases where the assertion of this interest is subject to a unilateralist approach, the institutional framework of multilateral cooperation can be avoided: “The foreign policy of a Republican administration will certainly be internationalist, but will start from the basis of strong national interest, not the interests of an illusory international community. “ This is a placing in accordance with the multilateralism transposed in the norms and institutionalised forms of cooperation that have an essential particularity of multilateral cooperation, mentioned by John G Ruggie: in practicing a multilateral foreign policy, states are faced with a trade-off

between the objectives and promoting the national interest - that would be possible only through a collective approach - and accepting the constraints and conditions involving the participation of such multilateral cooperation frameworks.

Trying to identify and analyze the sources of American unilateralism, Laurent Cohen-Tanugi believes that “American unilateralism is the synthesis of natural, yet innovative underlying American diplomatic tradition, between isolationism and interventionism, its two historic poles, under a triple mutation that characterized the post-Cold War international system.” Cohen-Tanugi refers to globalization, the total supremacy of the U.S., giving it an almost total autonomy in the full scale phenomenon of anti-Americanism, reflected dramatically in the 9/11th attacks. Thus, unilateralism an intrinsic element of any foreign policy, becomes a structural component of U.S. global strategy in an era of globalisation, unipolarity and anti-Americanism worldwide. The impact of the events of September 11th led to the revelation of contradiction between absolute power and absolute supremacy of the U.S., while diagnosing the vulnerability of the strongest state in the entire world order and the challenges of global terrorism. Those two factors, power and vulnerability, lead to a tilt of the strategic balance U.S. to unilateralism. The scenario of unipolarity in international system is increasingly being replaced in the international relations literature by the reconfiguration scenario of a multipolar world order or the idea of establishing a non-polar order for the 21st century. Non-polarity differs from the idea of multipolarity by deleting the idea of state actors as the single central paradigm of power and a diffuse redistribution of power between state and non-state actors, each possessing and exercising various kinds of power. For Haass, nonpolarity is governed only by way of multilateralism and may take the form of a “concerted nonpolarity” based on the creation and use of multilateral cooperation arrangements that are less formal and with low aspirations for a global consensus. Haass believes the recipe for global governance in a nonpolar world is selective multilateralism (*à la carte*), manifested in various forms of agreements signed between minilateralism or small groups and on specific issues. The way to address global issues complicate classical diplomacy, negotiation and alliances created to address the international issues will be rather situational and selective. In a multilateral negotiation,

they could share their views and interests on an issue and be inconsistent on others, which means more flexibility and a more nuanced redefinition of relations between states, giving up the dual pattern-state rival allied countries. U.S. no longer has, therefore, the luxury of promoting a consistent foreign policy that reflects the vision of “You are either with us or against us.”

Unilateralism as a mechanism of last resort, when a multilateral approach is impracticable or ineffective, seems to be the strategy recommended by most Americans and agreed by the U.S. in general. It is, as mentioned above, prescription selective multilateralism, in other words, the scenario of “multilateralism à la carte“ as described by the former director for policy planning in the U.S. State Department, Richard Haass, “What this administration will give is *a la carte* multilateralism. We will study each agreement and will take a decision, rather than to have a broad approach.”

The selective tactic must be based on an algorithm that identifies weaknesses and strengths of each possible approach, in particular contexts determined by developments on the domestic scene and that international developments that the United States must report reactively or proactively. Joseph S. Nye Jr., although advocates for the multilateralist approach, accepts that there are situations where it is desirable to shift towards unilateralism and suggests American decision makers a set of selection tests – *Checklist for Multilateral Versus Unilateral Tactics*- it identifies seven criteria that can determine the balance tilting to either unilateralism or multilateralism:

1. threat to basic survival interests;
 2. impact on maintaining peace,
 3. impact on strengthening global public good,
 4. compatibility with national values;
 5. situations / problems addressed intrinsically in a collective manner;
 6. shared responsibility;
 7. impact on soft power.
-
1. In critical situations that have implications on vital interests, not unilateral decisions and actions should be excluded, but trying to get international support is also important.

2. There are multilateral arrangements that may reduce the U.S. ability to restore peace in certain regions of the world and, given the overall U.S. global military role, security-related interests are more pronounced. It is a situation which justifies in the view of Nye, U.S. reluctance to sign the Ottawa Convention banning landmines and especially the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court, whose procedures, remain unclear, exposure of U.S. troops from unfounded accusations of the commission of war crimes.
3. Unilateral tactics that include elements of compromise to promote multilateral interests, for the global public good are acceptable and advisable. This is a special formulation of the argument “unilateralism = catalyst for cooperation“, a unilateral decision that may result sometimes in creating stronger mechanisms for collective action. The example often given by Krauthammer on the mobilization for the Gulf War unilateral coalition by President Bush Sr may be enhanced by a factual reference which is the area of international trade. Introducing the principle of multilateralism, by applying the most-favored-nation clause in international trade and formalization and generalization of the gold standard in the 19th century had as a driver Britain’s unilateral decision to open its markets and maintain currency stability.
4. U.S. participation in multilateral cooperation initiatives that promote passivity or are contrary to American values must also be treated on a selective basis and reporting to international regulations impeding U.S. involvement in the defense of these values may be governed by flexibility. Chinese and Russian opposition in the UN Security Council authorizing the 1999 intervention in Kosovo, which aim to stop the actions of human rights violations is, in Nye’s view, a fundamental shift in the U.S. towards the unilateralist option.
5. The great challenges on the global agenda – climate change, global warming, pandemics, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking, transnational terrorism, etc. – belong to the category of issues addressed in a concerted manner, given the impossibility of resolution through unilateral means of global threats. In this case, the option for unilateralism is not only not recommended, but is unnecessary, such threats can only be countered with instruments of multilateralism.

6. The division of responsibilities and costs is a major advantage that tilts balance in favour of the multilateralist approach, especially for participation in military operations. First, employing the U.S. military would respond to collective public preferences of the American public. Moreover, in practical terms, the umbrella for such multilateralism in military commitments significantly reduces image and political costs associated with the size of soft power that the U.S. has and that it has to maintain in a measure equal with the hard power.
7. Soft power is likely to suffer most significantly from variations and oscillations between unilateralism and multilateralism. Constant investment in hard power instruments and their use in a unilateral manner can lead to an inability to properly value and use soft power. Neglecting its importance leads to the possibility to mobilise political resources necessary for its consolidation and consequently determines a fragmentation of the attractive side of power through excessive and arrogant use of unilateralism.

Under such a scale for cost-benefit analysis, transferring unilateralism from the status of casual and temporary tactical arsenal to the status of absolute strategic option would be counterproductive for a global superpower in three ways: intrinsic nature of the most comprehensive global challenges, diminished transnational impact on soft power and the dynamic character of sovereignty.

Strategy recommendations made by Nye are somewhat oriented on the approach of emphasizing the virtues of multilateralism, many of the cases presented as potential exceptions to the rule of multilateralism application shall be accompanied by questionable arguments. Paragraph 3 is based on an argument built as a post-facto justification for recourse to unilateral action. The reasoning flaw lies in the very universal nature of its applicability, because it places an argumentative path only theoretically speaking. Consequences cannot be anticipated – potentially (but not certainly) dynamicised for collective action – in the initial stage of choice for unilateralism. Unilateral action can have a positive impact on shaping the future of unilateral (or multilateral) initiatives, but may end with a failure – both individually and collectively. Section 4 uses the argument of national value, which can be compatible or incompatible with a universally accepted

value system within a framework of multilateral cooperation, such as the UN. The argument defending national security through the exercise of force could be raised by any UN member state, including Arab countries, which could consider Jihad legitimate, through the persuasion of the moral debt to defend Islamic values. Nye's check-list seems to be rather a useful instrument for U.S. foreign policy oriented towards „à la carte“ multilateralism which does not exclude, in certain situations, certain aspects of the international unilateralist approach. It is about dictated unilateral decisions and actions – as American leaders themselves – inefficient institutions and multilateral cooperation schemes in meeting the new challenges of the global agenda.

The danger of inertia or passivity generated by missing consensus or unanimity necessary for the authorization of collective actions (especially in the UN Security Council) cannot be invoked whenever the U.S. decides to ignore the multilateral framework. Those decisions that favor action (independent and unauthorized multilateral courts) and the U.S. opt-out decisions in certain multilateral arrangements are both labeled as unilateralism in US foreign policy. American unilateralism can therefore be one of *employment (unilateralism of commission)*, and one of *omission or non-involvement*. Unilateralism of employment is generally based on American interventionism in solving certain global problems related to the security sphere. “The war on terror“ – began after the attacks of September 11 – is supported by a doctrine of national security strategy that confirms the legitimacy of preventive action, whether it is authorized by the United Nations Security Council or not. About duet preventive-preemptive concept we will discuss at greater length in another context.

Unilateralism of omission, rather well reflected in the decisions of the U.S. administration during the mandates of Clinton and Bush II, is justified, on the one hand, by the need to avoid risks posed by the confusing nature of standards and international regulations on which some multilateral arrangements operate (such as the International Criminal Court). Moreover, the decision to opt-out of U.S. compared to some multilateral international regimes is a common preservation of freedom of action in priority areas of national interest. The most famous example concerns the abandonment of the Kyoto Protocol, rejected by U.S. Senate, the Test Ban Treaty or not signing the Convention banning landmines.

The subtle interrogation in the subtitle of this chapter intended to surprise, from an anticipatory angle, the complexity of a report that makes it extremely difficult to draw a line between the two visions for foreign policy of inexorably unilateralist or evergreen multilateralist. The difficulty derives from the fact that, at the end of this work to investigate the relationship between unilateralism and multilateralism, one cannot formulate a response to the original question, making the relationship unilateralism – multilateralism easily placed in the area of contradiction, causality or flexibility. The three levels of reporting do not cancel each other but on the contrary, they preserve their fluctuations depending on the specificities of the international theme analysed.

The current setting of the international system, the challenges of globalization, interdependence and the transnational character of the great themes of this book make it impossible to build a comprehensive foreign policy strategy based on assumptions that are inherently unilateralist or inherent multilateralist. In addition, there are contexts in which the dispute between what can be defined as unilateralist and what can be defined as multilateralist is impossible to arbitrate and therefore difficult to solve, especially if we consider that the decisions of opt-out (unilateralism of omission) in relation to certain projects or multilateral international regimes are sometimes criticized as hard as unilateral decisions to use force to counter a threat.

The temptation to make generalized conclusions is risky, in that they circumvent the details and can lead to distortion of the overall vision of the problem studied, but have, on the other hand, certain virtues, enlightening, involving surprise at some patterns beyond fickle elements. It is almost clear that European states, taken in bulk privilege multilateralist solutions, especially when the agenda is a security problem and the alternative use of military force is one of the options. Furthermore, decisions, documents and official statements of representatives of the U.S. administration, especially after September 11th, 2001, can lead to an open conclusion of U.S. unilateralism as an option of last resort, where the regulatory burden of multilateralism is seen as an obstacle to U.S. policy objectives.

Both the U.S. and the European Union have addressed, often in a selective manner the multilateralist alternative or the unilateralist one according to the stake. „À la carte“ scenarios of multilateralism could, on the one hand, partially mitigate the perception of costs associated with the binding nature of multilateral cooperation. On the other hand, going towards a flexible multilateralism involves risks comparable to opening a “Pandora’s box“ from which, more or less legitimate arbitrary arguments can be extracted for the defense of national interest by unilateral means. For the European Union the surest way to strengthen the position as a global player is to promote the principle of “effective multilateralism“. For the United States, participation in infrastructure strengthening multilateralism seems to be perceived as a policy where assuming a certain kind of “captivity“ involving the acceptance of international constraints. On the background of the two perspectives, multilateralist credibility depends on the effectiveness institutions of global governance in meeting the challenges of the international agenda, a theme that we try to analyze in the sections below.

NATO as a main representative of transatlantic relations concerning security

To draw the main lines that could move NATO further, we use a form of reviewing the main issues of restructuring the Alliance contained even in the formulas and national projects that will fuel the future debate on the New Strategic Concept a document that will most likely be approved by the reverential 60th anniversary of NATO summit.

Thus we set out to illustrate the general debate concerning:

- NATO – regional or global alliance
- NATO – an Alliance based on common values and an effective tool to defend its members
- What is NATO for the US today?
- What do founding members think about NATO? What do new members think about NATO?
- Will NATO and Article 5 become less and less relevant for EU member states’ hard security?

As methodology we consider the first rule approved by consensus between the parties, the Washington Treaty with subsequent adjustments, the Final Declaration of the NATO summit in Bucharest and related documents and existing strategic concept dating from the summit in Washington in 1999. Then we discuss how the regulatory provisions that are applied to the feasibility and practical applicability of the options and future transformations of the Alliance can be foreseen.

A regional or global alliance?

We have several lines of evaluation of these perspectives: first, if NATO is likely to become a collective security organization to replace the UN or develop, through a symbiosis or a contract with the UN, in the global military organization to apply the rules UN Charter / Treaty of Washington / new rules agreed. Although such a line of argument has been launched and several premises exist in that direction, we believe that it is unlikely such a development will occur.

Subsequently, we address regional or global perspectives of NATO from several points of view: location, coverage, if global. Then if contributors, partners, members, the new architecture of NATO could evolve into a global organization, the types of relationships with global players. Finally we cannot overlook the chapter of resources and capabilities that limit NATO's ability to work anywhere, anytime, under any conditions.

Elements of reform of the collective security system. A global NATO?

Current debates about the UN reform agenda prioritise actions to enhance the efficiency of the organization in maintaining peace and security. The complex file of restructuring and rethinking the decision making process in the Security Council is only one faced of the need for the UN reform in the sphere of collective security, which depends on the stimulation of the reorganization of the entire system of global security, including peacekeeping efforts, conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. The vast majority of reports or studies related to the reform of collective security – the independent ones and those required by the General Secretariat of the UN – But consider first of all, a critical evaluation and

formulation of recommendations on the actions described in Chapter VI of the Charter, the peaceful resolution of disputes. It is an important dimension, but certainly less sensitive and therefore has a low potential to generate controversy that could paralyze the reform initiatives. The “heavy” part of the UN mission in the area of collective security is included in Chapter VII, Action in cases of threats against peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression. This part was deprived of recommendations even in the Brahimi Report, discussion on the reform measures of this type generally resuming to “scriptwriting” a very inconclusive restructuring of the Security Council.

The Brahimi Report, however, served as a reference for shaping the first “doctrine” written on the principles and parts of operations conducted by UN peacekeepers. Presented by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) of the UN at the end of 2007, the “Capstone Doctrine” includes that core of unwritten principles derived from experience of over 60 peacekeeping operations led by the UN since 1948. Exposure beyond the regulatory framework that guides engaging in peacekeeping operations, the document shows the evolution of the UN role in the entire spectrum of tasks related to peace and security (conflict prevention, peace restoration, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace building), with emphasis on peacekeeping. The concept of “Peacekeeping” does not appear verbatim in the contents of the UN Charter and is more difficult to define and integrate. It could be placed, as stated by Dag Hammarskjöld, the second Secretary General of the United Nations, somewhere in the chapter “VI and a half” of the Charter, the traditional methods of peaceful dispute resolution (mediation and negotiation) and those involving the use of force authorized under Chapter VII was therefore undertaking a complex and multidimensional. In the report prepared by the group of experts led by Lakhdar Brahimi in 2000 the need to develop “a rapid and effective deployment capacities” to engage successfully in peacekeeping missions was signaled. The efficiency of the operational component of UN activity in the field of collective security largely depends on the progress of institutional reform of the organization, particularly in terms of capacity of the Security Council to overcome a certain inertia in decision-making level, induced by different visions and interests of its Member States on a number of particular challenges of global security and practical manners of fighting.

Therefore, given the risk of extending the status quo in the manner assumed by the UN missions with the highest degree of difficulty of collective security, many opinions about the reform of the global security system are converging to investigate the viability of alternative institutional arrangements, that transcend the UN multilateral cooperation. It should broadly include a possible order in global security, a more effective and robust one, based on UN Charter principles, but built beyond the institutional framework of the UN, in order to provide “backup solutions“ where United Nations Security Council is faced with the inability to perform tasks subsumed under Chapter VII of the Charter. The scenario of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization expanded globally seems a viable alternative and quasi-legitimate according to theorists of collective security. Legitimacy derives from the fact that NATO is the only multilateral security organization whose consultative mechanisms and positions can be combined to accommodate the most important democratic powers of the world, having the most integrated military structure which enables rapid and effective response against Security threats.

However, the legitimacy of such arrangements on a global scale can hardly be justified by anchoring the principles and values of Western democracies, precisely because that would not meet the requirement of universality. A network of coordination and multilateral cooperation such as the North Atlantic Council or NATO-Russia Council (eg. The NATO-NATO Asia or Middle East) could be a way to extend the authority of the organization to take on security missions overall. The scenario of a “global NATO“ to replace – as a “default contingency institution“ – the UN is under a critical situation to situation transatlantic dimension of security governance in the center of the entire edifice of multilateral cooperation in global security. Such a view reconfirms the importance of boosting transatlantic partnership for the success of efforts to strengthen the infrastructure of global governance.

A regional alliance, with global partners

Washington Treaty by its name – “North Atlantic“, by its preamble – “is intended to promote stability and welfare in the North Atlantic region and the further specification of Article 6 of the area under Article 5, subsequently revised (the disappearance of the Algeria department of France in

July 3rd, 1962, to win the state independence of Article 2 of Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty adopted with the admission of Turkey and Greece in NATO, on 22th October 1951) a regional coverage. This refers both to the geographical area of the location of its members – Article 10 states that the expansion can only include European countries without a precise definition – as well as the area of action – Article 6 restrictedly mentions island possessions as the “North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer”.

The Bucharest Summit Declaration remains ambiguous on the definition of NATO as a global or regional Alliance, but the entries in the text lead indirectly to the relevance of the global component. Article 4 welcomes the Secretary General of UN and bilateral cooperation (subsequently signed in a document stating the defense of NATO countries operations of the UN Charter principles and the quality of selective instrument of security which NATO offers to the UN. To this we add the “ ISAF format “ meeting in Bucharest, the first meeting where so called “global partners“ are named and the importance of the Afghanistan operation is established (article 6 of the statement). In addition to this Article 16 mentions the situation in Darfur and Somalia.

But perhaps the most relevant article (in addition to bilateral granted UN-NATO summit later) is Article 35 of the Declaration, which clearly shows an opening of institutional collaboration with “global partners“ who are partly appointed, and which is the deep global component of the NATO summit in Bucharest that points towards the institutionalization of a contractual relationship under the form of partnerships with non-Member States and will not become members but who participate in NATO operations and will receive, in exchange for NATO support in the defense and security area.

“Art 35. The Alliance attaches great value to the expansion of its diverse relations with other partners worldwide. Our objective in these relationships is to include support for operations, security cooperation and an enhanced common understanding to promote shared security interests and democratic values. We made substantial progress in building political dialogue and cooperation in the development of personalized packages, a number of such states. We welcome in particular the significant contributions of Australia,

Japan, New Zealand and Singapore to NATO led efforts in Afghanistan. We also welcome the valuable contributions made by the Republic of Korea (South Korea) efforts that support the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan. Recognizing that each of these countries wishes to pursue a single degree of relations with NATO and that other countries would continue forms of dialogue and cooperation with NATO we also reiterate our desire to continue beyond individual relationships and to develop existing ones, according to the North Atlantic Council's approval and at a level that respects mutual interests."

From these provisions we conclude that the coverage area has become a fundamentally global, that operations are no longer limited geographically nor are types of partnerships, and there is a common and a fundamental interest on behalf of democratic states worldwide to join the defense of common values elsewhere in the world, in open or close partnerships with NATO.

Instead the Strategic Concept maintains regional geographical references - defense and security of its members but also the first reference of "out of area" after the Strategic Concept of 1991, in Rome, assuming "stability in the Euro-Atlantic" is the main objective for which detailed risks, threats, types of forces and capabilities, geographical balance, speed deployment, method of financing etc., are given. It was normal as these were the first operations outside the Member States but at the same time as the NATO crisis management capabilities were developed in areas of the Euro-Atlantic area, because they could affect Member States. And here we can assume that it is a regional reference, not beyond the size determined by the Washington Treaty. But this strategic concept should be revised and updated, as it originated before September 11th, 2001 and before the first activation of Article 5 itself.

There is another dimension that announces the opening of a global perspective with global relevance for NATO actions and operations: energy security and how this is explained within NATO. Thus, Article 48 of the final declaration of Bucharest stated "We note the report "NATO's Role in Energy Security", prepared in response to tasks set by the summit in Riga. Allies identified principles which will govern NATO's approach in this area and pointed out options and recommendations for further work. Based on

these principles NATO will engage in the following areas: synthesis and exchange of information and intelligence, design stability, promoting international cooperation and regional support; consequence management and critical energy infrastructure support. The Alliance will continue to assess the immediate risks to energy security. We will ensure that NATO achievements represent added value and are fully coordinated and integrated with the international community and a number of organizations specializing in energy security. We designated the Council, the Permanent SECTION, to prepare a consolidated report on progress in the area of energy security to assess during our 2009 summit.”

Without being a dramatic change of direction, there are two components that have global lengthening: first that the energy resources come from around the world and NATO missions in the direction of safeguarding the fundamental energy resources may therefore expand globally. Then consequence management and protection of critical infrastructure - pipelines and sea routes, of equal importance - announce a new direction of global development of NATO, and the need for global partners.

Now, if in fact we were to discuss current issues, which double the elements of normative-legal nature, we can basically see that we deal with an Alliance with global lengthening, that although does not assume responsibilities in the world, in any transaction, not even those that interest the “global partners“, with whom it did not quantify the final formula of cooperation and mutual support, except NATO led operations (Afghanistan), but who in fact, selectively act based on decisions from applications throughout the world. Thus, if the operations in Afghanistan – ISAF, the NATO Training Mission-Iraq NTMI – are known and most criticized, we must not forget other missions in developing the air-lift missions for the UN and EU missions Darfur, the anti-piracy mission off the Somali coast, the latest mission with participation of NATO vessels up to NATO’s naval visits required by Asian countries in Southeast Asia until the Far East, vessels accompanying missions on African Eastern Coast East and the Mediterranean, anti-terrorist mission Active Endeavor – OAE – off the coast of North Africa. All these give a real sense of global relevance of NATO operations and the Alliance itself. In fact naturally the capabilities

deficit was covered by cooperation with “global partners“, whose relations with the Alliance will be streamlined and institutionally integrated in the future to sustainably create this type of cooperation.

Globalization and the principle of global governance, especially in the area of security announces a natural development, organic NATO a global player by position. Even if future “global partners“ are not actual members, the States in question and the principles of cooperation show that the choice is not determined by strategic needs and capabilities to cover the deficit but contains the in-depth principle of common values, as specified in Article 35 of the Final Declaration of the Bucharest Summit and the list of states covered by those policies, all “actors belonging to the West“ by liberal democracy and free market economy, but also lifestyle and the Protection principles in the preamble of the Washington Treaty, *“They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area“*. And the best proof is the posting of “global partners“ of Euro-Atlantic states, NATO and Ukraine, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Initiative in the Gulf area. A full debate on this issue was made in the margin of the Riga summit.

An alliance based on common values and an effective protection mechanism for its members

From this point of view, it is clear that NATO remains an Alliance clearly based on common values and an effective tool to defend its members. If in both cases approved programming documents are clear, the only place to decide a way of conduct is in the expansion Chapter. Here the themes are very clear in terms of values, but the idea suffers from interpretation of “value added“ to the common defense of NATO members from new members, and here the subject has to be approached in a broader discussion.

Returning to the programming documents, the Treaty of Washington states in its preamble states’ determination to safeguard freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual freedoms and the rule of law “, as well as “ the union

for mutual defense efforts, maintenance of peace and stability. Article 5 is one of strength and solidarity, “an attack against one member is interpreted as an attack on the Alliance“, and the chapter reaction, with no explicit binding participation“ by any means “(as the solidarity clause included in Treaty of Lisbon), “each or jointly exercise their right of self-defense referred to in Article 51 of UN Charter“ and “will assist in containing and countering attacks.

Article 10 of the Treaty is relevant in connection with the extension, that states that “the parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State to become a member“ if “to further strengthen the principles of the Treaty and accede to the new member contributes to security North Atlantic region. So are the founding principles are specifically maintained, but also a condition of “contribution to the security of the North Atlantic region“ is further developed in forms and documents that deserves a full debate.

The final statement of the last summit of NATO at the Bucharest mentioned, even in Article 1 ‘commitment to a shared vision and shared democratic values’ included in the Washington Treaty. And in terms of new members invited to the fundamental principles mentioned in Article 2, namely that “The accession of new members will strengthen security for the entire Euro-Atlantic area and bring us closer to“ our goal of achieving a whole, free and at peace Europe“. It is clear that inviting Croatia and Albania is not explicitly judged in the light “level of democracy and respect for values“, but only for “contributing to Euro-Atlantic security“and“ a whole and free Europe“. Democratic principles seem to become a less strict criteria for admission, but become an important criteria in promoting common values in Europe combined.

The only relevant point in keeping the idea that in the space member countries the principles and values are the results from the MAP assessment reports of the two candidate countries (IPAP and MAP and the others) and the clear separation of “global partner“ gives other types of partnerships, which keeps in the area nearest the alliance democratic countries and Western cultures, wherever they may be found in the world.

The current Strategic concept, adopted in Washington in 1999, also mentions the freedom and independence of States and the principle of common defense with related instruments, but does not refer to common values that would have to defend the Member States, mentioned in the founding documents and the free and whole Europe formula does not cover an “export of Alliance“ values. Still in Article 10, the security component specifies as mandatory the “growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes“. This explanation retains the general formula of checking candidate states’ degree of democracy, more specifically sustainability and irreversibility of democratic institutions.

Therefore, under programmatic documents, we can say that, formally, NATO remains an organization based on its original values, that it expands but in accordance with keeping the “added value“ to the common defense and the existence of stable democratic institutions in new Member States, and that it sees at any point, explicitly, the need for “exporting democracy“, while the interpretation of actual values to new countries invited is rather loose and based on a political impact, not based on strict criteria.

Practical issues show an inclination to maintain values, but see as close the process of giving up “exporting“ the criteria outside the Alliance and the criteria used are not as stringent as the first expansion values.

The contribution of new members to the common defense “North Atlantic area remains to be discussed. It is clear according to the final Declaration of the Bucharest summit, that the signatory states - in this case all - recognize that receiving new members - Croatia and Albania - has lead to “increased security“ in the North Atlantic area. In fact, the unstable situation in Kosovo and the fact that Macedonia was not invited raises big questions in particular because they lack timing of receipt of Albania and Macedonia into NATO, especially because for the later the reason was a symbolic one and not concerning the background and, moreover, raised the position of veto by a single state, Greece, an unprecedented situation and costless situation for the Alliance.

Then the actual debate on the contribution of each of the new members, but also a debate on the contributions of older members, that meanwhile entered the EU, could help us realize that, once entered the EU, states have overlooked commitments and the investment in their capabilities, but also contributions to international missions of the Alliance, and how difficult it is to achieve practical validation of this goal, receiving only net contributors and, on the long term, the Euro-Atlantic security and defense policy.

Secondly, there is an entire discussion on what it means to contribute to “the Euro-Atlantic security“. According to the strategic concept in place, since Rome, understanding security after the school in Copenhagen led to a fundamental reinterpretation. Thus, the Strategic Concept in Washington and the content of the declaration of the Bucharest summit covers the security component with 5 dimensions, thus opening new perspectives for discussion on added value. Thus, as energy security is already a subject in the final statement it is very clear that the added value to the security of the North Atlantic that a state can bring could also include energy security, in this respect Georgia being able to be simply interpreted as an added value, for example.

Moreover, the idea of added value is judged by multiple readings: first an immediate one, when validating the invitation. Then one perspective, the sustainability of the added value. Finally, a prospective, medium and long term, which would show that if a particular state is not invited, security on a certain dimension, for example the energy in the medium and long, would have to loose. It is clear that even this step is not sufficient, because one test is involved, the Common Defense. And here the problem of defense costs for a possible outpost that can be deducted from the value added to the security of the North Atlantic area comes into place.

Consequently, the area of reading, interpretation and evaluation is sufficiently broad to allow each Member State its own evaluation of defense interests in relation to a potential candidate. Weightlessness comes from the lack of requirement to respond, even in an activation of Article 5, but also broader security needs of the North Atlantic area and nuanced interpretations of different perception of risks, threats and vulnerabilities on behalf of each state. We consider it an endless story with no possibility of a clarification of the more stringent criteria and that the range of interpretations and arguments reduce any expansion process to a fundamentally political exercise of behalf of the Alliance members.

What does NATO mean to the US today?

The debate on the U.S. relationship with NATO has several distinct and crucial components that link together and on the way the U.S. (and Europe) see the transatlantic relationship (as shown above) in general, its role as a catalyst for a global force of modeling and change, but some factual evidence as well:

- What is the role we want for the U.S. in NATO – leader, member of a transatlantic couple or one of the members
- What is NATO for the U.S.: an instrument of foreign policy, among many others (including, preferably, a predominant bilateral relationship with any NATO partner), a structure of legitimacy of their foreign and security policy or a catalyst for joint decisions on transatlantic issues
- How to make decisions / should decisions be made in NATO: U.S. preeminence, jams of non-consensus, real European consensus counterweight to U.S. decisions. Obviously this area is judged and effectiveness of the Alliance with the negative aspects-voluntarism, or positive-speed response.
- Sharing responsibilities: Leaving European security to the Europeans or maintaining U.S. involvement in Europe on security and defense. There are also the debates on the budgets, capabilities in operations, cost sharing, commitment to NATO operations, the ratio between defense planning and expeditionary forces.
- How each of the alliance members sees the expansion and future of the Alliance and Article 5 (subject discussed in a chapter below).

Obviously, all these are inextricably linked to the perceived threats, risks and vulnerabilities of the various Allied countries and their citizens, and the perception of the idea of security for each of them. Let us take in turn:

- The US Role and place in NATO: The U.S. is, naturally, a leader in NATO, not only the first peer, but even a leader of authority and decision, as long as we talk about a defense of the military-political alliance, with a tendency to turn into a political-military alliance, with the same defensive purpose. But there are variants of the proposed architecture, which limit this position: either create a counterweight to “Europea“, and drawing two components transatlantic NATO, which would balance a little more, if not military report, even politics, but the

result would be the polarization of the Alliance, whose effect would be a split / its disappearance or blocking decision would make the tool useless. There is a possibility that favors a position of “equals“ between the U.S.’s 26. Side effects of a “democratization“ of the Alliance would be loss of interest of the U.S. for the Alliance and its withdrawal, and that of the U.S. leadership and its capabilities, which would make the Alliance unnecessary or amorphous.

The debate is even more radical, when we talk about too much or too little US involvement in NATO: some states / political leaders are talking about too much U.S. in NATO, seeing leadership as a way to use NATO to endorse U.S. policies or design its external. Moreover, the idea of supporting a European component, the debate about budgets and capabilities is interpreted to be a “burden sharing“, a “selective approach to security“, “a bilateral alliance according to U.S. interests “.

We all must agree to the following principles (already accepted by all Member States, as proven by NATO documents, although disputed by some politicians):

- **The role of U.S. in European security and defense** is extremely important and we must keep the U.S. engaged in Europe (there are a number of states that see their existence depending on the U.S. security commitment to Europe).
- **NATO exists and has a direction of development under the current method of decision making** (which will probably remain the same in the foreseeable future) as long as there is a leadership in agreement with other allies, a sense of development that it is useful to humanity in general, for the Allies, and especially for contributors (the U.S. being the largest). **U.S. leadership** in NATO does not imply any waiver of its sovereignty, no “atlanticisation“ of European policies, any support / enforcement of U.S. policy or a white sheet over its policies. That is why U.S. leadership is required, must be accepted, and interwoven with rational arguments and balanced contributions to NATO operations which lead to increased importance of European voices and European interests in the matter, as long as the U.S. remains engaged in European security and European states involved in global policies, balancing U.S. policies and keeping Europe involved in major decisions.

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- **The attempt to bipolarise** is unrealistic for the European states (which still have separate positions), moreover the European pillar could create major problems in the functionality Alliance wither by making the Alliance ineffective due to US withdrawal or disporportional - with reduced legitimacy of an important role and voices global policies.
 - We have to accept as legitimate that NATO is an instrument of foreign policy for each allied state, the more so for the U.S., which therefore remains committed to Europe. It becomes necessary then for European states to direct themselves towards an effective and balanced contribution to the mission and demonstrate an integrative nature, and divide the costs and benefits in proportion to the contributions, and with strategic size and profile of each state.
 - The U.S. and other countries have the right to pursue policies which relate to all allies and other dimensions, and using other tools. So the U.S. are allowed to apply bilateral instruments (to limit the decision formula and formulas involving unilateral application of force that can be clearly agreed in the Alliance, and the current leadership is inclined to the U.S.) when EU or other states are not interested, and the EU may have its own operations in acting with the support or infrastructure capabilities of NATO or independently.
 - Coverage of legality and legitimacy is reciprocal, and can be agreed upon through the Alliance's system decision making system, to define threats and define areas of the Alliance. The problem of capabilities (at Transatlantic level) is also mutual, and as the US has military capabilities needed by the EU, and the United States needs capabilities that are European. Thus, in the spirit of multilateralism pursued by the European Security Strategy, the EU needs to keep the U.S. engaged in Europe and to participate in operations outside Europe (when it comes to transactions pertaining to the defense of Europe and North Atlantic security zone perceived as common).
 - The report between a separate action or other instruments (possibly ad hoc coalition of the willing) that U.S. and EU and NATO joint action must fall towards zero, while transatlantic perception matching risks and threats, but also capabilities and involvement in third spaces, must become more compatible.

These principles are able to give solution for the following issues, solution that will benefit all those involved:

For the US NATO is obviously a tool of foreign policy, among many others but the deep involvement of the Alliance in other directions showing interest on other planes can bring almost all of these issues on the discussion board within NATO, NATO's involvement as a whole, with increased security and strategic profile and the EU, and minimizing (to zero) U.S. actions outside the station. The "global partner" approach in NATO goes along the same lines and debate issues of defense and security in the formula equal to the Alliance, and not in another setting (not excluding here the UN Security Council). No one will discuss these issues outside of the Alliance if all these problems are "insider" problems of interest to all.

The formula can indeed bring legitimacy to U.S. policies, but it can also influence them and all European states and allies in operations and decisions and then fear of legitimizing a "unilateral policies" of the U.S. decreases exponentially because it is much less expensive for Washington to engage the Alliance in steady action, with cost sharing than a unilateral or random formula, which may result in higher costs, especially with decreasing levers that keep temporary U.S. allies close. Equally this approach is less costly for European states, than the formulas involving indifference and carelessness on specific issues, with time effects or the response after a unilateral action that may affect the interests of European states allied in a third area, the more you spend on taking away credibility from the US or delegitimising its actions. Moreover, a problem of this magnitude in a sufficiently efficiency and speedy bureaucracy to keep it attractive, is more interesting for the United States and any allies to balance the actual policies. NATO may thus be a true catalyst for joint decisions on transatlantic decisions regarding security and defense issues.

Concerning the decision making process in NATO, the de facto acceptance of U.S. rule is less harmful and realistic, even in the necessary leadership in the Alliance than the loss of interest or commitment in Europe and the U.S. decision to move outside the Alliance. Here are some important bottlenecks limiting the consensus by the themes ambitions minor or purely symbolic,

and real consensus obtained through discussion of arguments and tactical failure to achieve the strategic objective of all employment decisions within the Alliance, and avoid excessive forms of obvious to a European counterweight to any position or draft decision of the United States, the direct effect of polarization.

Obviously the effectiveness of the Alliance with the negative-voluntary or positive-speed response aspects are being judged here. When both dimensions are covered, it is natural to maintain joint decisions and operational effects and efficacy in cases that require prompt responses.

Here is the place to debate a subject that is accused of being a proof of safety division and that the U.S. responds only where it has interests in Europe, on a bilateral basis. We believe that this assertion is fundamentally flawed and is evidenced of a lack of strategic defense planning.

The fundamental mistake comes from a lack of interest in the subject of missile defense in Europe, a subject that is costly and unpopular. In fact, here we deal with an added value that the U.S. has brought to other countries by locating an additional defensive tool, for a threat that is not shared by all states. Here we can add numerous technical elements that show that the allied targets are not covered by exemption from the immediate holding capabilities, moreover, is already negotiating with the Russian Federation submission of an additional shield. Who made this assertion denies lack of obligation to the American tax-payer to fund only element of the defense of Europe and the location of a European defense values plus a state-funded sophisticated may be interpreted as an obligation of that State to produce the same type of defense for all the Allies, at their expense. However this interpretation as a “divisibility of defense“ for NATO states is at least laughable.

We will not conclude this section without addressing the idea of common principles to broadening the Alliance. Even accepting that the U.S. looks upon the NATO expansion as an opportunity to influence policy in the east, the same can happen with all the Allies, for all of them are involved in these decisions. Moreover, the formula proposes greater involvement and increased interest of all allies for a much broader category of issues subject

to change “expansion of political influence in the east“ of an actor in “Eastern enlargement of NATO’s political influence, all allies, including of the Europeans and the EU as such. Obviously, each step comes with costs and benefits for security, but we do not believe it is true that it increases the direct cost of territorial defense only because the new geographical area is much higher. Instead, each new Member State shall be received as an added value of transatlantic security and defense of the region and the common interface front with non-member States that can be seen as threats is relatively constant.

What do founding members think about NATO? What do new members think about?

We will attempt to briefly state what the main vision of foreign policy pursued by Member States of the European Union against U.S. power and to identify, therefore, certain **reactions, trends and preferences expressed by European “voices“** in a context of transatlantic relations.

Distinct echoes of European “voices“ were caught with greater clarity on the background of the fracture occurred in the transatlantic partnership as a result of U.S. military intervention in Iraq. Of course, reporting how the controversial decision of European foreign policy of the Bush administration in that particular context can be interpreted in terms of limits induced by circumstances. However, this episode generating dilemmas and transatlantic divides had impressive effects on the academic efforts to examine the seriousness of the crisis (temporary divergence or the consequence of structural differences in addressing international issues), to identify and understand the causes of this crisis and, not least all, to propose various scenarios of a solution to this impasse.

Generally speaking the literature on “transatlantic crisis“ oscillates, on the one hand, pro-European visions of those defenders of multilateralism and American unilateralism in dealing with attorneys’ global issues. On the other hand, it is easy to see the current trend of most theorists of international relations going to extremes, stressing that strategic convergence is an element that provides a “Transatlantic optimism“ – a fact largely contradicted by actual developments on the global scene – or those divisive

elements seeking to anticipate a worst-case pathscenario of transatlantic relations – scenario also contradicted by the recent rather encouraging transatlantic cooperation dynamic.

We will take as benchmark a neutral and balanced contribution, which is noted in the vast literature of transatlantic relations for the lucidity with which it dissects, at the interface between politics and theory, the division of the Western world. Using theoretical scales offered by three schools of thought - realism, liberalism and constructivism – the authors of the volume *“Divided West. European Security and the Transatlantic Relationship”* divided the continent into five customized profiles based on strategic options as a proportion of U.S. foreign policy vision: *“Atlantic Europe”*, *“Core Europe”*, *“New Europe”*, *“Non-aligned Europe ‘and’ Periphery Europe”*.

The UK is the best illustration of the *“Atlantic Europe”* and examining *“special relationship”* between the U.S. and the UK brings to the forefront an Atlanticist position which, while expressing concerns about the trends of American hegemony unilateraliste, defends the US foreign policy approach and support the inefficiency of the Gaullist French and German approaches at the level of their impact on the administration in Washington. By aligning itself to U.S. policy and choosing a direction opposite to that taken by *“Core Europe”* (*“Old Europe”*), the United Kingdom reiterated its traditional role of transatlantic broker, an increasingly ambiguous and difficult role.

A similar point of view on the role of Britain as a *“bridge”* in transatlantic relations, but perhaps far too optimistic in terms of vision related to regeneration of transatlantismului is suggested by Timothy Garton Ash. Timothy Garton Ash does not necessarily advocate the idea of transatlantic balance, but tries to investigate alternatives that could restore that balance or that would alleviate, at least, the impact of critical elements that marked the transatlantic relations in recent years. The key for euroatlanticist consolidation is also British. Beyond bilateral relations between European states and the U.S., Britain must assume the role of binder and *“performer”* in the relationship between EU and U.S. *“Great Britain links with Europe and America are so strong and vital that the choice between Europe and*

America would be like choosing to shoot your right foot or left foot. Therefore, we must try with all our forces to push Europe towards America and America towards Europe”.

Redefining transatlantic relations depends on the strength of strategic “euroatlanticist” visions struggle between two European ways of attempting to deal with the U.S. partner: “neo-Gaullisme” and “neo-churchillism. As Europe, guided by the vision of French, will adopt an increasingly neo-Gaullist view, fostering EU-US opposition, the U.S. unilateralism will become stronger. On the other hand, the United Kingdom should avoid extreme neo-churchillism, allying the U.S. unconditionally whenever the need to choose between the two, so as not to compromise the neutrality and the role of binder and its position as a member of the Union. Obviously, any evidence of multilateralism in the U.S. would help European euroatlanticism.

The “Core Europe” (“Old Europe”) vision in relation to the U.S. is best expressed, in the opinion of Forsberg and Herd, by Germany, particularly since it expressed its view against U.S. military intervention in Iraq before France, giving, as Maria Wagrowski, states, “the tone of relations between the EU and the U.S. at that time“. However, immediately after the U.S. invasion in Iraq, including the vast U.S. initiative on the “global war on terrorism“, the German position was reactive rather than proactive to the subsequent “global war on terrorism“, proving the absence of internal political will to place national Foreign Policy in a European context.

“New Europe’s “ position – a concept that means a group of new EU Member States – is built on a realistic approach to transatlantic division, which supports the idea of U.S. prevalence in the international arena, focusing on the historical argument to support U.S. dependence rather than the fear generated by American global hegemony. However, the force of the new Member States’ Atlanticist attitude is questionable in terms of the promoters of this theoretical scale, since, although it seems unlikely that “New Europe“ states will ever take up an open hostile position on Washington, their view on international relations does not differ radically from the old Member States. The interests and ambitions of these countries

outline a European profile visible in time, especially by engaging in the development of CFSP and ESDP, which will contribute to “New Europe’s” critical attitude of towards developments in U.S. policy on global security . “**Non-aligned Europe**“ includes those EU countries not members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Sweden, Ireland, Austria and Finland. True to the principle of military neutrality, non-aligned states, although generally adopt an equidistant policy between “Core Europe“ and “Atlantic Europe“, do not share the same strategic thinking and do not act as a compact block when they relate to the U.S. The neutrality policy of this group of countries can be supported, Forsberg and Herd’s believe, to the extent that the strategic dissonance between “Core Europe“ and “Atlantic Europe in the transatlantic relationship, NATO and the future role and functioning relationship between NATO and the European security and defense persists. In the event of a scenario of strategic convergence between the views of the two blocks, the field of maneuvering of the countries promoting the principle of military neutrality will be limited and their foreign policy option will be more difficult to support.

The impact of the ‘Periphery Europe’ vision on the heterogeneous spectrum of strategic positioning of EU Member States against the United States is extremely important, especially as Russia, the exponent of the concept of “peripheral Europe“, has a potential to become an actor of disagreement both at the Union’s level and at the transatlantic relations plan. But it is unlikely that Russia would opt - in a systematic manner and based on a realistic calculation - for a policy of operating transatlantic disagreements, because its interest are to address a constructive relationship with NATO, and consequently with the U.S. and the European Union.

1. NATO Secretary General

In his speeches as representative of NATO, Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer sought to clarify the importance of NATO in collective security and prevent potential threats from emerging. NATO’s official representative sees NATO as “the collective effort of many in order to ensure the security and more“, which emphasizes maintaining the security of NATO members and partners NATO’s leading role.

Also, concerning the future of NATO, the Secretary General's statements we can substrat the idea of NATO training and involvement in prevention and resolution of threats that are not necessarily classic but new challenges such as terrorist cyber attacks, WMD proliferation or loss of energy resources. It is clear that the future NATO perspective involves discussing emerging risks, an analysis of threats that may affect the safety and security of future generations and ensuring an effective response to these threats by developing their capabilities and making partnerships.

Thus, at the Bucharest Summit, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer insisted on the 4 main themes, which refer to the role and evolution of NATO:

1. reaffirming NATO operations as a vital security element- indicating here the importance of involving NATO in Afghanistan (to prevent the return of extremist camps, building a democratic and stable areas) and in Kosovo, but also undertaking joint action with the UN, EU and other major international organizations;
2. strengthening European space – opening NATO to the countries of SE Europe, Ukraine and Georgia, and by strengthening relations with countries in the Balkans (Montenegro, Bosnia Herzegovina and even Serbia)
3. extension of NATO's partnerships across the Euro-Atlantic area - since it is an era of globalization and NATO partnerships must reflect this;
4. addressing new risks and threats.

Finally, NATO's Secretary General believes that NATO needs to ensure its relevance and effectiveness concerning long-term actions, to show more clearly the public role and importance of NATO, and to consider the answers to various problems that only arise temporary and to bear in mind that permanent changes are necessary, sometimes even radical approaches to NATO. In the near future, NATO will continue to deal with strengthening its relationship with the EU, enlargement of the alliance, stabilizing the "failing states", the integration of new players (India, China) in the overall system, and combat threats like climate change, migration , proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc.

2. Founding members

BELGIUM

Belgium's position on NATO's future was underlined by HRH Prince Philip of Belgium in a speech delivered at the NATO headquarters in Brussels. HRH appreciates in a positive direction the alliance's leadership on enlargement, the renewing of its political and military structures, its renewed strategies and new missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Belgium has always agreed to assume responsibility as a founding member but also as the host nation of this organization; it also accepted and encouraged the integration of the seven countries in NATO that have proved to share the same vision. Belgium is in favor of a closer partnership with the Russian Federation as part of the objectives pursued by NATO: peace and security.

Belgium considers that real protection is gained through solidarity, alliances, unions, partnerships, a society that is built together, a community that shares the same values. Belgium promotes "building bridges" between nations to increase security and promote integration to strengthen and open multicultural societies promoted by NATO countries. These are the principles that guide Belgium within the organization.

According to Belgium NATO is a real European and Atlantic organization, which is what makes the organization unique and powerful. U.S. support is essential for Europeans. Belgium needs and fully supports a transformed NATO, an alliance of determined and well equipped members to meet new global challenges. After concluding a meeting with his Ukrainian counterpart, Yulia Tymoshenko, Prime Minister of Belgium said that Ukraine is not ready yet to join the North Atlantic Alliance as not all the prerequisites for accession have been met.

CANADA

In the Canadian view, NATO is the pillar of the relationship between Canada and Europe. Canadian participation in NATO included exercises conducted with allies and includes a high-level voice on matters of security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

Canada is involved in many operations under the aegis of NATO in the Balkans, in Iraq (since 2004 mainly in training security forces), in Africa and Afghanistan. The Afghanistan chapter is a priority for the Canadian government. ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) proves the practical role that NATO has in ensuring peace and security beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. Providing a stable, democratic and secure Afghanistan is a top priority of NATO and Canada. Canada strongly supports NATO leadership in Afghanistan and currently has about 2,500 people belonging to Canadian Forces in Afghanistan (Kandahar). Canada is proud to fight for achieving the ideals of NATO. The Canadian public opinion has voiced solidarity for the allies' in the mission in Kandahar.

FRANCE

France's attachment for the transatlantic relation is a sustainable and traditional one. France maintains that no coalition can replace the Alliance, that NATO must adapt to the new context and that the main asset of the organization in the future will be to strengthen Europe and defense. France advocates a continuous dialogue and respect between partners, and makes public their absolute solidarity for Turkey if it were threatened. NATO enlargement is a salutary decision since the alliance is in a wider geographical framework and a more consistent one at that. France supports the establishment of a NATO reaction force. The greatest asset of NATO will strengthen European security and defense policy who does not want a competitor but an alliance partner. In view of the French in the future the Alliance must take into account several issues: continuing efforts to maintain stability on the European continent, refurbishing its military structures, supported by strong upgraded European relations between all countries kept through of consultation and cooperation.

In the French vision the future of NATO largely depends on the future of the EU and the ESDP French commitment to NATO is a strong one considering the fact that France is one of the first countries that contribute to the alliance's budget and French troops have been engaged in NATO operations under UN mandate for 15 years. The fact that 21 EU countries are also NATO members shows in the French view within NATO we find the same values, same culture, same history. At present we can only speak of NATO and the EU together for defense, security and peace. France has

proposed four measures to promote NATO's transparency and cooperation between the alliance and the EU. Among the priorities of the French is the association of non EU NATO members to the ESDP.

Concerning the accession of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO, France has encouraged this, and noted that the two have the vocation to be members of the alliance, but stating that accession is a matter that has a timetable. However, at the December meeting in Brussels the French Minister for European Affairs Jean-Pierre Jouyet said: "The accession of Ukraine and Georgia is not current, nor are the interests of Europe or its relations with Russia"; at the Bucharest summit Prime Minister Francois Fillon claimed that France opposes the accession of Ukraine and Georgia because he thinks " it is not the right answer for the balance of power in Europe and between Europe and Russia and we want to conduct a dialogue with Russia on this issue."

France is more skeptical with regard to NATO's cooperation with other countries like Japan, South Korea, Australia, etc.

ITALY

Italian Ambassador Claudio Bisogniero stated in one of his speeches that NATO's role is to ensure stability and peace. He also mentioned that NATO has proved the most successful alliance in history and still associates it with the success the Alliance had in defending the West and the fight against communism.

In his view NATO countries had to switch to an active employment policy, not only for the security service but also for international peace and stability. NATO is also influenced by two seemingly contradictory factors: continuity and change.

In continuing his speech the ambassador wanted to add that NATO has always been unique in combining North America and Europe - with these two common links (cultural, economic and political). As he further emphasizes the Transatlantic Alliance is a framework that allows all countries regardless of the statute to be heard, to seek solutions based on consensus and to train and support military forces in action.

LUXEMBURG

Luxembourg's Defense Minister, Luc Frieden, says that NATO is an indispensable tool for international security. In his view this organization will need to ensure stability in the world at least for the next 20 years. NATO is a unique institutional platform where international security issues between Europe and America are discussed. NATO's future must take into account these two coordinates: the existence of a very effective military alliance and a firm commitment from all members.

Foreign Minister of Luxembourg Jean Asselborn stressed that NATO's decisions have had a major influence on neighbours - including Russia.

THE NETHERLANDS

The Netherlands is one of the main participants in the NATO mission in Afghanistan. Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende highlights the need for the EU and U.S. to work together. Following a visit to the White House the foundation of cooperation between the two countries as NATO allies to combat AIDS / HIV in Africa, were put into place. FGBAD (Future Ground Based Air Defense) is related to interoperability with other NATO air defense systems. The Dutch Parliament approved the extension of the mission in Afghanistan until 2010. Future vision of the Dutch alliance depends on success in Afghanistan.

NORWAY

If after the Cold War NATO was looking for new tasks in the future the challenge will be to choose tasks according to the resources owned and avoid spending them inefficiently. The future development of the organization should be based on a common political basis. Norway welcomed the improving political climate in the bosom of NATO once the new orientation of the U.S. (Bush's second term) came into being. The challenge for NATO's future remains to solve the problem of Afghanistan. NATO is vital for the future of an exemplary coordination among allies. Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Store, has proposed several propositions in order to improve coherence and international involvement of allies: the UN must take command of its international efforts in Afghanistan, we must improve cooperation and dialogue between capitals and headquarters of international organizations.

In terms of the NATO – Russia cooperation this is an important point that involves a multitude of demands. It is easy to see that the NRC has not evolved at the level expected when it was founded, not when it comes to political dialogue nor when it comes to practical cooperation. Norway hopes for a greater involvement by the Russian Federation. Working in the NRC is characterized by routine and lack of dynamism, issues on which Norway wants to have a word to say. Norway supports NATO cooperation with other countries like Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea. In Norway's view NATO needs global partners but must not become a global organization. Perhaps the biggest challenge that NATO has to face is to support the population of member countries for the actions they carry out.

PORTUGAL

Portugal's contribution to the alliance has increased significantly over the last decade in particular by participating in the IFOR in Bosnia. North Atlantic allies are still having a key role in European collective security and participation is essential for security and stability in Europe as demonstrated by the conflicts in former Yugoslavia. Portugal supports France's policy to strengthen the foundation of the European pillar within NATO. In view of the Portuguese NATO has to reform and develop by strictly pragmatic principles. Portugal supports cooperation with countries of the Mediterranean basin, Africa and South America

DENMARK

Denmark is in the process of transforming its armed forces, which will allow them to double capacity to participate in NATO missions. NATO must transform itself to remain a relevant organization, according to new threats: terrorism, failed-states and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. NATO's future must take into account a major transformation in the armed forces made by transforming its national army. The Danish Minister of Defense sees in the future of NATO the need to give credibility to this organization in the eyes of public opinion.

The US

In his speech at the Bucharest summit, the U.S. President expressed, on behalf of his country, his desire to see a united Europe in which all states must benefit equally from freedom and stability. He welcomed the NATO expansion, which in his opinion annulled the division of Europe and said the purpose of this summit is to expand alliance.

The U.S. is, according to its president, willing to expand the alliance towards countries that want to be part of it, considering that this would be very much to their benefit and to that of NATO in general, the extension must be made, in his opinion, based on merit rather than subjective considerations.

In fact, the leader in Washington stressed that even Georgia and Ukraine, as well as any European democracy that can fulfill the responsibilities that NATO membership may join in future.

America says that the foundation of NATO lies not only need a security policy of the U.S. and Europe, but also a common civilization, whose values should be protected and promoted together so they must act in concert against major threats like international terrorism, threatening the civilization.

The values it wants NATO to promote are the values promoted by the United States for a long time, namely freedom, democracy and human rights, and an optimal tool to ensure the triumph of these issues worldwide would be NATO, as demonstrated, says George W Bush, in Afghanistan and Iraq.

However, the alliance is designed to protect all innocents, possible targets of groups hostile to the values expressed above, and NATO is therefore especially important because it is the means by which each person can feel more secure.

Bush has argued that unless you fight against enemies on their territory we will have to fight them on our territory which would increase risks enormously. In other words, to preserve the safety of citizens of the alliance it is better to work remotely wherever necessary.

North-atlantic troops ensure stability, necessary security for new democracies such as Afghanistan and Iraq. For reconstructing areas where building a democratic state is at its beginning the U.S. launches new troops in those areas, to fight alongside the democratic forces against local extremists and to improve living conditions and safety.

NATO is therefore in the view of the American President, according to his speech in Bucharest, a coalition the U.S. has the honor of being a member of, with the aim of serving the values of open society and will continue to promote the same policies in the future, which is closely related to its nature, its reason to be. Victorious NATO operations are seen by Bush as a demonstration to the world that the international situation is not under the control of terrorist factions, but under that of the forces supporting the values present in the U.S. and Europe.

In the future, President Bush says that NATO must meet the growing challenges, fueled by technological developments; to this purpose he stresses the importance of anti-missile shields in Eastern Europe and the Pacific, for defense against potential missile threats from states whose capacity to produce them increases, such as Iran or North Korea. So the U.S. believes that 21st century NATO must pass from the simple philosophy of intervention to that of prevention, deterrence, evoking the raised shields and victories in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq as good ways to discourage threats.

In other words U.S. leadership sees a continued evolution of NATO, which is an adaptable structure that can always change the philosophy and methods to deal with new realities: the Cold War alliance was intended only to protect Western Europe from the USSR, without there ever being an

operation to this end during this period, then, after the end of this era it was an open organization, in which countries from the, now defunct, communist space could enter, it reached intervention in unstable areas, so in a more political active role, to a much more obvious and more important presence so that in future NATO efforts will prevent possible tensions and tragedies.

3. *New members*

Regarding the position of the States of Central Europe towards NATO and the future of the alliance, it is to support its initiatives.

- After the Bucharest Summit the Member States of the Visegrad Group Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic made a joint statement expressing their support for Ukraine and Georgia to join NATO
- These countries from Central Europe believe that the U.S. has a major role in the alliance and therefore their position is to work to determine the U.S. to realize that their support for the alliance is indispensable, better said the U.S. commitment to Western European states extends to the states in Central Europe and therefore the U.S. security commitment is indispensable
- Members from of Central Europe consider that NATO is the only military alliance capable of ensuring security in view of the that the EU has not yet developed a security policy dimension that will be able to replace NATO forces in the defense of Europe

POLAND

Poland's security strategy sees in NATO a military alliance that should strengthen its role in Central Europe and should focus on strengthened regional cooperation . To become a "coalition of subcoalitions". Also Poland's NATO membership offers greater security and is an additional security guarantee to Poland's domestic and international development. It is in the interest of Poland that NATO remains a military alliance whose purpose is to ensure the security of Member States. Strengthening

capabilities and strengthening relations between allies is a priority for Poland's external security policy. Also Poland is aware that the NATO military alliance must be able to cope with new threats to international security such as the asymmetric conflict, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Poland is in favor of NATO's continuing military transformation, and it supports the idea of designing a new NATO strategy corresponding to a redefinition of the role in preserving the security of alliance members.

Poland is in favor of a rapprochement between NATO and EU considering the two as complementary and not competing.

THE CZECH REPUBLIC

It considers that its main security threat is represented by states, non state organisation which do not respect the rules of international law and therefore supports the emergence of a new strategic concept of NATO to provide leadership in promoting democratic values and imposing peace and stability. The Czech Republic believes that the danger of spreading weapons of mass destruction requires specific methods in terms of preventing their spread and emphasizes that this requires some specific equipment of NATO's military forces which should play a role in preventing such a situation

The role of NATO is to remain a military alliance able to cope with new type of security threats and to cope with the tasks of peace enforcement and peacekeeping.

UNGARIA

Hungary considers NATO presence on European soil as a guarantee of its security on an international level.

Participating with troops to NATO missions is a problem for Hungary as the population does not agree with some of NATO's actions. Also because of the lack of capabilities and due to budget cuts for defense the danger is that Hungary will not be able to meet obligations arising from membership of the alliance.

ROMANIA

The access of the first three East European states to NATO in 1999 was followed by the biggest wave of NATO enlargement in its history in 2004 when 7 states were admitted into the alliance. The NATO leaders reaffirmed even at the Istanbul Summit that the Alliance doors will remain open to democratic countries in Europe that are willing to assume responsibilities and obligations of membership, under Article X of the Washington Treaty.

The summit in Bucharest was a milestone in establishing new lines of action for NATO and the transformation of the Alliance into one that can more easily adapt to security requirements. As NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said, NATO's main objectives in the coming period are to significantly accelerate the transformation of the organization, continue to provide support for Afghanistan to become a democratic nation and governed properly, but that the Alliance must retain its strategic and military advantage which is why all Member States should continue to invest in military capabilities to make them more flexible and to ensure the right equipment.

Romania, for example, is one of the new states which supports the Alliance's enlargement policy and wishes to broaden the areas of policy beyond the Black Sea region, to countries like Georgia or Ukraine, and enhanced partnerships with Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan. As the newcomer in the Alliance, Romania strongly supports NATO policy both in terms of political transformation and expansion of partnerships, as well as the promotion of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and fighting terrorism. On the one hand, Romania wish to join NATO was unable to determine a particular foreign policy line located in line with NATO needs to show the availability and necessity for Romania, in terms strategico-military. We must not forget that Romania has access to the Black Sea area of great strategic importance which managed to capture, lately, the attention of the international community. Romanian President Traian Băsescu, wished to reaffirm the support therefore will provide the strategic objectives during the formal NATO Summit in Bucharest.

Romania's main interest remains the Black Sea, which is why the Romanian delegation headed efforts to bring to the forefront the importance

of this area especially since the recent conflict in Georgia have increased the visibility of this region. It is very important to solve existing frozen conflicts in the Black Sea area, especially since the area is considered not infrequently a buffer zone between Russia and the European Union. Efforts by the EU to support regional cooperation in the Black Sea region have doubled after the conflict in August this year, involving Russia and Georgia, said Friday, November 1st, 2008, Leonard Orban.

We must not forget that Romania has been a EU member since 2007. One of the debates that has recently animated the international community is the extent to which the existence of NATO and the ESDP, in the context of the latter transformation and the strengthening cooperation between EU Member States on EU's own security policies are redundant given the fact that both cover the same area: that of security. Romania supports the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU since it realised the need for cooperation between the two organizations especially as the solutions to new security threats require the joint action of states and international organizations.

All these European issues concerning transatlantic relations make it almost impossible to find elements of compatibility and incompatibility between the U.S. and the European Union from an angle of analysis directed solely by diplomatic Washington-Brussels axis. Theoretical scales given by the great schools of thought in international relations can explain to some extent the stability elements defining transatlantic relations and the fluctuation of vision and foreign policy decisions that led this partnership towards a decline after 2003.

Will NATO and Article 5 become less and less relevant for EU members in terms of hard security?

This topic will be approached from two complementary points of view: first, a process of myth busting concerning Article 5 as a direct defense and security instrument and its real interpretation as an instrument for willingly discouraging and showing solidarity. The second point of view refers to the content, credibility and relevance of Article 5 for EU member states.

What we can say clearly, by looking at all NATO documents, the Washington Treaty, the Final Declaration of the Bucharest Summit or the latest is that **Article 5 does not warrant an ally's obligation** to react in case of an attack, by virtue of the legal effects of the documents.

Yes. Every ally considers himself attacked, and this limits the actions and relations with the aggressor but does not assume “**immediate reaction, with all the means available, to eliminate the threat and defend the ally under attack**” as it happens on international level with the state under attack. Because there is no constraint everyone can act through diplomatic or any other means to counter the attack. The North Atlantic Treaty only validates **every states' right to consider himself under attack a fight back in a legitimate way**, as Article 51 of the UN Charter states.

From this point of view it is self evident for every lawyer of expert working with this document that the reasons why the Allies react directly are different, based on the interpretation of the state under attack: self interests, interest regarding the Alliance, its credibility, direct threat to its own defense, the need to resort to reciprocal situation etc. Still the Alliance worked credibly with Article 5 as a fundamental instrument for **discouraging any attack**, for the simple fact that it **maintains the threat of a concrete and credible legitimate massive reaction on behalf of all the Allies**.

Until proven otherwise – a case of using Article 5 (possibly unprecedented by the consultations mentioned in article 4), not followed by operations or actions of the Alliance – **the compelling power of Article 5 remains fundamentally credible and an extremely solid security warranty for all Allies**. And let us not forget that one of the major arguments over the credibility of the warranty is given by the **way the Allies look towards Article 5 themselves as a credible warranty**. Thus the relevance and credibility of Article 5 for European state is given by the **way they themselves look at the content of this warranty**.

On a secondary level, a large number of European countries members of NATO, but also a large number of non-member states of NATO, and EU (which resumed in solidarity clause of Article 5 as a shaded) look at Article 5 as a defense and security component essential for their citizens.

Moreover, the effect of undermining the credibility and guarantee of security to of Article 5 within the Alliance, can lead to major effects on who shall subvert the symbolic value of Article 5, for security lies mostly in credibility, perception and symbolic images. Building credibility and image took a major part of the Cold War and almost 20 years of post-war and may be torn down easily and in no time, but could be replaced with something equivalent up to the effective implementation of Article 5.

Now, if we were to discuss NATO enlargement and the inevitable link with Article 5 of the Alliance, we believe that there are important arguments to show that the causal link is absent, while respecting the principles of extension referred to in Article 10 of the Treaty. The validity and credibility or Article 5, as well as its applicability is not less true for Turkey and Greece in the 60's and 70's that it is for future new members such as Georgia or Ukraine in 2012 year of 2014.

The idea of entering an area of influence of another superpower or regional power cannot be discussed now, unless NATO changes its current approach to the principles of international relations, other than the UN Charter rules. No NATO member state will be asked to go to war to defend a non-NATO member state such as Georgia and the defense Georgia defense really needs is the defense of any NATO member before a direct attack of the Russian Federation. Here lies in fact the credibility and force art. 5: the clear assertion clear, without doubt or ambiguity, the decision of Member States' action in defense of any NATO ally, even if the abuser is the Russian Federation.

If Russia receives such a concrete and coherent and consistent message in responses to each action, then the need to resort to force to protect ourselves as an Alliance would be throughly reduced. On the contrary, suspicions, obvious differences and disputes, questioning the credibility of Article 5. only lead to a closer need to respond in the defense on an ally. Who can afford such an option, these costs and undermining the Alliance itself to

much higher costs? How credible would the solidarity clause be if the same signatories did not respect and even undermine the solidarity of NATO.

A sufficient length of time, reform of power structures of future candidate countries, accurate and specific criteria for accession, all may not lead to the confirmation of the added value of NATO membership. And drawing red lines on the map is not credible in a post-modern world.

Chapter II
The ESDP-NATO Relation
Julian Chifu

There are several topics that have to be addressed when discussing the way we look at and try to solve the problems related to the relation and cooperation between NATO and the EU. Firstly we have different ways of viewing security, defining risks and threats but also planning reactions, capabilities to be used and ways to react in case of security issues. Secondly we have different approaches and types of formal cooperation between the two institutions. Not less important is the conjugated force of transformation that the two have in case of new and future members but also in the case of their neighbours and neighbourhood, necessary reforms for new members to join, these being consistent and complementary and leading to the institutional and functional modernisation of those states.

We have to realise that Europe has become, from several points of view a narrower place from a geopolitical perspective: whether we like it or not the EU core is moving; it moved towards the west during and after the Second World War and towards the East after the Cold War ended. Also Europe is richer in history, based on rivalries and competition between states. During the last 15 years we have not had a lot of conflict, more rivalries and competition, politics and policies whose “legacy” we have inherited to bring into the 21st century. Europe’s second element of richness is its experience in institutional construction – it is probably the most crowded place on earth in terms of institutions.

The fundamental issue today is that more and more of Europe’s problems are avoided and circumvented from a normal and frontal approach which of course takes these problems further away from finding a solution for the institutions we have created. So the problems that experts and practitioners feel are fundamental to Europe are outside the institutional mechanism that we have created.

The most shocking issue for anyone assessing Europe is that it is still rich in a special and strange sense, with acute forms of insecurity, compared to any

part of the world. We are still the continent where issues relating to security are high on the agenda and that adds to the sense of insecurity in Europe – even if someone would say that the sum of security problems comes from the high degree of rationalising and identifying them, their perception is foremost a mechanism tied to responsibility. Moreover politicians base their answers and decisions on this syndrome that does not always comply with reality.

Another issue is the fact that Europe has an important legacy when it comes to postponing a critical decision that concerns it and acting according to decisions taken by others. Finally we cannot ignore the fact that we are probably at the best point in the last 20 years for Europe to develop a more correct, effective and efficient relation between its institutions.

A few of Europe's fundamental problems obviously relate to the scaffolding effect on its security and of course the relation between NATO and the ESDP. We will underline a couple of these issues as open questions.

First of all who should take initiative for generating a real, correct and fruitful cooperation between NATO and the EU? Experts talks always turn into a classical debate over who came first: the egg or the chicken? Thus the first dilemma is whether states or institutions should take initiative. Of course there is no right answer to this question. No cooperation can be fundamentally improved unless states realise and come to an agreement over what they want from this cooperation. On the other hand states will never reach a right solution unless they are helped by national decision makers with the unique expertise that both NATO and the EU have so that they will understand how these enormous, complex and extremely sophisticated institutions work.

The second question is of course why should these institutions cooperate? International debate brings us a series of answers: Christophe Cornu argues the fact that cooperation is necessary because you would have a convergence between policies, in the economic field, in issue of military strategy and because it is only natural for them to do so. Other experts state that there are a number of other essential conditions, challenges and possibilities that are open and enlarge the area of cooperation further than

ever before. Nicole Taillefer also maintains that cooperation is natural in the case of the institutional construction process of both organisations and that what NATO does through its transformation process is to give a larger area of cooperation. Why they should cooperate is proven by the series of arguments relating to the good results already provided by this cooperation, as arguments for pursuing this road further and extending cooperation and convergence. Good results in critical regions are extremely important for the process to continue.

The third fundamental question is why would we want to deepen cooperation, what is the purpose and meaning of this? And here we have a number of answers: first cooperation is necessary to fill the hole in the new security paradigm and to answer new challenges and threats that the change in the international security environment. A second answer would be that we need to strengthen cooperation because we need to strengthen the transatlantic bond as it is of the utmost importance for Europe's security and defense today and in the future. The third answer would be related to crisis management, and the purpose of this collaboration is that NATO and the EU become more important and valuable institutions for Europeans. It has already been admitted that European institutions have a certain credibility deficit in the eyes of European citizens and so strengthening cooperation will determine a shift towards an heightened level of credibility. Finally another answer would be that there is a special agenda that can be achieved only if the cooperation between NATO and the EU would grow further.

The next question is what means do we possess to determine a better cooperation between NATO and the ESDP? We have a number of indicators and arguments which are relevant to formulating a complete answer to this question: first we have a great deal of political instruments and resources in terms of political thinking as well as political actions. Then we have the economic resources and means at our disposal which help to build any kind of cooperation, and can also help the institutional rationalising process to avoid duplicating capabilities and bringing efficiency to said actions. We have to use our resources to make both institutions more effective and efficient as cooperation leads to both institutions better serving their purpose. And through this cooperation Europe is brought closer to its dreams and goals but also closer to its citizens' expectations.

So this strengthening is not a mere exercise of improving institutions nor is it a simple exercise to make policies more effective but is fundamentally an exercise meant to make Europe capable to overview its own growth and development and reach its objectives, reflected both in the NATO and the EU objectives.

Keeping the strategic euro-atlantic partnership alive could provide security in several ways and levels, not just from a military and defensive point of view. The economic dimension as well as other dimension which we can find in both organisation cannot develop separately from the two organisations.

NATO and the EU are what we can call a “promise to get married”. The problem with any marriage is the way decisions are made inside a couple. This is exactly the problem: who takes the the important decisions and who takes the less important ones. In any case this marriage is a planned, will happen, and moreover will last if a proper decision making system is approved, based on common or complementary mechanism of applying the decisions made, in order to respect the independence of both organisations.

Divergences in approaching security between EU and NATO

The main debate concerning the NATO and EU/ESDP relation is determined by the differences in approaching several topics, conditions and ways of actions for safegurading security for the member states or approaching conflictual or delicate situations in different places in the world in particular. These include:

1. Using legitimate/authorised force in major international conflicts
2. The war or fight against terrorism with means of approaching organised crime
3. Pre-emptive versus preventive action
4. Different typologies for missions assumed by NATO and EU/ESDP

There are a series of bilateral accords for using NATO capabilities by the EU in missions lead by the EU, based on the Berlin plus agreements. But perhaps the most interesting are the innovations brought by the EU in terms

of security, Constitutional Treaty and later the Lisbon Treaty. These are the elements that shape the EU as a regional security actor, at least in its intensions and the analysis can be used later on to bring answers concerning the present and future relation between the two policies.

The most cumbersome element was the transatlantic tear, which came after the war in Iraq. It was explained, broadly, by the differences in European and American views concerning risks and threats, or by the answers necessary to counter these threats. Between 9/11th and 2008 the security doctrines of both the US and the EU and actions outside of counterstriking this phenomenon evolved towards a certain degree of convergence necessary to effectively approach this asymmetric threat multilaterally.

Multilateral security arrangements and authorised use of force

If we refer to global security in a context of multilateral cooperation with a universal vocation, the set of norms that circumscribe the limits of using legitimate force is present in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. At this level, the Security Council is the only UN structure abilitated to interpret the law, “to acknowledge the existence of a threat to peace, breach of peace or an act of aggression and to recommend or decide the measures to be taken, according to articles 41 and 42, to maintain or establish peace and international security.”

Getting involved in actions that have to do with security through multilateral arrangements are restrictive, but offer certain benefits such as: the legitimacy of military actions both national and international; the possibility to share responsibilities both in times of conflict and of post-conflict; facilities concerning access to the battlefield or access to information. All these benefits of multilateral cooperation in security are recognized, at least theoretically, even by the US administration, which still manifest a scepticism obviously tied to the UN Security Council’s ability to act quickly and effectively when pro and con arguments have to be balanced against using force (in the case of Iraq).

In this kind of situation where multilateral administration of security is perceived as obstructive towards US national interest, reorientation towards a unilateral approach is immediately justified by pointing out the costs of

multilateralism: the risk of giving away decision making abilities and sometimes even control over US military operations to states that do not have the same priorities and strategy as the US; the risks associated to postponing actions concerning international security that, in view of American officials, are urgent; the costs associated to information leaks due to multilateral cooperation commitments; excessively policising war strategies and distorting military objectives etc.

These are but a few of the arguments exposed by American analysts tempted to raise some of the problems of inconclusive interpretation of the Charter, of procedural or decisional slowness of the UN Security Council and present these as evidence for the irrelevance of this multilateral organisation. The most frequent method of justification in terms of proving the inefficiency of multilateralism in international security is reducing its significance to a military dimension. Still authorising armed interventions is only one of the components included in the multilateral taxonomy applied in the area of global security. Multilateral cooperation in security issues, including in the larger context given by the UN system, is multidimensional, starting – as it is stated in the extenso of Chapter VII of the Charter – from the actions meant to evaluate risks (information, analysis, identifying threats) or those of intermediation for solving disputes peacefully. It also implies humanitarian assistance before, after and during armed conflicts, applying economic, political or military sanctions. And last but not least another component of multilateral cooperation regarding security is supporting post-conflict reconstruction.

All these responsibilities complementary to authorised military intervention are meant to maintain peace and international security and are part of the global project for multilateralism for security. In these missions apart from different structures part of the UN – different regional organisations, ad-hoc state alliances participate towards a collective approach of problems belonging to the security concept. An attempt to defend the UN's relevance as a fundamental actor in administering global security starts from a brief succinct analysis of different military conflicts: East Timor, Kosovo and the war in Iraq. The interpretation is meant to counter the "UN's failure" in the two cases of using force without the authorisation of the Security Council, Kosovo and Iraq.

In East Timor the military intervention was authorised, supported and lead by the UN, this being a clear example of multilateral cooperation within the UN system. In the case of Kosovo, using force was not authorised by the UN, but the intervention was lead in a non-UN multilateral context, under the command of NATO. The US invasion in Iraq in 2003 was not authorised by the UN Security Council and did not take place under NATO support but was lead by an ad-hoc coalition of states under the leadership of the US. The last two episodes were considered by experts in international law as cases of formal violation of the UN Charter, although there were post-factum arguments in favour of the legitimacy of the two actions. The comission assigned to investigate the legal status of the intervention in Kosovo reached the conclusion that it had an “illegal but legitimate” status, based on the standard criteria that justify a humanitarian intervention, doubled by the argument of mobilising international support. Moreover the military intervention took place in a multilateral context, under the command of a regional security organisation, based on normes concerning collective security. Both in East Timor and in Kosovo, the UN authorised and supported actions of post-conflict reconstruction and supported local administration to deal with problems of post-intervention internal rehabilitation problems.

The Iraq issue is probably the most analysed case in unilateral military intervention, given the division it produced amidst the international community, the strong oposition expressed by most of the members of the UN Security Council and the absence of a multilateral umbrella given by a security alliance different that the UN. Still straight after the start of the military campaign in Iraq and the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime, there was an attempt by the UN to legalise the British-American actions by adopting a series of resolutions in favour of recognising the status of British and American troops as forces of occupation authorised by international law. The quick decision to open a civilian mission in Baghdad was followed by its bombing in august 2003 which determined the immediate withdrawal of UN officials from Iraq and coming back a few months later. Afterwards the UN’s role was a bit more active in monitoring the elections in 2004 and 2005 and the surveilance of the process of power transfer from the American-British forces to the new Iraqi leadership.

Starting from the particularities of the three military interventions, two of which took place under multilateral umbrella (UN and NATO) the main argument in favour of the relevance of the UN as a key organisation for administrating global security comes from the multifunctional character of security multilateralism. International security does not only depend upon the decision to resort to force or make its use more efficient in counter-acting against a threat, especially if it is a transnational one, which cannot be traced or defeted by a unilateral approach such as global terrorism. Multilateral cooperation implies the entire sprectrum of preventative measure – negotiations, sanctions, development aid, monitoring human rights violations as well as collective involvememnt in post-conflict reconstruction and peace-keeping actions.

In all these soft components of multilateralism, involving the UN is necessary and according to recent studies, much more effective than American involvement, based primarily on fighting threats by military means. In this dimension of international security through multilateral cooperation, the contribution of the European Union is also extremely important, given the typically European view of using soft instruments for peace keeping and security issues at a global level. The common element between the UN and the EU as multilateral actos concerning security is the so-called absence of human resources and military capabilities, both of which depend on the staff, capacity, budgets of member states. These constraints explain the reticence of both actors to fight threats by armed combat, as well as the doctrine similarities that value the *soft* approach.

Global war against terrorism: pre-emptive or preventive war?

Initial gaps between American and European perceptions regarding the terrorist threat were minimised, especially after the London and Madrid events drew Europe's attention on the magnitude of this international phenomenon. Both the US National Security Strategy and the European Security Strategy identify and place the terrorist threat among the major security risks on the international stage, alongside weapons of mass destruction proliferation, failed states or organised crime. Still the American view concerning terrorist threats – as it transpired from the successive security strategies of 2002 to 2006 – is focused in the first phrase in this document: “ America is at war. This is a National Security Strategy for a

period of war imposed by the serious challenge which we are facing – the magnitude of the terrorist phenomenon, fueled by an aggressive hate and crime ideology that the American people witnessed on the 11th of September 2001.” For the American administration the terrorist threat is perceived first of all as a national security risk, which justifies – within the logic of such a doctrine – the unilateral decision of confronting international terrorism, with or without the UN or NATO umbrella.

The New National Security Strategy of the US “in times of war” was presented by G. W. Bush at West Point in June 2002. The new document marked the end of the old American policy to border and discourage US rivals from the Cold war. Another type of threat, asymmetric, that of international terrorism, implied launching a different kind of war than that fought in the bipolar era. To reach these goals of fighting asymmetric threats at a world scale the US president introduced a new type of concept, *pre-emptive war* which differs from *preventive war* through the imminence of the attack from the other side. The semantic difference comes from the difference between and prevention: if the preemptive war pushes back and counterstrikes and imminent attack the preventive one eliminates a potential threat before it appears. Pre-emptive action is forced by circumstances while preventive actions forces the circumstance, by transposing the possible to the present.

The two types of confrontation can easily be placed inside different typologies of defense and aggression wars. Thus according to Article 51 of the UN Charter pre-emptive war can be considered legal, as it is similar to defensive wars, its legality depending on the degree of clarity, reality and imminence attributed to the aggression. Opinions related to the pre-emptive or preventive nature of the latest conflict in Iraq side towards interpreting the episode as a preventive action, hard to place in traditional philosophies of confrontations and exposed to the leap beyond the limits of international law. Z. Brzezinski, the former American council for National Security, states, by a rather critical view, the risks of confusion between pre-emptive and preventive action, confusion that leads to an interchangeability between the two concept in chapter 5 of the US National Security Strategy: “The distinction between pre-emption and prevention is important to the world order and should not be overlooked (...) Pre-emption can be justified

by national interests threatened imminently and thus, is unilateral. Great deal of information is necessary to argue (at least retroactively) such an arbitrary act. On the other side, prevention should be preceded as much as possible by mobilisation of political pressure (including at an international level) to avoid the inevitable from happening; force should only be used all other options have been eliminated and discouraging is no longer a credible alternative. If discrimination arise, especially from the super-power that is supposed to have the most means of discouragement – then a plague of preventive unilateral wars that pretend to be pre-emptive can occur.”

The American Strategist signals and extremely sensitive aspect in the unilateral approach of an asymmetric threat such as international terrorism: setting a precedent. Terrorism continues to be a notion that has no universally accepted definition in international academic or political circles. Prevention of such a threat with military means can induce the illusion of morality, if not legitimacy of any unilateral military intervention can invoke the imminent presence of danger, whether it is real, pretended or framed. Closer to the present, at a US Senate hearing on February the 1st 2007 Zbigniew Brzezinski takes the issue of unilateral armed combat risks, but also a fake pre-emptive character and present the scenario of a possible invasion of Iran by the US, starting from a similar pattern to that of the previous conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Brzezinski’s speech of February 2007 is, at times, controversial and betrays willful ambiguity. This later started comments relating to the possible intention of the former US councilor for defense to reiterate in an official setting the credibility – from his point of view – of conspiracy speculations tied to the framed origins of the 9/11th attacks. His vision on the best ways to counteract to international terrorist threats is closer to the European vision, that manifest scepticism concerning the long term efficiency of radical military measures to fight terrorism and stresses the essential importance of investigating and treating the causes of this phenomenon.

In the EU measure against international terrorism started to be analysed more carefully and subsequently formalised in June 2004 , at the European Council. As a result of presenting a report on the implementation of the *Declaration on the fight against terrorism*, the Political and Security

Committee was assigned to find the conceptual framework for identifying the ESDP's contribution to the fight against terrorism, including its pre-emptive dimension. The document is based on the following principles: solidarity among states; voluntary contribution by said states to the clear understanding of the terrorist threat by elaborating and facilitating access to risk analyses; coordination between pillars for achieving EU objectives in the fight against terrorism; partnership cooperation; understanding the complementary nature of ESDP and fully respecting member states responsibility in the fight against terrorism.

Through the ESDP member states can be part of civilian and military crisis management operations with four directives according to the *European Strategy on Terrorism*: prevention (mobilising all resources, including military and, given the asymmetric nature of this threat, facilitating access to information and information exchange); protection (during crisis management operations, for reducing human resources and material vulnerability in case of a terrorist attack) responding/managing consequences (for which military means can have a direct role or a supportive one); supporting third party countries in the fight against terrorism within different ESDP missions. Subsequently, through a Council decision of February 2007, the specific *Prevention, preparedness and consequence management of terrorism* programme for 2007-2013 was launched. Also within the multilateral fight against terrorism project, the EU signed an agreement with the US government concerning the security of classified information through which the two partners will cooperate by means of classified information exchange and concerning consolidating multiple protection mechanism which will ensure the necessary degree of security.

European multilateralism and managing global security

European ambitions concerning showing a credible profile in foreign policy, especially European Security and Defense Policy, were initially encountered with great reserves both by the US and the governments of the members states. Their reservations towards increasing their spending for European defense budget is self-evident, which combined with the intergovernmental character of this area of politics which complicates the decision making process a great deal further makes the military dimension

of ESDP a recent development but with a fast evolution. Since setting its objectives concerning minimal endowment for tasks included in the *Petersberg Missions triad* at the official launch of ESDP at the Helsinki European Council and the later agreement *Headline Goal* on the necessary capabilities for supporting operations within ESDP (reaction force of 60 000 people to be mobilised within 60 days) the EU capacity to involve itself in different military operations, for stabilisation or reconstruction has evolved a great deal.

Starting with 2003 the EU has participated in, through military and civilian forces for different missions and operations outside its geographical area – the Western Balkans, South Caucasus, SE Asia, the Middle East and Africa – first by taking over NATO mission and then continuing them in the Balkan area (ALTHEA mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina).

The EU is one of UN's main partners in managing crisis and conflict prevention, by having the full scale of necessary instruments for fulfilling missions in this area of governing global security: political dialogue, mediation, cooperation agreements, commercial policy instruments, development aid, economic and social policy, humanitarian or emergency aid, support for rehabilitation and reconstruction as well as coercion measure such as political and economic sanctions or military force. Amongst the political recommendations that target consolidating this cooperation on a multilateral level presented in specialised studies were mentioned the following main ideas: the need to establish priorities concerning conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction with the UN; multilateralising peace operations; consolidating the necessary mechanism for information exchange; strengthening the EU's visibility at UN level and consolidating the EU's legal status.

Innovations for the Reform Treaty on European security and defense issues

In the event that the Lisbon Treaty will be ratified it will include a number of innovations with fundamental implications on strengthening foreign and security policy. The document confirms the first single legal personality of the European Union. Creating a single legal entity will provide a better representation of the Union at international level and will also help to strengthen the role of the European Union as a global player. A Union

equipped with a single legal personality may negotiate and conclude international agreements, with the possibility of joining the European Convention on Human Rights. The Union will be able to join international organizations and may act in a more coherently and effectively on the world stage.

The Treaty states that the CFSP is subject to rules and procedures. It establishes, in fact, the particularity of the CFSP area that still remains subject to the intergovernmental method of decision-making and, predominantly, by unanimous vote. However, the new Treaty introduces a new provision (Bridge Clause) which allows the European Council to decide, by voting unanimously to extend qualified majority voting in CFSP for a future date. Decisions military or defense implications will require the unanimous vote. Decisions on the CFSP also have a special character, as they are not, with some notable exceptions, subject to review by the Court of Justice of the European Union.

Creating the post of High Representative of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is another institutional innovation introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. The High Representative will be appointed by the European Council and the post will include the two current positions with responsibility for foreign policy (the position of High Representative for CFSP and Commissioner for Foreign Affairs). The High Representative will occupy a central position in the European institutional framework and will be able to give the EU a stronger voice in international affairs. The Lisbon Treaty gives a double role to the High Representative. He will ensure on the one hand the Council Presidency for its Foreign Affairs configuration and on the other he will be vice-president of the European Commission. Among his tasks are also the right of initiative in CFSP and representing the Union in meeting third parties and intergovernmental organizations and conferences (including the Security Council and the UN).

The High Representative will be assisted in his activity by the European External Action Service. It would be composed of officials of relevant departments of the Secretariat of the Council and Commission, as well as national diplomats seconded by Member States. Service composition aims for convergence of Member States' foreign policies, and creating a common

culture in foreign policy. EEAS organization and operation will be a Council decision, a decision to be adopted after the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, based on a proposal from the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after approval by the European Commission.

The Lisbon Treaty also introduces for the first time a mutual defense clause that states that if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States are obliged to give aid and assistance by all means available. Another element crucial for reforming and strengthening multilateral cooperation in the intergovernmental CFSP and ESDP is to introduce a simplified method for strengthening such cooperation, namely the permanent structured cooperation, which allows Members willing to advance in this field. The real “defense Schengen“, permanent structured cooperation is more flexible than conventional reinforced cooperation and thus allow the Union to move forward in this area.

What deserves mentioning is that in both the EU and NATO the views on the strengthening of multilateralism in the area of security cooperation scenarios are focused on differentiated scenarios, “à la carte” alternatives that allow players to opt for involvement in certain projects for collective security, adapted to resources, capabilities and interests. At the European level the innovation of the permanent structured cooperation in defense and security is part of the wider reform of the Union starting with the idea of recovering credibility differentiated integration, which allows the creation of preferential alliances in different areas both within the framework of treaties and within the Initial informal basis, as well as outside the framework provided by the *acquis*.

Among the models of flexible integration within the Treaties, the most analysed options of flexibility:

1. the pre-determined flexibility model (option possible at the primary legislation level in which the treaty itself provides the premises of such flexible arrangements), such as eg EMU, Schengen (after Amsterdam) or, as we were saying, permanent structured cooperation between

- Member States which are willing and have the needed military capabilities to subscribe to higher demands in this area;
2. *micro-flexibility* (based on the instrument of constructive *abstainment constructive*) which gives Member States the option not to participate in a decision or action, while still allowing other countries to progress in that area
 3. enhanced co-operation – the most investigated instrument of implementing flexibility, introduced in 1997 by the Treaty of Amsterdam (under the name of closer co-operation) and subsequently revised by the Nice Treaty, which made famous its name of enhanced cooperation .

The idea of developing scenarios of “à la carte” multilateralism, particularly in the transatlantic sphere of regional security has increasingly numerous followers, especially in the context of recent efforts to reform patterns of institutionalized multilateralism as well as those of the European Union and NATO. Both reform processes are designed, in essence, so that organizations will adapt to meet their expansion requirements, but also to meet new challenges on the global scene.

NATO option for “à la carte” multilateralism

After the Cold War ended, NATO’s transformation followed two distinct dimensions: foreign and domestic. Reform requirements arose from the need to redefine relations with old organization’s rivals, to review the security environment and, therefore, to review the principles of internal organization, structure, policies and security strategies. Concerning foreign relations, NATO has established cooperative partnerships with countries in Central and Eastern Europe, thus opening its doors to the states in the region. In 1994 the Partnerships for Peace programme was launched, which created the premises for deepening cooperation and consultation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Three years later, in 1997, the three countries of the former Communist bloc (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) were invited to join the Alliance, with the Membership Action Plan for other states interested to join NATO to be established in 1999. In March 2004 seven of them joined the Alliance.

Internally, after the disappearance of the common Soviet threat that helped preserve the interests of the Member States of the Alliance converge, reform efforts aimed to turn the organization into a more flexible one, to harmonize differences in vision and resources of the allies. The NATO summit in Brussels in 1994, was devoted to a new concept of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), which had in view the preparation of multifunctional, multinational military structures, easily movable and adapted to military missions with a greater degree specialization. In 1996 the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) was approved within NATO which allowed the EU to access Alliance resources for self-employment in military action under the European umbrella. In 1999, at the NATO Summit in Washington, NATO launched its defense capabilities initiative for equipping allied forces for new tasks in the sphere of intervention and crisis management. Another element associated with the road towards a supple and institutional functionality was the opening of the NATO Response Force in 2003, based on a common pool of troops and military equipment with a greater degree of flexibility, interoperability and mobilized on a global scale.

In the internal reform plans internal NATO's response to uncoordinated development of strategic visions of the Member States, in shaping perceptions and changing different spectrum of current threats and defining priorities and interests separate part was that of institutional and structural flexibility. Literature devoted to multilateralism security institutions tries to find the extent to which such a differentiated approach to collective security cooperation affects or weakens the foundations of multilateral security alliances and, in particular NATO. Frank Schimmelfenning considers that a structure and an internal organisation that is less multilateral than NATO does not necessarily lead to a less multilateral attitude from members of the alliance. A relatively close vision is that of Seyom Brown in a 2006 report of the Institute for Strategic Studies of the US Army War College. The fact that NATO's viability and the consolidation of the transatlantic partnership depend on the Alliances' reorientation towards a "coalition of coalitions" based on elaborating a legitimising structure, decision making processes and internal routines with a modular character is suggested in the paper.

However, while Schimmelfenning's approach focuses rather on defending the flexibility of NATO's multilateralism as an independent factor assessment of multilateralism inclinations manifested by the transatlantic community actors, Brown built his whole approach on decentralization and demonolithization of the Alliance in order to maximize American flexibility, particularly freedom of action in the sphere of use of force.

To understand where the red line between the solidarity of multilateralism cooperation within NATO and the multilateral solidarity of member states availability is, one must notice that the force of moving multilateralism resides, as proved by a few recent episodes of conflict, in the nature and target of threat. If the threat is common and targets space, values and basic rules of the liberal transatlantic community (human rights violations and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans), multilateralism is strong. When the main purpose of collective intervention in the sphere of security is mainly that of Euro-Atlantic region's defense or to protect liberal values of community, the resources of multilateral cooperation of NATO allies are lower (the war in Iraq).

Reforming NATO under the principle of flexibility relates primarily to rethinking those rules and internal arrangements that would enable Member States to vary in degrees of participation and engagement in the organization's operations. The scenario is not essentially revolutionary, as elements à la carte multilateralism may be identified during the Cold War when France was able to withdraw from the eighth formal military integration project (in 1966) but remained a member of NATO and opted for a la carte cooperation with supreme command of the Alliance. And other Member States opted for some special arrangements in NATO in terms of, for example, stationary appearance of nuclear weapons on their territory.

Subsequently, the concept of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) allowed the mobilization of various forces of the organization "according to circumstances, the establishment of ad hoc command centres, staff members and partners in helping a specific mission" as necessary, based on a modular approach, to satisfy that mission. The very creation of the European Security and Defense Identity within NATO, which allowed the European Union to access its resources for coordinated operations

exclusively in Europe was based on the same principle - separate but not separated - which did not exclude non-involvement by the U.S. from certain operations conducted under the umbrella of the Alliance. Moreover, NATO's evolution towards a more flexible security organization engaging in certain transactions with some Member States, without requiring the involvement of all allies.

Participating to NATO missions is also open to non-member, partner or non-partner states. NATO partner states have a series of partnership arrangements that cover a wide spectrum of activities relating to security, some of which refer to strictly military actions: defense planning, arms control, peace keeping, fight against terrorism, planning and managing civilian emergencies, fighting natural and technological disasters etc. From this list of potential cooperation areas partner states can choose those domains and the level of involvement in collective actions that will fit their training level and skills as well as comply with NATO political and technical requirements.

Thus from the prevailing exclusivist organisation that set out to provide mutual security assistance for a restricted group of states, NATO has evolved towards being a multilateral actor engaged in both keeping regional security as well as *a priori* approaching global issues of security. Although not all states have an obligation to participate to military operations under NATO command, the privilege of security guarantees is non-discriminatory. On the background of an institutional redesigning process mainly focused on flexibility, the internal pulse of internal multilateralism within the alliance can be tested through consensual availabilities of member states to cooperate or remains outside certain projects that target collective security. The variables that NATO multilateralism depends on are tied both with resource and capabilities gap, the nature of the threats that must be fought and the sometimes diverging interests of the allies, given the absence of a common threat.

In the military field, U.S. supremacy is evident at all levels of employment in a possible military mission, leading to frequent expressions of dissatisfaction of the U.S. partner on low European involvement in certain actions by NATO. This is largely a consequence of the mentality of

“protected“ European countries to retain the reflex to be ranked as a safety consumer, assumed during the Cold War and demonstrating ambivalent reactions against the senior status of the U.S. . Thus, unilateralist old Europe states criticizes U.S. foreign policy that favors the use of instruments of force to counter threats and claims the right to be consulted and involved even though they are much less willing and able to confirm their credibility by participating in military actions for global security governance.

In this context, the US administration’s desire to adopt a transatlantic policy by which it can maintain those necessary reserves of multilateralism that can provide legitimacy for international foreign policy decisions, and on the other hand can diminish as much as possible the multilateral constraints regarding the use of force. S. Brown’s recommendations concerning American strategy are for keeping multilateralism to counter security risks, given the fact that in the current international context promoting a coercitive diplomacy needs global support, authorisation and legitimacy through multilateral cooperation and a framework for dividing tasks and costs.

Still in the event that such an authorisation from the UN or NATO does not exist the US must protect its national security interest (in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter that admits the right to self defense, be it individual or collective when the Security Council is unable to act). The solution thought out by Brown is adopting a modular way for engaging in collective operations. The possibility of involvement in the security field assumes certain efforts from the US to institutionalise and legitimate a flexible array of political structures, communication systems, control procedures and military command and certain arrangements to facilitate cooperation between different categories of actors who are capable and willing to commit to fighting security threats.

Opinions and expectation from new EU and NATO members for NATO and ESDP

New Member States of EU and NATO do not have an equal and consistent position towards NATO and the ESDP. In principle, there are governmental formulas that look from one or another angle and doctrine and from their own perspective, the relations with NATO and the EU, but also relations

with the Russian Federation. There are a couple of principles that they will not go over easily:

- Guarantees of a perfectly obvious solidarity in security and defense, both at NATO and EU level in the event that they are possible and will be credible.
- U.S. presence in European security scaffolding advice for the transatlantic relationship. For some countries that have emerged from the limited sovereignty space of socialism and the Soviet state, the U.S. image, credibility and proven capabilities are very present in public view, and in the outlook of the leaders, even if there is enough realism and responsibility to understand the limits capabilities and interests of the United States but also the costs that each member must assume for the benefit of Washington's constant presence in European defense and security
- Lack of contradictions between the U.S. and major European partners, but also coherence of EU actions on security and defense
- Avoiding duplication of resources available to Member States in both organizations.
- Consistency and effectiveness of NATO and EU actions for European defense and security
- A reduction of unnecessary red tape in European institutions.
- A transfer of expertise, planning and capabilities from NATO to the EU on dimensions that are missing from the EU.
- An consistent agreement sharing of responsibilities between the organizations.
- Unification of standards of training, weapons and calibres, procedures and types of reactions between the capabilities available to the international operations of both organizations.
- Settlement of blocked relations between the EU and NATO in the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus triangle
- Elimination of singular veto statements to major Alliance decisions such as the Greece's position in relation to Macedonia.

There are unprecedented cooperation formulas that can further develop the relationship between NATO and ESDP, which come the scrutiny EU and NATO Member States especially concerning further developing relations with new border and contiguous neighbouring states for the two organizations, in the East. The need for convergence of standards, institutions and rules, including security and defense, arise from the conjecture which claims that where there are discrepancies at the border there is room conflicts and, where there is increased compatibility violent conflicts cannot occur and problems can be solved peacefully, on the basis of the UN Charter principles or OSCE documents.

Concerning the EU as a security actor, it is one of the aspects of the international security system that relies on the adjusting of the added value of this new security actor. In this respect for the new European countries membership for their Western Balkans or Eastern neighbours is not as important as is getting closer to these states and bringing them closer to Europe through institutional, normative and substantial reforms – beliefs, mentalities – a change that has to take place on the basis of dual relations both with NATO – IPAP, MAP, Security Sector Reform – as well as with the EU. In this respect an important role is given to the new proposal, the Eastern Partnership or the drafting of the second generation of Neighbourhood Action Plans Policy, the Association Agreements, with the proposed content:

The most consistent policy so far, lasting for almost 5 years is the **European Neighbourhood Program**. It aims to harmonize the status, rules and institutions of the EU neighbouring states by **guaranteeing access to the EU internal market gradually**. Now we are witnessing the birth of the **second generation** of Action Plans, the **Association Agreements**. The one negotiated with Ukraine gives us a hint on the content of such agreements:

- **The enhanced / Expanded Free Trade**, opening the way for gradual adoption of principles and rules of a common market, as soon as these countries can adapt to rules, norms and will be able to build the necessary functional institutions and assuming the corresponding duties. The proposal also contains elements of regulatory and institutional convergence, apart from common market elements.

- **The agreement to facilitate access to visas, going as far as the liberalization of visa regime and to the free movement**, to the extent that countries concerned will be able to take responsibility for each stage will be able to meet institutional and political costs (through the conditions to the third parties) and will be able to build functioning institutions that can face the side effects of necessary conditions to be met.
- **The Energy Community**, based on a type of Energy Charter plus, an agreement on adjusting the rules by transit states, with EU states, including here the policies of the EU energy security strategy and enforcement of EU competition rules for transit countries, accessing energy transport infrastructure, within which costs they can afford
- **Involvement of EU / ESDP in frozen conflicts** – it is already the case with EUBAM between Ukraine and Moldova and the EU Monitoring Mission ESDP – in Georgia. This type of involvement could be extended to all frozen conflicts, as long as those states require such involvement. EU Entry in serious security issues in the frozen conflicts is an opportunity that the EU must take in order to become a relevant actor in this area, especially if its presence is agreed upon by the remaining players in the region as opposed to the NATO presence.

As we have seen, all elements contained in such agreement are made to strengthen rules, to extend EU rules to neighbours, to bring these states closer to the Union and manage modernization and transition affordably and on a sustainable basis. Particularly concerned are the transit states – Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova – plus Azerbaijan – provided a rapid accession to the WTO and a review of the democracy. Belarus is also in the forefront of attention once right conditions will allow the jump. Armenia is also in sight, even if it still has major problems – internal-leadership credibility, presidential elections in a bloodbath – external – blocked the border conflict with Azerbaijan and Turkey – but also the way the solution Security for Yerevan was chosen.

So energy security, secure routes and alternative energy sources – the EU and NATO instruments, including the provisions adopted at the NATO summit in Bucharest, involving protection of critical infrastructure on land and under water – are concerns of new members of both the EU and NATO for their own energy security but also for freedom of choice of European and NATO states in terms of foreign security and defense policy.

Concerns for a possible repetition of oil and gas supply disruptions to Europe is in the foreground, and concern about Russia's lack of resources to meet its commitments to the EU, for a possible cartel of carriers that could play between the quasi-monopolistic producer and the European consumer or a formula by which the quasi-monopolistic producer for the region would take over the transport infrastructure of other countries or would cartel between manufacturers and carriers succeed, all of these are fundamental security concerns for EU and NATO Member States.

Justified or not, citizens of member states and new EU members and NATO increasingly perceive the Russian Federation as a potential source of threat to the security of states concerned, to NATO and the EU as a whole, so that these countries expect to see in the renewed EU security strategy and want means, resources and capabilities to meet this perceived threat. Both historical experience and memory play an important role, and recent Russian actions in Georgia, and threats, aggression and violence of language from leaders in Moscow does not reduce these fears but has an opposite effect.

**What are the military capabilities that we must share and how?
What should be the strategic directions of weapons development?**

The principles of cooperation the informal NATO-EU working group

In order to answer this question we would have to come back to the fundamentals and first look at the NATO ESDP relation from this point of view. Thus the six principles of the common NATO EU declaration of 2002 include the partnership (for example "mutual reinforcement" of crisis management activities), bilateral efficient consultations for cooperation, equality and the necessary attention to "interests and decision autonom" both in NATO and the EU, "a coherent development and mutual reinforcement of common capabilities for both organisations".

In institutional terms the partnership is reflected under the Berlin plus agreements of March 2003, that authorise the EU to use NATO structures, mechanisms and capacities to plan, lead and command a military operation that is not part of the Alliance's area of interest. Moreover an agreement on

information exchange was signed between the EU and NATO and EU linking cells were installed at SHAPe and at the Command for Integrated NATO Forces in Neapole.

There is a phrase often used to describe the relation between EU and NATO forces: “separable but not separate”. The same forces and capabilities will form the basis of both EU and NATO capabilities but certain fragments of these can be allocated to the EU if necessary. Concerning the missions there is “a right to say no first”: only if NATO refuses to act in a threat can the EU decide to do so on its own.

Another mandatory point, in order to have the necessary capabilities for NATO and ESDP operations is keeping the level of defense spending at least 2% of the GDP, according to NATO standards. There is also an unwritten but accepted rule – the 3D: no duplicating what NATO already does effectively and with increased efficiency. No decoupling from the US and NATO and no discrimination of non EU NATO countries like Turkey.

What is lacking is a solid network and covering links between NATO and the European Union for security relations, so that, together, states of transatlantic community can be able and effective in combating the threats, risks and challenges both horizontally – that pass through areas of different competencies, with distinct regional and national interests – as well as vertically – those involving an enhanced communication, consultation, coordination, collaboration and transactions between different international instruments, governments, civil society and citizens alike. One way is to strengthen the effectiveness of the Informal NATO-EU Summit group.

Successive transformations of NATO and EU today led to the common conclusion that they cannot be achieved without a deeper cooperation between them. Complementarity became the key concept that defines the relationship between NATO and the EU. This was reaffirmed at the NATO summit in Bucharest, by NATO leaders and spokesman and the symbol of ESDP reform, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, holder of the rotating EU presidency in the second half of 2008.

This was the reason why strengthening the political NATO EU dialogue both informally and formally, was absolutely necessary and had an

immediate coordinated evaluation of the international and regional security environment as an aftereffect. The French presidency's initiative was to start informal working groups, at a high level between NATO and the EU. This structure could allow both NATO and EU to better coordinate their actions in areas where they have common interest. This group hardens the effectiveness of both organisations by coordinating positions and actions which will become more consistent. Within this group consultation on the evolution of current operations will take place and when faced with a crisis the group will trade opinions before launching any new operation. This space can be the proper forum to promote synergy between the two organisations and avoid incoherence.

The civil dimension of crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction

Another direction for developing the mutual relations and capabilities is the field of civil crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction. Since the capabilities the angle of approach used by NATO is somewhat tilted towards this dimension and new member states have a deficit in this field, and thus so does the organisation, and here we have an opportunity and a space where the ESDP can bring added value. In any case the field of civilian crisis management is a relatively new one for NATO but for the EU as well although it has proven extremely useful in contemporary operations, as complementary elements for strictly military operations. And concerning post-conflict reconstruction the concept is still insufficiently developed and requires a wider and more comprehensive approach. Nations and societies teared after violent conflicts are at the forefront of contemporary concerns and there are still debates amongst experts towards finding the simplest, smoothest solution for reconstruction and development of social governing tools.

The main areas of interest are given by the reasons a nation or the international community would get involved in a post-conflict reconstruction operation and how they could plan and prepare a reconstruction mission to maximize its effects. Obviously, planning and conducting post-conflict reconstruction requires specialized knowledge in various fields such as public governance, security, economy and civil society. Experiences and lessons learned have already showed the need for training those who participate in these operations but also in decision

making and planning. There are three main areas where capabilities must be developed:

1. Creating and maintaining a secure environment for the nation that went through a destructive and violent conflict but also for the reconstruction mission teams;
2. Planning and implementing measures of building public institutions and organising political, social and economic life for the nation
3. Building adequate capacities and implementing good governance principles as key elements of the reconstruction process

The European Union has, at its disposal, at the Commission's level, the European Training Group, for specific areas of civilian crisis management.

Arms acquisition

Military equipment acquisition has to be based on three capabilities:

1. Every state's ability to defend itself for a short period of time. From this point of view it is obvious why the argument "I do not need as their defense capabilities, according to Article 5, NATO troops will defend my country" is a great error. Moreover (see Annex 1), the self-defense clause is also present in the ESDP as is the solidarity clause in the Treaty of Lisbon.
2. The ability to receive components of expeditionary NATO/EU forces to work with the national forces on their territory. It also requires adequate space for barracks, command and control and capacity planning, but also elements of interoperability. Hence the need for infrastructure compatibility (done in NATO). This is why the construction and protection of critical infrastructure of highways, airports, ports is a security objective.
3. The ability to work with expeditionary NATO and EU forces in the field but also in the air. Usually compatibility and interoperability of weapons is extremely important because F16 fly with F16, Gripen flies with Gripen, the Eurofighter flies with the Eurofighter. Therefore it becomes extremely important for procurement of weapons to take into account existing armaments for both partners and allies as well as the duration of said armaments. Otherwise, a purchase of Gripen devices today could mean that only countries like the Czech Republic and Hungary, along, of course, of Sweden could support you.

This is the reason why arms acquisition must not only be political but also strategic and defensive, therefore a military decision.

If it were to make a summary of categories of weapons which are in service with armies of NATO and EU states in Europe, we will reach an enormous number of types and categories, all bringing major maintenance costs, purchasing of spare parts, etc. Streamlining this explosion of types of weapons is absolutely necessary as is more cohesion and a common at the transatlantic level. Here is another area of discussion between NATO and the EU.

We definitely have to accept mandatory elements of:

1. The relevance of NATO and EU security
2. Relevance, armed and credible forces at least in NATO
3. Identifying the niche of capabilities and added value of the EU to Europe's security
4. Proper formulas for co-decision making
5. Collaboration, dialogue and common or complementary capabilities in the field of energy security, with a special attention to critical energy infrastructure.

What are the implications of NATO expansion on the EU? Does NATO expansions mean a EU expansion (Ukraine and Georgia)?

In approaching this issue we must start from the real meaning of NATO and EU enlargement. Both mean the consolidation of democratic gains of the Members in question but also a substantial content transformation and democratic change of the states in their immediate vicinity, the regulatory and institutional modernization of the state. Therefore these processes - considered the most effective policies of both organizations, through their transforming and modernizing effects - bring not only security but also strengthen the democratic reforms of the typology of Western democracy and avoid typologies "original" of "sovereign democracy". Since the war in Georgia has proved beyond any doubt the Russian Federation's option not to join this type of democracy, the process becomes even more important.

We accept the need to respect the values and standards of both organizations as well as “fatigue“ of both institutions. However the process itself must not stop, even if this means NATO Bucharest Summit Declarations on Georgia and Ukraine commitment type or Salonic type commitments for near eastern states while states that are energy carriers to Europe and States fall in the New Association Agreements.

From this perspective, we believe that the answer to the question whether there are implications of NATO enlargement on EU enlargement is no. The two are not determined by each other, but NATO and EU policies in their neighbourhood contiguous Europe are interdependent and this road is required. The combined power of change brought by NATO and the EU leads to mutual self-enhancement and delivers major results for the border states.

Obviously the issue that NATO, not so liked in the region by the other big player, Russia, will make room for the EU “between“ the border NATO / EU and Russia. Again, planning steps raises some major problems. They maintain the stability and sustainability of democratic change to this day.

Previous experience has shown that the extensions were made in succession NATO-EU, in particular the need to provide a security solution for the new Member State, to give impetus to investors to come and support changes in market and institutional reforms and deepening democracy. A paradigm change may raise significant security issues.

Thus, a state where the security sector is not reformed, coming from totalitarian and repressive logic could lead to important elements of concern in terms of reversibility of democratic reforms and market area. Indeed, a security system that is not reformat, which reflexes from the previous soviet system, can ever overthrow, practically overnight, rules and democratic institutions and market systems that were build. Moreover, not reforming this sector can cause problems and delays, even harsh reactions of old institutions, supported by such a system and functioning institutional relations above. Without an urgent security system reform major impediments for reforms and institutional stability will make themselves known, leaving the way open for the reversibility of the aforementioned reforms.

This does not necessarily mean that earlier system and previous succession of forms should be maintained. Flexibility is a rule that must allow us to find ingenious solutions. Thus the EU can fulfil an even bigger role in changing and consolidating reforms, but this cannot be achieved without a reform of the security sector. The essential problem here is whether or not the EU has the necessary capabilities to achieve security sector reform and whether it need NATO logistic support for this.

The first step would be, creating a rule by which candidate EU countries should start by reforming the security sector. Some experts have suggested formulas for introducing the security sector reform in the criteria for asking the EU to open negotiations for joining the Union (the Copenhagen criteria). This way, or maybe through a different solution – this condition should be added to the formal criteria for joining the EU.

The second problem is obviously that of capabilities. Who? How? With what means? And here the debate is particularly important and goes from enhancing and developing EU capabilities in the field – which is open to criticism because of duplicitary criteria and effectiveness once NATO already has these capabilities – or a contractual form of effective NATO involvement, or a Berlin plus – like formula that will allow the EU to use NATO capabilities as needed.

At the level of the European Council we already have a few thoughts trailing in this direction as unexpected as it might seem. From this point of view it is clear that in terms of Security Sector Reform one must think about financing ESDP and lessons learned, best practices, a space where the EU has a well known deficit. Obviously the evaluation lead to capabilities, not only military but also civilian, especially concerning judges and prison guards, where the EU has had a deficit. And the capabilities of a civilian answer to security sector reform are very important.

How should the relation with the Russian Federation be like?

The relationship with the Russian Federation is a key pillar of cohesion of Europe and transatlantic cohesion. There have been numerous studies in which European states were categorized and split according to the nuances

of the relationship with Russia. From “old“ and “new“ Europe, a rather coarse way of categorization, similar to the transatlantic “Americans are from Mars, Europeans from Venus“, was moved to categories such as “condescending“ and “retractile“ with shades “benevolent pragmatism“ and “pragmatic retractile“ in relations with Russia.

The Russian-Georgian war closed, we believe, this issue: everyone has realized that the Russian Federation has no interest in the near future under the current leadership to go towards a democratic system, as we understand it. Also, the latest statement - the attack on Georgia, recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the location of missile threats in Kaliningrad, the resumption of strategic flights across the Pacific and Atlantic, the expedition for taking control of the North Pole, requesting a conference to rewrite European, even global, security etc. – all showed a revisionist Russia, in returning to the scene and with an already asserted political will to regain positions considered unjustly lost in international scaffolding.

Obviously the relationship with the Russian Federation should not be one of isolation, but one of engaging Russia. But any return to “business as usual“ should not be made too quickly, fully and without conditions, once there is not a real peace prospect in Georgia, nor Sarkozy ceasefire plan, with its imperfections and awkwardness is not met. Balance and pragmatism should be the defining paradigm shift given by the lack of prospects for Russia to become a member of the European democratic community in the near predictable future.

The need for Russia has to be balanced by the nature and mode of action of Russia. It is a necessary and compulsory partner but is not a “member of the Club“ or future member of the same club. The Russian Federation has gotten closer to the status the Soviet Union had before the Perestroika.

Obviously, as an alternative, the EU and Member States must maintain capabilities ready to use immediately for any window of opportunity for a sustainable change in the Russian Federation.

Another reality is how some European countries look at the Russian Federation after the Russian-Georgian war. A number of countries sent their

leaders to support legitimate democratically elected President of the independent and sovereign state of Georgia, even during the war. Vladimir Putin during the meeting with French President Sarkozy threaten that he will execut Saakaashvili in a public market, possibly hanging from one part of his anatomy. These states are entitled to see Russia and part of its external actions, including military doctrine and foreign policy made by President Medvedev after the brief Russian-Georgian war as a threat to state security. The reality is that there are European citizens, and not a few, but their political leaders perceive the sum of these acts and gestures as threats and wish to see NATO and the EU react to them by including them in the space of real threats, planning and budgeting accordingly, to fight the perceived threat.

EU Member States have different approaches to relations with the Russian Federation. There are practical ways of addressing the issue, two angles of different security solutions, including energy security:

- **Russia’s approach, interdependence** as a solution
- **Punishing Russia, isolating it and block all relations** except the economic ones.

The purely cooperative approach is too simplistic, to schematical and does not provide enough tools to deal with Russia. That is why some experts suggest a more refined approach:

- **Cooperation** in the vast majority of relations with the Russian Federation, not only in economy and trade, but also security issues such as terrorism, non / proliferation, etc.
- **Competition in certain economic matters**, especially in the states of the European Neighbourhood Policy in **democratization and human rights**, issues **of values**
- **Confrontation in several directions**

The refined approach to the Russian Federation may bring a set of instruments prepared for every topic, in any area of cooperation, competition or confrontation it might be. With the sum of these tools available, both the European Union, as well as each of the member state, and NATO itself, approaching Russia could prove to be more effective.

ANNEX
The convergence of reforms for NATO
and EU membership

We set out below to show that NATO and the European Union are closely linked both by high number of states that are members of both organizations, as well as for general security options and solutions that both institutions generate. Consequently, we believe it is useful to review NATO's role over time for security and stability, then evaluate the convergence of reforms for EU membership in NATO and, finally, we remember the political and economical character of NATO, to emphasize that beyond the common values, common tools, methodologies, common security, NATO and the EU are consistent, have a perfect convergence, but also cover both areas wider than those which are concerned with strict status in a complete symbiosis.

In this part we will test the compatibility between EU and NATO and will show EU concerns as an organisation, in terms of creating and developing, with the help of NATO, its own Common Foreign Security Policy – CFSP and within it the development of the European Security and Defense Policy – ESDP. These policies are supported by NATO, compatible with NATO and support defense and security policies of the Alliance to further add value to the EU's own capabilities, a gesture complementary with the NATO Berlin Plus agreements providing tools and capabilities for security and defense policies of EU areas in which NATO has no direct interest.

Moreover, France's announcement at the NATO summit in Bucharest of its the return in full duties and commitments in NATO military structures and the priorities that Paris, as the holder of the rotating six-monthly Presidency of the European Union has set - one for the second half of 2008, the strengthening of the ESDP, but also the creation of rules, methodologies and criteria of compatibility - if not the *acquis* in the future - for Foreign Policy, Security and Defense, all show that there can be no compatibility between a member/candidate EU country and a state that solves its security problems through guarantees offered by the Russian Federation.

1. NATO's role in European security architecture

Since the end of the second world war, the U.S. role in a Europe destroyed by war was of primary importance. First, the U.S. funded, through the Marshall Plan, the economical reconstruction of Western Europe after the war. Then the U.S. supported the creation of United Europe, later on the European Union. Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. and the transatlantic link were the pillars of Western European security. Through NATO, established in 1949, U.S. guaranteed security and managed the common defense of the Alliance.

Relevant to see the role of NATO in European security and stability are a couple of historical components, that changed Europe from the sum of NATO allies to the idea of a complete, democratic and free Europe, launched at the NATO summit in Prague. Then it is interesting to see the change NATO went through after the fall of the outer empire, the transformation and the adaptation of the military alliance of values and the concept of partnership, expansion and receiving new members. Moreover at the NATO summit in Rome, 1991, we can see another major proof of coherence and consistence concerning common values and ideas in the filed of security between NATO and the EU, modifying the Strategic Concept and adopting a definition of security promoted by the European school in Copenhagen, which is 5 dimensional security: political, military, economical, social and environmental.

Then we wil return to the first expanded NATO summit and new strategic concept of the Alliance of Washington in 1999, 50 years of NATO, since it is recorded as the first expansion of the Alliance with former socialist countries, then taking the whole European security as an indispensable element of security of NATO Member States, but also appeared in the premiere of operations "out of area", outside the Allies. The Balkans, but also the European post-Soviet space are areas of direct interest to NATO and spaces whose security and stability depends on the security of NATO member states.

The relationship with Russia is another component of the strategy for fulfilling the role of NATO in European security and stability. Relations are established with the Russian Federation in Rome in 2002 are reviewed, as

are the trends before and after the creation of NATO-Russia Council. The evolution of this relationship but also European security after September 11th is recorded in the last document of the Alliance, at the NATO summit in Bucharest. Here NATO and Europe see their security achieved through a global component and arrangements that include global partners, UN operations on other continents but also to prevent the war on terror from taking place on European soil.

Finally, to sum up NATO's role in European security and stability, we will briefly review the Alliance's operations conducted on the European continent, especially those made with the European Union or transferred to it for the reconstruction and institutional implementation of values.

1. NATO history in post-cold war Europe

Euro-Atlantic partnership and cooperation is seen today as one of the main objectives of NATO. The process was launched in 1990, when Alliance leaders launched a process of reconstruction of trust, friendship and partnership over the line East-West division of Europe, established during the the Cold War. Then a formula proposed cooperative relations with Central and Eastern European states and Soviet republics. Thus North Atlantic Cooperation Council – NACC was created in December 1991 as a forum for East-West consultations in Europe.

The essential step came forward in 1994 however, with the launch of the Partnership for Peace-PfP, a major program of practical bilateral cooperation between NATO and individual partners of ex-socialist and former Soviet space. The program promoted transparency in planning defense and budgeting, democratic control of military forces and joint participation in peacekeeping missions of NATO, as tools for building trust among European countries.

The invitation to join the Partnership for Peace was accepted by 30 central Eastern European and former Soviet countries. Of these, 10 have already become members of the Alliance and the other 3 were already invited to the Alliance at the NATO summit in Bucharest, next being the stages of ratification or pre-settlement phase of a symbolic dispute with a member of the Alliance for Macedonia.

Consultations on issues of security and defense of the 26 allies and 20 partner states shall take place within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council – EAPC institution that has succeeded NACC in 1997. The military forces of the Alliance and partner countries frequently interact and conduct exercises together on the basis of the agreed bilateral programs. Moreover, up to 9,000 soldiers in the partner countries participating in NATO peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, with a Russian contribution that was more important than that of any other state. All these are firm and indisputable evidence, universally recognized, concerning the role of NATO in European security and stability.

2. Rome 1991 – Europe of cooperation, peace and prosperity

The NATO summit in Rome in 1991 Statement is one of the relevant documents relating to how the Alliance planned its contribution to the future of European security and stability, the foundation for cooperation, peace and prosperity among European states on both sides of the the Iron Curtain.

Thus, the NATO summit in Rome adopted the Alliance’s transformation formulas in the context of collapse of Eastern Europe, the democratic revolutions and launching reforms, the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact and final months of the Soviet Union. On this occasion, NATO has proven resilience and the ability to identifying the role of the new Europe, which helped it survive the Cold War with a new agenda, in which European security was in the foreground.

Thus, the main transformation was easy to identify because of the way in which NATO was created as an alliance for common defense of its members, based on a core of shared values, values that were proposed to all Member States as goals for future missions, based on the democratic theory that “democratic and prosperous states do not wage wars one against another, but resolve their differences through diplomatic and legal means, through negotiations.” So NATO’s role was drafted in Rome in 1991, that of promoting the common European values. Article 2 of the Common Declaration of Rome noted “the world has changed dramatically. The

Alliance has been instrumental to this change. The peoples of North America and across Europe are to join a community of values based on freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law. As an agent of change, a stable and guaranteed source of essential security for its members, our Alliance will continue to play a key role for building a lasting order of peace in Europe: a Europe of cooperation and prosperity.

The Alliance recognized that in the environment of uncertainty and unpredictable change, NATO and the transatlantic relationship had shown that significant presence of American forces in Europe remains a long-term value for security and stability further. All functions and capabilities of the Alliance were still required to achieve security and stability in a changing Europe in the broad sense discussed by the strategic concept of Rome, the European definition of security, referred to in Article 4 of the Final Declaration of Rome “a concept that contains political, economical, social and environmental aspects alongside the military dimension of security. The document emphasizes that never until then had NATO hoped to secure the objectives of security and stability in Europe through exclusive political means, and the new European definition of security targets and new features will allow enlargement of the Alliance for a Sustainable stabilization of Europe’s view. Basically Alliance security policy could be based on three pillars, dialogue, cooperation and maintaining common defense capabilities, to the prevention and management of crisis affecting security.

In fact, the final document of Rome stated the Alliance military dimension as a key factor in the context of broader definition of security. The document stated without doubt “that the Alliance maintain its purely defensive character, its collective arrangements based on the integrated military structure and arrangements for cooperation and coordination and for the time predictable maintenance strategy based on two dimensions, Nuclear and Conventional as indissoluble elements of deterrence ability. For new targets the need to reduce the size of conventional forces and transforming them into more flexible one by increasing their mobility in order to react in a number of cases and assignments, being prepared both for defense and for intervention in case of conflicts.

NATO's nuclear forces (of the Member States but transferred to the Alliance, for reasons of capacity for negotiation and joint capabilities) were reduced, 80% of the stock of sub-strategic missile (small and medium-range action) was destroyed based on the conclusions on nuclear defense planning from Taormina. The fundamental aim of these forces was one eminently political: preserving peace and preventing war or any other form of coercion on the Member States. Basically the summit in Rome was the last to mention in its documents nuclear forces.

And developing a European defense identity was launched at the time in question, also in NATO, when the European Union was just starting to be built under the Maastricht Treaty in 1991, by merging the three European communities and the creation of political, institutional and joint decision making mechanisms.

Thus, the final declaration stated that, based on the consensus expressed at the meeting of foreign ministers of NATO member States in Copenhagen, NATO supports "the development of a security identity and role in defense of this identity, reflected by strengthening and stronger European pillar within the Alliance, which would strengthen the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance. Enhancing the role and responsibilities of EU members is an important basis of the transformation of the Alliance. These two processes reinforce each other. At the same time strengthening the transatlantic link is mentioned for ensuring strategic unity and indivisibility of security for all NATO members.

Moreover, the allies pledged that "as the process of building the CFSP and ESDP will evolve, to develop practical arrangements to ensure transparency and complementarity" between the European identity, the Western European Union and NATO. The evaluations and changes in relations with the Soviet Union and former socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe are also interesting. The document provides "a qualitative step forward" in bilateral relations over the Cold War front line in Articles 9.11 of the final Declaration of Rome.

Thus, based on common values assumed by the Alliance since its establishment and the new role of promoter of these values, identified by NATO after the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, the Alliance has assumed "the encouragement of the democratic development of the Soviet

Union and Central and Eastern Europe as the countries themselves pledge to make economic reforms and reject communist totalitarianism, as a form of governing states”.

The alliance pledges “to support all steps of Central and Eastern European states within the meaning of reform and is committed to providing practical assistance to help them succeed in this difficult transition”. Moreover the document mentioned in Article 9 that “the support and assistance (financial undertaken by Member States of the Alliance) is based on the belief that the security of Member States of the Alliance is inseparable from security of other countries in Europe.

So the Alliance assumed transition and security of Central and Eastern Europe precisely because its own security was directly related to the security of all states in Europe. Moreover, these phrases show very clearly the concerns of the Alliance in all areas of processing and value, but also economic, not only in military and security. The myth of the militaristic and bellicose NATO of the Cold War was thus losing ground, even on the propaganda level.

Article 10 of the document explicitly states desire for a complete and free Europe, and mentions how NATO supports this goal: strengthening the perception of security and confidence of European countries by supporting skills to meet the commitments of the CSCE and ensuring democratization is irreversible. They add a program to exchange views on security and related to military exchanges and contacts, to be walking towards increased confidence and security concerns of these countries.

On this basis the relationship between NATO and non-European states was built. In parallel with the emergence and development of democratic institutions in these countries, an increase in the need for cooperation between all European states, to the desire of these countries to have closer relations, consistent and comprehensive alliance, hence the need for a qualitatively new level of cooperation. And the solution was to create a relationship commitment institutionalized consultation and cooperation in the political and security (article 11 of the Final Declaration of the NATO summit in Rome), where Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia,

Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Hungary and the Soviet Union were invited to the effort of developing the institutional framework.

The proposal was to launch mutual diplomatic relations NATO-European countries, the opening of embassies, as well as a serious and structured agenda of meetings:

- Annual North Atlantic Council at ministerial level in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council
- Regular, at ambassadorial level in the North Atlantic Council
- Extraordinary ministerial or ambassadorial level, in cases requiring such meetings
- Regular meetings at intervals of stability in NATO committees including the political, economic and military, but also at other levels of the military institutions of NATO framework

Basically, NATO opened its activities in a transparent way for all European countries, also offering the legal basis for cooperation as the CSCE provided by all States concerned and comforting documents for Member States. Agenda meetings will be based on security and related issues. The Allies were to offer his experience and expertise in various fields such as defense planning, democratic concepts establishing civil-military relations, civil-military coordination of air traffic management, conversion of military complexes in civilian companies. In addition, all European countries were invited into the alliance programs of scientific and environmental research, and were included in a comprehensive program of information on NATO through diplomatic channels and embassies. Resources would be provided by allies.

3. The Strategic Concept adopted in Rome 1991 – a new definition for European security

Openness, transparency, involvement of NATO in European security of its allies and of all states, the indivisibility of European security, were all recorded in the Alliance's Strategic Concept that recorded thinking, policies, instruments and capabilities of NATO defense of Europe and European security.

It is interesting to see in the strategic concept, first, the assessment of the new strategic environment and security. NATO sees the profound political changes that took place in 1989 as a radical improvement of the security environment in that “former Soviet satellites have regained full sovereignty“, thus emphasizing Western thought that the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty that could not be reversed as accustomed in the Eastern Bloc before the democratic revolutions that have broken barriers between east-west borders.

Another point which limits sovereignty and independence, and whose resolution paves the way for NATO collaboration was the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe. Thus, the document noted that the three Baltic republics regained their independence, while the Soviet forces withdrew from Hungary and Czechoslovakia and have to complete withdrawal from Germany and Poland until 1994. These former enemies of the Alliance decided the abolition of the Warsaw Pact and rejected ideological war with the West for good.

Moreover, the new objectives of the Member states freed from communism are amongst others the implementation of policies for the creation of a pluralist democracy, rule of law, human rights and market economy, practically core values we and NATO share. Hence the conclusion that because the ideological division of Europe ended these countries were getting close naturally, through values, the foundations of cooperation within NATO, while the source of military confrontation of the Cold War no longer existed.

In fact in the chapter reserved for Alliance objectives principles of the Founding act were restated including the defense of freedom and security of its members by any political and military means, under the principles of the UN Charter. NATO also fights for a just and lasting peace in Europe, on the basis of democracy, human rights and rule of law.

The document reaffirms in Article 16, the transatlantic link and reiterates that “the security of North America is permanently and inextricably linked to the whole European security, a commitment to involve and justify the need to support the security of all European countries. On the practical

level, this principle translates into the need for collective and effective effort of all members to defend common interests.

Among the tasks put in place by NATO instruments were:

- NATO’s security policy is to preserve peace with the presence of military instruments and capabilities sufficient to prevent war and an effective defense
- A sufficient capability to successfully manage crisis affecting the security of its members
- The pursuit of political efforts of privileged dialogue with other nations that want a cooperative approach to European security, including in the areas of arms control and disarmament.

The fundamental objective of the Alliance, mentioned in the strategic concept in Article 20, is to “provide one of the indispensable foundations for a security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country can intimidate or coerce any European nation or impose hegemony through the threat and use of force”. A description of actual freedom and independence of any European state.

Moreover, the strategic concept has a chapter reserved, starting with Article 23, for protecting peace in the new Europe. The article mentions that the Alliance does not limit the options and that despite sufficient military capabilities and reserves the option to use military means and the need for defense and resolution of crisis, believes that its objectives - to defend the security and territorial integrity of its members and establishing a just and durable peace in Europe – have been achieved primarily through peaceful means. Tools of dialogue, cooperation, crisis management and conflict prevention are essential.

4. Washington 1999 – “Out of area” operations. European security after 50 years of NATO

At 50 years after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO member states gathered to celebrate the jubilee in Washington. On this occasion, the final declaration and adoption of a new strategic concept was to validate the

new transformation of Europe and the Alliance, with the same security concern throughout Europe. This time, however, NATO had already entered the enlargement process, while its operations were not strictly confined to the territory of Member States, but globalization and regional threats in Europe have led to the need for operations across Europe, “Out of area” wherever there is a crisis that affects the security of Alliance members. This final step confirms the commitment NATO towards responsibility for security throughout Europe, which directly affects the security of European members of the Alliance.

This time, NATO was preparing to become an Alliance for the 21st century, based on the same package of principles of democracy, individual liberty, rule of law and collective defense, based on the transatlantic relationship, the unique and indivisible partnership for Defense and Security linking Europe to North America.

The new Alliance was already announced to be broader, more capable and flexible, committed to collective defense and able to take over other tasks such as contributing to effective conflict prevention and engaging actively in crisis management and crisis response operations. The basic objective was, this time away from 8 years’ cooperation with nations and organizations to promote and increase security, prosperity and democracy across the transatlantic region. Moreover, the first step of expansion had already been made, as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland became new members of the Alliance, a living proof of overcoming the division inside Europe.

21st century NATO retained the power and advantages of the past in the context of new missions, new members and new partners. On that occasion, in Washington:

- A new Strategic Concept was adopted,
- The commitment for the Alliance’s expansion process was reaffirmed
- The Membership Action Plan was approved for states wishing to join NATO
- The Berlin decision was completed – the so-called Berlin plus agreements between NATO and the EU – for building the European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance which led to the growth of the efficiency of the Alliance’s European component.

5. The Strategic Concept of 1999 – the Petersberg missions, the relation with the WEU and with the EU

The essential component of the Strategic Concept adopted in Washington was, as already emphasized, the “out of area“ NATO operations, with NATO exiting the territory of the Member States to ensure their security, but also for the entire Europe. But, as dramatic as this change was, it remains the most relevant change noted on relations between NATO and EU cooperation and NATO support for operations which they plan independently, providing capabilities for Petersberg – type missions and building European identity within NATO in parallel with the European Security and Defense Policy. This construction shows the symbiosis between EU and NATO, NATO’s contribution to the building component of the EU security and defense capabilities and the complementary effect on EU capabilities by providing NATO capabilities.

The concept notes that NATO has successfully ensured the freedom of its members and prevented war in Europe in the 40 years of Cold War, then, combining defense with dialogue, played an indispensable role in ending the East-West confrontation in Europe. But political and security changes were more profound in the adoption of the last strategic concept in 1991, hence the necessity of a new assessment and adjustment of strategies and capabilities.

If the strategic perspective has proved most promising in Europe after the Cold War, it has proved to be the bearer of new challenges. New Europe, with a greater degree of integration has appeared, but with a Euro-Atlantic security structure in which NATO plays a central role. It is about efforts to establish new patterns of cooperation and mutual understanding in Euro-Atlantic region and commitment to new activities essential for greater stability. It is NATO’s commitment to stop the enormous human suffering occurring in the conflict in the Balkans.

Another important development has proved to be that of arms control. Contribution to the Alliance’s commitment was both in these directions but also towards adapting the definition and understanding of security and NATO procedures and structures to this new reality. Furthermore,

identifying new and complex risks arising in the first decade after the Cold War to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic, oppression, ethnic conflict, collapse of economies, the collapse of political order, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were identified. NATO was already demonstrating that it has stored in its regulatory scaffolding concepts of weak state and failed state, and instrumentation control and limit these risks and effects on European Alliance members and partners.

The experience of the Balkan wars, of ethnic conflict and separatism in the post-Soviet space, the effects of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and illegal nuclear arming of states, are found in the new strategic concept which reaffirms the fundamental objective of long term defense of freedom and security of its members by political or military means, based on common values, but also on a strategic objective to “secure a just and durable peace in Europe“. What is new is that the concept acknowledges that the achievements of the Alliance and the strategic objective may be endangered by crisis and conflicts that affect Euro-Atlantic area, so (according to Article 6 of the Strategic Concept of NATO in Washington) “the alliance not only ensures the defense of its own members, but contributes to peace and stability in the region. It is the argumentative, normative and theoretical basis of “out of area“ operations, beyond the Member of the Alliance, but also in Europe.

In assessing developments in the strategic environment, Article 12 states that “the EU has taken important decisions and provided impetus for greater efforts to strengthen its security and defense dimension”, a process with implications for the entire Alliance, and “all European Allies should be involved in these efforts, building on arrangements developed by NATO-WEU Western European Union”. The EU has already adopted the Treaty of Amsterdam to mark the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy - CFSP with an important component of shaping a common defense policy ESDP. According to the document, this policy was compatible with the common security and defense of NATO and the steps incorporating the Petersberg tasks of the WEU in the new EU Treaty, such as the development of close institutional relations of the EU with the WEU.

In the same context, of support for European security and defense-ESDI within the Alliance, within the Alliance forces and capabilities for WEU-led

missions have been available, based on the final declaration of the NATO Summit in 1994 and the Berlin Plus agreements in 1996. A very close relationship to strengthen peace and stability in Europe by increasing its military capabilities of European allies of NATO has developed between NATO and the WEU. Increased responsibilities and capacity of European allies was considered an added value to security and defense of Europe and useful for strengthening the Alliance's security environment.

Between risks and security threats on NATO, the Strategic Concept stated that, despite positive developments in the strategic environment and the fact that conventional large-scale military aggression against the Alliance were not likely, there is still the possibility of such long-term threats. The foreseeable increase of Russia's capabilities and readiness and willingness to recover the strategic position it once had was already foreseen, though not stated.

Between military and non-military risks against the alliance, with a multi-face nature and difficult to predict, the following were included:

- Uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area
- The possibility of regional crisis at the periphery of the Alliance to evolve rapidly (Kosovo was in full blast and threatened to turn into a bloody crisis)
- Economic and social difficulties of some countries in the Euro-Atlantic region and around it
- Ethnic and religious rivalries
- Territorial disputes
- Inadequate or missed reform efforts
- Abuse of human rights
- State dissolution
- Local and regional instability capacity spreading through influence on contact.

Obviously, all these crisis could directly affect the Alliance and particularly European allies, which is where the concerns of NATO to prevent crisis, armed conflicts and human suffering arises from. The domino effect on neighbouring countries, including NATO member states, was taken into account, as were the formulas through which other European countries were

affected. These concerns were followed, of course, by evaluation, planning and taking preventive tasks and eliminating their direct contribution to security throughout Europe.

In the chapter reserved for the 21st century Alliance model, the 5 dimensions of security are reiterated understanding, according to the Copenhagen school, but also the commitment and objective to increase efforts to develop effective cooperation with the UN and other European and Euro-Atlantic – a new formula, encountered for the first time in NATO documents, which stresses cooperation with the Alliance of EU and WEU. The purpose of cooperation is “building the European security architecture in which the Alliance’s contribution to Euro-Atlantic security and stability in the region and the contribution of these international organizations are complementary and reinforce each other, so strengthening Euro-Atlantic relations between countries as well as crisis management.

6. The relation with Russia: Creating the NATO-Russia Council, Rome 2002

The NATO-Russia relationship through the way it was built by the Institutional Alliance was always one relevant for European security. And in this area, ever since the collapse of the outer empire, NATO invited the Soviet Union in the North Atlantic Consultative Council - NACC and then Russia, like other post-Soviet states, to the Partnership for Peace - PfP and NATO-led peacekeeping missions in Europe.

The bigger the Russia’s formal growth was, but also the more NATO borders extended even within the post-Soviet (Baltics), the more care had to be shown in the institutional approach to relations with Russia to build confidence, to mark transparency necessary to engage Russia at the level of visibility that it wanted for it for the sake of the domestic market. So in Rome in 2002, the NATO-Russia Council – NRC was launched, which aimed to bring together allies and Russia “to identify and use opportunities for joint action“ (19 1).

The gesture was also a response to how admirably Moscow behaved during the events on 9/11th, when the emergence of a common enemy of both NATO and Russia, global terrorism, was seen. Thus, the Council was the

setting where NATO and Russia would work together as equal partners in areas of common interest to defend against common threats and risks to security.

The events of 9/11th gave rise to the need for integrated and coordinated action to address common threats. Terrorism suddenly came to the forefront of the NATO agenda, a place where it was not to be found – at the final statements and strategic concepts of the beginning of the millennium.

Based on the objectives and principles of the 1997 Founding Act, which enshrines the NATO-Russia relations, the new Nato-Russia Council was created as a mechanism for consultation, consensus, cooperation and decision making and actions. The principle of consensus and equal status of the Allies and Russia in the Council – and not an alleged parity between Moscow and the Alliance as a whole, but with the opportunity to discuss any matter concerned with the parties, but with decisions only by consensus and agreement of all the allies and Russia – the new Council promoted continuous dialogue on security issues for identifying emerging problems, determining common approaches and appropriate actions.

The Council presidency was provided by NATO's Secretary General and there were at least monthly meetings at ambassadorial and military level, twice a year at the level of foreign ministers, defense and the Chiefs of Staff. Occasional meetings were held with Heads of State. Areas of common interest were:

- the fight against terrorism
- crisis management
- proliferation
- arms control
- measures of trust
- missile defense
- search and rescue missions at sea
- military cooperation
- cooperation in case civil emergencies

To strengthen cooperation, Russia's NATO mission was established on March 18th, 1998, and on February 20th, 2001 a NATO information center was inaugurated in Moscow. On the 5th Anniversary of the Founding Act on

May 27th, 2002, the NATO military mission in Moscow was established, to increase transparency, the development of practical military cooperation and cooperation with the Russian Defense Minister.

Practically, the most successful mission was in the Balkans. NATO and Russian soldiers fought together for 6 years for peacekeeping in the Balkans, the IFOR and SFOR, in Bosnia, and Russia helped to end the conflict in Kosovo, while its troops were part of KFOR.

NATO and Russia have participated in joint military exercises of air defense and peace support operations, testing the interoperability of equipment and processes in areas such as transport and air supply. In the area of cooperation in defense, a NATO training, information and consultation centre was built in March 2002 and added to the cooperation in prevention and response to disasters, planning for civil emergencies, cooperation rescuing soldiers from the submarine Kursk, cooperation in science, research and environment.

Another relevant area was the fight against new security threats, based on regular consultations between NATO and Russia on new security challenges, threats of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, biological and chemical, and also the spread of ballistic missile technology, bearers of these weapons.

This serious, broad, institutionalized cooperation with Russia is also an important pillar of activity and a strong argument to highlight the contribution of NATO for European security.

7. The NATO summit in Bucharest – the present and the future of European security

The NATO summit in Bucharest on April 2–4th, 2008 was the last summit meeting of Heads of State and Government of Member States of NATO. On this occasion there were a series of provisions and commitments relating to security in Europe. This, however, has to do with different dimensions, related to NATO's actions in fighting terrorism in Afghanistan, operations with global partners, since, through globalization, threats have become globalized, as shown by 9/11th.

And documents from the NATO summit in Bucharest Alliance stress the consistency and continuity of policies to ensure the security of Europe, but also the policies of openness and transparency towards Russia, while its behaviour and statements prove that Moscow has changed, its ambitions have increased and the actor allowed itself to leave the international rules.

Already the language in the final declaration of the NATO summit use a completely different tone. Thus, expansion and strengthening capacity to confront current and emerging threats of the 21st century is the objective cited at the beginning statement, just before reiterating the principles and fundamental values of the Alliance. Then the presence of the representatives of European and global partner organizations - UN, EU, global partners is welcomed to Bucharest. Thus the transition from the Euro-Atlantic security and Europe's need for global action because "today's security challenges cannot be successfully confronted by NATO alone" towards "a wider partnership of the international community" as part of a broad approach based on transparency and openness on cooperation and determination of all concerned is made.

With regard to NATO-EU relations, Article 14 refers to a wide range of common interests related to security, defense, crisis management, combating terrorism, development capabilities and strengthen their mutual consistency. The successful operations in the Balkans but also the EU operation Althea, conducted with NATO capabilities under Berlin plus agreements are reiterated. Under common values and interests of EU and NATO, the two institutions work together in crisis management operations.

NATO recognizes the added value that a stronger and more capable European defense represents by bringing new capabilities to counter the challenges facing both NATO and EU as well. The Alliance continues to support strengthening European capabilities, to improve NATO-EU strategic relationship for greater efficiency and avoid duplication of efforts and costs in the spirit of transparency, while respecting the autonomy of the two organisations. But this does not imply an independent solution to the EU for European security, independent of NATO, but complementary and additional to the security capabilities provided by the Alliance, based on common principles and values.

The final Declaration of the NATO Summit sanctioned the self-suspending of Russia from the revised Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe and empowers the U.S. on behalf of NATO, to negotiate the matter bilaterally with Moscow in the interests of safety in Europe. Other direct contributions to European security are NATO enlargement with Croatia, Albania and Macedonia's decision on that step for stabilizing the Western Balkans, but also reaffirming the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Not at least, the support for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia and Moldova is reaffirmed. Energy security and interest in the Black Sea region appear in the final document as a contribution to European security. Also the launch and opening of the Cyber Defense Center in Tallinn is part of the same sphere of arguments for NATO's role in security across Europe.

8. Peacekeeping operations in Europe

We cannot conclude the arguments relating to the role of NATO in European security without a review of the Alliance operations in the European territory. We are talking about the SFOR – Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the KFOR operation in Kosovo, and the operations in Macedonia: Allied Harmony, Amber Fox and Essential Harvest.

SFOR Bosnia and Herzegovina was an operation carried out between December 1996 and December 2004 where the NATO led the Stabilization Force in Bosnia Herzegovina, in order to maintain the security situation and facilitate reconstruction of the state, after the war 1992–1995. NATO continues to maintain a troop headquarters in Sarajevo in order to assist the Government in reforming the security structures.

The role of SFOR was to prevent and hinder the restart of hostilities, to promote the climate of the peace process and provide selective support to civil organizations involved in the process. Basically, the activities were those of patrolling and providing security zones up to supporting defense reform and overseeing mining operations, arresting war criminals and assisting the return of refugees.

The European Union has conducted a force in Bosnia-Herzegovina through Operation Althea, resuming the peace stabilization role of NATO. Under agreements between the two organizations, NATO is providing planning, logistics and command support for EU-led operation, under the Berlin Plus agreements.

NATO operations in Kosovo cover peacekeeping operation in Kosovo that began in June 1999 and still continue. KFOR was held after a 78-day campaign of air strikes launched by the alliance in March 1999, in order to stop and prevent the humanitarian catastrophe in the region. KFOR remains in Kosovo under Resolution 1244 of UN Security Council, cooperating with people of the region, the European Union and the United Nations and with other international actors, to develop a stable, democratic, multiethnic and peaceful Kosovo.

NATO operations in Macedonia:

Essential Harvest was the first of held operations held by NATO in Macedonia, and lasted between August 22th and September 23th, 2001. It involved sending a 3500 NATO military personnel, logistics support, to disarm ethnic Albanian groups and destroy their weapons. The sole deployment condition was a dialogue between different parties and a final solution construction.

Operation Amber Fox followed the September 23th, 2001 and December 15th, 2002 operations and is in response to another request of Macedonian authorities. The specific mandate was to help protect international monitors who were supposed to oversee implementation of the peace plan in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Mission was developed with the participation of 700 NATO troops under German command with 300 troops already in country. The duration was 3 months with the possibility to be extended if necessary, depending on the situation in the country.

Finally, Operation Allied Harmony lasted from December 16th, 2002 to March 31th, 2003 and was created at the request of the President of Macedonia, Trajkovski, and was a classic peacekeeping operation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, following the ethnic conflicts occurring in Macedonia. The purpose was to avoid the risk of destabilization.

NATO presence had two dimensions: operational support efforts for international monitors of the peace agreement and advisory elements to assist the government in bringing security throughout the country. On March 17th, 2003, the operation was handed over to the European Union, but the Alliance remained committed to supporting Macedonia's NATO entry reason for which a civilian and a military special presence in NATO headquarters in Skopje remained, which continues to support the development of security sector reform and adaptation to NATO standards.

2. Reforms for NATO and EU accession

We proposed, in this part, to show that joining the European Union and NATO are equivalent in terms of necessary reforms. For this, complementary to those presented in the previous chapter, we demonstrate that the requirements of European Union documents look at NATO prerequisites as a mandatory part for the security of our continent, but also that the reforms required by both organizations coincide. Then we try to see if there are elements in the reform for NATO membership that do not explicitly appear in the EU accession Treaty - and here we mean the criteria for security sector reform, in particular - and how do Member States of the EU look upon the accession of a virtual state which is not a member of NATO, especially that part of the *acquis communautaire* which France wants to introduce to cover security sector reform. Finally, the whole effort is to prepare the way for an analysis of the CFSP and ESDP and to see in the next chapter, to what extent the two European policies are now compatible with solving the problem of security by guarantees of the Russian Federation as a candidate country.

1. ESDP and NATO

In the following part we will see how the European Security and Defense - ESDP, part of the CFSP started, and how the European documents talk about the EU's relationship with NATO. ESDP was European Presidency's priorities over 2 years, in 1999-2001, and is an integral part of the construction of European institutions and EU responsibilities assumed in front of the international community.

The Cologne European Council of June 1999 declarations mention that the EU seeks cooperation, consultation and transparency in relations with NATO, thus bringing added vitality to the transformed Alliance. The final document of the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999, underlined the need to create a force for rapid intervention in order to manage the crisis. The Council determined the precise role of the Member States of EU and NATO members and candidate countries, members of NATO. This symbiosis is relevant and shows the interdependence between consistent policies of the two organizations.

The European Council of Feira in June 2000, completed the missing link of collaborating with NATO member states and EU members. Thus, third parties in this category may participate in EU-led military operations, moreover, already at that time these states were listed in the document: Norway, Turkey, Poland, Czech Republic. At this European Council the basis of consultations with NATO on military issues were established, underlining that “the EU and NATO are organizations of different nature in terms of crisis management capability”.

Under the provisions of the Nice European Council, “the EU will be able to intervene through military actions in operations such as those for humanitarian operations, peacekeeping and crisis management - the famous Petersberg missions - although the EU has not proposed to have its own army. The Council also mentioned that “NATO remains the basis of the EU Defense, while the ESDP only adds more vitality to the Alliance.

After the events of 9/11th, the fight against terrorism has become one of the most important objectives of both NATO and EU as well, along with the creation of rapid intervention forces, improving management and crisis decision making and strengthening cooperation between the information of the Member States. Hence the need for the ESDP to become operative as soon as possible.

The Laeken European Council of December 2001, decided the final shape and the effective and efficient European defense policy. On December 6th, 2001, we had the NATO-EU ministerial meeting reconfirm the close relationship between the two organizations and good cooperation. In fact

everything here has stressed that EU enlargement may cause the strengthening of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership through proper distribution of duties and power in the European area. Furthermore, future EU members should be given a greater degree of inclusion in ESDP and the EU should establish mechanisms for consultation and cooperation, allowing countries to participate in debates on European defense and security architecture and to participate effectively in decisions to shape it.

Given that the specific objectives of NATO and the EU match it was very useful for all countries participating in NATO and EU enlargement after the fall of communism in Europe, combining the two processes in sizing reform efforts. Moreover, there is no precedent for a state to enter the EU without joining NATO and solving security problems. Without a priori excluding such a possibility, we look further at how the EU take on a neutral, non-NATO state, and finally, the extent to which the ESDP should be compatible with receiving a State that manages security through guarantees provided by a non-EU, non-NATO member with strong issues with the two organizations.

ESDP issues are included in the negotiation chapter “Common Foreign and Security Policy“ and refer to the transposition of the *acquis communautaire* in the national law, concerning the CFSP, but also the acquisition and the implementation of CFSP objectives after EU membership is achieved.

Among the commitments made by States that became members in the earlier stages are:

- solving all problems with their neighbours based on international law
- to support the EU (and NATO) integration of the former Yugoslavia states in the prevailing system of values in Europe
- to modernize and increase the effectiveness of the capacity of Defense, through a broad reform process of the Army
- Active participation in cooperative agreements with third parties and EU security policy and defense
- to support non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological weapons
- to take full EU objectives set out in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (affirming EU identity on the international scene, in particular by implementing a common foreign and security policy)

- to take over and implement the objectives of the CFSP, as they are stipulated in the provisions of Title V of the TEU (we return to analyze CFSP and ESDP in a later chapter)

The EU-NATO ministerial meeting in December 2001 noted clearly that “the processes of internal and external adaptation of NATO and the EU, including in terms of extending the two organizations are complementary and reinforce each other“. This was reflected by the provisions of the assessments made by both institutions in the case of states that joined both the EU and NATO as basically political provisions are similar, while the economic provisions, although developed for the European Union, had the same conditionality in NATO’s case (we will later see the economic provisions of the package of NATO integration), while safety issues for NATO integration package is found in EU observations.

Concerning political aspects in the integration wave of 2004-2007 for the EU and 2002 for NATO the same priorities can be found:

- Fighting corruption
- The situation of foster children
- The situation of the Roma minority
- Judicial reform
- Public administration reform

In the economic aspects of the provisions of the same states for NATO and the EU integration we find:

- Economic restructuring
- Sustainable economic growth
- Business climate
- Legal framework for foreign investments

Thus, improving the overall situation in the areas mentioned - with detailed development titles, institutions and legislation, in particular the EU - supported by government action and coherent legislative reforms parameters of performance targets for both NATO and the Partnership as Accession to the European Union were included. The criteria for inclusion in the two organizations are converging and mutually reinforcing, not only at the level of joint declarations, but also the requirements for joining the

two organizations. The economic development of countries aspiring to NATO integration is a fundamental process that can meet the requirements of Army modernization and the participation of a state according to the needs of the Alliance.

2. The common package of values and reforms

Concerning the political criteria for EU and NATO accession, internal performance parameters for membership in both organizations mostly coincide. Thus, by satisfying the political criteria for accession to the European Union, included in the Copenhagen criteria which allow addressing the theme, entitlement and opportunities for application for EU membership, a country ensures policy requirements on the internal dimension of NATO. Thus:

- a. The grounds of democracy, rule of law and protection of children through the following elements:
 - improving civil and political rights of citizens including the freedom of association and assembly
 - the restitution of property,
 - in matters of judicial reform court proceedings and the application of judicial decisions
 - judicial independence by the rules of the Supreme Council of Magistracy and the Code of Conduct for the judiciary
 - the criminal justice system reform through the introduction of probation and accountability of law enforcement agencies
 - fighting trafficking through regulatory measures, institutional plans and concrete actions
- b. The criteria for protection of minorities includes provisions such as:
 - Representation in national and local representative structures
 - Broad rights for national minorities to preserve language and culture for self-administration in compact living quarters
 - Adoption of general anti-discrimination legislation
 - The practical application of the Directive on equal treatment principle to people regardless of ethnic origin or race – managing ethnic conflicts, reducing their number and integration of minorities in national political and administrative life

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- c. criteria related to child protection provided by both institutions, a series of common provisions:
- Management of the foster children protection
 - To promote the best interests of the children in taking measures that concern them
 - Community responsibility for vulnerable groups of children
 - Strengthening social protection of children in difficulty or in situations of risk
 - Interdisciplinary and intersectorial approach to child protection, both in the context of social policies, family and educational policies
- d. Justice and Home Affairs criteria
- Visa policy
 - Border control
 - Control of migration
 - The establishment of foreigners law with common standards
 - Adopting the European system of extradition law
 - New types of passports, with high security to prevent forgeries
 - Facilities and appropriate upgrading of border points
 - Adoption scheme movement of persons under rules negotiated with the EU
 - Border security through information exchange agreements with neighbours
 - Integrated border management
- e. The criteria relating to the fight against corruption contains:
- Substantial reduction in tax evasion – fighting widespread smuggling
 - Creating appropriate institutions and mechanisms against money laundering
 - Diminishing underground economy

Concerning economic criteria necessary for a state to face integration into the European Union and NATO we also find common provisions.

- Strengthening economic stabilization
- Strengthening sustainable economic development
- Reducing the inflation rate and maintaining it at a low level

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- A growth in the volume of exports and a decrease in the balance of payments deficit
 - Improving the banking sector
 - Improving budgetary performance, in particular the budget collections
 - Significant increase of the Central Bank's international reserve
 - Increasing trade integration with the EU
 - Stimulating the development of SMEs and strengthening the middle class
 - Structural reforms and industrial giants' privatisation
 - Economic decentralization - the adoption criteria of a market economy between state and private sectors
 - The adoption of equal competition rules and fair competition
 - The return of industrial property to former owners
 - A stable legal framework for the investment climate
 - Bureaucracy reduction
 - Reducing the number of permits and paperwork necessary
 - Equal access to licenses
 - Building a functioning market economy
 - Industrial development
 - Improving transport infrastructure

In all the cases of states that joined the EU and NATO after the collapse of communism in Europe, preparations for joining the two institutions were similar and complementary, they boosted each other and have been instrumental in speeding up economic and social reforms, stability, welfare and modernization in each state.

3. Lessons learned from the accession of Eastern European states to the EU and NATO

To reveal the more pregnant coincidence criteria for joining NATO and the EU, we will look briefly at Romania's Preparation Plan for joining NATO, established in Bucharest in April 10th, 2002. We will see here the areas in which preparation for admission into NATO and chapter topics included political, economic, rule of law, the elements contained in the *acquis communautaire*, then we will examine the extent to which the provisions of a military nature and reform of defense institutions coincided with the accession preparation for admission into the EU and the specific differences for joining NATO.

The Membership Action Plan contains areas such as reform of the military body, improving planning by linking resources with objectives, transparency of economic reform, fighting corruption and human trafficking, protection of classified information and operation of special services, children's rights and national minorities. Although, apparently, some problems are not directly related to NATO enlargement, they were part of the reform package required for admission to the Alliance because of the compatibility criteria of Romania with the system of rules and values NATO.

The Membership Action Plan is prepared on the annual plan of reforms in the MAP, and thus fully reflects the requirements of the framework of accession negotiations with NATO but also the commitments of Romania in the negotiations to join NATO.

The Preparation Plan chapters mostly coincide with those relating to European Union accession criteria. We will thus focus on the other, the second part, to see which are the common elements which are the differentiating elements between NATO and the EU. The four specific areas are:

- Reform of military organizations
- Improving planning
- Protection of classified information
- The operation of special services

The criteria related to military reform and improving the planning body are:

- Generating real and effective military capabilities to ensure national security needs as well as actively contributing to NATO's military structure. Noteworthy here is that the criteria needs to ensure its national security and foreign missions of the EU and criteria of the EU package.
- Building a modern military force, reliable, properly structured internal needs and external missions, better trained and equipped , interoperable with NATO (EU criteria)
- Defense budget at least 2% of GDP. (Romania pledged to 2.38%) - reduction of forces acting in time of peace (EU criteria)
- Military career management

- Improving command and control system
- Creating a transmission system compatible with that of NATO (criteria in EU missions)
- Providing aerial surveillance operation Operational Center (EU criteria Chapters JHA and ESDP)
- Implementation the planning, programming, budgeting and evaluation system
- Enhancing capacity to participate in crisis management operations (EU criteria, ESDP)
- Improving Air transport (EU priority and the ESDP, the EU as a whole)
- Facilities and air bases capable of providing transit and transport plus storage for Allied missions.
- Ports to ensure the port and shipping capacity
- The size and structure of forces under the categories of forces negotiated with NATO
- Adopting the military career guide
- Compliance with the pyramid of functions and degrees, the staff use their skills in the right position
- Prepare NCOs and increased powers in the Army.
- Training and learning English

A brief analysis shows that the criteria for admission into NATO either or coincide with those for admission to the EU or are essential criteria for any army and ensure any state's security. Noteworthy here is that generating real and effective military capability to ensure national security needs as well as actively contributing to NATO's military structure or peacekeeping operations and crisis management, where the EU are mandatory criteria, are sine qua non criteria for any member of the EU and NATO. It is true that any state can alter the National Security Strategy and eliminate traditional threats to its security, but it becomes a vulnerability not credible for the European Union.

Also, the wording is quite clear that each state must have sufficient forces to safeguard its own territory and population, interests, not through NATO/EU support or capabilities or through that of another state. EU criteria does not directly discuss the idea of neutrality, but in any case, has the requirement categories of troops necessary to ensure its own security and contributions to foreign missions.

The main criteria related to information security and intelligence services (other than those related to political criteria) are:

- Matching classified information protection authority with NATO standards (existing criteria for the EU as well)
- The reform of special services (existing criteria implicit in the EU, although no formula developed to track points)
- Launch cooperation with partner services or allied state (criteria EU)
- Exercise democratic control over special services authority by special parliamentary commission (EU criteria)
- Adapt organizational structures and operational developments of predictable security environment
- Strengthening public confidence about the role and activities of special services
- Contacts with media to create a real perception of the authority of special services
- Drafting instructions and internal procedures to protect classified information and related legal acts. (EU criteria)
- Developing unique procedures in industrial safety
- Training security officials
- Develop mechanisms and procedures for electronic exchange of classified documents
- Adapt the objectives, tasks and missions of special services to meet the standards of a democratic society
- Balance between the principle of transparency, the activity of special services and providing classified information
- The establishment of procedures for the review of government officials with access to classified information

With regard to these criteria, they are either EU criteria as well or absolutely essential to consistent and reliable development of special services in a democratic society – they come from EU political criteria and of human rights or are nonformal criteria of the EU, which did not originally develop military capabilities, but officially permitted any Member State's and EU Member States' essential security.

3. Formal relations between the EU and NATO

Formalized relations between the EU and NATO came into being in January 2001, and formal development, design and their relations grew rapidly after the EU-NATO declaration of December 16th, 2002 on European Security and Defense Policy – ESDP / ESDP. The Joint Declaration reaffirmed EU access to NATO planning capabilities for its military operations and introduced the following principles of cooperation:

- Effective mutual consultation
- Equality and respect for the autonomous decisions of the EU and NATO
- Respect for the interests of EU Member States and NATO
- Respect for the principles of UN Charter
- To develop a joint consistent, transparent package of demands on the capabilities of both organizations, that would help and support the mutual strengthening of these capabilities

The package of documents adopted by both organizations in March 2003 contained the NATO-EU Agreement on Security of Information and Berlin Plus Agreement, which include:

- A NATO-EU Security Agreement (which covered the exchange of classified information based on common rules for the protection of security)
- Providing access and use by the EU to NATO planning capabilities for planning military operations of EU crisis management
- Use of NATO's military capabilities and communications units and the operations headquarters for EU – led crisis management.
- Procedures for acquisition, monitoring, return and recall of NATO capabilities and assets to the EU, in its own operations
- Terms of reference at deputy SACEUR (NATO commander in Europe), who will command, in principle, EU operations carried out under the Berlin Plus arrangements (a person who is European) and European Command Options for NATO.

- The EU – NATO bilateral arrangements and consultations in the context of EU crisis management operations using NATO capabilities and assets
- Incorporate in the NATO planning system established long-term needs and capabilities that may be necessary for EU-led operations, to ensure availability of trained forces and equipped for both the NATO-led operations as well as the EU.

NATO-EU cooperation in Macedonia, taking over NATO operations by the EU's Operation Concordia (based on the Berlin Plus agreements), or in Bosnia Herzegovina, which took over the command of SFOR EU and Kosovo, where KFOR (NATO) and EULEX (EU) have transferred some powers from first to second and further cooperate in the field.

NATO and EU are both based on common values and institutions and are considered “the most integrated and near community in the world”. At the same time it is a “security community”. The two organizations share a common collective identity, Euro-Atlantic, Western, etc. We share the same economic interdependence and mutual benefit created significant interest other organizations. We use the same type of institutions to manage domestic affairs and international relations. We share common values, perceptions and counter the same threats, share the same forces, capabilities and resources to address these threats. Since 19 states are in both organizations this makes the two organically linked. NATO cannot survive without the EU and EU cannot survive without NATO. The specifics of each one reinforces and brings power to the other, are complementary and symbiotic in all.

4. Compatibility issues between CSFP, ESDP, Russia

In this part we will try to answer a few of the questions that set the degree that political options set by the state in the National Security Strategy are logically consistent, practical and strategic and are not contradictory. Moreover, given the security options discussed in chapter 2 we want to see exactly what is the possibility that a non-NATO member can become a member of the EU, while it is neutral, or its security is guaranteed by a third party, non-NATO and non-EU.

1. The EU as a security actor

We propose to assess the EU's qualities as a security actor. During the first phase we will not refer to essential elements that are usually considered in such a case, the CFSP and the ESDP.

We will subsequently demonstrate, leaving from the European definition of security in the broader sense that the EU is a type of security actor whose main characteristics are developing political and administrative capabilities, which allows it to successfully cover the "soft" elements of security, and is a successful actor in economic, social, political and environmental security as we shall see further on its characteristics concerning "hard security", mainly military security and defense institutions.

It is certainly true that EU member states do not have this component covered but we must see how much of it is due to belonging to NATO, how much is because of individual national developments and how much is due to EU policies.

Basically the EU's political and administrative capability overimposes on the criteria that we studied in the previous chapter for NATO member states, that of planning, programming, budgeting and evaluation capacity. Moreover the EU behaves like an actor whose security is covered by NATO, who is only interested that member states have the capabilities to assure their own security (without having the instruments to check this other than by results and democratic rules, but without being able to check the security sectors' reform through indicators) – and here they interact with NATO who has the necessary capabilities to integrate force systems – and to contribute to external missions.

Here is where the difference between NATO and the EU intervenes, where the EU wishes to have its own capabilities, both civilian and military, for missions that are not NATO missions. Here again capabilities are taken/borrowed from the Alliance, according to Berlin plus agreements. The EU looks like an actor with assured security who wants to have capabilities for its own missions and thus creates security instruments once it has come across security problems that NATO cannot solve. This way the Energy Security Strategy is explained as are its police, justice, order

civilian capabilities, instruments that the EU uses admirably for the administrative-political component for state reconstructions, its added value to the notion of security.

The EU's quality as a post-modern actor is given precisely by its multi-level capacity, with administrative structures on different levels – sub-national, national, regional, European – with decisions being made at different levels according to the level that decision affects and specific attributes and sometimes with codecision formulas between the Commission, the Council and the member state – even foreign, security, defense policy. Unlike this model NATO is a pure intergovernmental institution, where decisions are made exclusively by consensus and where participation is voluntary, with the exception of the imperative solidarity “hard” guarantee of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, exception which gives the organisation its particularity.

Thus there is no point in discussing the importance of administrative capacity as a component of security, precisely because many of the security threats come from not having this capacity. The experience from the EU in strengthening community cohesion but also between pillars two and three but most especially from the capacity, expertise and ability to transform during the expansion process, the ability to integrate new members and transform actors within the neighbourhood, the attractiveness of the European model for neighbouring states, all are concrete elements of a security and capability that only the EU (and not NATO) has and are indispensable for 21st century security.

In the new forms of development and defining security we talk about an actors capabilities to be there and generate policies and promote interest as components of security capabilities. It is about the opportunity – presence – internal capability trinoma which validates actions. Then it is obvious we have to evaluate the thirds trinoma, action – effectiveness- efficiency in attaining ones goals and promoting ones interests. From this point of view the EU is truly a relevant, major actor with worthwhile capabilities, although it rarely feels the absence of some categories of instruments that come after having its own credible, solid military and “hard” capability.

For the EU we can evaluate 4 types of administrative skills which are relevant for its quality as a security actor:

- a. The first type of skill is that of rights and authority. They usually come from formal rules, are protected, interpreted by a structure of norms and institutions. Exercising a valid authority of institutions and political culture is absolutely necessary for legitimacy and recognition, and those who exercise the authority are thus validated, acknowledged and mandated.
- b. The second type of skill comes from the need for resources. It is about the elements that allow you to do certain things or make others do certain things. It is about money, properties, time, information, facilities, equipment are both individual and institutional capabilities.
- c. The third type of skill is given by competences and know-how. Individuals store competences through education, expertise, experience. Institutions gather know-how through traditions and rules.
- d. None of the aforementioned skills would have any relevance if there were not a fourth type, the organisational skills. It is important because it allows the use of rights, authority, resources and competences, and the skill comes from the effectiveness and efficiency of using the aforementioned skills.

It is obvious that the differences between types of skills especially appear from the limited character of others – money, properties. So if we estimate the aforementioned characteristics, the EU is a post-modern security actor with special instruments but with a limited and low-budget military/force instrument – something which it feels but compensated by leaving classical security to the states and to NATO.

2. CSFP, ESDP for states with no armed forces?

In order to answer this and the following questions we will have to choose a few elements from EU documents. The most important one is the European Security Strategy “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, compiled by Javier Solana and adopted by the European Council in December 2003, it is the first document of this kind elaborated at EU level. It starts by assuming that the “EU is a global actor”. Consequently “it should be ready to assume

responsibilities in the area of global security”. According to the document, the creation and the development of the EU are central elements towards moving the new security environment. The Strategy highlights the importance of policies based on credible military capabilities, for protecting European interests in the world and counterstriking the new risks on security, first and foremost concerning international terrorism.

The document mentions the primordial interest towards the new challenges on European security that the EU can stabilise, both directly and indirectly, because the risks of a traditional military confrontation on the European continent have diminished significantly. It is obvious that the latest developments could bring serious reappraisals of the document, and that the capabilities for self defense and conflict prevention may indeed be completely different.

But coming back to the standing Security Strategy the document considers that the explanation comes from two aspects:

- current security interests and objectives of European states do not generate conflicts, quite the contrary they favour cooperation and solidarity;
- the international security environment is positively influenced by European and Euro-atlantic integration processes, in fact by the expansion of the community of states that share and promote democratic and free market values, in the context of deepening regional cooperation.

Faced with the new threats on security the EU can respond through three strategic objectives:

- a. ensuring stability and good governance in its neighbourhood. This will imply extending the security area around Europe and will insure that states in this area (Eastern Europe, Western Balkans, Mediterranean states) are well governed. This objective will also imply continuing and developing Europe’s involvement in solving the arab-israeli conflict;
- b. creating an international order based on effective multilateralism. In a world characterised by globalisation (global threats, global markets, global mass media) security and prosperity depend on the existence of an effective multilateral system (this is clearly influence by events of the

time in Iraq and certain European states' discontent with American "unilateralism"). This is why one of the EU's objective must be, according to the Strategy, developing a powerful international society, characterised by the existence of efficient international institutions, as well as by the existence of world order based on respecting laws, first and foremost those written in the UN Charter (Here we could mention the failure of these requisites after the failure to reform the UN, the drop in credibility and effectiveness of the UN Security council, blocages and the fall of the OSCE rule system etc).

The quality of the international society depends on the quality of the governments that make it up. The best defense for European security is given by the existence of a world formed by well lead democratic states. This is why spreading good governance practices, fighting corruption and power abuse, benign rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the world order.

The European Security Strategy states, unequivocally, that the link with NATO and the Alliances' role in European security: "In this context an important element of this new world order is considered to be transatlantic cooperation within NATO";

- c. preparing a response to the new kind of threats. This response include the anti-terrorist measure package adopted after 9/11th, supporting measures to prevent weapons of mass destruction proliferation and assisting states with weak or unstable structures in the Balkans, Afghanistan, East Timor and Africa (The Democratic Republic of Congo). Identifying answers to the new threats must start from the fact that these often come from far away, are more dynamic and more complex.

This is why the defense line will have to be abroad for most of the time. The dynamic character will make it necessary to shift stress towards crisis and threat prevention. The complex character will require solutions to match it which will include export control, economic, political or even military pressure. The EU has all the instruments for adopting such complex solutions.

The document mentions the need and the effectiveness criteria of the security policy – as the EU does with all its policies. Thus if the EU security and defense policy is to become more effective, the Strategy sets as necessary a more active pursuit of its objectives through civilian or military objectives, a more coherent union of effort and command during times of crisis, more skilled by allotting more resources, avoiding duplications, better coordination of existing resources. Here it is stated that in an form admissible to member states at the time of the drafting of the document, in 2003, the role of the US in the security and defense of Europe by mentioning the fact that “in achieving its security and defense objectives the EU will have to bear in mind maintaining privileged relations with the US”.

Among the political implications for the EU determined by these objectives and imperatives from the Security Strategy, the document states that the EU must become:

- more active: a strategic culture which can ensure fast, robust and timely intervention using political, diplomatic, military, civilian and commercial instruments/actions;
- more capable: the new European Defense Agency has a major role in developing defense capabilities;
- more coherent: the ESDP and CFSP strong point is the belief that “we are strong when we act together”; the current challenge is in putting together and making different instruments and capabilities work.

Interestingly enough, for our evaluation, is the perspective determined by the Union concerning its prospects in the military and security objective called “Headline Goal 2010“. The document was adopted at the Defense Ministers meeting in May 17th, 2004 and is the result of adapting the HG 2003 (Helsinki, December 1999) to the new EU security strategy and the main objective set by the union’s decision makers: by 2010, the EU will be able to respond to crisis anywhere in the world. According to the document, the EU must be able to decide to launch a crisis management operation within 5 days from concept approval by the Council, and deployment of troops in theatre must be done 10 days since the decision to intervene.

In this context, one of the most important developments is the initiation and operationalisation of a tactical battle group concept, as a solid representation of the European rapid reaction force. In this context, the new “Headline Goal 2010“ moves the focus from quantitative aspects of the old Helsinki Headline Goal on the qualitative elements, consisting in efficiency rise of forces and hence their utility (interoperability, sustainability, mobility and speed of deployment in theatre). At the Ministerial Conference of employment of military capabilities on November 22th, 2004, a total of 22 Member States and Norway, a third party, pledged to carry and make available to the EU, 13 battle groups.

We must also note the fact that the EU is not new to the crisis management operations world, but has lead military operations in theaters. By compiling a short summary of its intervention so far, the EU has managed to deploy two crisis management operations (CONCORDIA, in 2003, in Macedonia and ARTEMIS, in summer 2003 in Congo), adding to that ALTHEA, its most important operations so far, by taking over SFOR from NATO at the end of 2004. CONCORDIA and ALTHEA were organised with access to NATO means and capabilities as part of the Berlin Plus Arrangements, while ARTEMIS was a EU operation within a framing country, represented by France.

The facts mentioned above allow us to formulate a clear answer to the question of whether a country may be a member of the EU without armed forces. The answer is clearly NO, because it would not meet the two mandatory requirements of the ESDP: ensuring self defense and security and contributing to EU battle groups and peacekeeping operations.

3. CFSP, ESDP and neutral states at the border?

If we go further and refine the content of the question, thus exploring the solutions Moldovan authorities have tried for their safety and the package of policy options adopted by a majority in Parliament, we should investigate what would, according to EU documents, formulate minimum security and military capabilities for a Member State.

CFSP and ESDP do not explicitly talk about the possibility of a neutral state to become a member, if the conditions of its military forces are sufficient to

ensure their own security and contribute to the capabilities of the Union. Obviously, in this context we should talk about a more important and extensive topic – what is a neutral state in the 21st century, at the frontier of Europe?

The negative answer to this question comes if we consider the provisions of the Constitutional Treaty on this topic. But as the Constitutional Treaty was not adopted, nor the revised – with the same provisions – someone might object that we refer to documents that are not in force.

The draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, presented by European Convention President, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, to the European Council in Thessaloniki (June 20th, 2003) and in Rome, the Italian Presidency of the EU (July 18th, 2003) all refer to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defense Policy (PSAC), as part of CFSP.

In the European Constitution project PSAC (Common Security and Defense Policy, CSDP) shall, therefore, replace both the old concept of ESDP and its extended option PESAC. The Draft of the European Constitution contains separate provisions on EU external action (Title V). The latter include a number of interrelated elements, including:

- Common commercial policy;
- Common foreign policy;
- Common security and defense policy;
- Developing cooperation;
- Humanitarian aid.

Within everyone of these components, the main objectives of the EU's external actions respect these two fundamental principles:

- external actions have to rely of principles that governed the creation, development and enlargement of the EU;
- external action have to follow maximising cooperation between member states on all level of international relations.

Regarding the first principle, we should mention the principles that governed the creation, development and enlargement process of the EU, because only based on these will we find solutions and directions within ESDP.

These principles are:

1. democracy;
2. rule of law;
3. universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms
4. respecting human dignity;
5. equality and solidarity;
6. respecting international law according to the UN Charter

The EU's external objectives concerning common policies and actions target:

- a. safeguarding European Union's common value, its fundamental interest, its security, independence and integrity;
- b. consolidating and supporting democracy, rule of law, human right and international law;
- c. maintaining peace, conflict prevention, strengthening of international security according to the principles of the UN Charter;
- d. supporting sustainable development from an economic, social and environmental point of view in developing countries towards eliminating poverty;
- e. encouraging the integration of all countries in global economy, including through banishing restriction in international trade;
- f. promoting international measures meant to maintain and improve environmental quality and sustainable management of natural resources for a sustainable development;
- g. assisting populations, countries and regions that face natural or man made disasters;
- h. promoting an international system based on multilateral cooperation and good governance at a global scale.

The ability to work in a Union of 27 or more states, will depend a great deal on the ability of the political leadership to define its strategic goals and boost their implementation in current policy. From this point of view, the European Constitutional Treaty shows true progress by implementing the President of the European Council and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union posts. The President of the European Council will be electeded by the Heads of State and Government by a qualified majority, for a period

of 2 years and half, renewable once. Thus we leave behind the practice of 6 months rotational presidency. The role of president will be to chair and drive forward the workings of the Council, ensure its smooth running and continuity and to ensure, at his level, the European Union's external representation. The new function will provide continuity, visibility and consistency for EU representation both externally and internally.

Also, the foreign policy profile has been boosted with the statutory office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union will be one of the Vice presidents of the European Commission and thereby a member of the Commission's College. He will lead the Common Foreign and Security Policy, will be responsible for external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union's external action, including chairing the Council of Foreign Affairs, as a structure of Ministers Council.

Concerning the **ESDP** the European Constitutional project, and the Lisbon treaty afterwards, reiterates the fact that this will include progressively building a common defense policy for the EU, that will lead to a common defense when the European Council shall decide it unanimously. PSAC shall to overcome the particularities in security and defense policies of the member state, shall have to comply with obligations imposed to NATO member states and ensure its compatibility with NATO security and defense policy.

The draft of the European Constitution brings five important innovations in the sphere of security policy and defense policy:

- Extension of Petersberg tasks
- setting up a European agency concerning Armaments Research and military capabilities.
- Application of structured cooperation in international missions
- the opportunity for closer cooperation of EU Members for mutual defense and
- Introducing a solidarity clause in cases of occurrence of terrorist attacks and natural or man made disasters;

Among these provisions, some are incompatible with the principle of neutrality in the sense imagined by the Moldovan authorities, traditional neutrality Middle Ages, which is internationally recognized:

- The existence of a foreign minister with the role of decision in foreign policy, security and defense
- The expansion of EU missions involving the use of armed force in missions other than the strict peacekeeping, with respect, clearly, the principles of EU
- Solidarity clause

This is the time to subject to a debate this formula which copies Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the founding document of NATO. Unlike NATO, which makes a distinction between cases of armed aggression and terrorist attacks (on September 12th, 2001 the North Atlantic Alliance activated for the first time in its history Article V concerning collective defense and declared war on terrorism), the European Union Lisbon Treaty makes this difference.

Tighter cooperation for defense issues is applied in cases of armed aggression and is binded by Article 51 in the UN Charter while the solidarity clause becomes operational in the case of terrorist attacks and natural or man made disasters. More specifically, the solidarity clause implies mobilising all EU resources, including military ones, for:

- Preventing terrorist threats on EU territory
- Protecting the populations and the institutions from terrorist attacks and
- Giving assistance to member states on whose territory a terrorist attack or a disaster took place.

Under this clause, no EU member state can be neutral, it is an ally of other European Union countries and it must react based on the solidarity clause, with all the tools available to support other EU countries.

The only real compatibility is that which is explicitly mentioned, NATO. But let us consider a debate where only documents that have already been applied are taken into consideration, not those that have not been ratified or those which will be adopted. This implies a debate on what neutrality means in the 21st century but also the place for a neutral state at the borders of the EU frontier.

Neutrality, in its classic meaning, implies not using force and not joining an organisation that implies taking sides, as an ally. From this point of view, neutrality is incompatible with membership of the European Union, once it implies adopting one side, that of the EU, according to the European Security Strategy. The ESS mentions the principles, interests, means of action, including military, to promote those interests, and this document is not optional for Member States.

Finally, let us assume the meaning of neutrality would be an exclusively military neutrality, that is not to contribute troops in action against another state or non-state actors. Without the solidarity clause and the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, this provision should be compatible with EU membership and even with the ESS once participating in EU operations is voluntary, so that every country can choose the operations it gets involved in. Here however we face other incompatibilities. How can you be neutral and contribute troops to the battle group document ESDP – which implies that these capabilities can be used as a rapid reaction force in every location determined by the Council!

Let us suppose, further, that Moldova is negotiating with the EU an opt-out from these operations, or to choose its missions. Obviously the Member state must compensate the costs otherwise and we do not know if this is feasible. But if here we can accept that such a negotiation is possible, we have to take into account the fact that the Member State is responsible for its defense and security – under the ESDP.

From this perspective, Moldova should prove that it has the possibility and the forces to ensure its security and defense. It is obvious that this cannot happen by altering the National Security Strategy and excluding certain types of risks and threats from the evaluation, which would mean that there is no need for some categories of forces to defend the territory. In this case, the candidate country would not be credible. The only option it would have left would be for another Member state or member states to guarantee its security. Without taking into account the costs of such an option the situation would be incompatible with military neutrality.

A last argument comes from another pillar of European scaffolding, Justice and Home Affairs. JHA provisions for a state at the EU border are sufficiently detailed and involve categories of non-military forces and civilian capabilities to protect state security and the European Union in the face of external threats and risks within the “cold war“ or realpolitik assessment, a situation that contradicts the idea of neutrality

4. CFSP, ESDP and the compatibility with Russia

We have to ask ourselves, given the particular conditions of the Republic of Moldova, with Russian troops on its territory, but also the theoretical option of having security ensured by the Russian Federation and having EU membership – are the two elements compatible?

Things are very simple and have already been discussed previously; the only situation where this would work would be if Russia were already an EU member! Otherwise, as we have seen, the security solution compatible with membership in the European Union excludes security neutrality or security guarantees by a third party.

5. UE-Russia – competition or bordering conflict?

The last part of this chapter refers to the European Union’s prospects, to the degree of convergence or competition towards Russia and, in those areas where competition is clear, the likelihood that it may turn into conflict. This last appraisal is needed to clearly determine a neutral state’s chance of keeping its neutrality and having alliance-like relations – the EU and the CIS – with both players competing. The logical and obvious answer would be NO, and the arguments are similar to those treated in Chapter 3, when we looked at the options for security of the Republic of Moldova, concerning Russia and NATO. But further on we wish to demonstrate that increasingly more, Russia and the EU are in conflict on a number of issues increasingly more connected with security.

We will discuss two areas where increased EU involvement increasingly affects and challenges Russian interests, who is prepared to defend those interests violently already creating a state of conflict with the EU. First of all we must mention EU efforts to diversify energy transit and transport routes, which is not only competing with Russian projects, but also with Russian interests to keep direct control over all categories of transit of these

resources to Western consumers. The European Union has acknowledged the incompatibility between EU and Russian interests on the matter, but also the reactions that betray Moscow's standpoint on this issue as opposing the EU. The lack of cohesion and different interests have prevented, until now, the development of an EU Energy Policy, but such a project is underway.

Secondly we have to look at the European Union growing urge to assert its interest in being involved in all processes of conflict resolution in the extended Black Sea region, primarily in the case of frozen conflicts. This is contrary to the Russian-American arrangements of 1994, that left Russia this important lever of control on non-slavonic countries in former Soviet space and is contrary to the interests of maintaining the current status quo in the area of frozen conflicts, which, conflicts which, as we have seen, Russia can "warm up" as it pleases. In this area, the European Union is left to recognize that its interests are opposite to those of Russia – it has not yet done so but may choose to after the recent Russian-Georgian war in South Ossetia.

It is obvious that because it has blended interests to engage itself in the conflict resolution processes in the Black Sea extended area and because it wants to reach its goals of promoting a stable, secure and democratic neighbourhood the EU finds that it is becoming increasingly difficult to promote its interest in the region while remaining passive to Russian policies in the area, which have adverse effects.

SECTION II

CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

C.P. 1

Getting right security in NATO's wider neighbourhood: does this still matter?

The future of NATO's partnership network. A special focus on the Balkans and Wider Black-Sea Caspian region

Cătălin Predoiu

Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs

I would like to welcome you all to this workshop on NATO's future strategic directions and the prospects of Alliance's partnership network.

Many thanks to the Center for Early Warning and Conflict Prevention and to the Public Diplomacy Division of NATO, which along with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania contributed to the organization of this seminar.

Undoubtedly, NATO's 60-year anniversary represents the right time for the Alliance to define its future objectives, taking into account the new types of threats and the dynamics of the security environment.

NATO's future posture depends on the way the members of the Alliance will harmonize the common strategic goals of the Alliance with their individual interests and respond to the new realities and challenges, having in mind the need to find a common ground and a unique voice of the Alliance in relation to these developments.

With the aim of strengthening security for all in the Euro-Atlantic area, the Declaration on Alliance Security, adopted in Strasbourg-Kehl, triggered the process of renewal of the NATO's Strategic Concept.

As we speak, the discussions on updating the Alliance's Strategic Concept have already begun in many Allied capitals.

These events, including our today's workshop, are designed to stimulate ideas and approaches on Alliance's trends and to provide a valuable conceptual basis for the experts responsible for drafting the preliminary version of the New Strategic Concept.

Our goal is to engage in debates representatives of the diplomatic establishment in Bucharest, well-known political analysts, experts from governmental and academic circles. Once again, I would like to commend the Center for Early Warning and Conflict Prevention for the initiative of organizing, this fall, a series of seminars in Romania, in close cooperation with the NATO Public Diplomacy Division.

This will provide us a framework to draw round a broad and innovative perspective on the security challenges of the 21st Century with special focuses on NATO's wide neighbourhood.

The New Strategic Concept will be a document with substantial political weight, at the disposal of NATO leaders, officials and academics in the field of security policies.

In general, the post-Cold War historical changes generated a revision in the strategic thinking of the Alliance. This revision was done by keeping a constant core of basic values, such as collective defense, solidarity, support for democracy, individual freedom, rule of law and a global but dynamic perspective, related to the evolving security environment.

Therefore, the development of the Strategic Concept should not be a process of re-invention, but one of refinement and adaptation to the new security challenges.

It will not affect the basic principles and functions of the Alliance - collective defense, transatlantic link, the indivisibility of security, Allied solidarity – as settled by the Washington Treaty.

Our basic philosophy for NATO in the future is a strong and sustainable transatlantic Alliance with both political powers and military “muscles”, able to properly deal with the challenges of the 21st Century.

Expanding and strengthening NATO’s partnership network, including the Euro-Atlantic Partnership is part of this vision. NATO’s ability to project coherent demarches and a proper image in the extended neighbourhood of the Alliance helps in finding solutions – for example in the Western Balkans – to the “unfinished business” that still carries potential for generating instability.

Major stakes pursued by Romania with respect to the strategic thinking on NATO’s wider neighbourhood refer inter alia to the preservation of values, principles and commitments as basis for NATO’s cooperation with partners. They also refer to the continuation of the “open door” policy with emphasis on compliance with membership criteria. Also to strengthening NATO’s partnerships and cooperation with the EU, UN, and the OSCE and to specific contributions to the building of defense and security institutions of states and/or organizations.

Reality shows that no one can act alone in the new security environment. That is why, the New Strategic Concept will have to determine the manner the Alliance will interact and cooperate with other actors and the way NATO will adjust its ideas, processes and, very important, capabilities to be compatible with other organizations.

In April 2009, Romania gladly celebrated five years of NATO full membership.

As a general assessment, we could say that Romania shaped the profile of a consensus-generating Ally with balanced approaches, interested in drawing the attention of the Alliance on developments in its immediate vicinity, particularly in the Western Balkans and the wider Black Sea region.

We believe that NATO should continue to improve and demonstrate more clearly its ability to meet emerging challenges on and beyond Alliance territory, including at the borders of the Organization.

NATO enlargement to countries of Central and Eastern Europe was a remarkable success for the transatlantic Alliance. It proved to be a very powerful tool to stabilize regions, encourage reforms and consolidate Europe. Due to this process, NATO continues to play a special role in

unifying a continent divided for nearly half a century. And that is why NATO should continue to promote tailored partnerships to foster greater stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area.

We believe that the problem of “global NATO versus regional NATO“ is only a false dilemma. In terms of geography, the main security challenges for NATO originate from its wide neighbourhood, from the former Soviet space to the Western Balkans, the Mediterranean and the broader Middle East. And that makes peace and stability in the wider Black Sea region and the Western Balkans essentials to the entire Euro-Atlantic security.

The Black Sea region is part of the European project of consolidating stability throughout Europe through democracy, cooperation and integration. It is an indispensable component of the Euro-Atlantic community of security, democracy and prosperity. It is also important in terms of diversification of energy sources and transport routes. Furthermore, it has also an important stake for the new approach on missile defense.

Substantiating Alliance’s added value in managing new challenges (energy security, maritime security, arms control, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missile defense) means also a more secure and stable Black Sea area, and an increased security in the Euro-Atlantic environment.

Romania has no interest in remaining the Eastern border of the West. Instead, we are determined to act as a catalyst of regional cooperation and Euro-Atlantic engagement in this region. Our goal is to have a secure, democratic and prosperous Wider Black Sea Area at our borders.

We believe that such a perspective is of regional and European interest and that it is something worth striving for.

Let me conclude by underlining that the process of upgrading NATO’s Strategic Concept provides an opportunity for underscoring the profile of NATO’s partnerships and for highlighting the need for NATO to contribute more to strengthening security in its neighbourhood - the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, the wider Black Sea-Caspian region, Central Asia, Mediterranean and others.

This is the reason why we will adopt - during the upcoming debates - an active and balanced stance, a creative and consensus-building posture, which will reflect Romania's specific interests, including those related to the security of its immediate neighbourhood. We intend to play a constructive role in the conceptual debates on the future role of the Alliance due to a special expertise resulting from our location at the Alliance borders with the Western Balkans and the Black Sea-Caucasus-Caspian regions.

Romania strongly supports a consistent policy of strengthening and developing NATO partnerships, with a special emphasis on the Euro-Atlantic Partnership, while encouraging NATO's proficient involvement in the Western Balkans and the wider Black Sea-Caspian region. Beyond the attention given to NATO-Russia relations, we are also interested in substantiating the distinctive partnerships with Georgia and Ukraine, as well as the relationships with interested countries of the former Soviet space and the Western Balkans. Consideration should be given as well to NATO's relationship with the Republic of Moldova.

We are convinced that the Alliance will continue to pay right and proper attention to its wide neighbourhood and Romania will make every effort to support this strategic process.

C.P. 2
Opening remarks
Military General Staff

It is with distinct honour and pleasure that I welcome all the participants to this workshop hosted here at National Defense Ministry. I would also like to address a warm welcome to our distinguished guest from the NATO HQ in Brussels, Admiral Gianpaolo di Paola, Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, who is going to join us in a few minutes via Video Tele Conference (VTC).

We are going to look, today, at a challenging subject: **“Protecting the Alliance security at the strategic distance or closer to home: correct estimations and false dilemmas”**. I strongly encourage you to take the opportunity provided by this joint project of Center for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning and the NATO Public Diplomacy Division with support of Ministry of National Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs to have an in-depth and open debate on this topic of high interest for Romania and for NATO, as well as for our friends and neighbours of the Euro-Atlantic area.

For six decades, NATO has successfully adapted to evolutions and managed to steer the allied energies in a constructive way and in a positive direction. After the end of the Cold War, NATO has become a global player, conducting missions away from the allied territory and projecting security in its neighbourhood. The security environment changed and NATO built up the common, allied approach to those evolutions that affected member countries. Working around the consensus principle helped the Alliance to generate cohesion. Thus, the 2009 Anniversary Summit has a special symbolic value, conveying a strong message on the unity of the Alliance in front of an increasingly provoking strategic environment.

With the aim of strengthening security in the Euro-Atlantic area, the Declaration on Alliance Security, document adopted in Strasbourg-Kehl, started the process of renewing NATO's Strategic Concept.

As we speak, the discussions on “upgrading” the Alliance Strategic Concept have already begun in many Allied capitals as well as within NATO Headquarter in Brussels. The need for a new concept is obvious for all of

us. NATO has consistently updated its functions and tools at hand in facing the new realities of the strategic environment. This reality has to be reflected in the content of the strategic concept that guides allied actions.

At the same time, NATO needs to determine the role it should assume in the 3rd Millennium in order to efficiently set its vision, level of ambition, as well as necessary structures and instruments.

The process of upgrading the Strategic Concept will be a major exercise. We support the prospective of a clear and precise document, which will be easily understood by populations of all NATO states, bearing in mind that the Alliance cannot work without the support of the public and parliaments of the Member States.

For Romania, the process of drafting the New Strategic Concept is as important as the final result. That is why – today and during the upcoming debates – we should adopt an active and balanced stance, a creative and consensus-building attitude in reflecting Romania's specific vision and interests, including those related to the subject discussed today: **protecting the Alliance security at the strategic distance or closer to home.**

The New Strategic Concept will be approved by the Heads of State and Government at the Allied Summit in Portugal, 2010, and until then we want to be as involved as possible in the process of drawing it.

Let me conclude by underlying the significance, for the Ministry of National Defense and for Romania, in general, of this process of multiple consultations and debates on the content of the strategic concept. Not only that we clarify our position and find the best way of promoting it, but we also learn about the concept, about other nations' perspective on the issue and about the value of fostering wide consultations within the system for supporting NATO's core values and objectives.

I am sure that this session will be successful and I am looking forward to learning about the findings and conclusions of the seminar. I am convinced that these findings will turn out to be valuable not only for writing the strategic concept, but also for MoD's activity in general.

C.P. 3
Talking points for the seminar
on the review of NATO's Strategic Concept

Mihaela Matei,

advisor to the director of Romanian Intelligence Service

My short remarks will refer to two main issues on the agenda for the future NATO Strategic Concept: political consultations within the Alliance and the development of NATO's capability toolbox.

- **First issue: What is the main trigger for revising the Alliance Strategic Concept?** Most common answers mention as primary cause the changes in risks and threats to Euro-Atlantic security, although equally important is the evolution of NATO's political and military objectives.

Since the end of the Cold War there is no international organization, NATO included, that has not seek, persistently, to extend its responsibilities to cope with emerging security problems. It goes without saying that each of these organizations has followed a specific political orientation – either on human security problems like UN, or democratization like OSCE, development of crisis management capabilities like EU or improvement of out-of-area deployable forces like NATO. However, in the midst of these almost permanent transformations, the idea of partnerships amongst different international institutions, to deal with complex situations has emerged only quite recently, mostly catalyzed by the evolutions in Afghanistan.

This is why, beside future risk assessments, the **definition of political objectives of the Alliance, commonly understood and supported by all Allies** is critical: what are the main NATO missions, what should be considered as secondary or better covered by other organizations or even by nations, themselves? It is mainly a political decision, not a decision simply based on an objective academic risk assessment.

It goes without saying that the current non-conventional risks to NATO countries are not covered by Article 5. NATO's collective defense, as it is right now, cannot deal with issues of climate change, energy shortages,

economic crisis or in some cases, not even with terrorist threats coming from second or third generation of immigrants in Europe. NATO cannot respond militarily to all security risks and it has little other-than-military means or mechanisms to react to a crisis as an organization. Should we define collective security by building new instruments for Article 5? **But let us face it: Article 5 is not a universal panacea. Moreover, our day-to-day challenges do not come in the shape of an Article 5 situation** – it actually happened only once in the last 20 years.

What NATO can do is to think about **re-interpreting the Article 4 provisions of the Washington Treaty** to offer a better cooperation and understanding on common security interests at stake and the military and non-military common responses to them. **NATO should forge better forms of political consultations and search for solutions when the different interests of its members are threatened.** It can provide a **forum for coordination and support**, including technical one if possible, in cases of civil emergencies – which it already did – or in case of cyber attacks or risks to energy supplies. Also, **NATO can and should develop extensive partnerships with global or regional organizations** to ensure that a common approach could be developed in relation to all its old or new functions: be it deterrence, prevention, response or post-conflict intervention. It is not enough to held high level discussions amongst different Secretary Generals of different organizations – what might be needed is joint task-forces or expert cells for in-depth discussions to improve NATO's comprehensive stance vis-à-vis other international institutions.

- **This leads me to the second issue I would like to raise:** Some years ago, there were two apparently conflicting paradigms under debate in relation to the role of the Alliance: on one hand, **NATO as a toolbox available for different coalitions of willing, on the other, NATO as a political forum for consultations.** But those two are not necessarily conflicting; instead they can be developed as a two-faced approach: NATO is both a political forum and a toolbox – there might be only **a need to better match them**, to ensure that the right capabilities are developed for the missions that everyone agrees with. In my opinion, it is also a **false dichotomy to put in opposition the capabilities for out of area missions and the ones for territorial defense, since all**

capabilities should be flexible and usable enough to be offered, once any of the two types of operations is decided. There should not be an army for Europe and an army for Afghanistan, but an army that can be deployed wherever necessary when our interests are threatened. We should also broaden our perspective on contingency planning and **enhance the collective political input or contribution to this process:** most of the crisis that occurred recently at NATO borders, have been politically triggered and their consequences were also political with an impact not only on NATO security, but mostly on our partners' one. **So contingency planning is and should be a matter of political debate and consultations.**

How can NATO pursue and deepen both its political function and its military "footprint"? In the first case, we should start to ask ourselves genuinely what is the meaning of NATO's global security objectives right now? What are the main priorities: are there related to the Near Abroad, are there oriented towards regions of risk and what are those regions – Central Asia, the Middle East, the North Africa? Here one of the problems today is that NATO itself has little input in its decision-making processes from areas of national expertise such as the academic world or the intelligence services. With the exception of military component, **the intelligence is not integrated into the mechanisms that activate a debate on security priorities at NATO. We cannot speak about NATO's role in counter-terrorism or prevention of cross-border threats without building and bringing more expertise in these areas.**

Enhancing cooperation in this field will also contribute to the use of the future NATO's Strategic Concept as a vehicle or a catalyst for accelerating the reform of current NATO committees and structures.

Second, how the NATO toolbox should be developed? Military planning has successively been adapted to face the new requirements for capabilities. However, there are many assets that can be used in the future and the Comprehensive Political Guidance has reflected this evolution: a complex operation requires civil expertise, intelligence, military forces for both warfare and peace building, humanitarian aid, NGOs workers and so on. **We need an integrated system of management for the capabilities required in a certain operation that should be developed – or at least foreseen – before a NATO operation starts:** what NATO has, what EU or

other organization can and are willing to bring, what capabilities and expertise NATO partners can add to the Alliance. Partnerships have in many cases been perceived as a tool for spreading confidence and stability – **there should be somehow integrated into the broad picture of NATO’s transformation as security and military resources**, and not only as “shows of good will” amongst nations. For example, if NATO wants to play a role in energy security, it should develop mechanisms together with its partners from Central Asia, Caucasus and Eastern Europe.

The *Comprehensive Political Guidance* has been a bottom-up approach generated by the operational pressure from Afghanistan. **We now need a matching top-down approach that will clear up some critical questions for the future of the Alliance.** We need both the political “sense-making” – what is the extent of NATO’s role today and what are its limits? – and the capabilities to match it.

NATO is the most efficient coalition of willing that ever existed. We should not lose the willing, nor alter this coalition.

C.P. 4**Remarks at the Conference “NATO and the New Strategic Concept. Romania’s priorities”***Milea Constantin*

Cyber Intelligence Center, Romanian Intelligence Service

It is a great opportunity for me to address such a distinguish audience. My short remarks will approach several issues regarding cyber security, as a more and more important topic on the Alliance agenda for the near future. Of course, the primary near-term security concern for our countries has been the global economic crisis and its geopolitical implications. But the economy is global mainly because of its reliance on information infrastructure. And we already know that the information infrastructure, including telecommunications and computer networks and systems is critical to virtually every aspect of our modern life. As all government, private sector, and even individual activities continue to move to networked processes, these types of threats will continue to grow.

The rising connectivity between information systems, the Internet, and other infrastructures creates opportunities for attackers to disrupt telecommunications, electrical power, on-line public services, air traffic control, and other critical infrastructures. Over the past several years we have seen different cyber attacks against critical infrastructures and we have also seen combined conventional military operations and cyber attacks used simultaneously. It is general accepted the fact that a successful cyber attack against a major financial service provider could severely impact the national economy, while cyber attacks against physical infrastructure computer systems such as those that belong to the military have the potential to raise major challenges for our defense capabilities. This could have a dramatic effect on losing or winning a war, whether it is conventional or informational, with real or virtual world consequences. So cyberspace is real. And so are the threats that come with it. We could clearly assess now that cyberspace is one of the great strategic assets of our time. It is also a question that will deeply put under question the efficiency of current legal systems that protects our citizens and nations.

Over the past years, the use of cyberspace has developed to become much more sophisticated and targeted. And we expect these trends to continue in the coming year. Our estimate is that threats to information technology infrastructure are a matter of public safety and national security across the Euro-Atlantic community. We expect disruptive cyber activities to turn into the standard scenario for future conflicts.

Cyber security and cybercrime, including massive and coordinated attacks against countries critical information infrastructure, and terrorist operations using the Internet, are threats of critical concern to our global society. Terrorists are now more adaptive and innovative in their actions and timely information plays a significant role in increasing the effectiveness of their operations. By exploiting the global information infrastructure and its underlying technologies, terrorists can operate in a virtual electronic world that provides them with a huge advantage for communication and coordination. They may use such a resource on a vast scale triggering unexpected consequences such as civil population intimidation, social unrest in weak or failed states or even economic crisis. Terrorists may use information infrastructure for electronic attacks, and most likely both in conjunction with physical attacks to increase their effectiveness in deadly operations against our societies and our citizens.

When referring to a massively coordinated digital assault on a government by another, or by a sizeable group of individuals, than we are speaking about cyber warfare. The information warfare has moved beyond the military dimension. Information warfare is now a societal issue. Today, the terms information war and cyber war are used to explore a range of conflict types covering political, economic, criminal, security, civilian, and military dimensions. And dealing with these topics becomes a major priority of national and international security.

From the strategic perspective we have to assume that technological advantage is a must for information superiority that has become one of the main priorities in all security organizations or structures. It is now clear this cyber threat could turn into one of the most serious challenges we are all facing as an Organization. It is also clear that we are not as prepared as we should be, from the conceptual and methodological points of view. Significant work remains to be done in order to protect, defend, and respond to the cyber threat in a manner that should obviously improve the overall security of our nations as its main end goal.

The new strategy that NATO is defining for the near future should start from the first decade of the 21st century realities: human society is dependent, both in the military and civil domain, on energy, on people and on goods transportation, money transfer etc., all based on communications and information technology systems, to an extent that this is enough to destabilize a nation. In this respect, progressively the security focus is moving from conventional war theatres in the physical space, towards new confrontation theaters placed rather in virtual or cyberspace.

My key points are:

- Any attempt to deal with cyber security as individual nation is doomed to fail. If tackled in a broader multi-national context, cyber security will enable better understanding and response, and consequently a greater chance for success.
- It is necessary for NATO to develop a comprehensive strategy to secure our countries' infrastructures and integrated information and communications networks. It is essential to adopt clear milestones and performances metrics that will measure progress in implementing this new security frame. Further, this strategy must be fully connected with the new Strategic Concept of the Alliance.
- Work with all key players, governments and the private sector is required to ensure an organized and unified response to future cyber incidents. It is not sufficient to simply strengthen our defense after a cyber incident or attack occurs. The same development that has been used in NATO's response to disasters and civil emergencies should be undertaken: we have to have plans for sharing information, standardizing warnings and ensuring a coordinated response. A proactive defense posture needs to anticipate future attacks. In this context, cyber security specialists need to design the tools and know-how that will enable prevention and response to any attack on the network or any hardware component.
- Strengthening public-private partnerships is critical to this endeavor. We should start from the assumption that vast majority of our critical information infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector. One of the main challenges will be to issue a set of common standards and regulations from the various practices and procedures that are already on the market.
- Further, it is necessary to build together a cooperation concept for developing national cyber defense systems by deploying adequate

technologies, and jointly define common platforms for staff training. We also have to integrate these systems at a level able to ensure real time coordination in the field of operations.

- It is also important to identify the financing mechanisms of such an expensive enterprise as the security of information infrastructure, according to financial management principles within NATO.
- All previous issues should be consistently supported by an integrated campaign to promote cyber security awareness as a typical component of the NATO's security culture. NATO should develop and conduct a coherent dialogue on cybersecurity, both with public and private sectors, focusing to develop more public awareness of the cyber threats, as well as with other international organization that might provide support and expertise in this area. NATO-EU dialogue should be a prerequisite of further endeavors for defining the Alliance cybersecurity strategy, as the critical information infrastructure that needs protection is actually pretty much the same for both organizations on our continent.

From our perspective, developing a cyber defense system must be based on cooperation, starting with detection and analysis, and continuing with taking proactive and reactive measures in order to limit or cancel cyber attacks effects. To support the development of such a system, starting with the mid of 2008, the Romanian Intelligence Service, as national authority in cyber-intelligence field, has developed a number of activities designed to build a trusted, collaborative environment, by promoting cooperation with various public institutions, private companies and academic partners.

In this context, taking advantage of the European Commission CIPS program, the Romanian Intelligence Service started a nationwide project to develop a pilot demonstrator for an Integrated European Cybersecurity System. This project, designed in a public-private partnership framework, is aiming to create, with demonstration purposes, a national prevention, identification and coordination defense system against isolated or massive cyber attacks, addressing national critical information infrastructures, and in the future, possibly broader European networks.

I believe such an approach, although still in a project stage, might be of use when the debates on the future of NATO cybersecurity capabilities will take shape.

C.P. 5**Adapting NATO to the 21st Century: One Eye on Europe and the Other on the World**

Ambassador *David J. Smith*

Director, Georgian Security Analysis Center,
Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, Tbilisi

NATO's first Strategic Concept was DC 6/1, written behind closed doors and forwarded with a simple note: "The enclosed report is a revision of DC 6 as approved by the North Atlantic Defense Committee at its meeting on 1st December 1949. C.H. Donnelly, Col, USA, Secretary."

Today, writing NATO Strategic Concept number seven – or 7.5, if you count the 2006 Comprehensive Political Guidance approved at the Riga Summit – will likely not be so simple. But a new concept is needed, nonetheless.

Indeed, since 1999:

- NATO has enlarged twice, accepting twelve new post-Cold War members;
- New York and Washington were attacked on 9/11th 2001, prompting NATO's first invocation of Article V;
- Public transportation in Madrid and London was attacked in March 2004 and July 2005;
- NATO has been waging an apparently intractable war in Afghanistan;
- Russia conducted a cyber attack against NATO ally Estonia in the spring of 2007;
- Russia has several times engaged in energy coercion;
- A Russian cyber attack on Georgia during the summer of 2008 was followed by a massive invasion; and
- Russia remains in flagrant violation of the August 12th, 2008 European Union-brokered Six Point Ceasefire Agreement, and it continues to occupy Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Akhalkgori and Perevi Village.

Threats – and I mean threats, not challenges or risks – are far and near, new and old, unfamiliar and all too familiar. NATO needs a new Strategic Concept to deal with them all.

That said, the 1999 Strategic Concept and the 2006 CPG form a good foundation. These documents maintain collective defense as the alliance's core function, however, at the same time, they say that NATO must face emerging global asymmetric threats. To meet both challenges, the alliance must build readiness for the full range of missions, wherever they emerge, and however unforeseen they may be.

The drafters of the new concept must take care not to use the 1999 Concept and the CPG as a foundation upon which to rest, but as one upon which to build.

The process – process, because words are not the objective here – must force the allies to:

- Confront tough issues;
- Resolve differences of approach; and
- Sustain concrete commitments;

all to adapt the most successful alliance in human history to the realities of the 21st Century.

Although there are 28 NATO member states and, therefore, at least 84 opinions, they coalesce into three schools of thought:

- Territorial defense idealists;
- Territorial defense realists; and
- Globalists.

Of course, these are schools of thought, focuses or emphases. They are not mutually exclusive categories.

First, let us address the territorial defense idealists. There are some, including some big names, who would emphasize the core mission of territorial defense, and then define out of existence any threat of attack in Europe.

Were the territorial defense idealists to prevail in NATO, such thinking would render the alliance into a post-historical security discussion forum, concentrating on:

- Interoperability – although there would be little point in it;
- Coupling America to European security – although America's interest in NATO would quickly wane; and
- discussing the European balance of power with Russia.

There is the real rub. If there is a balance of power in Europe, then NATO would be a post-historical organization living in still a very historical world because balances of power are the stuff of history.

Indeed, any notions of European post-history perished beneath the treads of Russian tanks trundling through the Roki Tunnel into Georgia on August 7th, 2008.

Some try to escape this inconvenient fact by saying that Georgia is not a democracy; or that Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili started the war; or that Georgia is not in NATO, and Article V will surely protect NATO members.

Say what you will, but you cannot hide!

Say what you will, but Georgia is a fledgling democracy – and that is part of the problem. If Georgia were a malleable tin-horn dictatorship, Russia would never have attacked. Georgia faces many challenges, but it is a democracy, and reform such as the introduction of jury trials – to name just one area – is proceeding.

Analyze, if you will, Saakashvili's every move on August 7th and 8th. Whatever you find, you must also recognize that the Russian attack was well and long-prepared, starting with the declaration of Kosovan independence and intensified after NATO's April 2th–4th Bucharest Summit failed to grant Membership Action Plans to Georgia and Ukraine.

Take comfort, if you will, in Article V, but recall that NATO preserved peace throughout the Cold War by making clear that it was prepared to back

up Article V. Today, NATO's deterrent posture is a shadow of its former self. If we consider:

- The west's flaccid response to the Russian invasion of Georgia;
- Its continued disregard for Moscow's violation of the EU-brokered Ceasefire Agreement; and
- Under-resourced and under-exercised plans for NATO territorial defense – indeed, denial by some NATO and NATO country leaders that such NATO planning is even necessary;

Vladimir Putin may not be deterred.

Such directness has become politically incorrect and, therefore, uncommon in the west, which tells us something in itself. No one – least Georgia; least the post-Cold War NATO members – wants a confrontation with Russia, but denial to the point of refusing to call things by their proper names is the surest route to just such confrontation

NATO's core function must remain territorial defense, but well grounded in reality. So the point goes to the territorial defense realists, but this far is from end the game. The territorial defense realists must join hands with the globalists.

Now, some globalists – although not all – ignore traditional threats at home, just as the idealists do, but in favor of fighting terrorists as far away as possible. This is as dangerous as idealistically defining European threats out of existence.

NATO must first defend its own territory, however – make no mistake – it must also build upon the global outlook that it assumed at the end of the Cold War, which is reflected in the 1999 Concept and the CPG.

Daunting as the world of 1949 seemed – and no doubt was – the 21st Century is far more complex. Today, in addition to good, old-fashioned tanks, we face:

- Cyber attacks;
- Energy coercion;
- Terrorism;

- Proliferation of WMD;
- Trafficking of
 - Nuclear materials,
 - Guns,
 - Drugs, and
 - Human beings;
- Climate change – and there are serious security implications to climate change; and even
- Disputes over water or food.

NATO should not plunge into all of these entirely, or even in part. But the world for which we are writing the next Strategic Concept will be very different from that of 1949, even that of 1999. The alliance must take on some of these challenges—in whole or in part—coordinate with other organizations how to handle the remainder, and generally prepare to operate in a very complex global environment.

However, let us be clear that NATO remains the North Atlantic Community's primary security organization. To adapt it to the 21st Century, the Strategic Concept must establish that the alliance has the lead role whenever any state or significant non-state actor takes hostile action against a member intended to compel the member to fulfill the attacker's will, including attempts to limit a member's territorial integrity or sovereignty.

For example, just as we now accept that a terrorist attack by a non-state actor could be an Article V event, the new Strategic Concept must lead members to see cyber attacks as possible Article V events. Moreover, an Article V response may be military, but it may also be deployment of a battalion of computer experts rerouting Internet traffic through alternative file servers – or both.

If such intellectual consensus can be achieved, many other things will fall into place. An alliance with such a contemporary and global view will naturally consolidate its democratic European base. This will:

- Promote democratic development;
- Mitigate back-sliding and gaps, for example, in the western Balkans;
- Deter attacks on Europe's periphery, for example, in Georgia; and
- Strengthen NATO's gaze and reach to the south and east.

To avoid any misinterpretation: NATO must continue to enlarge now, with an even-handed approach to the western Balkans and the Black Sea region. As Romanian Interim Foreign Minister Catalin Predoiu said on October 15th, “Romania has no interest to remain the Eastern border of the Western world.” That is quite right. Romania should be NATO’s window on a calm European lake, not its last outpost on a stormy sea. And – make no mistake – that means NATO must reach across the Black Sea now because history is not waiting.

A NATO so reinvigorated would prepare for out-of-area, indeed out-of-Europe operations, accept that such operations could be Article V operations, and forge partnerships with appropriate non-member like-minded nations in and out of Europe.

So, that is all that the new Strategic Concept must do: forge agreement among 28 member states and lay the intellectual foundation for realistic territorial defense and global security.

Perhaps the drafters could put a very simple cover note, as in 1949, on a very complex achievement. It will be hard, but it must be done. NATO must keep one eye on Europe and the other on the world.

C.P. 6
NATO and the New Strategic Concept.
A Military Approach

Mr. John Seamon

Introduction

Madame Albright, in her opening remarks at the first Conference on the New NATO Strategic Concept last week in Luxembourg, stated very clearly that the “value of a revised strategic concept will not be found in its theoretical brilliance, but in whether it provides practical answers to some inescapable questions,” one of which she outlined as, “does [the new Strategic Concept] ensure that NATO’s resources are sufficient to meet NATO’s responsibilities?” What I would like to do today is to offer a few “ideas” for consideration by the Group of Experts, as well for worthwhile discussion and reflection amongst us here today.

Capabilities

In considering NATO’s need to provide for collective/territorial defense but also maintain “effectiveness at strategic distance,” what sorts of capabilities are *really* required by the Alliance? In the not-to-distant past, two types of NATO operations were generally considered: territorial (for Article 5) and out-of-area (for CROs), which carried distinctly different burdens for Allies’ force structures – the need to operate “in place” versus the need to be able to deploy. That distinction has been replaced by the generally-accepted call for all Allied capabilities to be “expeditionary.”

But a recent, increased call for Alliance effort to be devoted solely to defense of the European homeland, to include increasing in-place forces and development of specific Article 5 Contingency Plans for Allied nations, has recently gained some popularity. Some claim that “if NATO cannot protect, it cannot project,” (*Alliance Reborn*, p26). If this argument is valid, then it needs to be considered in the drafting of the new Strategic Concept... but before we do that, let us define what we mean by *expeditionary*.

Expeditionary forces need to be: rapidly deployable; generally capable of full-spectrum operations; self-sustaining; and capable of operating at strategic distance, in extreme climatic environments, in locations with remote/austere infrastructure situations, and as a total force.

But, just within Alliance territory we have:

1. Strategic distances, for instance between London and Ankara, Lisbon and Tallin, Oslo and Athens to name just a few.
2. Extreme climatic conditions, to include high altitude, mountainous areas; hot, arid desert conditions; cold, wet polar conditions; etc.
3. Remote and/or austere infrastructure situations that exist – or can be caused to exist – to include:
 - a. A/SPOD airfields and harbors not being available and/or "clean"
 - b. Communications systems that might be down and/or compromised
 - c. National health-care infrastructure and systems that might be overwhelmed
 - d. Energy grids that might be overwhelmed and/or knocked-out
 - e. And many other examples, to include the fact that even if everything mentioned above was 100% available, it still might not be politically viable to "militarize" these (largely) civil capabilities and systems!

In addressing the issue of having to be able to "protect to project" (which is basically a political statement recognizing the linkage between public support for expeditionary CROs and the feeling of security NATO provides to Allies), I would offer that, in a truly operational assessment of required Alliance capability, "if NATO cannot project, it cannot protect." *Therefore, expeditionary capabilities and forces should explicitly be called for within the new Strategic Concept.*

But how to do that? One former U.S. Ambassador to NATO used to state that "capabilities are too 'wonky' for HoS/G and Ministers to consider in detail." So, we should not spend long periods of time debating what text is appropriate for Heads to use in discussing capabilities. But amazingly, the Alliance already has a comprehensive, political document, public in nature and endorsed by HoS/G, that outlines the need for these types of

capabilities – the aptly-named Comprehensive Political Guidance, or CPG. *I would offer that, as a start point, the entire Capabilities Section of the CPG could be pasted in its entirety into the first draft of the new Strategic Concept.*

Discussion could then follow over which parts to REMOVE as inappropriate or outdated, rather than trying to create acceptable, fresh text for inclusion in the new Strategic Concept. (This, by the way, was the original idea for the CPG when it was being drafted – it would initially “live” between the 1999 Strategic Concept and Ministerial Guidance 2006, but then be subsumed into the next Strategic Concept, once it was to be drafted.)

Transition: Expeditionary Capabilities → Resources.

The Chairman of the Military Committee, Admiral Di Paola, made the following remarks during an address at the NATO Defense College on 25th September 2009: “... threats in a globalised world put a particular emphasis on capabilities that are expeditionary in nature. Ultimately, whilst the Military can define the resources needed to achieve the desired capabilities, it is only the Politicians that can ensure that those capabilities are adequately resourced. In other words, the New Strategic Concept must be resource aware... If this is not the case, then it would be little more than a “fairytale exercise”.

Resources

By all accounts, NATO, and broader Alliance defense, is, speaking collectively, woefully and critically underfunded. This is the fault of Allies – specifically, the failure of present and past senior political leadership at the national level to direct adequate defense expenditure, and to then expend it efficiently. As Admiral Di Paola stated, it is an issue that demands consideration in the new Strategic Concept. *I offer this: in order to give new impetus to spurring Alliance and public sphere debate over nations’ defense expenditures, HoS/G ought to adopt a new measure of performance and task their Ministers (Defense, Foreign, and Finance) with development of an appropriate range of acceptable levels of performance for Allies against it.*

I am quite sure most of you are thinking: “Exactly what NATO does *not* need – another metric!” But despite the ubiquitous nature of the mantra of “spending 2% of GDP on defense,” that figure has never been formally agreed and *just does not work!* The new Strategic Concept should take the opportunity to establish a metric closer to those in government responsible for establishing national budgets and determining the allocation of national resources.

But what do I mean by “closer?” HoS/G and their Finance Ministers do not “own” their nations’ GDP. But they do “own” their nations’ budgets, and are directly responsible for its allocation on a yearly basis. Actually, HoS/G own the discretionary portion of their nations’ annual budgets – that part which is not committed to such areas as debt servicing, pensions, healthcare, etc. – of which defense is a portion.

So perhaps a percentage of annual discretionary spending is a better, more tangible way to express to HoS/G and their publics what their slice of the Alliance defense burden ought to represent, in real, understandable terms. A new metric will not spur increased defense spending in and of itself, but it could *reinvigorate* and *refocus* the debate over levels, responsibilities, and relative costs in the public sphere, and that would be a good thing.

In fact, we already have such a precedent for using a new metric to reinvigorate and refocus debate within NATO on a specific area, namely Allies’ national force structures: Usability. What I propose is a similar undertaking, only with respect to Resources. Determining what the proper level ought to be, however, along with any potential enforcement mechanisms, is a debate for another day entirely.

NATO Command Structure

To prepare for a refocused, reinvigorated debate in the public sphere over defense resources and capabilities, and efficiencies in delivering in both areas, the Alliance ought to clean its own house first. And that house, so to speak, is the NATO Command Structure.

Madame Albright offered that, "... we must recognize that a strategic concept is, by definition, a forward looking document... We must ask ourselves what NATO should look like and how it should be operating five or ten years from now." This mandate applies in the most literal sense to the NATO Command Structure.

The Command Structure ought to be the outward, collective expression of the Alliance's operational functionality and commitment to providing for the security of the Euro-Atlantic region. It ought to represent – and set the standard for – the provision of effective capability and efficient use of resources at the highest levels. Instead, it has come to represent just the opposite: inefficiency, stagnation, and the line of first defense by nations seeking to protect their own narrow national interests rather than agreeing to reform for the greater good.

NATO's HoS/G ought to, at the same time they unveil the new Strategic Concept, therefore, task a "blue sky" review of the Command Structure.

Such a wholesale restructuring ought to be done without concern for the current geographic locations, manpower ceilings, or flags-to-posts allocations, and without regard for the current "wiring diagram," which still retains legacy relationships that do not serve the functional concerns of today.

The Chairman of the Military Committee, in that same address to the NATO Defense College, made the following remarks about capabilities: "We need Credible, Adaptable and Flexible Capabilities, and further Military Transformation... At the same time, we also need to develop more flexible and cost-effective capabilities, which can be adapted to face new threats and roles."

I wholeheartedly agree, and further expect that the publics of Allied nations should demand, before they are asked to commit more treasure to Alliance defense, that the NATO Command Structure represent the preeminent example of a credible, adaptable, flexible, cost-efficient capability in the Alliance.

Conclusion

Early in my presentation, I suggested that the issues of resources and capabilities are inextricably linked, but the provision of them to the Alliance was too far removed from the very people who could bring the necessary influence to bear in Allied capitals – namely Heads of State and Government. I then offered a few suggestions about how to bring the provision of capabilities and resources closer to these individuals, namely by:

1. Reflecting appropriate portions of the CPG in the new Strategic Concept, namely those dealing with capability requirements;
2. Finding a more appropriate metric for measuring the provision of national resources to defense to replace the legacy “spending 2% of GDP”;
3. Tasking a “blue sky” restructuring of the NATO Command Structure as a necessary reflection of the seriousness with which the new Strategic Concept holds the provision of resources and capabilities.

C.P. 7**New Threats: Energy Security, Cyber Defense, Critical Infrastructure protection***Călin Stoica*

Director General for Strategic Affairs

We have recently embarked upon what I believe it is an ambitious, but necessary endeavor - updating the current NATO Strategic Concept, with the aim of providing the framework for continuing the process of adapting the Alliance to the new strategic environment.

Some of what we now call “new risks and challenges” were included in the 1999 Strategic Concept. This is the case with terrorism, organized crime or disruption of flow of vital resources. But the danger these risks pose to our security has dramatically increased during the past ten years.

Some other risks we are facing today, such as the cyber-attacks, piracy, climate change and energy security have become more prominent after the adoption of the current Strategic Concept, and the Alliance should be prepared to deal with them.

All these risks are fundamentally affecting both our security and our way of life and we need to tackle them in an efficient manner. And NATO’s role in these particular areas is definitely one of the issues that have to be addressed more in-depth, as an area where significant evolutions have taken place since the Washington Summit, in 1999.

What role for NATO? NATO definitely does not have either all the answers, or all the instruments needed in order to face this kind of challenges.

However, Romania strongly believes, and other allies share this view, that NATO has unique tools that allow this organization to play an useful role, complementary to the efforts of other actors in these fields. In my view, we need a two-fold approach: first, to identify the specific means that NATO

can use, and, second, to find a functional relationship, to establish the appropriate division of labor with other organizations, in order to ensure that these challenges are being addressed in a truly comprehensive manner.

Energy security is today a top priority on the international agenda. This is no longer exclusively a national competence, nor is it uniquely an economic issue. Energy security is an issue that requires a multifaceted approach, a great deal of cooperation and coordination among national governments and international organizations, a strong partnership between public and private actors.

Energy security is a highly relevant and topical issue for NATO as well.

It is extremely relevant because energy security is obviously an issue playing an ever growing role in the security of our countries and in international security, in general. As security is NATO's core business, energy security becomes a legitimate topic of debate for the allied states and it would be unusual to be otherwise.

It is also highly topical because at the 2008 NATO Summit, in Bucharest, the heads of state and government agreed upon a number of guiding principles for NATO's role in energy security, as well as a number of specific areas for possible NATO involvement. These are: information and intelligence fusion, projecting stability, advancing international and regional cooperation, supporting consequence management and supporting the protection of critical infrastructure.

In these fields, NATO has a clear value added to offer and a number of practical programs both within the Alliance and with NATO's Partner Countries are ongoing.

Subsequently, in Strasbourg – Kehl, our heads of state and government underlined that the issues of a stable and reliable energy supply, diversification of routes, suppliers and energy sources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks, remain of critical importance, and declared continuing support for efforts aimed at promoting energy infrastructure security.

Romania has been one of the Allies actively advocating for a more prominent and more active role for NATO in the field of energy security, with the conviction that through its experience and capabilities, the Alliance has, together with other relevant actors, an important word to say.

Romania believes that the main areas where NATO can usefully play a role are: assessing the risks to energy security, protecting the critical energy infrastructure, and supporting regional cooperation.

Allow me to dwell a bit more on each of them.

First, assessing the risks. NATO has today an impressive network of partners and one can easily see that this network of cooperation, which goes from the Mediterranean basin to Black Sea and Caspian regions and continues in the Middle East, covers producers, consumers and transit route countries. The Alliance can therefore serve as a platform for consultation and cooperation on energy security issues among Allies and with partners. These consultations play an important part in the overall assessment of the risks to energy security, while NATO's expertise in defense and security sector reform, crisis management and civil emergency planning can be used to provide assistance and know-how to interested partner countries.

Second, protecting the energy infrastructure. Through the operation Active Endeavour, for instance, NATO has been maintaining security for key resource routes in the Mediterranean. How can we make best use of the experience acquired until now? Romania does see a role for NATO in supporting the national capacities and regional initiatives in order to ensure protection of energy infrastructure and sea lines of communication.

Last, but not least, the support for regional cooperation. This process is a two-fold one. On the one hand, due to current security concerns, cooperative activities with Partner countries often impact on energy security issues. (Areas such as defense reform, critical infrastructure protection, counter-terrorism cooperation and environmental protection may all impact on resource security). On the other hand, cooperating with partners on energy security issues is a necessary component of an up-to-date, relevant, cooperative approach of NATO towards the Euro-Atlantic security.

These considerations are of particular relevance for **the Black Sea region**, which, by its position at the **crossroads of Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East**, is a hub for trade, energy and transportation links.

The dialogue and cooperation in this area can only be mutually beneficial. We are in favour of bringing it a step forward, by practical, focused cooperation activities, including at experts' level, to discuss common risks and ways to protect critical energy infrastructure.

Along with ministerial and high level commitments, we also need public-private partnerships and the connection of existing networks of stakeholders: political actors, the business sector, civil society, international institutions. These remain the basic principles of all our regional initiatives, whether they address energy security, environmental protection and climate change or regional research partnerships.

Following the decisions our heads of state and government took in Bucharest, NATO has started to engage dialogue with the private sector, through formal (sessions of NATO relevant committees meetings) or informal contacts (conferences, seminars and workshops), with a view to discuss risks and ways to protect critical energy infrastructure. Bearing in mind NATO's role and specific contribution in the area of energy security, it is important to know the perceptions of the private actors with regard to the energy security threats, and also to share views and experiences on the modalities to ensure better protection of the energy infrastructure and to exchange lessons learned on security practices. I hope that our conference will provide us with more relevant ideas in this respect.

The evolutions in the energy field of the last few years have increased the interest and the attention devoted to this area.

The Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis in January 2009, which severely affected a number of Allied and Partner countries, illustrated the serious effects of a disruption in the flow of natural resources. These events have also proved once more that the issues of a stable and reliable energy supply, diversification of routes, suppliers and energy sources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks, remain of critical importance.

Romania has constantly promoted, at the top of our foreign policy agenda, the realization of the Nabucco pipeline, the backbone of the Southern Gas Corridor and the most important EU-backed gas project in the Black Sea region. The Nabucco ceremony this July in Ankara re-confirmed the political support of all partner states through the signing of the Nabucco Interstate Agreement, an essential element for taking Nabucco closer to completion.

In the oil sector, as part of our diversification option, we support the development of the PEO (Constanta – Trieste) pipeline project. We also promote short and medium term energy projects, such as the construction of an LNG terminal in Constanta harbor, the development of underground gas storage facilities, and the interconnection of our national energy systems with those of the neighbouring countries.

In the field of renewable energies, we aim at capitalizing on Romania's potential, especially with regard to hydro and wind power. In the latter case, it is worth pointing out to the recent ambitious project initiated in Dobrogea. We underline the significance of tackling the effects of climate change and we also hope in a significant progress in the context of the Copenhagen Conference, being aware of its importance for the security of future generations.

All the above mentioned demarches are important when it comes to the assessment of Romania's involvement in energy security, but they are not the only ones.

In this respect, I would firstly commend the US proposal to establish an EU-US Energy Council, an initiative that we consider a great opportunity to deepen the trans -Atlantic energy dialogue. As an EU member state and strategic partner of the US, we intend to actively support the materialization of this Council.

Secondly, I would mention the accelerated development of our energy cooperation with Central Asian and Caucasus countries. Their involvement in energy projects such as Nabucco represents both the way forward to a predictable answer to European energy security, but also a geopolitical insurance policy for consolidating the political and economic independence of Central Asia.

Thirdly, the successful approach of global and regional energy challenges also needs trust-based and mutually respectful cooperation with the Russian Federation and Ukraine, actors of high importance in the Black Sea energy framework. Romania, as well as the EU and NATO, has a particular interest towards these countries.

The Russian Federation is Romania's traditional energy partner with whom we need to further develop pragmatic economic and energy relations, future-oriented and focused on shared opportunities. Regarding Ukraine, we support the rehabilitation of the Ukrainian gas transit network, in accordance with the objectives established on the occasion of the EU-Ukraine Conference in March this year.

I have chosen to focus only on one of the new risks that need to be addressed more in depth in the future NATO Strategic Concept, namely energy security.

I am convinced that these discussions that we are having today will result in concrete ideas that will constitute an important and useful contribution to the ongoing work of updating NATO's Strategic Concept.

C.P. 8

Cyber War, Cyber Defense

Khatuna Mshvidobadze

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Today, we discuss what should be in NATO's new Strategic Concept, what should be considered real threats to the Alliance, how to prevent and respond to those threats and how to sustain stability and security accordingly.

In the 21st Century, we face new threats that are the 21st Century equivalent of armed attacks as conceived in 1949, and these might be as detrimental to our security as terrorism.

In the summer of 2008, Georgia was attacked by its northern neighbour not only conventionally by air, land and sea, but also via cyber space.

Cyber attacks are a form of warfare in the early 21st Century. High technology and online skills are now available for rent to malevolent governments, organized crime and terrorist organizations, and can potentially destabilize a country's economy and crucial security infrastructure.

The Russian invasion of Georgia was to some extent preceded by a series of cyber attacks that developed into an integral part of the armed attack, fully ready as Russian tanks rolled into Georgia on August 7th.

This is the stark reality:

- Russia fully coordinated its cyber attack with its land, sea and air attack – the wireheads were fully prepared as Russian tanks trundled into Georgia on August 7th.
- The cyber attack was an integral part of the armed attack.
- Indeed, the cyber attack performed some missions that would heretofore have been assigned to aircraft or artillery.

- Analysis by the US Cyber Consequences Unit – an independent research institute – indicates that all the preparatory work was accomplished before the war – obviously the cyber war coordinators, in other words, the Russian government, were fully aware of the impending attack upon Georgia and its timing.
- The cyber attacks against Georgia represented improvements over the techniques used against Estonia in the spring of 2007.

Most of the attacks were of a type called Distributed Denial of Service attacks – DDOS. Cyber criminals take over bits of perhaps thousands of privately owned computer and lash them together into so-called *botnets* that then blast information at a target website. Imagine downloading the entire Windows XP operating system every 6 seconds! The target site is rendered unable to perform its intended service.

Most of the *botnets* used against Georgia had already been used for criminal activities. The Russian government was in cahoots with Russian organized crime!

Cyber attacks can be used to:

- Debilitate certain specific defense computers
- Create a sense of panic or demoralization among the population, and
- Prevent effective communication by the government

Another tool used was web postings of instructions to individuals with limited computer skills who could contribute to the cyber attack efforts. The web-site postings were so productive that forty-three targeted websites were effectively shut down or defaced, in addition to the eleven targeted by the *botnets* associated with organized crime.

Here is how it worked. The real ringleaders operate from a distance. There was a hierarchy to the agents involved:

- At the top, “soldiers” – professional planners, computer scientists and engineers. Experts and commentators have directly accused Moscow of sponsoring the attacks as their magnitude required the resources only a state-sponsor can provide.

- Next, “mercenaries” – criminal organizations paid to carry out certain elements of the attacks – there were strong signs implicating the Russian Business Network, a now defunct or disappeared criminal organization.
- Finally, there were “volunteers” – individuals with PC’s who were recruited through social networks to augment the attacks.

Make no mistake – many of the cyber attacks were so close in time to the corresponding military operations that there had to have been close coordination between people in the Russian military and the civilian cyber attackers.

When the cyber attacks began, they did not involve any mapping stage, but jumped to the sort of packets that were best suited to jamming websites under attack. This indicates that the attack script had to have been written in advance. Registering new domains and new websites were accomplished so soon that all the steps had to have been prepared in advance.

The Cyber attacks disrupted the Georgian Government’s information and communication efforts, financial transactions, Internet and cellular telephone connections for several days.

The era of cyber warfare has begun.

When the NATO Alliance was formed, cyber war was a thing for books or the cinema, but the Russian attack on Georgia now demonstrates that we are facing it in reality.

To be relevant to the new reality, NATO and its partner countries should concentrate more on establishing prevention mechanisms against cyber warfare.

NATO must now act.

The new NATO Strategic Concept must not only treat cyber warfare comprehensively, it must recognize that this form of warfare can be an integral part of armed warfare, indeed it can substitute for artillery and air interdiction. Consequently, the Strategic Concept must recognize cyber warfare as a potential Article V event.

It follows that NATO must gather relevant intelligence, devise counter-measures and defenses, develop plans and programs and conduct exercises.

Finally, there must be greater funding, participation and support for the Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, including the participation of partner states such as Georgia that can contribute positively to the alliance's efforts on cyber defense.

C.P. 9**Managing challenges and opportunities in NATO's wider neighbourhood.****The need to build circles of stability:
the case of the Mediterranean region**

Fatima LAHNAIT

The Mediterranean region is a region of enormous cultural, religious, political and economic diversity. Three continents meet there. More than 20 states border the Mediterranean sea.

This diversity gives all sense to speak about Mediterranean security : **European and Mediterranean security are indeed linked.**

Over the last decade, debate about Mediterranean security concerns has intensified. The European Union's Barcelona process and NATO's Mediterranean dialogue have given these discussion a substantive character.

Economic interaction, expanded reach of modern military and information systems, political spillovers are producing a significant area of problems (from Kurdistan to Western Sahara) that are neither strictly European nor Middle Eastern.

The Mediterranean issues are imposing new intellectual and policy challenges on both sides of the Atlantic and on both shores of the Mediterranean¹.

Beside that, the adaptation of the alliance in term of missions reinforces the importance of the South. The idea of doing more in and around the Mediterranean is part of the consensus within NATO.

¹ Societies on both sides of the basin share a growing perception of declining personal security. In Europe, the concern about spillovers of political violence from crisis across the Mediterranean compels the attention of political leadership and public opinion.

The Mediterranean Dialogue

To address these concerns, NATO opened, in December 1994, a dialogue on security with several Mediterranean non-European countries : Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypte, Israel and Jordan (each of them linked in a different way to the alliance).

Its purpose was to send a signal to the southern neighbours of NATO's will of engagement and partnership.

From the outset, the Mediterranean dialogue was designed to evolve, and it has. Over the years it has deepened. NATO provided assistance in areas where its expertise offered a comparative advantage.

Political discussions have become more frequent and more intense. The number of activities² has grown: the objective is to increase transparency and promote better mutual understanding between the Alliance and its Mediterranean partners.

The American approach in the Mediterranean dialogue has favoured military training, exercises and other pragmatic aspects of cooperation (crisis management, emergency planning) over political dialogue. Today, almost 85% of NATO's Mediterranean programme concern military issues.

Other practical activities also aim at building confidence through cooperation in areas of mutual interest. It includes courses, seminars and other activities in the fields of civil emergency planning, crisis management, science and the environment, defense policy and strategy, in addition to a programme of military cooperation activities.

The 2004 NATO's Istanbul Summit gave a new dynamic to the cooperation by transforming it to a **partnership** and by promoting the political aspect of the Mediterranean dialogue. Since then, there has been periodical contact between NATO and its Mediterranean partners.

² They include, above all, information activities.

Now, as NATO recasts its strategic concept, looking towards the Lisbon Summit, it is likely that many of the new concepts and contingencies under discussion will emanate from the European periphery, from the Maghreb to the Levant, with the objective of building a reinforced partnership for peace and security.

The recent shifts on missile defense in Europe have made the Mediterranean basin the centre of gravity for the key aspect of transatlantic defense policy.

The convergence of American and European interest looking South, and the fact that both the United States and Europe can act with almost equal effect around the region, make cooperation on security and development in the Mediterranean a key near-term test of improved transatlantic relations.

But, from the perspective of the Mediterranean dialogue states, it implies the uncomfortable idea that new risks are emanating from the South, but it also suggests more active western involvement in addressing the South's internal and regional problems. Therefore, it is difficult to southern states to accept this approach without reservation, with the exception of Israel.

Why should the Mediterranean Dialogue still matter for NATO ?

The first reason is the region's potential for instability. The Mediterranean provides some important cases where conventional clashes over resources and territory are possible (examples include the Western Sahara dispute, "the cold conflict of the desert"). The threat is not a crusade of Islam against Europe, but the revival of nationalism in the basin.

The second reason is terrorism. It is likely to remain a leading functional concern for the Alliance around the Mediterranean and a leading issue for cooperation with the Mediterranean dialogue partner countries. This issue provides a tangible context for counter-terrorism discussions within NATO and within the Mediterranean dialogue.

Third reason, proliferation risks are a shared challenge in North-South terms. Since a decade major Southern European population centers are within range of ballistic missiles that could be deployed around the Mediterranean basin and in the Middle East.³

Proliferation risks and the debate on addressing them are now permanently operating factors in the Mediterranean environment⁴.

Economic disparities and their close connection to migration are the fourth reason why the Mediterranean region matters to NATO.

Their effects are obvious: high unemployment rates, particularly among a politically frustrated younger generation, and consequently migration.

Immigration remains a highly politicized issue in Europe and discussion on that issue remains central to relations between the North and the South in the Mediterranean. But it is difficult and inappropriate for NATO to take up this issue with dialogue partners, except for addressing the control of human flows..

The Mediterranean is an energy “entrepôt”, so the fifth reason is energy security. About 65% of Western Europe’s oil and natural gas imports pass through the Mediterranean. Some 3000 ships cross the area every day. Europe has become dependent on North Africa for some 25% of its gas requirements, with far higher levels of dependence in France and Southern Europe (Spain and Portugal).

This fact is likely to increase as gas continues to be a fuel of choice and as new pipelines are developed. Most of this supply reaches Europe through the Trans-Med line linking Italy and Libya, and the Trans-Maghreb pipeline supplying Algerian gas to Spain and Portugal, as well as France, Germany and Belgium, via Morocco.

³ Turkey being already exposed to ballistic missile risks from its Middle Eastern neighbours.

⁴ Cooperation for arms control remains an important aspect in conflict prevention and conflict avoidance.

And unlike oil, the gas market remains regional rather than global, with much fixed infrastructure and far less flexibility to respond to supply interruptions⁵.

Furthermore, the expansion of oil and gas pipelines is creating new opportunities for cooperation and conflict, with implications for the security and prosperity of North and South.

So, as NATO's Mediterranean initiative evolves, energy security becomes a rising item of the Mediterranean dialogue: the Alliance being a partial guarantor of the physical security of energy transport around the region.

The last reason why the Mediterranean dialogue matters is because it encompasses the Middle East

Developments in the Middle East peace process continue to influence the overall security environment in the Mediterranean and have traditionally inhibited progress on all Mediterranean initiatives⁶.

Therefore, the fate of existing regional initiatives, including NATO's Mediterranean dialogue, will be strongly affected by developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The current crisis exacerbates longstanding Arab suspicions regarding Western security institutions and makes an effective multilateral dialogue North-South lines difficult.

Other contentious issues include the control of the maritime routes, drug trafficking, debt, cultural tensions, information security, environment and climate change, and all the challenges of the global economic crisis.

⁵ Algeria and Libya are playing the key role in this issue. NATO should consider the difficulty of bringing Libya into the dialogue.

⁶ As it is the case of the Union for the Mediterranean launched in July 2008 by the French president Nicolas Sarkozy. The Israeli attacks on Gaza in December 2008 and January 2009 have frozen the Union's projects.

What more can be done to achieve the objective of improving and enhancing the Mediterranean dialogue ?

The dialogue has not met its full potential

In the first place, the Mediterranean is not a homogeneous region. There is no common definition of security among the Alliance's partners and NATO has to take this diversity into account: its partners have different needs and ambitions regarding their relationship with the Alliance.

Furthermore, NATO's members have a different perception of the region : there is a need for a common approach and a recognition by ALL the members of the importance of the issue.

Secondly, the playing field is crowded, with many institutions involved in the Mediterranean initiatives. NATO should avoid duplicating what other organizations are doing.

Thirdly, NATO should continue to play to its strength, which is military cooperation and assume a role in creating military confidence and cooperation among the partners rather than creating potential enemies. Meanwhile, the Alliance should encourage more cooperation and activities through the NATO Science For Peace Programme

Fourthly, NATO has to be sensitive to how changes may be perceived by dialogue countries and to take into consideration their public opinion.

Finally, the main security problems in the region have deep economic, social and political roots : NATO is not well suited to deal with these challenges, even if the Alliance can encourage South-South cooperation. In most instances, the European Union should take the lead in longer-term strategy.

If it is fashionable to see the Mediterranean as part of an "arc of crisis", it might more accurately be described as "an arc of change".

C.P. 10**Abstract for the conference on
“A NATO New Strategic Concept and Romania”***by Oleksiy Kolomyets*

President of Centre for European and Transatlantic Studies, Kyiv, Ukraine

For now, nobody can ever predict: “Will a drafting of a new Strategic Concept end with a success?” In the meantime, if this work is rather succeeding, a Concept will be a paper only, but strategic. The allies should determine: ‘What NATO’s ‘unique’ is for today and will be for the future?’ But this ‘unique’ has to be based on an own transformational development. And a real transformed unique should deserve a praiseworthy.

It is a political algorithm, which does require a common strategic thinking and approach. They do not exist for today and hardly will emerge in the near future. Drafting a new Strategic Concept will be the key, possibly final, testing for NATO on a political integrity and credibility.

A new geo-strategic realism has emerged: “The Trans-Atlanticism Vision of the past may no be longer possible in the future”. Many European members both of the EU and NATO have to concede this fact. Neglecting it can deteriorate the situation in NATO further.

This year, almost clear, can be decisive and critical for NATO. False and strange illusions of many European NATO-members that the transatlantic policy of the Obama’s administration will be upturned, in fact, appeared as illusions. Instead ‘a hard unilateralism’, as Robert Kagan wrote, ‘a soft unilateralism’ is dawning with the clear features of enhancing strategic irrelevance and retreat.

The strategic situation in Afghanistan for NATO is becoming almost critical. For ‘a unity’ of the Alliance such tendency is reaching to a critical point, to its own Rubicon – behind it, either a step-by-step vanishing or Renaissance, that may be followed by emerging of an another organization.

In the front of the relationships between Ukraine and NATO there were raised the next key questions:

- *Will the Ukrainian vision of security and defense coincide with the corresponding vision of NATO for a long-term perspective?*
- *How to reach a coincidence between the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Ukraine and the strategic vision of the Alliance's future?*
- *How to correct the Ukrainian Euro-Atlantic strategy in correspondence with the NATO's strategic goals and to explain proper this correction in public?*

Ukraine has become 'a strategic orphan of Europe' with unpredictable consequences in the short- and mid-term perspectives. There will be useful to see what does such 'a strategic orphan' reflects about the key stones lying on the road ahead a future of the Alliance.

Speaking at the 'Launching NATO's New Strategic Concept' conference on July 7th, 2009 General James Mattis stressed: 'Clarity is needed by everyone looking at NATO today, whether from inside or outside NATO'. I would like to add the one additional word is 'flexibility'

- *Article 5 of the Washington Treaty*. Possibly, the transatlantic allies must proceed with one of the difficult choice in the Organization's history – either to delete Article 5 from the Treaty's text, or amend it with the clear obligation for the member-states to take part in military actions. Obligations in Alliance should be obliged, but not to be a choice of wishing.
- *The rule of consensus*. The 21st century's realities simply does not allow for the Organization to function in the framework of consensus-ruled principle. Deletion of the algorithm, leading to strategic and operational paralysis of the Alliance, will be the second very difficult choice.
- *A continuation of the enlargement policy*. Blocking the Alliance's future enlargement will also deteriorate the NATO's rationale with an acute perception that the NATO's enlargement strategy should be re-written and based on strict rules and conditions There need to be invented the so-called 'Atlantic acquis', which have to be fulfilled by new future

entrants with an undisputed continuation of the NATO's 'open door' policy.

- *The principle of indirect military deterrence.* The Alliance must have at its own disposal such military capabilities, those level of development will make simply meaningless for any potential adversary to conduct a policy of threat or intimidation.
- *The problem of nuclear weapons development.* “Might the Alliance overcome as mistaken as well as primitive dreams of the world free from nuclear weapons?” – the question is more than strategic. And the second one is ‘May NATO develop such nuclear deterrence potential, which will be ready to defend among the Organization’s member also her partners?’
- *The NATO – EU question.* Eventually, the EU should abandon from, mainly paper ESDP and transfer all of its own prototype military structures under the united command of the Alliance. The EU should remain for itself exclusively civil and reconstruction and building functions.
- *The budget of the North-Atlantic Alliance.* There must be deleting an ‘unfairness formula’ for the NATO’s budget making up and conducting of operations. The Alliance is desperately needed for a common budget for financing of its missions.
- *A Free World and Russian challenge.* When after the Russian invasion the existed framework of, unknown why, strategic relationships between NATO and Russia have fallen apart, then that empty space emerged, which must have been emerged. There need to brush aside doubts and illusions and to launch a wide-scale preparation of ‘The Freedom Strategy’ for Russia: opening radio broadcastings, TV-channels, Internet-portals, books printing and public engagement. Appeasement policy towards Russia will only made a situation inside NATO more unstable and suspicion. An unfocused deterrence can be regarded as a crucial cornerstone for NATO responding to the Medvedev-Putin’s Russian regime.

NATO is the product and the tool of a freedom simultaneously. But the strategy of successful development of this tool is exclusively in its member-states' hands and intentions. There should be extremely clear that NATO does not create common interests and common perception. Concepts, even ideally written, might be retained absolutely usefulness, if allies are not having the common vision for sake of they are uniting.

The most successful in the history Alliance had come through its own a 'point of no return'. But inertia of the brightest past does influence unprecedented on the today and the future. Alas, it is guessed that an inertia period for NATO is already squeezed for a catastrophic small. For Ukraine, fortunately or unfortunately, it is an 'almost strategic coincidence' as well.

C.P. 11**NATO and the New Strategic Concept. Romania's Priorities**

by *Mr. Kristaq Birbo*

Secretary Executive of the Atlantic Council of Albania

Let me start by saying that it is both a pleasure and a friendly obligation to participate in such important activities organized by the Conflict Prevention Center and Euro-Atlantic Council of Romania.

As a new NATO country, Albania will be active in the process of development of the new strategic concept of the Alliance. Albanian political and military leadership are aware of the task of the Summit at Strasbourg & Kehl. We are committed to provide the best expertise we have to support the Expert Group led by Mrs. Allbright.

In my opinion, political masters of our countries will have their crucial voice in formulation of the new strategic concept, especially when it comes to the level of ambition of the NATO Alliance in the future security environment. In this context, we will be driven by their common approach.

Our people are already aware that international terrorism is the main security threat, and the NATO is evolving to be the key instrument in the fight against terrorism. NATO involvement in the Balkans at the end of the last century, in few words could be said that changed radically our region.

Now the situation in Balkans is much better in all directions. But, the complacency would be unwise. Conditions could emerge that could increase the terrorist threat in the future. The stability of the region, law enforcement and other public institutions are not so strong. Some terrorists now fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan or elsewhere may decide to redeploy to other regions, including the Balkans, in the future.

Albania adopted a national action plan against terrorism in 2002 and has expelled suspected Islamic extremists and terrorists. Albania has also

cooperated extensively to block financial and other assets of persons and groups operating in Albania with suspected links to terrorists. Albania froze the accounts and assets of some Saudi suspected businessman who is thought to support Al Qaeda and have links with terrorist groups who was extradited from Albania.

In June 2003, the Albanian Parliament passed a strong money-laundering law that included antiterrorist financing provisions, bringing Albania's legislation into compliance with international standards. In 2004, the Government froze the assets of terrorist financiers, curtailed the activities of suspect Islamic NGOs, and detained or expelled individuals suspected of having links to terrorism. Later, Parliament passed legislation to implement asset freezes against persons designated as terrorists or terrorist financiers by the United Nations. Albania has ratified all 12 UN international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

Other challenges being faced with are the continuation of the uncompromised fight against organized crime and illicit trafficking of any types, corruption and informality and the further consolidation of the public administration capacities. A lot has been done in this area, but considering the proper eradication of these phenomena is a long-term goal, that fight remains a permanent priority goal of Albania.

Since 1996, Albanian Armed Forces, play an important role in the fight against the terrorism being engaged in various contributions to peace support operations. This active engagement in international operation is constantly appreciated by all international factors we are together in operations.

With the NATO integration, and later on EU integration, it is natural that the engagements and contributions to international operations will not be any longer based upon voluntary basis of a partner country, but based upon the obligation as a member country of the Alliance, and based also upon the situations, possibilities, methodology, risks and advantages, benefits and contributions that our country will share and exchange with international security and defense structures.

Albania is the first and, I do not know exactly but I think so, the sole country in the world which has successfully eliminated all its chemical weapons, stocks acquired by the Communist regime during the 1970s. In this framework it will be a very great success if we can create a region clear from the chemical weapons. At my opinion this must be one of the NATO contribution for the future in Balkans.

One other problem in our region is the huge quantity of the old ammunition, a big part of which is instable because it is made 60 or 50 years ago. Albania continues its effort to destroy all this kind of ammunition. In this field I think all our countries are involved and it is on the benefit of our the entire region to accelerate the rhythm of their destruction.

In the fight against the terrorism and other threats to our population it is important to improve and reinforce the service secret and intelligent service in order to discover in time illegal activities and to avoid the risk, let say, of an overestimation of these threats and the creation of the idea that the terrorist groups are everywhere.

It is a clear need to make the general public, in all our countries, better aware of what NATO is for these days. People understand what NATO does but they do not understand how this relates to its fundamental purpose or even their immediate security interests, what it offers that other organizations or security frameworks do not. And in so doing, a new Concept will help us to elicit the public support that is essential to NATO's continued success.

One very important point in the fight against the terrorism is the harmony between all the religions in our region. A significant Muslim population lives in the Balkans. The reality, throughout all these years, showed that their opposition to terrorism has been strong and they have very good cooperation with the United States and the international institutions in the Global War on Terrorism.

The Albanian nation, with three religions and four religious communities offers to the world the rare example of inter-religious harmony, dialogue, peace and coexistence. Our nation, although with three religions, an ideal

premise for conflicts and divisions, has never known religious conflicts throughout his history. We offer this positive reality as an example to enrich our common experience and efforts for tolerance and understanding, for modesty and wisdom in the relations among faiths – an important element of civilization.

The last decision of EU for visa liberalization with Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia is a great success for our region. But meantime, this decision has created some dissatisfaction for our people. This because three countries that for the moment are out this decision are Albania, B&H, and Kosovo, populations of which are majority or near-majority Muslims. There is not other explanation when Albania for example has fulfilled all democratic conditions to be member of NATO but no for visa liberalization. In my opinion this situation must be repaired and not to create a hotbed to extremist elements.

A new set of non-traditional challenges are ahead for the countries of the Alliance. All of them and other unpredicted ones, will require new responses, new capabilities, new doctrines and tactics, new equipment, and last new education and training. So, a transformation mindset is very important to be developed to handle this set of dramatic changes.

I think the new strategic concept should confirm again the statement of the previous strategic concept that "...the doors of the Alliance remain open..." for all the other Balkan Countries.

C.P. 12**Managing challenges and opportunities in the wider NATO neighbourhood. The partnership network as an investment in the trans-Atlantic and international security. The relevance of the critical NATO neighbourhood: The Balkan and the wider Black Sea Region**

H.E. Mr. Ljupco Arsovski

Ambassador of the Republic of Macedonia to Romania

The Republic of Macedonia welcomes the approach of wider consultations through exchange of opinions and through involvement of relevant institutions, experts and country representatives regardless whether from fully fledged members or Alliance partner countries, engaging them in an exchange on a topic which will essentially determine the future development of the new NATO strategic concept in response to the modern security challenges, and which will also impact the overall functioning of the Alliance.

We believe that such a transparent approach will enable qualitative advancement of the strategic goals that the Alliance is to define under the new Strategic concept.

It is a fact that after the 9/11th terrorist attacks the landscape and understanding of global security and peace are no longer the same and have significantly changed. This has imposed the need to redefine the positions of the Alliance and its role globally and in the Euro-Atlantic area. The development of a new strategy (which will replace the strategy adopted in 1999 at the Washington Summit), will enable the Alliance to counter the new security challenges, such as the non-conventional threats and energy security.

Furthermore, we strongly believe in the fundamental postulates of the Alliance – as a relevant transatlantic forum for consultations among countries, the main goal of which is to defend and promote the shared values, based on principles of democracy, individual freedoms and the rule of law, through a consensus decision making principle. The Alliance open

door policy is of essential importance for its development and for the purpose producing individual and regional security.

A segment of no lesser importance is investing in one's own development and in building societies prepared to share common values and responsibilities, and capable of contributing to regional and global security.

And indeed the Republic of Macedonia has been making such investments in the last 11 years. The main strategic priority is fully fledged membership of NATO and the country's development as a responsible and dedicated member of the international community, able to contribute to the overall international activities aimed at accomplishing the major priorities at the international agenda.

We are fully aware of the importance of regional cooperation. We consider regional cooperation to be our top foreign policy priority. The Republic of Macedonia and the countries of the immediate neighbourhood share identical strategic foreign policy commitments, which have resulted in deepening the cooperation in the process of integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic organizations, regardless of the fact that the level of fulfillment of the aspirations in this respect varies among the countries in the Region. The established regional initiatives and forums are of course a reflection of this cooperation which can always be advanced and deepened.

We strongly believe in the individual readiness of countries to contribute to NATO-led operations, within and beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, as a contribution to global peace and security.

The Republic of Macedonia provides significant logistic support to the NATO/KFOR troops in Kosovo. The Coordination KFOR Support Center (KFOR-HNSCC) will continue providing logistic support to the NATO operation in Kosovo - KFOR by facilitating the accommodation, stay and further movement of the KFOR, then by ensuring healthcare services, fuel supply, escort, customs certification, protection of troops and securing the major communication lines in the Republic of Macedonia through the Coordination KFOR Support Center (KFOR-HNSCC) and support to air surveillance operations.

Understanding the needs of our Allies and aware of the need to share the responsibilities, as of 2002 we have been contributing troops to the NATO, EU and UN operations outside our Region. Currently, we contribute slightly less than 4% of our land forces to international operations. Furthermore, by 2010 we plan to increase our participation in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan by 50% (or about 250 troops of the Army of the Republic of Macedonia).

As a Partner country and as a country at the doorstep of fully-fledged Alliance membership, the Republic of Macedonia is fully prepared to give all the possible contribution to advancing the work of the Alliance, sharing with NATO member-states and Partners the common responsibilities and values, contributing thus to regional and global peace and security, as well.

At the end, I would like to underline that with above mentioned facts as a real proves, my country, The Republic of Macedonia is already in the New Strategic concept.

C.P. 13 **Estonia and the New Strategic Concept**

Ott Laido

Policy Planning Department Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Conventional threats persist. Hence, despite the recent changes in the security environment – and as the matter of fact in NATO itself - the meaning of Article V has not changed and must be understood as unchanged.

A new Strategic Concept (SC) has to assure the validity of the Alliance 's collective defense both to its members and non-members. Regrettably there is hesitation amongst the allies, thereby weakening NATO's political cohesion. A new SC needs to eliminate these doubts by assuring that NATO is a collective defense organisation, regardless the fact that it has developed beyond the initial concept of being a territorial defense organisation.

However, there are also unconventional adversaries and challenges that make robust conventional responses irrelevant or inappropriate. The Alliance may face adversaries differing from states, non-state actors to even private companies.

Though such a “new attack” against an Ally may not be automatically defined as an armed attack, thereby launching the collective defense mechanism under Article V, it still requires a collective response that can be applied through Article IV.

Estonia does not support the idea of making a list of threats that apply under Article V and those which do not. In short, Article V must not be diluted. Giving no such list, we would also leave some space for the “big unexpected” – potential threats that are unknown at the time being.

However, regarding the impacts of so-called new threats – such as energy security, cyber security and climate change – these should not be taken as threats that require response through Article V. Herewith we raise the importance of Article IV.

Article IV is both broad and strong enough to enforce a collective response for dealing threats in cyber space, for example.

C.P. 14
Importance of the (Western) Balkans for NATO:
Lessons Learned

Adel Abusara

Research Fellow at the Centre for Civil-Military Relations, Belgrade

Presentation, connected to topics from Panel 2 of the conference was focused on two important issues/strategies that stemmed from NATO involvement in the ex-Yu conflict, thus helping NATO to understand its new role in changed, post-Cold war world.

NATO and the EU have undergone long way from initial “fencing” the Balkans off and applying the, so-called “quarantine strategy” to extending the European zone of peace into that region, and creation of, what academics call “post-1999 European order”. One of the strategies to achieve this evolutionary transformation was to acquire socializing centrality for the Balkans. It means that both the EU and NATO have managed to start creating somewhat predictable, credible security communities, by socializing domestic elites. This led to creating standards of predictability in the region, thus excluding the possibility of new conflicts for the foreseeable future. This kind of security-creation influence could be implemented elsewhere, not just on the Balkans.

Second lesson learned from the involvement in the region of the Balkans is connected to the EU-NATO relation – it is actually firm and fruitful co-operation that NATO has with the Union, unlike anywhere else in the world. New Strategic Concept can and should emphasize the need for enhancing this co-operation, despite all the problems connected to it and to make it a role-model for future handling of conflict and post-conflict areas. On the other hand, there is a need to emphasize the laggings of this co-operation: the problems like “NATO primacy” in the relations incarnated in NATO “right of first refusal” have to be overcome. Two partners should deal on the equal level in the areas which they can manage the best. Many of the

obstacles to this co-operation have been already lifted (hesitations about ESDP, France's non integration into the Alliance), which makes it necessary to work on.

Finally, the influence of Russia in the Balkan region should not be underestimated, although it is hard to take for granted speculations that Russia intends through its close relations with Serbia to come back military in the region. Still, its strengthened economic influence should be closely observed by NATO as well.

C.P. 15 **New strategic concept and the outside powers**

Florentina Marin

NATO has been able to keep his role as a provider of security due to his strategic situations. The new strategic era was opened by the interpretation of the USA of the 9/11th attacks, so his role on the global derived from the confrontation with an irregular and unconventional enemy.

Despite the jihad phenomena, new risk factors were seen at the horizon: the return of Russia demanding her superpower status power. Particularly, to all this we can add new elements: nuclear proliferations in North Korea and Iran, the revitalized China and the rise of a new concept, populism.

NATO is also threatened from inside. We do not have to forget that it is build on national states, which now are trying to preserve their interest not the interests of the Alliance. (See Germany outside Europe Alliance, negotiating with Russia concerning gas supplies)

Russia: In august 2008, Russia showed the world that it passed over its paralyzed phase and occupied her centered place in the European strategic arena. 14 acts of intimidation since 2005 show the dangerous comeback of Russia. Its strength lies in her confidence in being the only superpower that dominates the gas and petroleum sector.

Since USA was busy in Afghanistan and Iraq, Russia adopted a new strategy. Russia is not using only its traditional sphere influence, but its adopting a strategy confrontation. To achieve it, Moscow resorted forging ties with countries likes Venezuela or Iran, consolidating her military capability and giving a new approach to the gas era.

Iran: Since USA try to moderate Iran behavior, it became much more aggressive and radical. The development of extremist national projects lies in its nuclear program. This situation has a great impact on the strategic map.

Three possible actions were discussed to deal with this nuclear program:

1. Sanctions- were seen as a pattern to develop connections with other nuclear countries and which in a second phase will have affected other countries depending on Iran, for example Turkey dependent on Iran's oil supplies.
2. Intervention – it would have transformed the world in an opened field for nuclear weapons
3. Incentives – the sticks and carrots strategy was lost on the way; the carrots offered by USA were inappropriate. This is why Iran should stay on the political agenda of NATO.

If international efforts fail, because they cannot find actions which deal with the nuclear path of Iran, NATO can be used to build a comprehensive strategy to contain Iran. His past behavior and his new behavior demonstrate that this country will not make any concession without political and military pressure.

Policy consultation and co-ordination in NATO would increase incentives for Iran to reach an agreement, as only the US can offer what Iran is most interested in, namely security guarantees and international recognition.

Terrorism: Since the 9/11th attacks the western realized that terrorism is a small part in a globalize world. The phenomena called Islamic radicalism have much more intensity. In this sense, the power of NATO has to be spread all over the world. NATO's strategy against terrorism is the result of consensus between the various positions of its member countries.

Maintaining international cohesion in the fight against terror and the specific need for these actions appear to suggest that if this kind of operation is approved they should be accompanied by major efforts to explain to the public why they are needed.

Proliferation: North Korea, India, Pakistan have already became nuclear powers. The problem is the security pressure felt by some regions which are trying to preserve security by acquiring nuclear capabilities. This consequence stays in the regional dynamics which is amplifying the risk of instability. Now, NATO missions will have its routes in theaters of operations.

Security and recession: It is a proven fact that EU is not investing in the defense sector. (The result lays in the recent technology Conference). Because there is not a perceived threat, NATO members are concentrated now on resolving the economic crisis situation. They are not concentrating on the existing power breach and they are not seeking the salvation in the defense sector.

An essential way to take in account NATO today is to develop and transform its perceived culture. The national rejection to suffer casualties and continuous necessity of peace has become a real obsession for the society. People do not believe anymore in the power of the institutions to deal with threats.

The culture of zero losses is now determining the actions of NATO. New strategic concept has to adapt to the new strategic culture of Europe, which is now rejecting war. There is a public fatigue in regard of using war as a primer solution to resolving conflicts and a rejection of using their own national forces.

C.P. 16 **NATO's New Strategic Concept**

LTC. Doina MUREȘAN PhD.

NATO is likely to begin a review of its strategic Concepts following the April 2009 Summit in Strasbourg-Kehl that marked the sixtieth anniversary of the Alliance. A new Strategic Concept will be ready for 2010 or 2011 depending on the level of political ambition and the pace of negotiation. The current Strategic Concept is ten years old since the Alliance has changed considerably, both politically and militarily. We provide an overview of the political and military issues that will shape the new strategic concept and we make three arguments: the Strategic Concept codifies past decisions and presents them to the public as a coherent whole: indeed, codification and public diplomacy are its core functions. Another argument is that a new Strategic Concept must balance the push and pull of two competing visions of NATO and their political implementation. A final argument concerns the future: The NATO will continue down the path of global engagement.

What is NATO's Strategic Concepts? We can say it is the Alliance's operational and dynamic view of its founding treaty. Iulian Chifu, Director of the Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Center Bucharest stressed that the new strategic concept is a programme document, its content including the new directions of development for the Alliance. Each NATO member state comes up with own suggestions for the drawing up of this new concept, he says. In order to prepare a new Strategic Concept, NATO members must first understand and agree what the Alliance represents today and how it needs to develop its military capabilities in order to function in line with what NATO represents. All Allies, from the largest to the smallest, are actively consulted and involved. Moreover, the process is engaging partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, as well as partners all over the globe. The new Strategic Concept will therefore be not only an analytical document. It also will have to give specific guidance to NATO governments on how they need to further transform the Alliance and their own national defense structures and capabilities so that successfully meet

NATO's core tasks in the 21st century. The Strategic Concept is the core NATO document that establishes and reflects this transatlantic consensus. Clearly, because the security environment that NATO has to deal with changes, the Alliance's Strategic Concept has to be periodically updated. The current Concept dates from 1999, a time when NATO had 19 members in comparison with the 28 it has today and when NATO's focus was very much on challenges within Europe or on Europe's periphery. The new Concept is to be ready for approval by the NATO Summit in 2010. In Brussels, the consensus exists already on the fact that the 1999 concept is no longer adequate to meet the risks and threats of our times. It belonged to the last century. The security environment has changed, with threats assuming a transnational and global character. NATO has enlarged. Its political and military capabilities have evolved. The conclusion was that NATO should have a mission statement pertinent to the challenges currently faced.

Since the inception of the Atlantic Alliance in 1949, the transatlantic security organization has produced six bona fide Strategic Concepts.¹ The Strategic Concept that NATO will agree in 2010 or 2011 will be third post-Cold War Strategic Concept. But what will the new Strategic Concept contain, and what kind of NATO will it envisage? The former position stressed the continuity between alliance of the past and future; the latter stressed the transformation of NATO from a traditional alliance to a "hub of security relationships that is destined to manage global problems, as one official put it".² NATO must now define its identity and place in a new, rapidly changing world. If security is a global matter, then the new strategic concept should reach out to a worldwide audience.

Romania considers that the process of elaborating a new NATO Strategic Concept must be a NATO domestic study, and an opportunity to inform the public about the future role of NATO. The transparency and inclusion in this process of some large categories: congressmen, mass-media, representatives of the academic and non-governmental, represent some very important

¹ The six Strategic Concepts are DC 6/1 (1949), MC 3/5 (1952), MC 14/2 (1957), MC 14/3 (1962), the Alliance's New Strategic Concept (1991) and the Alliance's New Strategic Concept (1999).

² Interview at NATO headquarters, October 30, 2008.

elements, said Cătălin Marian Predoiu, interim ministry of Foreign Affairs. From Romania's perspective, the elaboration process of the new Strategic Concept is as important as the final result. Within the elaboration process, Romania will plead for reaffirmation of collective defense Article 5 as the primary responsibilities of NATO, for the actualization and consolidation of the main tasks of the Alliance within the current Strategic Concept (security, discouragement, consultation, crisis and partnership management), to which is added the answer to the new challenges, emphasizing the energetic security and proliferation of missile technologies. Romania wishes the Art. 5 re-affirmation. In order to support this functional role, the concept noted that the NATO forces should maintain the ability to respond to Article 5 and non-Article 5 crisis. Perhaps the most significant part of the debate was on the NATO-EU relationship. Most participants underlined the necessity for NATO to work together and to interface with the United Nations, other international organizations and regional groupings with a security dimension.

Another field in which Romanian side seems to be interested in is energy security. There was also discussion about NATO relative to such subjects as terrorism, piracy, humanitarian activities, climate change and food security.

Never in its entire history, the North Atlantic Alliance remained tied to principles and concepts that had stopped corresponding to reality. Since the beginning, NATO did not prove only power and solidarity, but also a great adaptability, realism and flexibility, acting like a true security organization. On fact, the Strategic Concept must give public opinion in the Alliance countries and beyond a clear sense of why NATO still matters and how in many ways it is helping to make them more secure.

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C.P. 17**Cyber defense*****Tatiana Busuncian***

Director of Pro Marshall Center of the Republic of Moldova

I would like to inform you that recently the Pro Marshall Center of the Republic of Moldova in cooperation with the NATO Centre of Excellence Defense Against Terrorism (NATO COE DAT), the NATO International Staff/ Defense Policy and Planning Division (NATO IS) and with the support of the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme organised the Training on Cyber Terrorism - a 21st Century Challenge for State Security.

The training provided an opportunity to sustain initiatives in examination of basic belief about cybercrime, which certainly must be analyzed within government, academia, defense sector and industry. The project represents a first step in providing a new understanding of cyber-security, where the training proceedings will serve educational purposes. The project also highlights the importance and strengthens the educational background of key institution representatives in the field of state security. The participants trained on effective decision making and strategies' elaboration, encourage the cross-disciplinary sharing of information that could help national security leaders' create complementary defensive solutions, build on shared expertise and innovation.

The contribution of the training enforced the cohesion and the common understanding of the instability risks that could affect state cyber-security and the beginning of a new stability dimensions for the regional and European space.

Cybercrime is a growing and serious threat to individuals, business and government. It is a problem that will continue to escalate as technology changes. The very strength of cyber crime is the very weakness of our efforts to control it: being able to cross international lines. A click of a button can digitally transport thieves and terrorists 5 000 miles and across

20 borders. Attempting to monitor and prosecute these type of criminals is possible but requires cooperation across those borders, cooperation that the criminal need not acquire. A system needs to be developed that will allow nation victims of cyber crime to swiftly prosecute these criminals without stepping on the toes of another nation's sovereignty.

After 9/11th the world changed and we should be aware that terrorism is bound to be with us for the foreseeable future. The outcome of the measures applied in preventing and combating terrorism is helpful only when a political will from all engaged parties exists. A serious engagement in the collaboration process is significant in elaborating a well-defined strategy and fostering a win-win situation in fight against terrorists' acts.

In conclusion I would like to mention that the best protection on new Cyber threats is regional and international cooperation which represents a viable solution only in case when both the theoretical and practical approach is considered. This link represents a global requirement for an international interdependency at national, regional and international level, to which the cooperation and integration must be best fitted to. Nations must have in place their own domestic cyber laws but must also have a system that allows for collaboration with other countries. Many systems have emerged globally and many of the big pieces may already be in place to harmonize cyber law worldwide.

C.P. 18**Protejarea securității Alianței la distanță strategică sau mai aproape de casă: estimări corecte și dileme false**

General de brigadă dr. Valeriu NICUȚ

La Summit-ul NATO de la Strasbourg/Kehl din Aprilie 2009, după discuții consistente, națiunile au fost de acord cu faptul că se impune proiectarea și elaborarea unui Nou Concept Strategic, care să-l înlocuiască, pe cel din 1999, valabil încă și care să asigure Alianței un set de precizări strategice pentru, cel puțin, următoarea decadă..

Salutăm, susținem și ne racordăm la mesajele [reprezentantului] Ministrului Apărării Naționale și al Președintelui Comitetului Militar NATO, Amiral Giampaolo Di Paola privind importanța și implicațiile Noului Concept Strategic, a rolului și sarcinilor fundamentale ale Alianței, a definirii priorităților între numeroasele exigențe care sunt formulate – și care vor fi, fără nicio îndoială, formulate în continuare – față de NATO, precum și a identificării resurselor necesare pentru a le putea satisface.

După cum previzionăm la nivelul Statului Major General, Noul Concept Strategic va diferi de cel actual, nu numai din perspectiva conținutului său dar, mai ales, în ceea ce privește modalitatea originală și modernă în care este conceput, precum și a destinatarilor prevederilor sale.

După cum probabil cunoașteți, un număr de națiuni membre și-au pus întrebarea dacă abordarea publică, largă a proiectării fizionomiei Noului Concept Strategic nu va afecta imaginea Alianței, nu va deconspira din preocupările sale de nivel strategic și nu va fi un efort contraproductiv. Se pare însă că lucrurile nu stau deloc așa, iar pentru perioada pe care o parcurgem, pentru provocările noi cu care ne confruntăm nu ne rămâne decât să identificăm și aplicăm soluții noi, iar modalitatea de lucru transparentă și interactivă afișată de NATO reprezintă una dintre ele.

O altă dovadă o reprezintă însuși seminarul pe care îl desfășurăm azi, cu participarea nu numai a structurilor specifice Sistemului Național de

Apărare dar și a altor agenții și organizații, cu preocupări în sfera intelectuală. Dorim deci să discutăm și să obținem o înțelegere comună a problematicii generate de viitoarea fizionomie a Noului Concept Strategic și să cristalizăm puncte de vedere pentru a contribui la consolidarea unei poziții naționale în acest domeniu.

Cu prilejul aceluiași Summit din Aprilie 2009, Secretarul General NATO a fost împuternicit să formeze și să coordoneze un grup de experți care să înceapă proiectarea Noului Concept Strategic. Acest grup de politicieni și diplomați unanimi recunoscuți pe plan internațional, în strânsă conlucrare cu Consiliul Nord Atlantic și sub conducerea Secretarului General NATO au sarcina de a creiona arhitectura Noului Concept Strategic. În etapa în care suntem în prezent, acest grup sau numai câțiva membri, vor vizita națiunile membre pentru a le prelua și înțelege punctele de vedere naționale și vor trebui să construiască, să mențină și să susțină consensul general în ceea ce privește conținutul conceptului, prin prisma regăsirii pozițiilor naționale respective.

În prezent, la nivel ideologic, NATO se confruntă cu două curente de opinii. Primul este reprezentat de faptul că în ultimele două decenii a trebuit să adopte o serie de măsuri și responsabilități care nu fuseseră inițial previzionate, corespunzător contextului geostrategic din acea perioadă, respectiv autodeterminarea și autoapărare împotriva amenințării sovietice. Acest lucru, care a generat evoluția Alianței de la o organizație de apărare colectivă concentrată în Europa la una care contribuie la securitatea mondială, a avut drept consecință difuzia masivă a graniței dintre nevoile națiunilor privind securitatea, apărarea sau stabilitatea. Drept urmare este imperios să definim rolul NATO în actualul mediu internațional de securitate.

Al doilea curent de opinie se referă la nivelul relativ scăzut de apreciere mondială de care se bucură NATO, deși Alianța traversează perioada cea mai activă din întreaga sa istorie. Angajarea publicului în înțelegerea și susținerea politicilor de securitate este, în mod tradițional, limitată, astfel fiind dificil de obținut și menținut sprijinul politic pentru asigurarea resurselor necesare susținerii operațiilor. Dacă coroborăm acest lucru cu limitările și restricțiile generate de actuala criză economico-financiară și cu

reducerea eforturilor în a explica cetățeanului de ce NATO are nevoie să acționeze în afara granițelor teritoriilor membrilor, observăm nivelul de angajare al NATO în Afganistan. Astfel, legitim, putem să ne întrebăm de care parte a balanței, care are pe un taler estimări corecte iar pe celălalt dileme false, se situează **“Protejarea securității Alianței. La distanță strategică sau mai aproape de casă?”**. NATO, în noul său concept strategic va trebui să ia în calcul și se evidențieze ambele probleme: atât rolul său cât și promovarea propriei existențe.

Rolul NATO poate fi astfel privit prin prisma noilor amenințărilor existente dar și a celor previzionate cu rezultat direct, implicit în remodelarea unor sarcini și misiuni prezente sau asumarea și implementarea altora noi. Din această perspectivă, înțelegerea comună a implicațiilor existenței și invocării articolului 5 din Tratat devine o necesitate stringentă. Articolul 5 este în strânsă legătură cu identificarea și definirea amenințărilor, pe care NATO va trebui să le facă față: terorismul, proliferarea armelor de distrugere în masă, asigurarea securitatea energetică, schimbările climatice, protecția spațiului virtual, siguranța infrastructurii de interes transfrontalier.

Înțelegerea comună a implicațiilor Art. 5 necesită obținerea de clarificări și a unui consens asupra unor probleme pe care Alianța ar trebui să le rezolve prin intermediul Noului Concept Strategic, și anume: semnificația apărării comune în fața noilor tipuri de amenințări; rolul NATO în apărarea colectivă (Art. 5) corelată cu securitatea (operații expediționare, misiuni de răspuns la crize, etc); cum se menține credibilitatea Art. 5 și când se aplică prevederile acestuia?

Prioritizarea sarcinilor este un aspect care acum a dobândit o importanță covârșitoare. Multe dintre documentele de planificare ale Alianței sunt concepute pe un anumit “standard” privitor la resurse, și anume: elaborarea unui maxim de nevoi operaționale pentru a putea face față tuturor situațiilor posibil a se întâmpla. În condițiile actuale de limitări drastice ale resurselor, devine aproape inevitabilă o prioritizare a acestor sarcini. Această situație poate fi agravată dacă îl corelăm cu prelungirea estimată a actualei crize.

Din această perspectivă, pentru a alinia nevoile cu resursele de toate categoriile aflate la dispoziție, apreciem că Noul Concept Strategic trebuie

să stabilească o ierarhizare a priorităților și, implicit, a sarcinilor Alianței. În pofida faptului că o ierarhizare a priorităților implică riscul unor “alegeri” greșite, acest lucru poate fi apreciat ca un jalon important în evaluarea performanței membrilor NATO, precum și în împărțirea echitabilă a responsabilităților între națiuni.

În strânsă legătură cu rolul NATO în ceea ce privește apărarea membrilor și securitatea Alianței se situează problema relațiilor cu Rusia. Acest aspect a constituit o preocupare majoră a tuturor eșaloanelor de conducere aliate, dar și a celor naționale. Avem în acest caz parte de încă o dilemă, pe care Noul Concept Strategic este solicitat să o clarifice.

Pe de-o parte NATO s-a angajat într-un parteneriat unic cu Rusia, având ca vârf de lance Consiliul NATO-Rusia, la nivel de ambasadori, iar pe de altă parte numeroși aliați (ca să avem în vedere numai istoria și localizarea acestora) “asimilează” menirea Art. 5 ca fiind direct asociată Rusiei. Întreruperea relațiilor cauzate de conflictul ruso-georgian din vara 2008, a înrăutățit și mai mult situația.

În prezent suntem nevoiți să obținem clarificări privind unele aspecte ale acestei relații cu Rusia, clarificări pe care Noul Concept Strategic va trebui să le aibă în vedere, și anume: sunt relațiile NATO-Rusia bazate, în principal, pe valori sau pe interese comune?; cum abordăm această relație prin prisma faptului că, unii aliați, prevăd în planurilor lor o posibilă agresiune din partea Rusiei?; care este gradul de implicare a Rusiei în procesul NATO de luare a deciziilor?

Proiectarea Noului Concept Strategic se află la început, în faza de reflecție, marcată de o serie de seminarii și ateliere de lucru, în care statele aliate vor încerca să-și cristalizeze o poziție națională și să propună modalități de soluționare la unele teme importante aflate în dezbatere: sarcinile fundamentale ale NATO în domeniul securității; angajamentele NATO în era globalizării; coeziunea transatlantică NATO – UE; parteneriatele; transformarea: structuri, forțe și capacități.

În contextul multidimensional al schimbărilor masive în peisajul geostrategic internațional, în special din ultimii zece ani, națiunile așteaptă

ca Noul Concept Strategic să sintetizeze acele elemente care ar trebui nu numai să înglobeze și să reprezinte interesele aliaților dar să și precizeze, în termeni suficient de flexibili, conduita de acțiune a NATO, în spectrul militar, diplomatic, de comunicare, etc, pentru cel puțin următoarea decadă.

Statul Major General este direct interesat de rezultatele discuțiilor și dezbaterilor pe care le vom avea astăzi dar și în zilele următoare pe marginea acestor subiecte vizând construcția și consolidarea unei poziții naționale privind fizionomia Noul Concept Strategic, având în vedere că după elaborarea și publicarea conceptului, sistemul militar în ansamblul său, trebuie să transpună în fapt cele prevăzute în document (planificare operațională, planificare resurse, elaborare strategii, etc).

Vă urez să fructificăm acest prilej prin abordarea realistă și sinceră a problematicii care ne preocupă asociată Noului Concept Strategic al Alianței. Suntem conștienți de efortul masiv, multidisciplinar care urmează a fi depus pentru a finaliza această "Constituție" a Alianței, și tocmai de aceea trebuie să ne aducem aportul la acest lucru pentru a putea aborda mai bine provocările de azi, de a întrezări riscurile de mâine și de a prevedea modalitatea posibilă de acțiune de poimâine, toate în scopul protejării populației, teritoriului și intereselor naționale.

C.P. 19

Protejarea securității Alianței la distanță strategică sau mai aproape de casă: estimări corecte și dileme false – aspecte politico-militare și militare ale Noului Concept Strategic (NCS)

General de brigadă dr. Virgil BĂLĂCEANU

Actualul Concept Strategic al NATO datează din 1999, când Alianța număra 16 membri, iar azi sunt 28, având la bază experiența implicării organizației în soluționarea crizei din BALCANI. În acest context, misiunile, pentru prima dată în istoria Alianței, au avut un caracter ofensiv, în afara zonei sale tradiționale de acțiune și fără a fi invocat Articolul 5 al Tratatului de la WASHINGTON.

Numeroase aspecte ale acestuia rămân bineînțeles pertinente și valabile. Prin prisma situației geopolitice internaționale actuale, este necesar ca acest concept să se racordeze nu numai la evenimentele politice și situațiile de securitate majore survenite în acest început de secol XXI (ca să amintim aici numai de atacul terorist din America (9/11) și angajarea NATO în AFG) dar și la rezultatele capacității Alianței de a se transforma și adapta sau de a previziona unele provocări pe care le-am putea face față în viitor. În consecință, după cum sublinia fostul Secretar General NATO Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, *conceptul actual nu reflectă imensa transformare suferită de organizație, care a trecut de la o alianță "eurocentrică" la una care tratează chestiuni de securitate ce depășesc cu mult frontierele Europei.*

Ne este tuturor clară necesitatea în ceea ce privește elaborarea unui Nou Concept Strategic la nivelul Alianței. De altfel, acest lucru a și fost agreat de națiuni cu prilejul Summit-ului NATO de la Strasbourg/Kehl, din acest an. Din perspectiva abordării militare a premiselor de proiectare a Noului Concept Strategic, noi, cei prezenți, trebuie să fim în măsură să cristalizăm unele aspecte militare care vizează problematica.

Generic, așa cum este definit de Alianță, conceptul strategic reprezintă modul de acțiune adoptat în urma analizei unei situații strategice. Cu alte cuvinte, este enunțarea a ceea ce trebuie făcut, în termeni suficient de

flexibili încât să permită dezvoltarea nu numai a conduitei de acțiune militară, dar și a celor diplomatice, economice, de comunicare, etc sau altele asociate acestora.

Definiția în sine a conceptului strategic NATO este atât de largă, încât poate induce, chiar și pentru o mare parte a militarilor o anumită stare de confuzie, nefiind foarte clar ce ar trebui să conțină acesta și care ar trebui să fie aria sa de cuprindere. În acest palier ar trebui să intervenim noi, în esență România, pentru a putea milita pentru inserarea în Noul Concept Strategic a referințelor care vizează interesele naționale, coroborate însă cu cele ale Alianței.

Nu trebuie omis, de asemenea, că necesitatea elaborării Noului Concept Strategic trebuie să țină cont și de perceperea rolului NATO în noul context de securitate, atât din perspectiva opiniilor populației țărilor aliate dar și a țărilor non-NATO, cât și perceperea NATO de către media, *nu ca pe un polițist mondial, ci ca pe un observator, care trebuie să prevină și nu să acționeze.*

În decursul istoriei sale, NATO s-a adaptat și remodelat continuu, făcând față cu succes schimbărilor mediului global de securitate, care, dintr-o analiză rapidă și obiectivă conduce la creionarea a cel puțin trei premise fundamentale care trebuie luate în calcul pentru procesul de transformare:

- noile tipuri de amenințări și implicit noi tipuri de misiuni care să le facă față;
- aceste misiuni impun re proiectarea capabilităților existente sau crearea altora noi, după caz;
- iar misiunile și capabilitățile necesită un cadru nou, adecvat, de cooperare, noi relații, noi concepte doctrinare, noi soluții, inclusiv în spectrul resurselor de toate categoriile.

Astfel, de la înființarea sa, Alianța și-a adaptat fundamental doctrina în câteva rânduri, ca răspuns la amenințările specifice. Numai în ultimii zece ani, NATO a suferit o transformare profundă, evoluând de la o structură al cărei rol era de descurajare, preponderent în plan militar (fără, însă, a avea un trecut activ în plan operațional, acțional) la o organizație cu rol de impunere a păcii, prin angajarea forței.

În prezent, având în vedere schimbările pe plan mondial în domeniul amenințărilor la adresa securității, sunt vehiculate opinii privind transformarea NATO dintr-o structură “*cu responsabilități nelimitate într-un spațiu delimitat*”, într-o structură “*cu responsabilități limitate într-un spațiu nedeterminat*”. Pe acest fond, trebuie să facem referire la:

- relațiile transatlantice,
- la echilibrul între planificarea strategică pentru apărarea națională și operațiile expediționare ale Alianței,
- la eliminarea birocrăției excesive având drept vârf de lance o formulă nuanțată a consensului în cazul deciziilor,
- la participarea echilibrată în operații de interes general pentru membrii NATO
- nu în ultimul rând la răspunsul colectiv împotriva terorismului, a proliferării armelor de distrugere în masă
- la acțiunile privind protecția spațiului virtual, asigurarea securității energetice, a siguranței infrastructurii de interes transfrontalier și la schimbările climaterice.

Cum să facem apărarea colectivă mai eficientă în sec. al XXI-lea

Analiza contextului geostrategic internațional relevă clar că, în prezent, NATO este angajată în operații făcând față unor amenințări care nu s-au putut prevedea în momentul elaborării actualului concept strategic (care a fost elaborat în 1999).

Încă din 1949, conceptul apărării colective a constituit liantul esențial al NATO și a reflectat natura pur defensivă a Alianței, cu accent pe prevenirea războiului și importanța solidarității membrilor. [*Notă: Strategia națională de apărare a țării menționează, în cap. 2.1, că ”apărarea colectivă trebuie să rămână misiunea centrală a NATO?”*]

Inițial, NATO a stabilit o strategie de operații la scară largă, concentrate preponderent pe apărarea teritorială. În continuare, strategiile NATO au fost adaptate la riscurile și amenințările specifice diferitelor perioade istorice, constând în diferite tipuri de abordare: de la politica represaliilor masive, apoi la riposta flexibilă, până la strategiile actuale, bazate pe securitate, consultare, descurajare și apărare, gestionarea crizelor și parteneriat.

Totodată NATO este o alianță pentru apărare care asigură securitatea membrilor săi, iar apărarea colectivă este sarcina fundamentală a acesteia, astfel operațiile non articol 5 de răspuns la crize vor influența într-o măsură relativ mică Noul Concept Strategic dar mai ales Structura de forțe NATO (NFS).

Declarația de Securitate a Alianței pune accent pe funcția de bază a acesteia - apărarea colectivă - care se bazează pe indivizibilitatea unei securități aliate. Ca urmare, apărarea colectivă trebuie să rămână misiunea de bază a Alianței și componenta principală a procesului de planificare operațională, în timp ce angajarea militară în operațiile de răspuns la criză să se facă în limita forțelor la dispoziție și când situația de securitate o impune.

Noțiunea de apărare colectivă în acest nou mediu de securitate, trebuie analizată și înțeleasă coroborat cu provocările specifice sec. al XXI-lea, cum ar fi atacurile cibernetice și întreruperile aprovizionării cu energie, care pot destabiliza profund o țară fără să se fi recurs, în sensul clasic, la mijloace militare. Aceste provocări nu atrag automat răspunsuri militare, totuși, acestea trebuie să fie însă colective.

Consider așadar esențial să contribuim la întărirea conceptului, inclusiv prin intermediul Noului Concept Strategic, prin care să se poată oferi tuturor membrilor asigurarea că nu vor fi obligați să facă față singuri acestor provocări.

Pentru ca NATO să continue să își mențină relevanța în actualul mediu de securitate, este nevoie de o nouă înțelegere a Articolului 5. Se impune redefinirea mai clară, în termeni actuali, a cerințelor pentru apărarea colectivă, într-o lume în care provocările sunt globale, iar riscurile și amenințările nu au granițe.

Astăzi, mai mult decât apărare colectivă, statele membre au nevoie de securitate colectivă pentru apărarea valorilor și intereselor noastre comune. Noul Concept Strategic va trebui să dovedească faptul că aliații acordă importanța cuvenită apărării colective, din cel puțin două perspective majore referitoare la modalitățile de implementare a Articolului 5.

O primă perspectivă impune reafirmarea principiului împărțirii echitabile a eforturilor, prin alocare concretă a resurselor pentru crearea capacităților necesare, de fiecare stat membru.

A doua direcție majoră va viza perspectiva viitoare, în care apărarea colectivă să asigure capacitatea de răspuns împotriva actualelor riscuri și amenințări la adresa securității.

Apreciem și milităm pentru menținerea conceptului de apărare colectivă ca pilon fundamental pe care se sprijină Alianța. Experiența a evidențiat faptul că națiunile trebuie să reconfigureze permanent balanța de forțe necesare atât apărării naționale cât și desfășurării acestor forțe în zone de criză îndepărtate în cadrul operațiilor NATO.

Apreciem că acest lucru reprezintă un motiv suplimentar pentru configurarea nevoilor reale și a celor *sui generis* de forțe și capacități necesare pentru toată gama de operații militare, atât pe teritoriul național cât și în afara acestuia, de la menținerea păcii până la acțiuni combatante.

Apărarea colectivă este și trebuie să rămână misiunea de bază a Alianței și componenta principală a procesului de planificare operațională, în timp ce angajarea militară în operațiile de răspuns la criză se face când situația de securitate o impune și în limita forțelor la dispoziție.

Ca urmare Noul Concept Strategic trebuie să stabilească cu claritate scopul, obiectivele și funcțiile Alianței, să definească provocările și amenințările la adresa securității acesteia și să indice mijloacele și capacitățile necesare confruntării cu aceste amenințări, dar să și definească măsurile de instituționalizare a Art. 5, să stabilească regulile de angajare și principiile realizării apărării colective și cooperării în cadrul acesteia.

Utilizarea și înțelegerea conceptului de solidaritate al aliaților, apreciat cel puțin prin prisma conceptului apărării colective și a rapidității evoluției mediului de securitate, trebuie întărit cu o atitudine corespunzătoare, tradusă prin participarea cu forțe și capacități la toate operațiile NATO, fie acestea combatante sau nu. Această atitudine a națiunilor trebuie înțeleasă

doar din perspectiva dificultăților generate de actuala criză mondială, care, cel puțin pe termen scurt, generează reduceri financiare masive și reținere a politicului de a aproba trimiterea personalului peste hotare.

Cum aminteam mai devreme, Noul Concept Strategic trebuie să reliefeze distinct faptul că în lupta împotriva acestor provocări naționale nu sunt obligate să le facă singure față. De asemenea, trebuie realizată armonizarea priorităților strategice naționale, din perspectiva efortului sistemului militar, cu cele a Alianței.

Variante de planificare pentru noii membri

După cum cunoașteți, sistemul NATO de planificare a apărării (NDPP) este în curs de tranziție către noul model, recent adoptat. Debutul primului ciclu complet, după noul model, va fi marcat de elaborarea noului Concept Strategic (NCS), pe baza căruia va fi realizată Directiva de planificare.

În prezent, la nivelul NATO HQ se consideră că documentul “*Comprehensive Political Guidance*”, aprobat la summit-ul de la Riga, este încă valid și, prin urmare, aspectele esențiale pot fi preluate în Noul Concept Strategic, în părțile ce vor face referire la planificarea apărării.

Din această perspectivă, este de așteptat ca Noul Concept Strategic să nu includă un nivel de ambiție formulat explicit, cantitativ și calitativ. Acesta ar trebui, conform noului model al planificării apărării, să fie formulat în Directiva de planificare, document ce va fi aprobat la nivelul miniștrilor apărării. Considerăm că România ar trebui să militeze pentru prezentarea echilibrată, în Noul Concept Strategic, a celor două obiective strategice: implicarea în gestionarea crizelor actuale și transformarea capabilităților, în sensul adaptării la cerințele mediului de securitate previzionat.

Folosirea eficientă a resurselor în procesul de dezvoltare a capabilităților – care, în opinia noastră, se extinde dincolo de planificarea apărării – este, pentru multe state Aliate, influențată și de evoluțiile cerințelor de capabilități specifice UE. Considerăm astfel, că se impune o mai clară exprimare a dorinței NATO de colaborare, cel puțin în domeniul planificării apărării, cu UE.

După cum știți, la nivelul NATO există în prezent un număr de planuri de contingență pentru apărarea colectivă a teritoriului unor națiuni de la frontierele Alianței, cât și un număr de planuri de contingență generice¹ pentru diferite tipuri de misiuni, cum ar fi combaterea terorismului și a armelor de distrugere în masă, operații de răspuns la criză, menținere a păcii, evacuare non-combatanți, embargo, managementul consecințelor, etc, toate rezultate prin prisma aplicării actualului concept strategic al NATO.

Deși, așa după cum am subliniat, apărarea colectivă este și va rămâne pentru mulți ani pilonul principal pe care este constituită Alianța Nord-Atlantică, totuși, inițierea elaborării unor noi planuri de contingență de tip articol 5 “clasice”, pentru apărarea teritoriului unor state NATO, inclusiv a României, ar putea determina apariția unor sensibilități la nivel politic, mai ales în relațiile cu vecinii Alianței.

Acest fapt nu trebuie însă să conducă la ideea că planificarea militară prudentă pentru apărarea colectivă a teritoriului nu-și are locul mai departe, doar că aceasta trebuie reorientată, pentru a răspunde noilor tipuri de amenințări. Astfel, din perspectivă națională, considerăm necesară **promovarea unei viziuni echilibrate, unificate, de la Marea Baltică la Marea Neagră**, privind securitatea omogenă la granița de est a Alianței și apărarea colectivă a noilor membrii NATO.

Gestionarea unor operații tip Afganistan

Evaluarea influenței lecțiilor învățate în urma pregătirii, dar mai ales a desfășurării operațiilor NATO, în special cea din Afganistan, asupra Noului Concept Strategic poate fi prospectată, deocamdată, din perspectiva **rolului NATO**, așa cum a fost acesta prefigurat până în prezent – NATO fiind unul din principalii actori în participarea la managementul global al crizelor civile și militare.

Abordarea comprehensivă / multidimensională **bazată pe efecte** reprezintă conceptul de unificare a eforturilor majorității actorilor reuniți sub același

¹ *Generic Contingency Plans - GENCONPLANS*, care pot fi dezvoltate mai departe pentru îndeplinirea diferitelor tipuri de misiuni și care vor facilita adaptarea rapidă la situația concretă de pe timpul apariției și dezvoltării unei crize.

obiectiv pe timpul implicării într-un conflict sau criză. Acest concept are înțelesuri multiple și este puțin probabil ca pe termen scurt și mediu să fie agreată o definiție comună pentru toți actorii implicați într-un conflict.

Rezultă că din această perspectivă modul de abordare al unei crize va evolua atât în cadrul Alianței, dar și mai ales în cadrul comunității internaționale, NATO trebuind să-și coordoneze acțiunile cu această comunitate într-o criză non-articol 5 privind:

- unitatea de efort și asigurarea planificării și evaluării integrate a proceselor, fără restricții de oferire a informațiilor;
- integrarea activităților militare cu actori multipli și realizarea sincronizării și lucrului în colaborare;
- asigurarea direcționărilor esențiale și a unei strategii coerente.

Operațiile ISAF au la bază acțiunile “*Clear, Hold, Build*”² specifice doctrinei contra-insurgente. Într-o operație de contra-insurgență are o mai mică importanță câți insurgenți sunt eliminați sau capturați într-o anumită perioadă de timp.

Sfârșitul acțiunilor militare va fi determinat de către populația locală. Aceștia vor decide dacă pot avea încredere în propriul guvern, legitimitatea acestuia decurgând din capacitatea lui de asigurare a securității și serviciilor esențiale. Din păcate, un guvern dependent în totalitate de donațiile comunității internaționale are șanse mici de a se legitima în fața propriei populații.

Actuala strategie militară în Afganistan este focalizată în exclusivitate în domeniile securității și economic și nu acordă importanță posibilităților de a capitaliza succesul într-un posibil progres în domeniul cultural, care poate sprijini eforturile de protejare a populației prin izolarea talibanilor. În Afganistan doi din cei trei piloni³ fundamentali ai participării unui contingent la o misiune în afara granițelor țării/ factori determinanți proprii oricărei operații de contra-insurgență au devenit fragili: ***credibilitatea forței internaționale*** în fața voinței insurgenților și ***sprijinul / încrederea populației***.

² Neutralizarea insurgenței din zona de operații, Menținerea securității în zonă, Dezvoltarea socio-economică.

³ (1) voința / determinarea trupelor proprii pentru îndeplinirea misiunii, (2) necesitatea unei credibilități reale în fața inamicului, (3) sprijinul / încrederea populației locale.

Pentru consolidarea pilonilor afectați sunt în dezvoltare acțiuni vizând câștigarea sprijinului / încrederii populației, simultan cu neutralizarea insurgenților. Recenta evaluare a COMISAF solicită îndreptarea atenției către populația locală, dar strategia propusă se bazează tot pe alocarea de resurse importante suplimentare.

Un fapt deseori considerat adiacent acțiunilor militare îl reprezintă comunicarea strategică/relația cu mass-media. În prezent populația afgană a fost mobilizată/intimidată de către insurgenți în special prin transmiterea eficientă a mesajelor de propagandă.

Acestea sunt numai câțva aspecte legate de planificarea, organizarea și, mai ales desfășurarea operațiilor militare conduse de NATO, dintre care cea mai relevantă este ISAF, iar toate acestea se pot regăsi într-o adecvat în conținutul Noului Concept Strategic.

Echilibrul dintre apărarea teritorială și operațiile “out of area”

Angajarea în operații în afara zonei de responsabilitate, impuse de necesitatea combaterii amenințărilor, a determinat modificarea profilului de organizare și planificare a operațiilor strategice. Dar atenție! Acest fapt nu trebuie să inducă statelor mici ale Alianței percepția adâncirii unor tendințe de marginalizare a propriilor **interese** naționale în domeniul securității.

Rolul apărării antirachetă⁴ în noua concepție strategică

În mediul strategic contemporan, dezvoltarea și proliferarea rachetelor balistice, inclusiv a celor cu posibilități de folosire a încărcăturilor de nimicire în masă, constituie o amenințare semnificativă la adresa teritoriului și populației statelor NATO. Această amenințare este amplificată de eforturile tot mai susținute ale unor națiuni de a-și dezvolta arme de nimicire în masă și capacități de transport la țintă cu rază tot mai mare de acțiune. Programul NATO de apărare antirachetă a fost conceput tocmai pentru a asigura protecția teritoriului, populației și a forțelor (inclusiv a celor desfășurate în teatrele de operații) împotriva acestor tipuri de arme.

⁴ Nivelul ridicat de clasificare a informațiilor privind apărarea antirachetă (NATO SECRET) restrânge semnificativ posibilitatea abordării aspectelor pur militare ale acestui subiect.

Participarea României în cadrul inițiativei MD NATO are la bază interesul pentru conectarea la eforturile aliate, dezvoltarea unui sistem antirachetă aliat și asigurarea acoperirii întregului teritoriu național. Poziționarea României se fundamentează pe două principii esențiale: indivizibilitatea securității în cadrul NATO și solidaritatea colectivă față de țările vulnerabile la atacuri cu rachete.

România susține continuarea dialogului privind implicațiile de securitate ale sistemelor antirachetă, atât în cadrul consultărilor cu alți aliați, cât și cu statele partenere. În particular, în ceea ce privește relația cu Rusia, ne putem pronunța în favoarea promovării unui dialog deschis pe acest subiect, precum și identificarea unor modalități concrete de cooperare în funcție de evoluția proiectului aliat, precum și a interesului Rusiei în acest sens, plecând de la realitatea că securitatea Mării Negre nu este posibilă fără un angajament solid al acestei țări.

Definirea unui rol al NATO în securitatea maritimă

Securitatea maritimă reprezintă un element cheie al securității și stabilității globale datorită faptului că oceanele și mările lumii au devenit un mediu din ce în ce mai accesibil și folosit pentru activitățile infracționale și acțiunile potențial ostile la adresa securității și stabilității Alianței. Importanța strategică pentru Alianță a liniilor de comunicații maritime este dat de însăși valoarea de circa 90% din totalul volumului comerțului mondial. Întreruperea liniilor de comunicații maritime ar avea consecințe grave mai ales asupra sectorului energetic și ar crea cadrul necesar pentru proliferarea activităților ilegale, a terorismului, proliferării și migrației în masă, etc.

NATO reprezintă o alianță compusă din națiuni cu porțiuni extinse de coastă, vechi tradiții maritime, mari capacități navale și puternice interese comerciale, fapt ce impune și presupune ca NATO să se preocupe și să joace un rol important în asigurarea și menținerea securității maritime aliate și internațională. Rolul NATO în securitatea maritimă ar trebui să fie complementar față de funcțiile îndeplinite de agențiile naționale și internaționale civile de impunere a legii și de autoritățile maritime.

Noul Concept Strategic va trebui să definească clar care sunt tipurile de misiuni în domeniul maritim ce necesită un răspuns colectiv din partea

Alianței, care va fi rolul forțelor navale ale națiunilor, distribuirea responsabilităților între națiuni, să definească granițele dintre apărare și securitate, limitele de participare în cazul activităților de susținere a autorităților responsabile pentru impunerea legii .

Putem identifica, astfel, interesele strategice ale Alianței din perspectiva securității maritime:

- protecția integrității teritoriale și spațiului maritim costier a țărilor membre;
- asigurarea protecției populației, a instalațiilor, bunurilor și infrastructurii din zona maritimă;
- prevenirea proliferării armelor de nimicire în masă;
- protecția infrastructurii critice și a celei energetice;
- asigurarea libertății navigație și a accesului la resurse (de suprafață sau subacvatic);

Riscurile și amenințările, identificate sau previzionate, la adresa Alianței din domeniul maritim se pot încadra în două categorii: amenințări curente (atacuri împotriva navelor, folosirea navelor încărcate cu materiale chimice sau radiologice pe post de armă, transportul armelor de nimicire în masă (WMD), etc), precum și amenințări viitoare (amenințări la stabilitatea și securitatea zonei Arctice, migrația datorată creșterii nivelului mărilor și oceanelor, dezastrele naturale, lipsa resurselor, creșterea competiției pentru resursele naturale, etc).

Succesul în asigurarea și menținerea securității maritime depinde în mare măsură de buna cooperare în domeniul schimbului de informații cu agențiile civile de impunere a legii, cu organizații internaționale (ONU, UE, IMO), ONG-uri, etc. Concluzionăm acest aspect afirmând că asigurarea și menținerea securității maritime se poate planifica și realiza în cel mai eficient mod prin cooperare.

Elemente militare care ar trebui incluse în noul concept strategic al NATO

Dinamica accentuată a scenei politico-militare internaționale, precum și perfecționarea continuă a tacticilor și procedurilor de operare ale organizațiilor teroriste și ale grupurilor insurgente, corelat cu interesele de securitate și economice ale membrilor Alianței, impun permanent ca NATO

să adopte o nouă linie doctrinară, mai flexibilă și cu aplicabilitate imediată, atât la nivelul politico-strategic, cât și la cel operativ-tactic.

În accepțiunea noastră, Noul Concept Strategic al Alianței trebuie să răspundă la cel puțin două obiective majore: întărirea securității colective, și respectiv, inițierea transformării NATO din punct de vedere al planificării, înzestrării și executării integrate a viitoarelor misiuni expediționare. În acest sens, apreciem că trebuie finalizată o formă viabilă a unei forțe de reacție rapidă, expediționară, corelată cu cerințele strategiei de securitate a UE. Mai mult, pentru a evita duplicările de efort și costuri, se impune coordonarea nu numai a procesului de transformare dar și a sistemului de pregătire și instruire (prin sistemul de educație și exerciții comune).

Apreciem că principala temă pe care dorim să o dezbatem, dar pe care trebuie să o avem stringent în atenția noastră, se poate defini astfel: *noi amenințări – noi priorități – noi sarcini*. Va trebui să încercăm să identificăm soluții posibile, dar în același timp și fezabile la câteva întrebări:

- Care sunt cele mai probabile amenințări potențial îndreptate împotriva Alianței, pentru cel puțin următoarea decadă?
- Care sunt prioritățile NATO privind amenințările deja identificate, precum: terorismul, proliferarea ANM, statele neguverdate, atacurile cibernetice, securitatea energetică, pirateria, și de ce nu, schimbările climatice;
- Care sunt caracteristicile unui posibil atac asupra unui membru, pentru care se invocă Art. 5?

Rezolvarea, fie și parțială a acestor probleme conduce la concluzia că Alianța este și va fi nu numai un *exportator de securitate mondială* dar se constituie și într-un “*constructor*” al acesteia.

Dezbaterile privind Noul Concept strategic al NATO survin pe fondul intensificării unor critici interne privind neîndeplinirea obiectivelor asumate în cadrul Summit-ului de la RIGA (2006), fapt concretizat prin reticența unor state membre de a pune la dispoziția NATO personal și forțe, în principal în sprijinul operației ISAF. De asemenea, au apărut unele opinii privind orientarea echilibrată nu numai către amenințările asimetrice, dar și

către cele clasice și obținerea implicării NATO în zone cu relevanță economică strategică deosebită, de perspectivă, cum ar fi cea arctică.

Deși Alianța a reușit ca după sfârșitul Războiului Rece să dea dovadă de o mare capacitate de adaptare, prin admiterea de noi membri, reorganizarea structurii de comandă și reconfigurarea misiunilor, ceea ce a permis dislocarea de forțe dincolo de zona tradițională de acțiune, o serie de factori au indus obstacole suplimentare pentru dezvoltarea și implementarea unei strategii coerente a Alianței, nu atât în formularea acesteia, cât, în special în aplicarea practică a ei – *a se vedea operația ISAF, unde evaluarea noului COMISAF a relevat accentuat acest lucru*. Acești factori se referă, în special la lipsa unei percepții comune asupra riscurilor și amenințărilor; la incapacitatea aliaților europeni de a aloca suficiente resurse pentru operațiile în derulare; și la relativa dezangajare a SUA față de problemele securității europene;

Urmare a unui dialog intens și permanent cu națiunile, autoritățile militare NATO, au recomandat principalele linii de dezvoltare și domenii în care ar trebui să se concentreze elaborarea Noului Concept Strategic, astfel: operațional; capabilități și transformare; și parteneriate. Astfel, la nivelul Statului Major General, cu implicarea structurilor din compunere și subordine, s-a derulat și continuă un proces complex de analiză a acestor domenii. Din perspectiva abordării militare a problematicii se desprinde concluzia că unele componente, pe care le apreciem a fi foarte importante, sunt necesare a face parte din structura Noului Concept Strategic.

Pentru domeniul operațional rezumăm principalele direcții de acțiune: reanalizarea Art. 5 prin prisma înțelegerii comune a configurației unui posibil viitor atac; clarificarea relației dintre apărarea colectivă și securitatea colectivă (avem aici în vedere securitatea energetică, apărarea cibernetică, reducerea criminalității internaționale); asigurarea unei percepții unice privind asumarea riscurilor comune în ducerea operațiilor, respectiv participarea cu trupe și/sau cu compensarea financiară a costurilor acestora; menținerea echilibrului între misiunile specifice Art. 5 și cele non-Art. 5.

Pentru domeniul capabilităților și a transformării avem în vedere: dezvoltarea unor programe de transformare și/sau realizare a acelor

capabilități cu care Alianța va trebui să răspundă riscurilor și amenințărilor previzionate; configurarea capabilităților pentru asigurarea unui răspuns rapid în situații de criză; pregătirea operațiilor pentru a fi desfășurate împreună cu alte organizații / actori internaționali; dezvoltarea comunicării strategice pentru asigurarea unui mesaj politic convingător; armonizarea la nivelul Alianței a operaționalizării structurilor de comandă și de forțe care să țină seama inclusiv de costuri; asigurarea din fondul comun a deficitelor actuale; coordonarea procesului de realizare a unei forțe de reacție rapidă care să fie corelată cu cerințele UE și sistemul de pregătire și instruire NATO.

Pentru domeniul parteneriatelor ținem cont de: amplificarea interacțiunii cu actorii internaționali: ONU, UE, OSCE; (re)stabilirea relațiilor de cooperare cu F. Rusă; continuarea programelor de parteneriat (PfP, MD, ICI); sporirea interacțiunii cu țările care nu sunt membre NATO și cu alți actori internaționali pentru a crea oportunități de extindere a rolului Alianței în asigurarea securității și stabilității dincolo de zonele tradiționale de angajare; dezvoltarea relației cu UE, pentru o mai bună cooperare în condiții de complementaritate, având drept argumente: pachetul de forțe este același pentru ambele organizații, procedurile și tehnicile trebuie să fie identice fiind vorba de aceeași militari, iar prioritățile trebuie armonizate având aceleași tipuri de deficite.

Principalul scop al Conceptului Strategic din 1999, așa cum este menționat și în Tratat, de a apăra libertatea și securitatea membrilor prin mijloace politice și militare, trebuie menținut și întărit ca element fundamental și în Noul Concept Strategic. Noul Concept Strategic va fi documentul fundamental după care Alianța se va ghida pentru cel puțin următorul deceniu, iar acesta trebuie să fie “într-un limbaj clar”, explicit din perspectiva valorilor Alianței și să exprime modalitățile de contracarare a tuturor riscurilor și amenințărilor cu care NATO se va angaja pe viitor.

Proiectarea și elaborarea Noului Concept Strategic, așa cum a reieșit și din prezentările și discuțiile anterioare, presupune și adoptarea de soluții la problemele legate de riscurile și amenințările neconvenționale și asimetrice, la modul de implicare în promovarea democrației, de recurgere la coaliții de voință și nu în ultimul rând de dezvoltarea relațiilor dintre NATO și UE în domeniile securității și apărării.

Alianța este percepută ca o organizație cu resurse considerabile. În contextul extinderii spectrului de riscuri și al creșterii complexității mediului de securitate global, problema capabilităților va deveni unul dintre factorii decisivi care vor influența credibilitatea Alianței. Aici ne referim nu numai la existența și menținerea acestor capabilități, dar mai ales la modul și gradul de angajare al acestora.

Transformarea Alianței ar putea avea în vedere armonizarea eforturilor din domeniul militar, atât pentru contracararea amenințărilor asimetrice, cât și a celor clasice, nuanțarea sau o nouă formulă care să dea mai multă flexibilitate deciziei prin consens, refacerea, consolidarea relațiilor transatlantice și implicarea în noile amenințări existente (securitatea energetică, schimbări climaterice, etc). Este evident că ritmul și capacitatea de adaptare al Alianței la mediul internațional (politic, militar, de securitate, economic, etc) trebuie menținut și susținut. Alianța va trebui să își definească noile priorități într-un mediu de securitate aflat în schimbare. Revizuirea Conceptului Strategic nu presupune schimbări radicale de politică, el va trebui să reflecte faptul că NATO își completează și actualizează transformarea militară cu o profundă transformare politică, în scopul realizării unei mai bune coordonări a aliaților cu partenerii și organizațiile internaționale, pe baza împărțirii echitabile a responsabilităților.

Odată cu procesul de dezvoltare a Noului Concept Strategic, statele membre trebuie să considere rolul Alianței ca întreg, din punct de vedere nu numai simbolic dar și funcțional. La momentul actual există două viziuni vis-a-vis de viitorul rol al NATO. Una consideră că Alianța ar trebui să rămână ancorată regional, axându-se în principal pe misiuni de apărare colectivă (tip Art. 5), în timp ce cealaltă pune accentul pe întărirea rolului global al NATO, subliniind că ignorarea dimensiunii globale ar reprezenta sfârșitul Alianței. Există suprapuneri între aceste două poziții, în sensul că misiunile de apărare colectivă ocupă un loc central pe agenda susținătorilor globalizării NATO, în timp ce problemele globale figurează pe cea a susținătorilor dimensiunii regionale.

Am abordat câteva aspecte relevante privind unele propuneri de configurare a Noului Concept Strategic. Acestea, după asimilarea și dezbaterile lor, pot constitui o etapă importantă pentru consolidarea unei poziții naționale privind caracteristicile și viitoarea fizionomie a Noului Concept Strategic.

C.P. 20 NATO as a threat to Russia

Giorgi Kandelaki

Russia being a faithful part of common European space of security and inter-dependency in everybody's interests, including of course and perhaps first of all of Georgia's. Democratic and free Russia that respects its neighbours and engages in mutually beneficial activities with them will simply make Europe and the world a much better and safer place to live. But we have to show courage and accept the fact that democracy and western values is not exactly how the future is seen not only in Moscow. Connecting to the title of our seminar, I would argue that if NATO wants to have a pragmatic and realistic outlook towards Russia, it has to accept three facts and make judgment accordingly:

First, what Russia is really afraid of, is **more freedom and more democracy** at its borders. Few remember that Russia's hostility towards Georgia was there before: Reactionary elements in the Russian government and the Army sponsored and orchestrated a mass ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia in 1993, which deprived that beautiful Black Sea province 75% of its entire pre-war population. Occasional bombings of the Georgian territory started in 2001, two years before President Mikhail Saakashvili came to power. Still, the turning year was 2004, when the ambitious reforms started in Georgia. The tragic paradox is that the more reforms delivered – true, with mistakes and failures – the more frustrated people in the Kremlin were getting. **In another words NATO is openly seen as threat not because it poses military threat to Russia – they know very well that it does not – but because it advances political and economic system that is seen as representing existential threat to the regime in the Kremlin and therefore, in this interpretation, to the Russian state itself.** This is a fact declared in the mainstream Russian discourse and not accepting it would be disservice to NATO.

Second, and perhaps rather provocative to say, there is a concerted policy emerging from Russia aimed at de facto **undermining** of Article 5. Anxiety on part of some allies on this matter, exaggerated or not, is there. And Russia's effort to undermine the value of Article 5 in **European political discourse and public opinion** is there as well. We need to face this reality.

Third, it is very much in that context that Russia seeks more European energy dependence on it. It is perhaps not a co-incidence that tens of bombs fell in the vicinity of Baku-Supsa oil pipeline. If Russia regains control over Georgia and, yes, what they call “regime change” is also a declared policy, than all alternative energy transportation projects such as Nabucco and White Stream will be off the agenda. Therefore, important issues of energy security should be prominently featured in the new strategic concept.

To sum up, prominent place in the new strategic thinking of NATO should be devoted to improving communication with the Russians, to making sure that this or that move is interpreted as it is and not as they wish. Perhaps best example of this is what happened in this building slightly more than a year ago. The decision of the Bucharest NATO summit was interpreted in Russia as victory and as window of opportunity—an invitation for aggression. Again, this was very much declared and mainstream discourse which was largely neglected in the west and by NATO.

Finally, it is in this context that I think that NATO should make sure that the future MAP for Montenegro should not be seen in Moscow as green light for anything. This is something very important for us.

It is of crucial importance that we do not repeat mistakes of the last year and send as clear messages as possible to Russia that it must respect sovereignty of its neighbours, that open, high-level discourse essentially treating that very sovereignty as anomaly is an unacceptable relic of the past; that occupation of Georgian territories should end, that the ethnic cleansing Russia carried out should be reversed, that Russia should stop distributing passports in Crimea, abandon public questioning of Ukraine as a state, resume oil supplies to Lithuania and so on.

C.P. 21 CyberCrime Prevention. CERT-RO

PhD Mireille Rădoi,

Senior Lecturer – National Defense College

Cyberspace¹ - A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.

With the emergence of Internet came a heavy dependence of modern societies on computer network enabled capabilities.

Moreover, globalization made the world an increasingly interconnected place. Just about everything that happens in the real world is reflected in cyber space.

„Cyberspace is real, and so is the risk that comes with it.“² – remarks by President Barack OBAMA on securing cyber infrastructure. May 29th, 2009.

Electronic communication networks and information systems are now an essential part of the daily lives of citizens and are fundamental to the success of world's economy.

Networks and information systems are converging and becoming increasingly interconnected.

Despite the multitude of benefits, it has also generated a series of threats, namely intentional attacks against these information systems.

¹ Definition according to Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.

² Retrieved from http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-Securing-Our-Nations-Cyber-Infrastructure/.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INTERNET³

- a *network of networks* that consists of millions of private and public, academic, business, and government networks of local to global scope that are linked together by different technologies
- comprised of many voluntarily interconnected autonomous networks
- accessed almost anywhere by numerous means
- operates without a central governing body
- maze-like architecture that offers users a high degree of anonymity
- great capacity to multiply and extend information

VULNERABILITIES

Vulnerability is a weakness which allows an attacker to breach a system's security.

Vulnerability is the junction of three aspects:

1. **Susceptibility or flaw** presented by a system
2. **Access** to the flaw
3. **Capability** to exploit the flaw

To exploit the vulnerability it is necessary for an alleged attacker to have just one tool or technique that enables him to connect to a system's weakness.

Internet design allows hackers to **stealthily access, read, modify, delete** data stored on or traveling between computers.

Each month, there are approximately **100 additions to the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)** database.

Constantly evolving malicious code move far more quickly and build more paths into networks than system administrators can prevent, similar to the pattern of criminals and law enforcement.

³ http://www.livinginternet.com/i/iw_arch.htm.

More importantly, as opposed to warfare, the cyber attack may be elegantly launched from in front of a computer, from a remote location at a **fraction of the cost and risk for the perpetrator**.

Security strategists must be and many of them already are aware of the fact that more and more political and military conflict will move to cyberspace.

Unlike the intensely studied classical warfare, the ubiquity and unpredictability of the Internet makes it ever more complicated to prevent and protect from cyber threats.

„Security is always excessive until it is not enough“. Robbie Sinclair, Head of Security Country Energy, NSW, Australia

Cyberwarfare tactics⁴

- **Cyber espionage:** The act of obtaining sensitive, property or classified information from individuals, competitors, governments.
- **Web vandalism:** Defacing a web page or the practice of denial-of-service.
- **Gathering data:** Intercepting or modifying classified information, which paves the way for espionage.
- **Denial-of-Service Attacks:** One person controls several computers, launching a DoS attack against systems.
- **Equipment disruption:** Intercepting or replacing orders and communications that use computers, satellites.
- **Attacking critical infrastructure:** Power, water, communications, fuel, commercial, transportation.
- **Compromised Counterfeit Hardware:** Hardware that has malicious software concealed inside the software, firmware or microprocessors.
- **Propaganda:** Spreading political messages through or to anyone with access to the internet or any device that receives digital transmissions from the Internet.

⁴ <http://www.scmagazineus.com/cyberspace-and-the-changing-nature-of-warfare/article/115929/>.

EU - ENISA

- established in 2004 by EU Regulation No 460/2004
- fully operational since September 1st, 2005
- carries out a very specific technical, scientific or management task within the „Community domain“ („first pillar“) of the EU

Objectives:

- seeks to develop a culture of Network and Information Security for the benefit of citizens, consumers, business and public sector organizations in the EU
- helps the European Commission, the Member States and the business community to address, respond and especially to prevent Network and Information Security problems
- assists the European Commission in the technical preparatory work for updating and developing Community legislation in the field of Network and Information Security

Martin Selmayr, spokesperson for **EU Information Society Commissioner Viviane Reding**⁵: „We need a rapid reaction force. What ENISA is doing now is sitting around a table and drafting reports. They are very accurate but this is not enough. We need a body that operationally deals with the security”

CYBER DEFENSE ON NATO’S AGENDA

- Cyber defense first appears on NATO’s agenda at the 2002 Prague Summit
- Confirmed as a priority at the Riga Summit of November 2006

A major cyber attack on Estonian public and private institutions in April and May 2007 prompted NATO to take a harder look at its cyber defense.

- At their meeting on 14th June 2007 Allied Defense Ministers agree that urgent work is needed in this area

⁵ <http://www.euractiv.com/en/infosociety/commission-eyes-common-cyber-defenses/article-171476>.

- NATO conducts a comprehensive assessment of its approach to cyber defense, which results in a report to Allied Defense Ministers in October 2007
- Report recommends the development of a NATO cyber defense policy
- The policy is agreed in early 2008.

“NATO remains committed to strengthening key Alliance information systems against cyber attacks. We have recently adopted a Policy on Cyber Defense, and are developing the structures and authorities to carry it out. Our Policy on Cyber Defense emphasizes the need for NATO and nations to protect key information systems in accordance with their respective responsibilities; share best practices; and provide a capability to assist Allied nations, upon request, to counter a cyber attack. We look forward to continuing the development of NATO’s cyber defense capabilities and strengthening the linkages between NATO and national authorities.”
Bucharest Summit Declaration, Issued April 3th, 2008

NATO Bodies with a responsibility in cyber-defense

- North Atlantic Council – has overall control over NATO’s policies and activities with regard to cyber defense
- NATO’s Consultation, Control and Command Agency (NC3A) and the NATO Military Authorities (NMA) – responsibility for the implementation of the new policy
- NATO’s Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) – key role in responding to any cyber aggression against the Alliance

Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves took a strong stand on countering cyber attacks by invoking the use of **Article 5** of the North Atlantic Treaty: „*Weapons should not matter. If you blow up a hospital or an electricity plant the threat is the same. But there is no symmetrical response. What is the response after the attack?*“⁶

- Despite pressures, the competencies of the new authority will fall exclusively on Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty for now: member **may consult** in case of a cyber attack, but will not **be bound** to assist each other as foreseen in Article 5.

⁶ Idem.

- Instead, NATO is considering courses of action that involve coordination in a political and technical response.

Computer Emergency Response Team - CERT

Aims to detect and prevent security incidents.

CERT teams are spread all over the world:

- Austria – AConet-CERT works within the Austrian Academic Computer Network which is administered by the Vienna University Computer Center
- Switzerland – SWITCH-CERT works in the field of education and research within the Swiss Education & Research Network
- Estonia – **CERT EE** works with security incidents within Estonian networks, that originate in Estonian networks or which are reported by citizens or institutions from Estonia or abroad
- Finland – CERT-FI is a governmental team which works within the Finnish National Authority which regulates communications, FICORA
- France – **Cert-IST, CERTA, CERT-Renater**
- Germany – CERT-Bund is a governmental team that works within the Federal Bureau for Information Security (BSI); **CERTCOM-** provides services for businesses
- Great Britain – BTCERTCC (British Telecommunications CERT Co-ordination Centre); CPNI; JANET CSIRT.

USA

1. **US-CERT** – a partnership between the Department of Homeland Security and the public and private sectors
US-CERT is responsible for the protection of national Internet infrastructure.

How it works

- Operates a security operations permanent center
- Informs through a website
- Develops and takes part in national, regional and international exercises
- Offers expertise for investigations
- Supports governmental agencies that have been affected by the use of malware software
- Offers behavioral techniques for static and dynamic analyses

- Administrates detection and collection software
- Warns against cyber threats
- Administrates the National Cyber Alert System
- Writes analyses on the current and future status
- Provides on- site response capabilities for federal and state agencies
- Coordinates federal programs for CERT teams regarding best practices and other information security data
- Collaborates with other CERT/ CSIRT bodies from home and abroad.

2. **CERT/CC**

CERT/CC (Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center) works within the Software Engineering Institute, a federal research center that pertains to Carnegie Mellon University.

CERT/CC is the first CERT organization in the world. It is also an expertise center on Internet security.

What it does

- Constitutes the contact point for Internet security emergencies response
- Promotes communication between experts in the field
- Identifies vulnerabilities of computer systems
- Develops partnerships with technology producers in view of solving vulnerabilities
- Facilitates the creation of other such response teams
- Organizes activities aimed at raising awareness on information and computer security
- Collaborates with research organizations
- Research activities that seek to create new methods and instruments for the protection of computer networks

Each country established a center responsible with CyberInt.

In Romania, 2008 marked the moment when the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) was named the national authority that deals with such military missions.

CERT-RO, a project long overdue

In 2009, important steps were taken in order to institutionalize a governmental CERT in Romania.

Many public institutions (MoD, STS, SIE etc) as well as private ones (banks, companies etc.) have their own CERT.

The principle is that the problem should be addressed in the network it emerged.

However, in order to increase efficiency:

- Civil and Military
- Public and Private
- National and International

structures should engage in a joint effort to combat cyber criminality.

SECTION III

NGO DEBATE

D. 1

NATO – The New Strategic Concept

Narciz Bălășoiu

Any sort of reflection regarding the future of NATO must begin with an evaluation of the commitment and devotion degree that the member states have toward the organization, because these values will be strengthened only if the alliance will respond to the necessities of the states. On an abstract level, NATO has numerous advantages that are not sufficiently translated into action, needing two major commitments to remedy this deficiency.

On one hand all the member states and the organization itself, must sustain the military stabilization effort outside the Euro-Atlantic area, and on the other hand they must turn once again the organization in the main strategic entity of the West. At the same time, NATO must become once again the center point for strategy coordination and security policies on both sides of the Atlantic, needing to revitalize the concept of “the West“ as a global player and NATO as a symbol of cohesion and cooperation of Western countries. Facing the challenges of globalization is not possible outside of the transatlantic cooperation, the major premise remaining convergence of interests, mutual understanding, cultural affinity and tradition of cooperation in the last 50 years.

NATO adaptation consisted in the globalization of It is mandate - “out of area” operations such as Afghanistan, becoming frequent. A first

consequence is the fact that the organization is no longer required to prevail in conventional conflicts, instead the future of NATO is to become the provider of stabilization forces.

The real challenge NATO is facing is the lack of political transatlantic consensus on the world we live in. NATO failed to recognize the complex nature of the wave of democratization that began after the Cold War and its impact on the security dilemmas that both Europe and the U.S. is facing. The North Atlantic Alliance neglected security threats arising from the transformation of democratic regimes of some member states of the alliance.

The new wave of democratization is global and coincides with the end of the Cold War, global spread of market economy and the fall of colonization which has resulted in the proliferation of the weak states. The politicization of religious or cultural identities is a destructive feature of the new populist conditions. The disagreement between liberal constitutionalism and democratic principles of majority is a distinctive feature of this new wave of democratization, which in many parts of the world takes the form of populist revolution. In this new context, NATO must overcome major challenges: to regain public support of member states, to prevent the malfunctions in the decision-making process resulting in the appearance of populist governments, to develop a common agenda that draws attention to security, and promotes democracy. Answers regarding the architecture of the new NATO strategic concept will occur naturally once differences of view, existing between the U.S. and NATO members in Europe, will be solved.

Both the attacks of September 11th as well as the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have made it in such a way that on the transatlantic line appeared inadvertences concerning the place and the role that NATO has to take on the geopolitical and military map of the world. The attacks in New York and Washington on September 11th, 2001, revealed a gap in the perception of terrorist threat and raised the political importance of Islam in the relationship between Europe and USA. This inconsistency regarding the threat perception was appreciated by political and military analysts as a major risk for the Alliance's ability to respond to threats and international terrorism risks. Paradoxically, strengthening perceptions of the imminent risk that terrorism presents, did not lead to an unconditional support for the strengthening of NATO. This is due to how the two poles on the axis of

power perceive the danger of radicalization of Islam, that is to say an external threat to the United States and an internal one to Europe. As follows the European community has responded to the threat of terrorism by requiring a more active role for EU in the local security and global affairs, maintaining a critical posture towards the U.S. war against terror. The capability issue was the center of the transatlantic debate even before the attacks on September 11th, 2001. The U.S. army felt under-equipped in comparasion with the European armies endowments. Both in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. leaders have found the cost of acting alone, thus, showing that high tech weapons are not enough, and that ground troops are absolutely indispensable. 2003 marked the highest point in Europe's ambitions to position itself as a counterbalance of the hiperpower that is the U.S. at the same time of the emergence in Europe of the "common foreign and security policy". Analysts have become extremely concerned about NATO-EU rivalry in relation to each one's importance in making the decisions regarding the main military operations. First USA has shown its limits in Iraq, in relation to its ground troops, and second Europe was unable to withstand the Russian Federation, the latest developments in the post Soviet area demonstrating this. Also, the U.S. has an enormous power when it comes to the ability of destroying an enemy, but was not so effective when it came to exercise territorial control and guide the reconstruction of a nation. As for Europe, the recent political developments in Ukraine have shown that the transformative power of the EU is dependent on how ready it is to provide a place under its tutelage.

In view of many, the great transatlantic debate over Iraq has emanated from a big misunderstanding of the phrase 'world order'. In this debate U.S. favors the unipolar world in which there is a benevolent hegemon, while Europe sustains a multipolar world and the supremacy of international law, denying the sustainability of U.S. hegemony.

In very pragmatic terms the organization faces a number of challenges that claim necessity for resource correlation to the tasks and objectives which will be assumed by the organization. Budgetary constraints do not allow preparing for "full range of missions", the current priority requiring a resizing of the efforts and capabilities to ensure a climate of stability.

Defining NATO's purpose is an essential element in the process of reflection on the new strategic concept. In this sense the main directions of approach are based on the need to redefine NATO's role, and establish new priorities of the Alliance. While most "old" NATO states admit its role in global stability and involvement in missions beyond the boundaries of member states, the "new" states focus on Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the main accent falling on the territorial defense missions. Although most members of the Alliance highlight NATO's role in confronting new challenges such as energy or the climate change problem, they cannot outline the specific role of NATO in combating these problems. However, there was a consensus that the new role must be defined according to the common perception of threats and challenges NATO will confront in the future. Regarding priorities, lack of financial resources in all NATO countries will inevitably lead to the need for prioritizing tasks and the economic crisis will certainly worsen this problem.

In this respect the Alliance will have to prioritize the requests for applications to order to adapt the requests to the resources. Any prioritization involves the risk of bad choices, so the strategy is based on identification and risk management with a clear emphasis on shared responsibility. A very sensitive issue is a controversy born around Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. As a political and military organization, NATO's main purpose is providing security and collective defense for its members, and Article 5 incorporates this duality by stating the law to protect the population, security interests and the territories of the member states. Contrary to appearances Article 5 is not a guarantee in itself of security, by not requiring NATO states to defend at once military allies. Today, the meaning of Article 5 is more difficult to define, due to the necessity of answering these questions: How can NATO's role be balanced between self-defense (Article 5) and security (expeditionary operations, stabilization missions)? Can NATO's mission in Afghanistan be regarded as an Article 5 in remote places? Is NATO currently able to defend its territory at any time? How can Article 5's credibility can be preserved? When to apply Article 5?

One aspect that should not be left out of sight in the founding process of the new NATO strategic concept, refers to the fact that in the light of new technology, the adversary attacks will aim weaknesses of the alliance, using unprecedented methods, therefore the reconsideration of methods used in

military operations is imposed. The continuing evolution of risk and threats to the vital interests of NATO, will put the solidarity within the Alliance to the test, as well the common understanding of what is Article 5. Another direction of approach refers to the need to develop relations with non-NATO actors (non-member states and international organizations alike) to enhance the Alliance's ability to ensure security and stability beyond the traditional areas of commitment. NATO's growing interaction with international actors will allow Alliance to influence positively and prophylactic, the vision and values in a world of ideas in the full process of globalization.

D. 2**NATO at crossroads: in search of a renewed
Transatlantic solidarity***Monica Oproiu*

The new Secretary General's initiative of launching a process of reflection over the future of NATO, which would ultimately bring a redefinition of the Alliance's strategic concept (hopefully next year), has given the opportunity of introspection and wide consultation among experts, decision-makers and practitioners in this field. Romania has had its share of debates and will continue to address this issue during the next months, but one of the most interesting, yet predictable topics was that of making the Alliance regain its role as the main political consultation forum for the allies and elicit the adequate public support for its future orientation and self-assumed tasks. This is not (only) about getting member states and the public opinion acquiesce into sending more troops to Afghanistan or other Afghanistan-like places that NATO might involve itself in later on. This should be about assessing the meaning of transatlantic solidarity today and the current perception of what used to be called "shared values".

But how do we do this? And how can we use the results of this kind of evaluation in order to make a significant contribution to the Alliance's future, or at least to the redefining of its strategic concept?

There is no doubt about NATO's relevance today; 20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, nobody in Europe questions the Alliance's role in reunifying and defending the continent in the last two decades (with the collective defense provisions of the Washington Treaty being the main deterrent during the Cold War). Nevertheless, the increasing variety of threats to which there is not only one answer and the myriad of perceptions when it comes to current security challenges, which add to the selfish (and eternal) promotion of national interest (even within alliances) raise the question whether the Alliance is still solid and worthy of all the hopes invested in it. One must think that what lies beyond Article 5 and the routine of calling one another "ally" for some decades now is a true feeling of belonging to the same community of shared (democratic) values and a strong commitment for partnership and joint problem solving through

political consultation in the first place. And this has to be as accurate as possible to both decision-making and public opinion level.

Designed to “keep the Germans down, the Americans in and the Russians out” – that is limited in scope and focused on collective defense of both sides of the Atlantic – NATO has evolved spectacularly into an almost global policeman with security interests well beyond the initial Euro-Atlantic area. Moreover, it has contributed to the democratization of its member states (Portugal, for example) and even to the appeasement of historical quarrels among them (the case of Turkey and Greece). The question today is not whether it will endure for another 60 years, but how to make sure this will happen, starting with the future Strategic Concept in order to provide renewed security guarantees as well as a redefinition of its goals. Moreover, this opportunity should be used for reaffirming the member states’ resolve to promote NATO membership as a vehicle for democracy and raise awareness of public mood towards it.

There is no NATO equivalent for the Eurobarometer and one may argue that it really is not necessary; nevertheless, one should pay attention to the latest Transatlantic Trends 2009 survey by the German Marshall Fund of the US as some very interesting trends in public opinion were unfolded. One of the key discoveries of the GMF team was that of an increasingly evident rift between Western and Central/Eastern Europe when it comes to several issues, including NATO.

First of all, the Alliance seems to be enjoying much more support in the western part of the continent than in the eastern one, which might be a little puzzling if one takes into consideration the “battle for NATO” each of the states here impatiently fought during the 90’s in order to get membership. Only 53% of East Europeans, compared to 63% of West Europeans, consider NATO to be “essential”. What made the central- and eastern Europeans get over their vivid enthusiasm so soon is an issue worth further exploring. Is this disappointment with the Alliance’s transformation or just weariness of the hardships of membership?

At the same time, only 28% of the former would envisage trading-off some NATO policies (such as future enlargements) for securing oil and energy supply from Russia, while 41 % of the latter would be willing to do so. One might conclude that the above figures contradict each other or that energy security is less important for the East Europeans. My opinion is that Easterners are more reluctant to appease Russia (to put it mildly) than their

Western counterparts and, even though they do not treasure NATO like they used to (when it seemed intangible), they refuse to concede anything to their eternal nemesis – Moscow – and still share a conflictual paradigm of their relations with it. This is an element of crucial importance; someone said during the debates in Bucharest that the closer you are to Russia, the more you perceive it as a threat and the further you are, the more you see Moscow as a potential partner. There is no doubt that NATO must continue to engage Russia in one way or another, but all that talk about a new “pragmatic approach” towards it actually proves that there is still no unanimous perception of Moscow’s intentions and “pragmatism” is due to substitute for a common assessment of member states.

What is really worrying is the dramatic plunge of Turkish support for the Alliance, from 53% in 2004 to only 35% in 2009. Although the Iraq war explains in part this huge drift, it may also be connected with Turkey’s new found sense of self-importance and renewed ambitions of regional (and West-spiteful) leadership.

Although the moment of “Old Europe versus New Europe” has come and gone (see the Iraq war debate) and nowadays the Alliance seems as united as ever, these findings of public mood show that the rift is actually there and that some confidence-building should take place urgently, especially in the case of Turkey (which by the way feels alienated from not only Europe, but also the USA, with only 34% of those surveyed considering that Turkey shares Western values!).

That is why I firmly believe that the new Strategic Concept, both through the process of elaborating/developing it and as a final result, ought to reinforce the transatlantic solidarity and common credo (in democratic values and worthiness of collective self-defense) which made the Alliance reach its 60th birthday. Throughout the debate, each member state will provide its own input of priorities, threat perceptions and envisaged solutions to current challenges; there are already some who fear that not having one national representative in the group of experts undermines the chances of making its voice heard (and its concerns be taken in consideration). Consequently, NATO officials will have to make serious efforts in order to alleviate these fears and ensure that all voices will be heard, all substance and wording of the Strategic Concept will be decided in common and that all national inputs will be granted equal value.

It is neither possible, nor desirable to subject the debate concerning the future Strategic Concept to swings of public mood; but within an alliance of democracies, public opinion should have its say and that is why due attention should be paid to surveys like Transatlantic Trends. After all, the future of NATO means, *inter alia*, the future of its armed forces (in terms of capabilities, strategic outlook, global outreach) which further triggers some inevitable loss of life and other types of sacrifice. As a result, this document should clearly state the enduring meaning of “shared values” and “solidarity” among allies and encompass viable ways of upholding it in the 21st century.

Because what sets NATO in motion is a joint commitment for mutual security and freedom from fear on both sides of the Atlantic, now more than ever, with the reintroduction of conventional warfare in Europe (the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008), the ever present threat of a nuclear-armed Iran and the proliferation of non-conventional threats also (cyber attacks, energy shortages, etc). In the end, if the Alliance does not yet (or no longer) cater perfectly to the member states’ security concerns, it nevertheless remains the best that they have achieved so far and they must further build upon it.

D. 3

New Alliance for New times

Bogdan Nedea

Overview of 60 years

As NATO celebrates its 60th anniversary, it is in grater demand than ever before. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is at the heart of a vast and ever-expanding network of partnerships with countries from across the globe and it is developing closer cooperation with key civilian institutions. And the Alliance's enlargement process remains a strong incentive for aspirant countries to get their house in order.

In its symbolic role, NATO represents the agreement of twenty-six countries in North America and Europe "that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." It is, by its nature, the very meaning of deterrence, a concept that shaped the global environment throughout the Cold War.

Its functional role is to "safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means." To do so, the Alliance identified in the 1999 Strategic Concept ways in which it could operate in an environment of "continuing change." It recognized the importance of maintaining an open dialogue with Ukraine, Russia, and Mediterranean countries, the continued process of enlargement, the problems of nuclear proliferation, and a commitment of conflict prevention and crisis management. In order to support this functional role, the concept noted that the NATO forces should maintain the ability to respond to Article V and non-Article V crisis. However, as a consensus-based decision-making organization, the Alliance became strained as threat perceptions diverged, especially with regards to the current operations in Afghanistan, where the U.S. sees itself as fighting a war and its European counterparts see themselves as being confronted with a humanitarian crisis.

Since 1999, some have argued that the attacks of September 11th; the ongoing war in Afghanistan; the U.S. invasion in Iraq and subsequent reconstruction effort; and terrorist attacks in London, Madrid and Mumbai each respectively changed everything. For NATO, this means that it is not only necessary to define its symbolic purpose in the new international security environment as it develops a new Strategic Concept, but its functional purpose as well. Adapting to new perceptions and a new physical environment has proven to be extremely difficult for the consensus-based organization, mainly a result of the historical representation that NATO encompasses and the general differences between Alliance members.

In short, at age 60, NATO has become such an important and influential part of the international security environment that it is hard to imagine the ways history managed without it. And yet, the same history, gave the young alliance a short life expectancy upon its birth. The initial duration of the 1949 Washington Treaty was modestly set at 20 years, by which time, it was assumed, the post-war recovery of Western Europe would have been completed and the transatlantic defense pact become obsolete. Few of the people who were present at NATO's creation would have dared to hope that this Alliance would not only outlast the Cold War conditions that brought it into being, but indeed thrive in a radically different security environment.

New Strategic Concept

A sound transatlantic consensus on NATO's roles and missions and on its strategy to deal with security challenges is essential if NATO is to function optimally. The Strategic Concept is the core NATO document that establishes and reflects this transatlantic consensus. Clearly, as the security environment that NATO has to deal with changes, so the Alliance's Strategic Concept has to be periodically updated. The current Concept dates from 1999, a time when NATO had 19 members compared to the 28 it has today and when NATO's focus was very much on challenges within Europe or on Europe's periphery.

In order to implement a new Strategic Concept, NATO members must first understand and agree on what the Alliance represents today and how it needs to develop its military capabilities to function in line with what NATO represents. There is no better example as to where interests and understandings of NATO's symbolic purpose and its capabilities diverge

more than the current mission in Afghanistan. Here, the U.S. has clearly stated that it not only finds the mission in Afghanistan to be of critical importance for the war on terror, but it also links the security of Afghanistan to its own. In Europe, where the conflict in Afghanistan is mainly considered a humanitarian crisis and not as closely linked to European security, differs greatly with its general perception of the war. In turn, the national governments have not aptly defined how NATO should function in this war or humanitarian crisis, as they cannot agree on basics of the crisis. The New Strategic Concept must be the new law for NATO's actual problems and a stepping stone for any future challenges. At the moment NATO's priorities are mainly focused on Afghanistan. But even as the alliance confronts this immediate challenge, it must also open a searching debate about three over-the-horizon issues that it can no longer afford to push off: its relationship to Russia; its decision-making rules; and the scope of its global ambitions

On all three issues, NATO members should be guided by realism and sobriety.

With Russia, NATO must seek to avert the continuation of zero-sum competition, instead mapping out a practical vision of programmatic cooperation. The young NATO-Russia Council must be used as a leverage in future cooperation modules between the two. An "open-door policy towards Russia may benefit the international climate, no doubt, but the price of Kremlin is much too high even for NATO. To invite Russia as an equal partner is one thing but to allow it deep in the decision making structures and also give it the right to vote is another.

On decision-making, NATO must acknowledge that its growing membership makes reliance on consensus ever more unwieldy, necessitating adoption of a more flexible approach to governance. The new European act may be set as a good example of reliable decision-making system. A majority instead of a consensus may also be a wild card that may cause discontent among the members but it will surely speed the decision-making system.

As for its global aspirations, NATO must withhold them, realizing that efforts to turn the body into a worldwide alliance of democracies promise to speed its demise, not its renewal. Global aspirations for a military alliance may not be welcomed with great joy by its people and it would certainly not bring peace. There will always be challenges and those to rise and challenge.

2009: New Challenges, New Leadership, New View

Leadership

2009 brings changes at the highest level for NATO. First of all the election of the new US president Barak Obama of which there are high expectations all around. He has been seen as the last stand in world full of turmoil. The EU relies on the him to remake the US-EU relations, and all around he is expected to quell if not settle for good the ongoing conflict of the former Bush administration. The NATO summit in Strasbourg-Kehl was the first for president Obama and he is just being introduced to the ways of the structure. Even so there is no time to waste as the problems that NATO and the US are facing are urgent.

A new figure on the NATO board is the Secretary General. Once with Javier Solana's end of mandate everybody thought that it would be difficult to replace the expertise and knowledge. General Anders Fogh Rasmussen the Danish PM was elected unanimously by the NATO Council on the 4th of April. Fogh Rasmussen's task will not be an easy one as he assumes leadership of the Alliance at a difficult time. Afghanistan is on the first order of business followed closely by the relationship with Russia. The tasks at hand are not easy and it will take a lot of skill in resolving them.

Challenges

In 1999, terrorism barely warranted a mention, NATO had not even conceived of an out-of-area mission as ambitious as Afghanistan, and the enlargement process was only beginning. But by 2001, the Alliance had invoked Article 5 for the first time, in response to the terrorist attacks of 11th September. By 2003, it had embarked on its most challenging out-of-area mission in Afghanistan. NATO has gone on to admit ten new members, create new structures, partnerships, and initiatives.

Even with new members the old ways were kept and therefore no progress in decision-making or acting accordingly to the situation, was made. The military branch alone is no longer an option. As much as it served in the Cold War years sheer military force is not a viable option for the future of the Alliance. NATO name will no longer be equivalent to peace-bringing, but war-bringing if along with the troops does not come a healthy post-conflict reconstruction investment. It appears to be a solid consensus that the strategic challenges faced must lend themselves to purely military

solutions. The best example for this is in Afghanistan, where military aspects are a necessary but insufficient component of a comprehensive solution. The new Strategic Concept should confirm the close link between security and development and draw the necessary consequences for planning and deployment of Alliance armed forces. This link calls for the closest possible cooperation between political and military authorities in planning and execution of overseas missions. It also means encouraging closer contacts and involvement with non-governmental organizations. Yet, ultimately, NATO is a political and military alliance, it should be carefully assessed what NATO's role should be in addressing specific challenges. International terrorism, the hottest problem on the table at the moment, is a major security concern – especially the potential for the combination of extremist organizations and weapons of mass destruction. It must be clear, and therefore made clear, that NATO is the proper organization to address this threat not only by arms but by extending a helping hand towards evolution and development, therefore maybe preventing a future threat of the same kind.

The Russian issue is even more delicate because NATO is dealing with the one country on Earth that could match its military and pecuniary possibilities. The use of force is out of the question, the development and aid are refused by Moscow, therefore the only way left is diplomacy through which invite Kremlin to participate in creating a common plan that would serve both sides – maybe, a beginning for a form of allegiance.

Whatever the merits of NATO enlargement – and they are many – the expansion of the alliance has unquestionably come at the expense of its relationship with Russia. To be sure, Russians themselves bear primary responsibility for the recent backsliding on democracy as well as their bouts of foreign policy excess – the war in Georgia most notable among them. But the perception among Russia's leadership and its public alike that NATO's eastward expansion impinges on their country's security and prestige has certainly not helped matters. Appropriately, NATO seems prepared to put on hold for now its commitment, agreed upon at last year's Bucharest summit, to offer membership to Georgia and Ukraine. But the mere prospect of Ukrainian and Georgian membership continues to intrude in NATO's dialogue with Russia.

The way out of this bind is to find a formula for encouraging Moscow to become a stakeholder in Europe's security order, making Russia a

participant in rather than an object of NATO's evolution. The Cold War has been over for more than 20 years and if the West understood that, for the sake of the collective security Kremlin must be assisted and aided to comprehend the same thing. The alternative to that is a one-way dialogue and no solutions. Moscow may well decline the offer in favor of estrangement with the West. But at least NATO will have done its best to avert that outcome.

Also problematic will be NATO's relationship with Georgia and Ukraine. Russia has made it clear that it opposes enlargement. But reaching out to Georgia and Ukraine is worthwhile. Even though Europe needs to rebalance its relationship with Russia, giving Moscow a veto over NATO's decisions is unlikely to encourage better behavior by the Kremlin. The outcome of that will surely not be the same as providing Georgia and Ukraine with MAP's but there are not promises of improvement in any direction. NATO is being confronted with a difficult decision: a slight improvement in its relationship with Russia may mean putting of Ukraine and Georgia on hold for an indefinite period. The risk analysis in this case may prove to be a hard one.

The key is therefore to make sure the two commissions NATO has established to help Ukraine and Georgia reform their defense structures actually mean something. From experiences in the Balkans, it is clear that overseeing politically sensitive defense reforms is more difficult than technical assistance or just serving as an umbrella for allied reform assistance. It has to be different this time if NATO's offer is to mean anything to Kiev and Tbilisi (and Moscow).

Every decision taken amidst NATO regarding Russia was taken in the interest of maintaining the bilateral relations in agreeable terms. So NATO does not consider Russia an enemy, but, does Russia see NATO as an enemy? What if all of NATO's struggle to make this work is in vain, would that be worth the lack of blame on its part when the time comes? "When the time comes" is another way of saying a new Cold War or even a Hot War. It is obvious that the old hatreds and suspicions have not dispersed and a good example for that are the Zapad (West) 2009 exercises. Zapad is the biggest most complex military exercise since the fall of the USSR. More than 60.000 Russian along with Belarusian soldiers, 1000 tanks, 600 airplanes

and artillery equipment were deployed during this exercise that simulated the defense of Belarus from a very modern-equipped enemy army that was attacking using the centric warfare network system, the same system used by the NATO forces. So, in other words, the first major military exercise organized by Russia in 18 years was a simulation of fending off a NATO attack.

Recent findings of journalists from the *Wprost* magazine in Poland show that as a part of the exercise (part that was not disclosed in the original press report) it was also simulated the invasion of Poland. The invasion of a beach in Poland was preceded by a rebellion of Polish minority in Belarus. At the exercise took part almost 13,000 soldiers and the objectives were taking out a gas pipeline and simulation of the launching of a nuclear missile. All of this happened on the day on which Poland was commemorating 70 years from the invasion of the Red Army as a result of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. If we take into consideration the facts above we can conclude two things: Russia is either really concerned about a NATO strike or is trying to send a violent message to the Alliance in order to achieve its own agenda.

The Zapad exercises were considered a threat by eastern countries like Poland, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, countries that do not possess the necessary capabilities to fend for themselves, thus relying on NATO. The immediate request of Poland (after the disclosure of the new fact about Zapad) was a NATO base on its territory. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, are bound to organize a military exercise along with the U.S. in 2010 in the Russian buffer zone. These are just precautionary measures but they can only make things worse as Moscow is known to respond to challenges and never be intimidated.

At this point, the immediate goal is not finding the precise formula for reaching out to Moscow, but beginning a strategic conversation that makes clear that NATO members are sincerely committed to anchoring Russia within the Euro-Atlantic community. The conversation can begin by exploring ways to make more of the NATO-Russia Council. NATO members should pick up on Moscow's call for fresh thinking about a "new European security architecture." This dialogue must be backstopped with concrete strategic cooperation on issues such as missile defense, access to Afghanistan, and diplomacy with Iran.

New View

NATO finds itself at a turning point and making the right decision must not be delayed. The EU-NATO relation was damaged during the years of the Bush administration and many of the common goals were abandoned due to loss of trust. EU now expects a great deal from the new Obama administration and is confident about entering a new stage in the bilateral relations. Until then the situation is still low-ranked. But it should be possible to create a working-level basis for an EU/NATO rapprochement. One idea would be for the EU to take charge of reconstruction in Afghanistan's largest cities, with NATO providing security inside and US forces operating in the provincial hinterland. The two organizations should consider other areas for cooperation including in-theatre ISAF support to EUPOL (European Union Police Mission), joint training and pre-deployment preparation for PRT (Provincial reconstruction team) staff and joined up civil-military exercises. Even better, a NATO/EU School on Post-Conflict could be set up where each organization can bring their respective strengths to bear to the benefit of missions where both are present. Changes in the way NATO missions are financed should also be explored, perhaps through a commonly financed NATO operations budget

Future Borders

Ongoing enlargement also forces the issue of the need to reform decision-making in an alliance that has 26 members and counting. As its ranks grow in number and diversity, continued reliance on consensus may well become a recipe for paralysis. Finally, members would be wise to begin addressing the calls – coming primarily from American voices – to extend NATO's reach beyond Europe and transform the body into a global alliance of democracies. Recasting NATO's relationship with Russia and reforming decision-making require careful deliberation. The proposal for NATO to go global does not; it should be readily dismissed.

NATO has its hands full in Afghanistan; indeed, its ability to prevail remains open to question. With the Afghan mission so straining NATO's resources and cohesion, it is hard to imagine that the alliance is ready to take on additional commitments further ahead. NATO should by all means forge strategic partnerships with countries and regional groupings willing to contribute to the common cause; the help of non-members (like Georgia) in

Afghanistan is more than welcome. But making NATO the institution of choice for dealing with conflicts around the world is a bridge too far.

In the Balkans, Caucasus, and Europe's far east – as well as in Afghanistan – NATO has much unfinished business. It had better focus on completing these tasks before packing up for new missions in Kashmir or the Gaza strip. Moreover, extending NATO membership to the likes of Japan, Australia, and Israel would not only prove uniquely contentious for the alliance but also saddle it with commitments likely to go unmet.

To be sure, NATO has an important role to play beyond Europe; it is already developing linkages in the Mediterranean. But prudence requires that NATO focus primarily on helping others help themselves – providing assistance and training, serving as an institutional model, on occasion partnering with local states in limited missions – all to the service of standing up other security organizations around the globe that can be as successful in their own regions as NATO has been in Europe.

Even though the alliance is stretched almost at maximum, two long term challenges for NATO are likely to emerge. The first is NATO's potential role in any Israeli-Palestinian settlement, including peacekeeping tasks and assistance in building Palestine's security institutions. The second, longer term challenge is how to deal with Africa. It is believed that, despite the AU's request to NATO to help build up the AU's capabilities, the efforts made have not yet been completely effective. In order to live up to those two future tasks, reforms are also needed to improve both current and future operations, including adjustments to NATO's command structures, so that greater authority can be delegated to military commanders and in-theatre integration with partners like the United Nations (UN) can be improved.

D. 4

NATO's new Strategic Concept.

The relation with Russian Federation

Adriana Sauliuc

Created in 1945, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was built to protect the security of the member states and, without no doubt, the Washington Treaty was and remains a remarkably enduring agreement. Its core values have served NATO well, during the 60 years of existence, being just as true today, like they did in 1949.

Today, we can say that the Alliance has successfully ensured the freedom of its members and had an active role in preventing war in Europe, during the 40 years of the Cold War. But when this was over, the question was if the organization was still relevant and *what NATO should do?* Created with the main purpose to counter the threat of communist expansion after the World War II was over, when the Soviet Union turned from ally to enemy, the collapse of the soviet state in 1991, brought a new international landscape. The disappearance of the main enemy left NATO with no obvious purpose and in this situation, the Alliance understood that there was necessary a rethinking of the strategy, and since the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO was undergone a process of transformation, a process ment to help the organization to adapt to the transformations of the international landscape. For this, NATO agreed the first Strategic Concept on 8th November 1991, at the NATO Summit in Rome, and the years that followed, brought important changes for the Alliance, with the essential elements of this Concept: statements about instruments necessary for crisis prevention and management, cooperation and partnership, demands for the transformation of armed forces towards flexibility, deployability, and sustainability etc. It is certain that during the 90's, when NATO engaged on military operations for the first time, it was the proof that the Alliance shown itself and the entire world, that the organization is able to adapt to an ever changing security background. The mission in 1995, was the first ever peacekeeping mission for the Alliance, and took place in Bosnia-Hertegovina, with a close work of the European Union and the United Nations, and NATO did its job very well, with professionalism and devotament.

The next Strategic Concept (25th April 1999), adopted in the Washington Summit, codified the developments and the decisions adopted in 1991. After the conduct of combat action in Yugoslavia without a UN Security Council mandate, when the air campaign brought to a halt the human catastrophe unfolding in Kosovo, the Strategic Concept emphasized the central role of the United Nations and its Security Council's prerogative. The 1999 Strategic Concept, a satisfactory description of the Alliance policy and strategy, highlighted that NATO learned from the previous experiences (missions in 1995 and 1999) and realized that if the Alliance wants to remain relevant in the security field, it would have to be active and have an important role in crisis management, crisis response operations and conflict preventions. So, the Strategic Concept adopted in the end of the 90th, declared NATO's main functions: Security Consultation, Deterrence and Defense, Partnership and Cooperation, Contribution to Prevention and Crisis Management, as the "core security tasks".

Looking back now, at the 60th anniversary we can all approve that NATO had a grate contribution at the European and global security, by respecting the principles of the United Nations like democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. But today, at ten years after the 1999 Strategic Concept was adopted, this seems to no longer reflect the NATO's *raison d'être*, in a security landscape dramatically changed. In this present time, after events like 11th September 2001, intervention in Afganistan and Iraq and Russian – Georgian War, during a period of the worst economic crisis since the depression in the 1930s, rewritin a new Strategic Concept by the next summit in late 2010, is more then necessary, because it offers an opportunity that the members cannot miss, an opportunity to develop stronger consensus across the NATO's states and the Alliance challenges, ambitions, resources and partnerships.

Because of the present altered strategic concept, NATO needs to reevaluate its strategy, goals and functions and the evolution of the new Strategic Concept involve in a certain way, three important factors: a major challenge in the strategic environment, reaching a consensus within NATO as to the changes that need to be made; and adapting to the possible "unintended consequences" of the previous concept, which was the result of a quite conservative remit, and a product of many compromises. The preparation of the 2009 Strategic Concept, which generally is "the authoritative statement of the Alliance's objectives and provide the highest level of guidance on the

political and military means to be use in achieving them”, is the task of a group of wise men. They have to pay attention to relevant subjects for NATO, in relation with Russia, energy, terrorism, humanitarian activities, piracy, food security and climat change.

NATO’s relationship with the Russian Federation and the new Strategic Concept

Today, after the Russian – Georgian War (August 2008), considered by many commentators a *caesura* comparable to the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the terror attacks over the United States of America (2001), NATO more then ever, have to create a new relation with the Russian Federation, so the Alliance to fit the former soviet territory into a pan-European security framework. But, in the present time, there is no simply way to do it, because of Russia’s goals, its behaviour and the prospects for the cooperation or confrontation between NATO and Moscow.

Russia is important for the Alliance, which need a reliable ally to count on, in many issues like: combating terrorism, confronting piracy, cooperation in Afganistan, countering missile and nuclear proliferation, or containing narcotics trafficking. Even if NATO’s current attention is now, very much on Afganistan, as well as it was a decade ago, on the Balkans area in Europe, Russian Federation remains an important actor that will always have a hard word to say in the eastern Europe security, even if there is a general accepted idea that NATO cannot recognize a Russian sphere of “privileged interests” as well as will not recognize the independence of the breackaway Georgian separatist republics: South Ossetia and Abkhazia. NATO also reaffirm the rights of all countries, including the ex-sovietic states, Georgia and Ukraina, to choose their own position in foreign policy, as well as their partners or alliance.

The current landscape with all its features, can only express that the Alliance must work harder with Russia, even if the two parts share similar concern about border security, terrorism or nuclear threats. In this respect, cooperation with the Russian state is achievable in arms control and nonproliferation areas. For this, the USA and Russia are engaged in negotiations for a new Strategic Arms Control Treaty (START) that will expire at the end of this year (5 december). In the mean wile, there are serious nuclear discussions between USA and Russian Federation for a missile defense now, when state like Iran and North Korea are threatening

the world's security. Russia's participation at the international efforts for resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue is very important, an absence of the Russians is like to undermine this efforts and their effectiveness.

But NATO's cooperation with Russia means much more, because the Alliance needs Russian support in a number of other issues, from achieving an Israeli – Palestinian settlement, to cooperation in fighting in a quite new threat – the piracy off the coast of Somalia. All these things are linked to the world's security and stability, that can only be achieved if NATO can count on a reliable partner like Russia. For this, it is vital for Europe and the United States of America to agree on how to deal with Russia and to find the answer to a very important question: *should the Alliance build an European security together with Russia, or with an eye on the Russian state?* Whatever the answer is, NATO needs Russia and vice versa, both sides must desire a common way to solve the current problems of the international security, today, when conflicts have different forms: extremism, energy and ethnicity.

A good relation with Russia is very important from the energy view, too. Russian state is the biggest gas supplier in the world in a time when most of the European countries depend on Russian gas. Energy security is very difficult to achieve, even if we talk about big countries, like United States of America and China, or smaller states, like the countries in Europe. For the most part, oil and gas sources are located in political unstable parts of the planet, with an anti-Western view and resources are used as political weapon. The gas crisis in January 2009 (when European Union rather the Alliance had to handle the situation) has raised concerns about Russian energy policy and the strategy to use the gas as weapon of economic and political intimidation. In this context, NATO cannot avoid the energy issue, which seems to be more important every day. The new Strategic Concept is required to increase the Alliance's role in the energy security especially now, when the organization tries to establish a closer cooperation with Russia, the biggest gas supplier in the world.

Keeping the dialog channels open with Russia, and a revitalization of the NATO – Russia Council, can only bring a new era of cooperation with Moscow. The relationship with the Russian state was and remains a subject of paramount importance for the Alliance. It is time to attempt a fresh beginning between NATO and Russia, whose geopolitical position continues to be a hybrid because, torn between East and West, we can say that Russia

is certainly not an enemy anymore, but also not yet an ally. That is why, the discussion about a new Strategic Concept should include and treat very seriously the thorough reassessment of Russia's policy and the transformation of the existing cooperation into an effective partnership NATO – Russia, as a possibility to defeat common threats and enhance common interests. Alliance expects from Russia to use the 21st century currency, not the 19th century methods, for the present international problems. NATO hopes that Russia realize that a “zero-sum” thinking is outdated and must be drop, and that one side can only gain security, for instance, with the other part's help. For this, the Alliance needs a coherent Russian policy, and the Strategic Concept should bring a new relation between NATO and Russia, more confident and more productive.

D. 5

NATO – The new strategic concept

Narciz Bălășoiu

According to the definition offered by NATO, the strategic concept is a set of recommended measures following the analysis of a strategic scenario. This approach is based on the need for tracing the direction lines of military, diplomatic, psychological and economic sectors in accordance with security needs. The first document of this kind was adopted in the Alliance in 1952 and since then, successive changes were made as a condition to meet the new challenges. An important step in this direction was made in 1990 at the London reunion, where Heads of State and Government agreed on the need to adapt the North Atlantic Alliance to new realities occurred due to fall of the Iron Curtain which also meant the end of the Cold War. It was a moment when the transformations of Europe had to put its mark on the long-term vision of what it means common security and defense policy. One of the main elements that mark the new NATO strategy, calls for the transformation of the Alliance from an organization based on collective defense, to an entity able to guarantee Euro-Atlantic security and democratic values, both inside and outside its borders.

At present NATO is faced with a number of challenges that need to be analysed in order to get some answers on how the new strategic concept should look like. One key element is the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which created a gap in the core of transatlantic axis. According to simplest definition, NATO is a political-military alliance that aims to provide security and collective defense for its members. Although Article 5 refers to the binomial system of collective security and defense, its form does not submit an implied warranty, because it fails to compel its members to express an act immediately, in order to defend allied troops. Article 5 binds to a series of questions that basically aim the need to find a balance between self-defense (Article 5) and security - such as expeditionary operations and stabilization missions.

Another major issue on NATO's agenda is Russia, which, on one hand developed a strategic partnership with the Alliance through NATO-Russia Council, and on the other hand is considered by some members to be the main target of Article 5. In the relationship with the Russian Federation

there are views that even though claim a strengthened partnership, the lack of common democratic values can prevail in the face of common interests. Even though sustain efforts have been made in order to reset relations with Russia, the latest developments in the Balkans concurrent with increasingly desire to reassert its power, have led to a deepening of the gap between the two power poles. Nuclear proliferation is an issue that has lately sharpened mainly as a consequence of the Iranian Nuclear File developments. Also questionable is NATO's ability to cope with the requirements of non-proliferation in the 21st century, and the need to strengthen commitments on this in Europe.

The economic crisis is also a challenge whose effects could not be even quantify. Budget cuts create difficulties for NATO to susstain its comitements, so member states will have to take into account to prioritize in which missions and operations to engage. The risk of such an approach stems from the fact that not every country perceive the same types of risks, so the homogeneity of the security climate is put to the test.

In pragmatic terms there are a few basic directions of approach that must be considered in the process of reflection on the new NATO strategic concept. A major step is the need to adapt to increasingly complex challenges. Firstly it is necessary to enhance the development of offensive and defensive strategies to counteract the areas where poor governance creates a security vacuum. In order to keep up with technological progress, the Alliance needs to encourage the development of a viable strategy, able to sustain innovative industries so that the time between invention and use of new technologies will be reduced. The main objective is to enhance the acquisition of superior capabilities in all areas where security risks are involved, and possession of a technological advantage over adversaries. Also the Alliance needs to encourage development of an ability to react quickly to threats that are based on new technologies, and spread immediately to its members the counter methods. In order to accomplish these tasks, besides strengthening NATO's inter-operational capabilities is required to develop advanced integrated technologies of intelligence and monitoring. A second step is to increase collaborative efforts with the external environment, concurrent with the establishment of new institutions. The Alliance need to resize institutioanal collaborations and exchange of experience with officers from non-NATO countries, and to adopt an active approach in relations with states that have problems in maintaining a stable governance, and thus ensuring a secure environment. A concrete measure is the implementation

of policies to mentor and advice indigenous forces. Another key element that needs to gain more attention from NATO leaders, is the process of conflict prevention and resolution, along with consequence management. This segment requires adapting both the authorities structures and decision-making process, and also improving NATO-EU partnership on non-proliferation and consequence management. In order to achieve such an objective it is necessary that besides adapting NATO capabilities to respond to humanitarian challenges (cataclysms), to reform the alliance's command structure for a prompt response and in close collaboration with other government bodies such as EU and UN .

As a prophylactic measure is necessary to intensify efforts to combat weapons proliferation. For an efficient development of these measures is required together with governmental and international organizations, to improve the capacity to discover, track, identify and neutralize the subjects involved in the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Distruction. In addition to these measures is essential to increase human resource training within NATO in order to assist national civil authorities.

A problem that is becoming increasingly stringent refers to the need to conduct expeditionary forces in the most hostile and remote areas. This issue claim the need to review policies on defense and coordination of operational planning while maintaining the capacity to develop concurrently a whole range of operations and missions. In terms of capabilities must be provided the necessary means to move mobile forces over large distances, on short notice, and in urban areas fast and efficient air transportation.

Taking into account the cultural diversity of the areas where NATO forces act, the issue of communication gains a critical role, so it is very important to deliver consistent messages and strategies to engage in battle, so that the strategic objectives reflect themselves in the fundamental values. This objective should be supported by achieving high standards in education, in order to create educated staff able to understand the cultural challenges in different areas in which they operate.

Defining a new strategic concept will be a laborious process because it entails the adoption of complex solutions to address the new types of unconventional and asymmetric risks and threats. Also this document will need to refer to the way the Alliance will be involved in issues related to promoting democracy, reconstructing nations, along with developing EU role in defense and security, and bringing relations between the EU and NATO at a higher level.

D. 6

The new NATO strategic concept and the realities and the new threats to the security environment

Mirela-Ancuța Samoilă

How will the Alliance respond to the new reality threats? Is a question from which the Nato Strategic concept is answering. The answer to this question is a definition of what will remain from NATO, what ways will it choose, is going to be a global instrument that answers all the problems sending mission where fact realities demand it.

In the context of constant changes in the security environment given by the russian-georgian war in august 2008, the financial crisis, also of the developing PESA, weapons proliferation potentiating new threats. In the new geo-political threats we must not disregard the old threats. Only the Alliance's enemy, terrorism, which had as starting point the actions that followed the 11th September actions, are no longer on the first place on a priority scale of the priorities from the new context, but are the cyber security and energetic security.

For old NATO threats owning instruments that reply in return for the new ones does not have the instruments to respond. Now the question comes to mind: to what threats will NATO answer and with what priority. We must not forget the elements from the past, elements learned from missions in the past, but only the elements that are surpassed by the recent evolutions in the security environment. The Georgian conflict, but also the existent classic missions NATO underline once again that Nato had never given up fighting threats in classic style, fact revealed by the proliferation of any kind.

A reevaluation of threats at NATO's adress

Even when it comes to NATO adressed threats we have the tendency to look for threats outside the Alliance, but many times they are on the inside. In the category of these threatthat sprang from the inside of the Alliance: populism, losing the support for the states, organized crime. Above all this there are: weapons proliferation, terrorism, totalitarist countryes, inter state conflicts, global warming.

The loss of support of the NATO's states members - In the context of the last years, after the 11th September 2001 attacks, numerous surveys have indicated the fact that the support of the European states has dropped the support for NATO, unlike in US. Because people did not find themselves in the fight launched by the US against the terrorism, due to the fact this did not impact on the directly, the same situation after the subway attacks in London – UK, Madrid – Spain. So, the decline of citizens's support for the fight against terrorism and for NATO. When it comes to threats to energy security, Europe's biggest problem, support is higher, this is due to the conflicts at the NATO borders, Ukraine and Russia gas dispute from January 2009, when Russia stopped providing energy to Europe. NATO lost population support from the states members of the Alliance with growing necessities, and growing costs for Army support, specific to the US population that realised the costs allocated for sustaining the Irak during the Bush administration, fact proved when people stopped voting a new republican.

The proliferation of Mass destruction weapons – main subject of the UN reunion in 2009, where US relaunched the fight against Iran nuclear proliferation. In Iran's nuclear problem, Turkey, Nato member is the only one that sustains even presently the opinion that the nuclear threat does not come from Iran's side but from Israel's side, a state that does not admit to the fact that they own nuclear power weapons. And this support comes in the context of public opinion support for approving any action of the AKP guvern (The justice and Development Party) agains Israel in the Gaza confrontations.

The totalitarian states – where it does not exist a so called fight against totalitarian systems but more of an implementation process in the totalitarian states of the elements specific to democracy, on a generical idea – two democratic states have less chances of declaring each other war. The implementation of democracy in Afganistan is a timetaking process, even if elections took place, building the democracy and the reconstruction post conflict from this area will take some time, even if the civil mission PESA, EUPOL are trying the reconstruction of the democratic institutions and training the personal from these institutions, together with the NATO mission that is in charge of the security for that zone.

Inter-state conflicts, and the problematic states – The case of Georgia and Russia is an evidence of the ethnic conflicts, for example making the Alliance temper their reactions. A problem was the consensus problem that is delaying NATO's actions in the field with a few weeks. In these 2 examples the problem arose who will intervene EU or NATO, who has the competency to solve this conflict. The inter-ethnic problem from Bosnia and Hertzegovina rebecame actual problems, so as a first example of post conflict NATO reconstruction, taken as an example for future EU reconstruction mechanisms, the PESA missions seems that did not have any success at all. We can conclude that NATO due to its military capabilities can solve the actual interventions issue, military missions, for PESA remaining the post-conflict reconstruction part.

Populism – is a threat associated with the global model of democracy, that comes in the context of the democratization process from Eastern Europe's side, and that is separating from the initial model of liberal democracy. Populism can lead to weakening institutions power and efficiency of the key institutions of democracy, law independency, media's and armys independence. Once the people gain confidence in the populist leader and a decreasing confidence in the political elites that constitutes an alternative for governing that state, assuring the democratic mechanisms, encounter problems in approaching external problems, security problems. Behind the actions in community's service, for community's welfare, the state leader tries to lead without political consensus, but by his own opinions. So, judging by the deficiencies arosed in these new Eastern- democracies, will oly lead to an instability cauzed by the possibility of a populist revolution.

Organized crime – sustains the fear and insecurity and creates the guidelines for the future terrorist actions, also for proliferating weapons trade, even if the most threatened regions are the ones at NATO's borders, we cannot exclude the problems from inside NATO's states, in Eastern Europe. Organized crime together with the ilegal migration generate if not anihilated, violent identity themes and weaken the security.

Global warming – this implies recent clima changes – represent a more and more discussed subject in the last year because these lead to increasing the conflicts generated by environment considerations, but even the crisis

generated by the natural disasters put under the question sign the efficiency of the reactions coming both from national authorities and of the international ones. Another question rises – if in the future NATO will react in these types of catastrophies.

Terrorism – the threat based on the 11th September 2009 attacks, the geopolitical world has redefined their security strategy, but remains in NATO's priority strategies. In this time there was a passing from international terrorism to internat terrorism more powerfull because of the damage that can cause and the fact that these two collide together.

NATO Priorities

Even if the threats are truly found on NATO's list, they cannot be annihilated because of the current capacities and because of the costs involved. That is why, depending on NATO's interests, there is a number of priorities for which the Alliance has channeled its resources: energy security, cyber defense, terrorism, the defense of the individual.

Energy security. Energy security represents a problem more specific to Europe because it depends on the energy that comes from outside its borders, especially from Russia. It becomes a NATO problem when the viability of the energy treaties is questioned and because of the threats that are related to the infrastructure that provides for the energy transport. Without a treaty regarding energy security between Russia and EU, the agreements between the two parts does not mean too much in the current context. Looking for the first time at the Nabucco project, it has been considered that this will solve all the energy security problems, but because other Russian energy supply projects have surfaced and adding to that Turkey's actions regarding Nabucco and White Stream projects, will underline the interests that come to play and which can manage the insecurity of the imported energy dependant countries as well as of their respective citizens.

Cyber defense. In the new security environment, criminal infractions are correlated with cyber defense. The current strategy for cyber defense of the member countries is the instrument through which the combat against a

cybernetic attack can be ensured from any NATO member country. The screening against such attacks can resolve a conflict and by finding and stopping the enemy's means of communications can prevent that conflict.

Terrorism. It is one of the NATO's top priorities that is still current. The future actions are reflected by the way NATO is handling the current situation in Afghanistan. Because of the mission's costs in Afghanistan, the trust in a future success is decreasing.

The defense of the individual. It is a new concept that seems to draw NATO's attention, once the re-evaluation of NATO's threats is put under investigation and once a new strategic concept is designed. Balancing between a NATO as an ununiversal box tools or an Alliance that must reach its objective which was created, raises the question if NATO needs to change its view on things and to look from the countries security point of view or of the defense of the individual, of the citizen.

Along these NATO's threats and priorities, the relations with the muslim world, the frozen conflicts underline the need for an Alliance which can count on its member's advice to prevent conflicts, threats, to coordinate its actions depending on the available resources, on the support from the member countries and the consensus in taking decisions regarding NATO's intervention missions should not be an obstacle for resolving conflicts.

D. 7
**NATO, from Euro-Atlantic partnership
to Global Partnership**

Radu Arghir

With the end of the cold war NATO's strategic priorities had to change in order to accommodate the new status quo that demanded more focus on security rather than defense issues. A massive invasion in Europe became an unlikely scenario but the collapse of the Soviet Union and the desintegration of the Warsaw Treaty left behind what could be called "a mess". The East, South-East and Central European countries, including Soviet Union successor, the Russian Federation, needed, above all, security guarantees from what was then and still is the main Defense and Security provider in Europe: NATO.

NATO took the necessary steps and established dialogue with former communist countries by means of bilateral talks and, more importantly, within the framework of what was then The North-Atlantic Cooperation Council. As dialogue progressed new instruments were created to deal with new requirements. Among them the Partnership for Peace (PfP), that dealt with individual states, and allowed NATO to provide tailor made assistance and the Mediterranean Dialogue were established in 1994. The next important step was involving NATO's partner countries in joint security operations. The opportunity came with the end of the Bosnian war and the Dayton peace agreements. In the context of common operations in Bosnia, the Euro – Atlantic Partnership Council was created as a successor of North-Atlantic Cooperation Council (EAPC) in order to enhance cooperation.

Since then EAPC came a long way and saw some of its members join NATO. Other achievements include Creation of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre and Disaster Response Unit, launching of Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (following 9/11th) and Individual Partnership action Plan(an enhanced version of PfP, 2002), and the establishment of the PfP Trust Funds(following Ottawa convention, however its role expanded over the years from funding destruction of mines to destruction of small arms and other obsolete military equipment and Supporting discharged personnel) to name just a few.

This was NATO's response to the security needs of Europe (and CIS countries), however, with the new shift in NATO's strategic concept EAPC and its instruments, can play a significant role in shaping NATO's future foreign actions. The biggest challenge facing NATO at the moment is Afghanistan, and despite difficulties there we cannot assume that similar operations will not be conducted in the future. As NATO's role becomes more global it needs the right tools in order to successfully deal with the new challenges that lie ahead. Classic military intervention has its limitation and is only a part of the peace building process. Of course, there are other organizations like the UN, or other regional organizations that own better tools when it comes to peace building. Still NATO through EAPC and PfP has managed to acquire a number of instruments that can be put to good use in the future. Peace building includes security sector reform, clearing minefields and reintegration of combatants, and NATO is already equipped with the tools to make a difference in those areas.

During a conference in Bucharest, where NATO's new strategic concept was discussed, Daniel Korski (European Council of Foreign Relations) underlined the fact that NATO can and should become the most important defense sector reform provider (including reintegration of combatants) in the world. This is indeed a way forward for NATO, but it can do more. It can become the driving force behind the implementation of the Ottawa convention by extending the geographical area (and providing more funding) where PfP Trust Funds can implement projects. Rather than assisting only partner countries (PfP and Mediterranean Dialogue) it can assist any country in need, provided that it requested assistance. And this can apply to any other area where Trust Fund can help (like conversion of military bases or destruction of small arms). Also, when it comes to (natural or man made) disaster response NATO can organize joint exercises and provide much needed expertise to countries all around the globe, and can assume a leading role in the process.

This can be achieved by means of bilateral agreements with individual countries or cooperation with regional organizations and either way will require closer coordination with the UN. It will not necessarily be easy and will require diverting or allocating new funds as well as new mechanisms. Further more, the process will be a lengthy one and require political will and constant involvement before NATO can become a world wide driving force when it comes to defense reform, mine (and other military equipment)

disposal and disaster response. But it is a way forward for NATO that will allow it to expand way beyond its traditional security building area. Also, the number of countries or regional organizations that are in need of assistance in these particular three sectors is not likely to decline any time soon.

NATO is now known to be the most successful collective defense organization in Europe but it is time to go further than that and expand its success to other areas in the broader concept of security. Collective defense is still, and should be, at the heart of NATO's priorities but in the light of 21st century challenges it is imperative that it expands its leadership to other areas of security.

D. 8

The NATO-Russia Game

Roxana Ursu

Emerged from the need to counterbalance the soviet threat and maintaining this main goal until the late 1980s, NATO had to make, after the end of the Cold War, a “fundamental reorientation of the alliance’s overall strategy” and to rethink its goals and purpose according to the new reality of the international stage. The dissolution of the USSR in 1991 as well as the development of new types of threats determined NATO to focus more and more on aspects of political security such as democracy, free markets and political stability rather than military and territorial defense. But even if the Strategic Concepts (1991, 1999 and the 2009 work in progress) were meant to adapt the alliance both political and military to the complexity of the international stage, a thing still remains one of the main reasons for NATO’s existence: Russia.

Many people ask themselves why does an organization such as NATO is still necessary today if the reason for which it was designed, to oppose the Soviet Union, is gone. The answer is clear, not only new threats to the security of the member states have emerged, but Russia’s legacy, to promote anti-democracy, is the basis of one of the most important NATO purposes.

In what concerns Russia it looks upon NATO enlargement with worry even though officials on both sides say that Russia and NATO worked and will continue to work together as partners in different areas. It is true that NATO has no territorial claims against Russia and scenarios regarding military confrontations between the two are exaggerated. Facts such as the expansion of NATO near to Russia’s borders, the disappearance of the buffer zone, the inferiority of the Russian military forces and capabilities comparing to the ones of NATO show otherwise. The truth is that even though the military area seems to be the main reason for Russia’s worries, the element that really affects its Western value system and NATO’s growing capacity to promote it in the Russian neighbourhoods, outgrowing Russia’s influence in the area. So, what is the natural reaction for Russia? Of course that to act aggressive, finding reasons for disagreement to try to keep the power of influence.

Alexander Sharavin, director of the Moscow-based Institute of Political and Military Analysis, stated his opinion to an independent radio that “NATO’s expansion in itself does not present any threat... This organization cannot present a threat — it has multidirectional interests, because there are more than two dozen states there” so Russia “should not be carried away by this anti-NATO rhetoric.” On the other hand, the Russian President Dmitri Medvedev said in August 2008 that “NATO’s nothing to Russia” and in March 2009 he stated that Russia would rearm its military and boost its nuclear forces because NATO is expanding towards its borders.

Such statements show that different, even contradictory opinions regarding the NATO-Russia relationship and the way the two actors define their intentions towards each other arise even within the Russian community. Many Russian experts, like the case of Alexander Sharavin, agree that Russia’s perception about the ‘NATO menace’ is exaggerated and people should not get carried away by this aggressive rhetoric. It is perfectly normal that NATO has multiple interests since it is an alliance that consists of 28 independent member states, but the objectives of this organization have evolved: there is no more counteract the Soviet Union, but more of reorienting its capabilities so it can deal with new types of security threats like terrorism, failed states or weapons of mass destruction.

On the other hand, Russian officials, led by president Medvedev, seem to approve and yet not the fact that Russia and NATO are not enemies anymore and can work together for a strong partnership. At first sight we could say that their way of expressing the situation, the fact that they oscillate between the conviction that NATO cannot be a match for Russia’s power and the idea that NATO’s expansion is a threat to Russia’s national security, is the result of a failed doctrine, a post-imperial pique, a wounded national pride. If we go further the approach of Medvedev and its supporters it is partially justified because NATO, by the process of enlargement, affects directly Russia’s ability to pursue an agenda which is not focused on consolidating democracy. Offering NATO membership to countries such Ukraine or Georgia coincides with diminishing the influence of the Russian Federation in the area, and practically narrows the possibilities to put into practice certain foreign, trade and economic policies. So, Russian leaders realize the danger of losing power and to countervail the situation they call on a deterrent strategy: the idea of partnership is not foreclosed, but when certain actions come against Russian

interests they go for threatening statements and declarations which usually brings Russia and NATO to talks and negotiations, and finally to the regain of balance of power.

Critics often say that NATO's enlargement it is the decisive factor in the deterioration of the Russia-NATO relationship, but NATO supporters think that Russia's interests are not wounded by the close relations between NATO and Russia's neighbours. Moreover, pro-NATO officials and experts agree that NATO exerts a positive influence on Russia by eliminating political instability in the East. Both perspectives have their dose of truth and Russia as well as NATO realize that together with the fact their relationship is in transition and it needs to adapt to the new realities and challenges of the international climate. Threats like terrorism, failure states, populism, organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and others are reason for to work together, to build a strong partnership which can allow them to face globalization. Although the new reality should make them avoid the temptation of engaging into disagreements and take the path of a positive evolution in their relationship, in the end the story remains just a game with the motto "you are no match for me and yet I cannot manage without you". Practically it is a game of two, NATO and Russia, in which the players compete against each other without ever reaching the finish line.

THIRD PART

Annexes

International Conference
NATO and the New Strategic Concept. Romania's Priorities

22th October – 24th October 2009
Constantin Stere Hall, Palace of the Parliament,
13th September, A1 Entrance

Program

Program Director: Iulian Chifu, CPCEW
Co-director of the Project: Mircea Mîndrescu, Romanian National Defense College

22th October

Arrival of the foreign guests
20.00 – Welcome Dinner, Burebista Restaurant

23th October

7.00 – 9.00 – Breakfast for the foreign guests
9.00 – 9.30 – Registration – Palace of the Parliament

9.30. Introductory session

Welcome address

9.30-11.30

**Panel 1: Adapting NATO's strategic concept in order to address the
21st century challenges. Is NATO capable of multi-tasking?**

Focus points:

- Sharing security burden inside NATO while preserving trans-Atlantic partnership and solidarity;
- The meaning of Article 5: balance between conventional and asymmetric threats
- Balancing the collective defense, operations in the vicinity and the need for actions at a strategic distance, providing collective defense while pursuing “out of area” operations
- Terrorism and WMD proliferation: the role of missile defense, disarmament and non-proliferation;
- Increasing NATO’s role in dealing with cross-border threats and challenges

Moderator: Iulian Chifu, CPCEW

Main speakers:

- Dr. Jamie Shea, Director for Policy Planning, NATO International Staff
- Teodor Meleşcanu, Vice-president of the Romanian Senate, President of the Defense, Public Order and National Security Committee
- Daniel Korski, European Council of Foreign Relations, UK

Discussants: 5-7

- Sergiu Medar, Former National Security Advisor, Romania
- Oazu Nantoi, MP, Foreign Affairs Committee, Republic of Moldova
- Col. Gheorghe Tibil, Defense Policy Directorate, Romanian MoND
- Mihaela Matei, Advisor of Romanian Intelligence Services Director

Debate

11.30-12.00 Coffee break

12.00 – 13.30

Panel 2: Tackling challenges and finding opportunities in NATO’s wider neighbourhood. Partnership network seen as an investment in Trans-Atlantic and international security. The relevance of NATO’s critical neighbourhoods: the Balkans and the wider Black Sea region.

Focus points:

- The need to build circles of stability in the Balkans - Black Sea-Caucasus - Central Asia; the Mediterranean region – Middle East – Afghanistan
 - The role of neighbourhood/regional instability in the future Strategic Concept;
 - The right balance between NATO policies and instruments: partnerships, enlargement; reforms; cooperation and dialogue;
 - the role of partnerships in a broad sense (including partners across the globe);
 - relations with Russia in the 21st century;
 - relations with other organizations (UN, EU, UA, others);
 - relations with emerging powers (China, India);
- NATO developing security capacities (the role of NATO's partnerships with Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq)

Moderator: Sergiu Medar, Former National Security Advisor of the president

Main Speakers:

- Cătălin Predoiu, Minister of Foreign Affairs (message presented by the Director General Călin Stoica)
- H.E. David Smith, US Ambassador to Georgia

Discussants: 5-7

- Cristian Diaconescu, former Romanian MFA
- Zoran Vujic, Assistant of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, chief of the General Directorate for NATO and Defense Policies, Serbia
- Georgi Kandelaki, Deputy Head of Committee of International Relations of Georgian Parliament
- Brig Gen Alexandru Cotoara-Nicolae, Head of the Defense International Cooperation Directorate, MoND
- Kristaq Birbo, EuroAtlantic Council, Albania
- Fatima Lahnait, Mediterranean Dialogue senior Fellow, Morocco
- E.S. Dl. Ljupco ARSOVSKI, Ambassador of Macedonia in Bucharest
- Elkhan Mehdiyev – Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Chairman, Azerbaijan

13.30 – 15.00 – Lunch

15.00 – 16.30**Panel 3: Shifting NATO's focus between collective/territorial defense and the need to be effective at strategic distance****Focus points:**

- Article 5 in the 21st century;
- Contingency planning for the new members;
- The value of the NRF;
- Striking the right balance between Article 5/Non Article 5 operations; Capabilities and resource requirements
- Conceptualizing Afghanistan in the new strategic concept (NATO's role in stabilization and reconstruction missions).

Moderator: Mircea Mîndrescu, National Defense College**Main Speakers:**

- John Seamon – Col (ret), former US military advisor of the US to NATO
- Gen. Valeriu Nicuț, Romanian General Staff

Discussants: 5-7

- Ștefan Tinca, Gen. Director, Planning and Analysis, Romanian MFA
- Ott Laido, Secretary of State, Estonian MFA
- Adel Abusara, Centre for Civil-Military Relations, Belgrade
- Dr. Daniel Nelson, Former Advisor to Defense and State Departments, Johns Hopkins University, US
- Cornel Codiță, Director of Program, CPCEW
- Hari Bucur Marcu, DCAF

16.30-17.00 Coffee break**17.00-19.00****Panel 4: New threats: Energy Security, Cyber Defense, Critical Infrastructure Protection****Focus points:**

- Energy security: the right policies, instruments and partners;

- Critical infrastructure protection and NATO’s role
- Cyber-Defense;
- NATO’s role in maritime security and protection of maritime lines of communications

Moderator: Liviu Mureşan, Eurisc Foundation

Main Speakers:

- Milea Constantin, Cyber Intelligence Center, Romanian Intelligence Service
- Călin Stoica, Director General, Security Policies, Romanian MFA
- Mireille Rădoi, National Defense College, Romania

Discussants: 5-7

- Tatiana Bosuncian, Pro Marshall Association, Republic of Moldova
- Khatuna Mshvidobadze, senior associate of the Georgian Security Analysis Centre
- Oleksiy Kolomiyets, President, Centre for European and Transatlantic Studies, Ukraine
- Eng. Şerban Lungu, Director of Defense Integrated Planning Directorate, MoND
- Daniel Ioniţă, Director for Security Policies, Romanian MFA

19.30-21.00 Dinner, Capşa House

24th October 2009

7.00 – breakfast

9.00-11.00 – meeting of Romanian representatives with partner countries representatives – 20 representatives

11.00 – coffee break

Departure of the foreign participants

**The international conference “NATO and the new strategic
concept. Romania’s priorities”
- Report of the proceedings -**

The Centre for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning organized Friday the 23rd October, in the Constantin Stere hall of the Parliament Palace in Bucharest the international conference “NATO and the New Strategic Concept“. The conference ended series of events meant to debate NATO’s New Strategic Concept and Romania’s priorities concerning it, organized with the help of NATO Public Diplomacy Division, the East-East program administered by the Soros foundation and the German Marshall Black Sea Trust Fund. The results of the debate that took place during Friday’s conference and during the four workshops organized at NGO level, academic level, political and military leader’s level will be structured as a policy paper, reflecting Romania’s position towards the New Strategic Concept and will be presented to Romanian decision makers, who are preparing Romania’s mandate concerning these negotiations, NATO’s group of experts for the Strategic Concept as well as ambassadors of NATO member states in Bucharest.

The conference brought together governmental and civil society representatives from member states (the US, the UK, France, the Slovak Republic, Estonia, Poland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic), partner states (Georgia, Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova, Serbia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Albania, Morocco), the academic environment and the media, as well as NATO officials (the Director for Political Planning Jamie Shea). Romania benefited from representation on a military, political, intelligence, academic and NGO level bringing a substantial and multilayered contribution to the debate concerning NATO’s future.

A series of common elements could be found in the speakers’ interventions: the relevance, opportunity and complexity of the process of elaborating a New Strategic Concept, reaffirming NATO’s core function, expressed in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and restoring trust in Euro Atlantic solidarity, recalibrating the relationship with Russia on more pragmatic grounds, consecrating the alliance as a forum for consultation on security and using the mechanism offered by Article 4 to its utmost potential, having a more efficient type of cooperation with other relevant actors(UN, EU, OSCE), rethinking/amplifying the partnership network with special mentions for the Black Sea, the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Mediterranean, the Gulf area or global partners and reiterating the idea that

the future of NATO includes flexible and efficient expeditionary forces that can be deployed at a strategic distance, keeping a continuity between territorial defense and expeditionary forces, preparing in real fighting situations for territorial defense and introducing the concept of transborder security in the vicinity of the NATO border.

A special thought was given to punctual matters such as energy security, cyber threats, expanding the Alliance and the open doors policy, cooperating in matters relating to intelligence and financing defense. On the later, Teodor Meleşcanu, vice-president of the Romanian Senate and President of the Defense, Public Order and National Security Committee, former defense minister, put forward the idea of introducing an explicit paragraph towards regulating the percentage of the GDP allotted by member states, or at least addressing firm commitments, in the New Strategic Concept. He also reiterated the need for NATO to focus on transborder security that can deal with a number of serious threats like terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation or illegal arms, drugs, persons trafficking, whose income often finances terrorist networks.

It became clear from the beginning of the debate the fact that defining a New Strategic Concept is not a simple intellectual or bureaucratic exercise meant to foretell the future or bring paper changes to the Alliance's tasks; there are multiple reasons for such a debate, but NATO will only truly evolve by means of actions and operations and less through theoretical refinements.

Jamie Shea believes that the Alliance needs to intensify consultations in order to fully perceive the new threats to security (and embed them in the perceptions of all member states), to pass from reaction to prevention and anticipation (of crisis, conflicts), to coordinate priorities with existing resources and, above all, reinstate trust in the value of Article 5 (especially in Central and Eastern Europe). This idea was repeated by the representatives of member states found on both sides of the Atlantic, proving that the fears present in this part of Europe are taken into account at the Alliance level and that solidarity exists and will be reflected in the evaluations put forward by the group of experts.

But security will never be exclusively ensured by territorial defense, NATO's involvement in theatres such as Afghanistan is becoming ever more necessary. Moreover an evaluation that was presented at the conference, put forward at least 20 situations with the potential to become

the next Afghanistan where the Alliance might have to intervene because of risks to its safety. Thus NATO must own capable expeditionary forces, political will/consensus to take part in such operations and good coordination with the other actors involved in a thorough, integrated approach, promoted by the Alliance. Also, it was stressed that the military assurance that Article 5 mentions has to be doubled by a political and a psychological one to reaffirm the Alliance's core function – collective defense.

If adopting the New Strategic Concept is about adapting NATO's founding principles to this era, at the same time we must avoid turning this debated into a win-lose situation, where some member states manage to include their priorities and some do not. From this point of view, Daniel Korski, from the Council for Foreign Relations underlined the fact that 4 distinct security communities are distinguishable inside NATO, each with its own perceptions and interest:

- *the new conservatives*- interested that NATO continues its involvement in Afghanistan, develops its counter-insurgent capabilities and flexible operational platforms;
- *the new cold warriors*- preoccupied by eastern threats and the relevance of Article 5
- *those that follow NATO's force projection* – they want to invest in it and approach areas like energy security;
- *anonymous*- those who will not support expeditionary forces and seek to “hide” behind an internal debate

Thus, in keeping up with the changing times, regarding our principles, this must be doubled by an approach that reaches all four points of view so that the New Strategic Concept will be comprehensive and focused and will allow NATO to act outside the Euro Atlantic area.

It was agreed that without a clear progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan and without proper investment for its objectives the Alliance will not be able to impose its agenda at an international level; at the same time the debate towards defining success in Afghanistan remains open.

Also, NATO needs to develop its ability to respond to negative implications of frozen conflicts and give special attention to border areas. For this reason, the relationship with Russia was present in all speeches. It is generally accepted that it has to be a realist, pragmatic one but a consensus must be reached (within the Alliance) regarding NATO's expectations from

its partnership with Russia. The idea that the partnership will engage Russia but will not be able to change it and that the main difficulty is the fact that Moscow seems to see NATO as a threat was mentioned many times; still common interest abound and the partnership could work, but it needs clear boundaries and red lines for Russia to see and acknowledge.

The partnership with the EU was discussed as one with a high potential for development, but taking into account defense spending, NATO and the EU continue to compete for the same resources belonging to member states. An alternative is making other partnerships more effective and getting the most out of regional cooperation. To this end the fact that the Mediterranean Dialogue was not used as much as it could have been used (in an area that is becoming increasingly important as a result of the plans for modifying the American anti-missile shield and which deserves special attention anyway because of chronic regional instability, terrorism, illegal migration) was stressed upon.

Cooperation in the Balkans was also brought up, showing that in this case the security equation was solved by carefully building trust over time and helping local cooperation initiatives that have led to improvements. Still the speakers mentioned President's Medvedev recent visit to Belgrade and the accord signed which could lead to a new deployment of Russian forces in the region for the purpose of becoming a regional centre for deploying force in case of civil emergencies.

The perspective regarding the Caucasus is not so optimistic, as the Russian Georgian conflict of 2008 significantly affected the perception of Alliance partners in the area; thus they demand that NATO takes into account their security concerns and restrict cooperation with actors labeled as aggressors. The Alliance's neighbourhood is essential to NATO but two things must be avoided: creating stability circles around the core represented by the north Atlantic community, which might lead to new separations in Europe and a process of excessive regionalization (because partnerships should engage NATO as a whole and equally interest all members of the Alliance, not just the ones around the border) and, given NATO's long term involvement in Afghanistan, the idea that only partners who offer hands on support will be valued.

Also, the fact that a state can have multiple identities has to be accepted, its security option being non-exclusive; for example a state can be a NATO and EU member state and still have a good relationship with Russia.

Romanian speakers paid special attention to the importance of the Black Sea Region and leading the republic of Moldova on the road to Euro Atlantic integration, reiterating their support for Georgia and Ukraine in their effort to join the Alliance. Iulian Chifu, director of the Centre for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning underlined the fact that NATO expansion must continue, by applying the “open doors” policy, so often present in declarations. As for the republic of Moldova, it has to undergo a true democratization process and a consistent reform of the security sector as well as a substantial growth in terms of political stability.

The conclusions reached during Friday’s debate, as well as previous reunions will be forwarded to the group of experts led by Madeleine Albright, thus illustrating Bucharest’s views regarding an active participation in defining NATO’s New Strategic Concept by consultations with allies and partners and by promoting its own priorities.

Report of the debates

On the 23th October 2009, Romanian National Defense College and Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Centre with the help of NATO PDD organized the Conference “*Regional perspectives on NATO’s New Strategic Concept*” at the Parliament Palace. The conference lasted between 09.00 and 19.00.

The dynamics of the political-military international scene, the permanent improvement of the tactics used by terrorist organizations and insurgent groups and the security and economic interests of the Alliance member states demand that NATO should adopt a more flexible and feasible policy, both at political-strategic level and operational-tactical one.

By using suggested topics as a baseline for discussions, the following ideas have been expressed:

Jamie Shea, Secretary of the Expert Committee, NATO HQ

NATO is in a phase of reflection. Now is the moment when a comprehensive image on NATO’s place and especially on what it has to do in the future is focused. A Romanian perspective on what it could be done is important. NATO is not able to wait as long as EU does. NATO’s option is for action, it likes to act in each crisis accordingly; and it progresses based on the lessons learned.

There are several directions toward a “new strategy “:

Despite the fact NATO has done important things in Afghanistan it has to review what it can be done in order to enlarge the aria of action.

The efforts may be concentrated on a collective way of action. NATO is expecting bad things to happen. That is why anticipation and prevention are very expensive. The international environment must be regulated in the same manner the finance are, UN has acted very much for establishing the general image of the international environment.

NATO must be transparent and open to the large public. This is the only way it can get public opinion’s support.

The resources and capabilities must be brought in the front line

The priorities must be established. NATO is skilled in adding some things on the list without eliminating the less useful ones.

NATO must become the main actor in action in the field of security. From this point the confidence in NATO's capacity could be restored. That is why a new strategy is needed. It is essential for NATO to become operable in the distant areas where conflicts emerged.

The allies must be re-assured that NATO is viable and any doubts they may have must be eliminated. NATO must be able to act out of area with expeditionary forces.

The Article 5 type actions must be re-discussed in the light of the member state's proposals. The problem of re-assurance is a political, not a military one. Also the NATO-Russia position must be re-debated. NATO will not try to transform Russia's policy. NATO will act keeping the promises to Georgia and Ukraine. As it concerns the NATO -Russia relations a consensus must be reached within a ratio between agreement and disagreement of about 90% to 10%.

We have not to think Afghanistan is a "product too far away for NATO". On the contrary, we have to concentrate more on resources for this zone. Afghanistan has offered a series of lessons very well learned and understood by NATO specialists.

The capabilities must be improved. From statistic viewpoint only 18 of 28 allies meet the defense expenses requirement of 2% of GDP.

Until now NATO was concentrated more on operations, but it must be also concentrated on some other problems, such as security of the environment, etc.

The member countries are encouraged to bring new resources to NATO. EU and NATO doctrine must act complementarily but NATO must remain the leader. NATO should be able to use EU capabilities because EU has bigger military spending, but NATO remains the leader because NATO's role is to be a leader in the field of security.

NATO was concerned too much about Afghanistan and too little about the Balkans (too much talk and too little action).

NATO's activities regarding the enlargement were slowed, but this will not stop enlargement.

There are other threats whose resolution involves other countries that do not contribute with troops in Afghanistan. NATO should take the most profitable advantage from the relation with each member. The Mediterranean area is an area with many possibilities where strategic opportunities will be also studied.

Teodor Meleșcanu, Vice-president Romanian Senate, President of the Defense, Public Order and National Security Committee

The present conference is an opportunity for Romania to offer information and use the one being offered by teams of foreign specialists.

I admit Mr. Biden's contribution regarding the serious manner NATO approaches the problem of Russia and of South-East European states' security. The possibility Russia will become a NATO ally (member) is not excluded. Even if we consider the problem of the anti-missile shield; we will always respect the values of the neighbour states. Russia's capabilities in case of anti-terrorist fight must be taken into consideration.

Daniel Korski, European Council of Foreign Relations, UK

There are two aspects to be taken into account:

- Counter-insurgency;
- “New cold warriors“

The states should define their priorities directly, not hiding them any more behind debates on security. Because of the crisis the needed capabilities for Alliance cannot be provided. There are several small alliances acting under NATO's umbrella. NATO must concentrate on operations in border areas. EU has many more soldiers, but they cannot be deployed abroad. Also EU spends more money “on defense”

Russian President stated that in certain areas he can cooperate with NATO (for example the piracy) but referring to enlargement Russia has asked where it should stop.

Article 5 types of problems, risks and threats should be discussed in NATO forum and this does not mean that NATO will become the global expert no. 1.

NATO should be engaged in any type of missions, to develop capabilities, to lead and to be led to be involved and to cooperate with other organizations.

NATO must become the main object of reform in the field of security. This implies not the reform of the armed forces in each member country at once, but only by reforms NATO can be more operational, more effective out of area and in other domains.

I think NATO must not be involved in all missions. There are other organizations more efficient in solving certain kinds of missions.

Even NATO desires its own progress, without a sound financial support there is nothing it can do. Consequently the problem of resources remains the essential one for any transformation process.

NATO should be feared inside and should be understood outside.

Mihaela Matei, Advisor of the Director, Romanian Intelligence Services
NATO does not respond to the new risks. Article 5 is not a universal and does not comprise all types of missions. Article 4 is very important as it specifies the help that could be given in certain emergency cases.

NATO should have intense consultations and discussions with other organizations. NATO leaders do not pay the needed attention to this problem.

The troops engaged in operations must be trained for any kind of mission. Intelligence is taken into consideration only in its military significance, but not as a component as such of the NATO reform. There are more approaches determined by the mission in Afghanistan. There must not be any decisions generated by the missions, i.e. taken on the route.

Oazu Nantoi, MP, Foreign Affairs Committee, Republic of Moldova

Even if NATO's neutrality regarding certain problems in Republic of Moldavia has been declared, the problems themselves still exist.

Speaking about the many problems in cooperating with NATO, the most of them are determined by the relation with Russia. Decisions taken by Voronin's Government could affect the relations NATO - Republic of Moldavia. Now Republic of Moldova is in the process of changing its decision-making power.

Col. Gheorghe Tibil

It is difficult to approach Article 5 type missions as long as this article has lost its credibility.

The last events in Georgia have shown that sometime NATO's interest can generate chain reactions.

The need to co-relate the national defense problems and the new threats results from the need for adaptation to the new international environment

and to the new threats which are not all of them of military nature. A new comprehensive approach of the new risks in the field of security must be taken into consideration.

Sergiu Medar, Former National Security Advisor, Romania

The most important thing is that NATO is a powerful organization. After the Riga Summit NATO assumed new missions so that NATO's transformation has to touch new domains. In NATO missions must be involved all intelligence services belonging to all countries because the risks and threats are extremely various.

"Sharing capabilities" is another aspect to be taken into account by all NATO members. NATO is underused. It should be involved in security sector transformation, but this is a civil problem.

I think NATO and EU should make a private partnership in security sector; otherwise mistakes can be made (Iraq)

"Critical Strategic Infrastructure" protection is very important.

H.E. **David Smith**, US Ambassador to Georgia

It is nice to see how Romania pays attention to the Black Sea and surrounding countries.

NATO must be forced to address also the intellectual part of the transformation. The new concept does not involve the destruction of the old concept. The 1999 concept must be the basis for the new one it must be the vector which solves the old disputes.

Georgia is a democratic state in spite of others' declaration and this bothers Russia. The Russian attack was intensely and lengthly discussed. Georgian President has been forced to attack first.

NATO will address other risks and threats. NATO must understand it is the main actor and it must remain as such. NATO enlargement must reach other allies such as Georgia.

NATO, in fact, is suffering from a lack of Public Relations because people do not understand what is with that 2% of GDP.

Zoran Vujic, Assistant of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, chief of the General Directorate for NATO and Defense Policies, Serbia

Serbia defends and agrees with the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is in the interest of the Alliance and the EU.

Fatima Lahnait, Mediterranean Dialogue senior Fellow, Morocco

Today, more than 50% of the activities within Mediterranean Dialogue are of military nature. It must be taken into account that the EU has become dependent on Mediterranean countries from an economic (transportation), oil (gas), export and import (by sea) and shipping view points.

Arabian suspicions regarding NATO and Mediterranean Dialogue have led to tensions in the area. The New Security Concept must be clearly defined by NATO.

Georgi Kandelaki

Russia aims at increasing the tendency to make the neighbouring countries economically / energetically dependent on it.

The key role of the New Strategic Concept should be the relation with Russia. Russia must be determined to understand and reconsider its stand on former Soviet countries.

Kristag Birbo

Terrorism is the main threat

Hari Bucur (DCAF)

NATO has never discussed the issue of reserve forces but only that of the active forces. If officials would consider the reserve forces then appropriate NATO military background can be ensured.

Otto Laido, Estonia, MFA

Estonia does not want to make a list of threats and risks against which NATO can operate under Article 5.

It must be clarified if the Article 5 is still valid or not. It can be invoked, but we must discuss if it is good to do so or not.

Media Report

On 23rd October the Palace of the Parliament hosted a Conference focused on: NATO and the new strategic concept, managing challenges and opportunities in NATO's wider neighbourhood, partnership network as investment in trans-atlantic and international security, the relevance of NATO's critical neighbourhood: the Balkans and the wider Black Sea region; balancing NATO's focus between collective/territorial defense and the need to be effective at strategic distance; new threats: Energy Security, Cyber Defense, Critical Infrastructure Protection. The activity was the last part of the project "NATO and the new strategic concept. Romania's priorities", organized by the Center for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning in partnership with the National Defense College, with the support of NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Black Sea Trust of the GMF and the East-East program of the Soros Foundation.

On the 21st October, the Conference was announced on the site of the Ministry of Defense in a press release:

(http://www.mapn.ro/cpresa/13202_Conferinta-finala-pe-tema-noului-concept-strategic-al-NATO). A special talk-show was dedicated on Monday, 19th October at 21 hours on the public national television, TVR1, with the participation of Iulian Chifu, director of the CPCEW and Cornel Codiță, Director of programs at the CPCEW. It lasted for one hour and hosted a debate on NATO's new strategic concept.

On the 21st and 22nd of October the conference was advertised on the national radio Radio Romania Actualitati, on 21st of October at 18.10 (for 20 minutes) and on 22nd of October at 21 hours, with live interviews of Mr. Iulian Chifu. The same broadcast appeared on Realitatea FM on the 22nd of October. Also, on the 21st of October, it was advertised on B1 TV (for half an hour), beginning with 16 hours, and on the 22nd at 16 hours on the news TV channel Antena 3 and at 19 hours on the news TV channel Realitatea TV.

Mr. Iulian Chifu, Director of the CPCEW, was present in all previous radio and TV broadcasts.

During the day of the Conference took place, it appeared in articles on the various news agencies, televisions stations, such as: Newsin

(<http://www.newsinfo.ro/ministerul-apararii>),
Tvr 1 (<http://www.tvr.ro/jurnal.php?play=41203>), a short movie was made available on Armata TV: (<http://www.mapn.ro/armatatv>) and a photo gallery on the site of the Ministry of Defense (<http://www.mapn.ro/fotodb/20091023>). In that very evening, on national TV, Mircea Mîndrescu, director of the National Defense College gave an interview.

The day after the conference the journalists published articles in the following newspapers: Ziua (<http://www.ziua.ro/display.php?data=2009-10-24&id=260720>), FINANCIARUL

(<http://www.financiarul.ro/2009/10/24/romania-and-nato-new-strategic-concept/>) and on Moldavia's radio, Vocea Basarabiei, in the news and on the show "Mai aproape de Europa":

(<http://voceabasabiei.net/index.php/stiri/politica/5263-audio-d-dungaciu-j-shea-cr-diaconescu-i-chifu-o-nantoi-t-busuncian-v-spanu-g-scarlat-la-mai-aproape-de-europa>),

(<http://voceabasabiei.net/index.php/mai-aproape-de-europa-cu-stela-popa/5248-audiomai-aproape-de-europa--cu-stela-popa-24-octombrie-2009>).

During the following days the Conference was mentioned in other articles, such as: a Romanian military magazine, Observatorul Militar (28.10-3.11. 2009)

(<http://www.presamil.ro/OM/2009/42/Ziar%2042%20site.pdf>),

the site of the NATO in the Republic of Moldova

(<http://www.nato.md/content/view/1175/1/lang,en/>) and the news agency ActMedia

(<http://www.actmedia.eu/top+story/romania+and+nato+new+strategic+concept+/23735>).

A show with the full coverage of the event, including some 14 interviews of the participants has been filmed during the conference by the National Television TVR1 for the debate show "From East to West", which is specialized in the debate of international themes and is aired every Saturday starting at 1 P.M. The full show will be aired after the presidential elections, but images and comments will be made available by TVR1 until then. For the images and video, an upload was made by the MFA on their web site, and another one by the national TV. Contacts will be sent to the NATO PDD.

LIST OF THE PARTICIPANTS AT THE CONFERENCE
Palace of the Parliament, Constantin Stere Hall

Name	Institution
Chifu Iulian	CPCEW
Mîndrescu Mircea	Romanian National Defense College
Bănescu Traian	President of Romania
Shea Jamie	Expert Committee NATO
Codiță Cornel	CPCEW
Fota Iulian	National Security Advisor of the President
Korski Daniel	European Council of Foreign Relations
Medar Sergiu	Former National Security Advisor
Meleșcanu Teodor	Vice-president of the Romanian Senate
Nantoi Oazu	Foreign Affairs Committee, Republic of Moldova
Aurescu Bogdan	State Secretary, Romanian MFA
Tibil Gheorghe, Col.	Defense Policy Directorate
Klimpush Ivanna	Open Ukraine
Matei Mihaela	Romanian Intelligence Services
Predoiu Cătălin	Minister of Foreign Affairs
Smith David, Amb.	USA-Georgia
Diaconescu Cristian	Former Minister of Foreign Affairs
Smolar Eugeniusz	Center for International Relations
PolandVujic Zoran	Chief of the General Directorate for NATO and Defense Policies, Serbia
Cotoarcă Nicolae Alecsandru, Gen. brig	International Defense Cooperation
Mazuru Bogdan	Secretary of State, Romanian MFA
Lahnait Fatima	Mediterranean Dialogue senior Fellow, Morocco

Secăreș Vasile	President, NATO Studies Center, Bucharest
E.S. Dl. Ljupco Arsovski	Ambassador of Macedonia in Bucharest
Geoană Mircea	President, Romanian Senate
Kokoshinski Oleg	Euroatlantic Committee Ukraine
Rădoi Mireille	National Defense College
Seamon John	Former US military advisor of the US to NATO
Oprea Ștefan, Gen.	Romanian General Staff
Nicuș, Gen.	Romanian General Staff
Antonescu Crin	Senate, PNL
Pangrac Martin	MFA - NATO Department Slovakia
Oancea Viorel	State Secretary, MoND
Tinca Ștefan	Romanian MFA
Nelson Daniel	Johns Hopkins University, US
Marcu Hari Bucur	DCAF
Azimov Araz	Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Azerbaijan
Constantin Milea	Cyber Intelligence Center, Romanian Intelligence Service
Kandelaki Giorgi	Embassy of Georgia
Birbo Ktistaq	Albania
Laido Ott	MAE Estonia
Dragomir Radu	UTI
Ioniță Daniel	Director, Security for Security Policies, Romanian MFA
Bosuncian Tatiana	Pro Marshall Association, Republic of Moldova
Mshvidobadze Khatuna	Senior associate of Georgian Security Analysis Centre
Kolomiyets Oleksiy	Centre for European and Transatlantic Studies, Ukraine

Lungu Șerban	General Military Staff
Șerban Alex	Vice-president, ATA
Samoilă Mirela Ancuta	CPCEW
Stamate Ana Maria	CPCEW
Ursu Roxana	CPCEW
Oproiu Monica	CPCEW
Abdisa Seila	CPCEW
Bălășoiu Narciz	CPCEW
Arghir Radu	CPCEW
Romer Walter	CPCEW
Radu Gabriela	CPCEW
Tarban Carmen	CPCEW
Nedea Bogdan	CPCEW
Sauliuc Adriana	CPCEW
Pordea Alina	CPCEW
Mitea (Marin) Florentina	CPCEW
Secară Sorina	CPCEW
Platon Andreea	CPCEW
ES Dashnor Dervishi	Embassy of Albania
ES Leo D'Aes	Embassy of Belgium
ES Valentin Radomirski	Embassy of Bulgaria
ES Philippe Beaulne	Embassy of Canada
ES Ivica Mastruko	Embassy of Croatia
ES Petr Dokladal	Embassy of the Czech Republic
ES Ulrik Helweg-Larsen	Embassy of Denmark
ES Henri Paul	Embassy of France
ES Andreas von Mettenheim	Embassy of Germany
ES Georgios Poukamissas	Embassy of Greece
ES Oszkar Laszlo Fuzes	Embassy of Hungary
ES Mario Cospito	Embassy of Italia
ES Vladimir Jarmolenko	Embassy of Lithuania

ES Maria W.J. van Gool	Embassy of Holland
ES Oystein Hovdkinn	Embassy of Norway
ES Wojciech Zajaczkowski	Embassy of Poland
ES Alexandre Vassalo	Embassy of Portugal
ES Dagmar Repcekova	Embassy of Slovakia
Elkhan Mehdiiev	Embassy of Georgia
ES Estanislao de Grandes Pascual	Embassy of Spain
ES Ayse Sinirlioglu	Embassy of Turkey
ES Robin Barnett	Embassy of Great Britain
ES Mark Gitenstein	Embassy of SUA
Nikolai Nikolov	Embassy of Bulgaria
Valentin Inceev	Embassy of Bulgaria
Jose de Pierpont	Embassy of Belgium
Paul Kobliska	Embassy of Czech Republic
ES Dusan Crnogorcevici	Embassy of Serbia
H.D. Gorgionici	Embassy of Serbia
Arsovski Ljupco	Embassy of Macedonia
Gurez Lilia	InfoTAG
Posastiuc Cristina	Open Source Center Bucharest
Iancu Cristian	Open Source Center Bucharest
Cunningham Mark	BST
Barabas Janos	Embassy of Hungary
Harnagea Catalin	Institutul pentru Libera Inițiativă
Brand-Jacobsen Denisa	UNDP
Bouaru Sorin	Senate
Ungureanu Adriana	Special Telecommunications Service
Petrescu Ion	MoND
Latea Cristi Daniel	Romanian Presidency
Talpan Florin Costel	MoND
Ștefan Laurențiu	Embassy of SUA

Epure Cătălin	Shark Computers
Balica Bogdan	Shark Computers
Moser Stefanie	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
Nahoi Ovidiu	Foreign Policy
Ilinoiu Anca	Romanian Presidency
Voinea Georgeta	Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
Onișoru Gheorghe	Spiru Haret University
Munteanu Cristian Irinel	MAE
Repciuc Teodor	MoND
Szechely Mihaela	Government
Antonescu Mădălina Virginia	MFA
Săraru Ruxandra	Radio Romania
Gombos Cătălin	Radio Romania
Ciobanu-Dordea Aurel	Government
Olaru Stejarel	Government
Marincuș Ligia	Embassy of Canada
Popescu Oana	Cotidianul
Arsene Georgiana	New York Magazine
Tarus Adriana	NewsIn
Păvăluca Luana	NewsIn
Chelu Cătălina	NewsIn
Captaru Vasile	Radio Romania International
Guzun Eugenia	Radio Romania
Stângaciu Laurențiu	Radio Romania
Ciubotaru Răzvan	Cotidianul
Dragomir Gheorghe	Romania in Lume Association
Micu Nicolae	Eurisc
Roșioru Antuanela	Prompt Media
Olteanu Karina	Agerpres
Voica Sorina Laurenția	Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Câmpeanu Cristian	Romania Libera

Turculeț Diana	RAO
Nițoi Ana Maria	The Diplomat
Rădulescu Bogdan	Radio Romania Actualitati
Dincovici Nadia	9 o'clock
Lungescu Oana	BBC World Service
Opriș Adrian	Media NT
Singer Alexandru	Hasefer
Rpdulescu Adelina	NewsIn
Ivan Ionel	Romanian Parliament
Obiziuc Stelian	MFA
Cămărașan Cplin	MFA
Zulean Marian	Romanian Presidency
Moldovan Ovidiu Daniel	Government
Ghișă Alexandru	MFA
Blaj Mihai	MFA
Călin Emanoil Ioan	MoND
Bărbieru Alexandru	Government
Platona Pavel	UNPR
Paturca Roxana	MFA
Grădinaru Beatrice	Government
Intotero Natalia Elena	MAE
Manolache Felicia	Ministry of Finance
Popescu Alexandru	Embassy of Republic of Moldova
Iancu Nicolae	SRI
Andronic Cătălin	MoND
Pavel Daniel	Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Donea Ștefan	European Commission
Gorita Ion	Ambassador
Puhace Ioan	MAI
Stanciu Mihaela	
Arhire Stela	

Lazăr Gilda	JTI
Ficcarelli Giorgio	European Commission
Cibotaru Viorel	IESP
Pop Adrian	SNSPA
Spiroiu Nicolae	Eurisc
Spătaru Andi	MAI
Mureșan Liviu	Eurisc
Simons Onno	European Commission
Tudose Cornel	University of Bucharest
Popescu Daniel	Union International Center
Celac Sergiu	NCSD
Munteanu Cristian	University of Bucharest
Nedelea Cerasela	University of Bucharest
Jose de Pierpont	Secretary II Embassy of Bulgaria
Nikolov Nikolai	Attaché Embassy of Bulgaria
Incev Valentin	Advisor Embassy of Bulgaria
Covacs Atilo	Secretary Embassy of Hungary
Stanciu Ruxandra	MAE
Puscion Ewa	Secretary I Embassy of Poland
Salameh Nawaf	Alexandriion
Christoforidis George	Alexandriion
Bărbătosu Mihaela	University of Bucharest
Taraban Dragoș	TVR
Lukacs Claudiu	TVR
Ghiurco Monica	TVR
Radu Motoc	Program Director SOROS
Sergiu Panainte	Program Coordinator SOROS
Matei Mihaela	SRI
Milea Constantin	SRI
Nițoi Mihai Costin	SRI
Druga Florin	SRI

Chirieac Bogdan	TVR
Ghiță Virginia	TVR
Milescu Dragos	TVR
Ivănescu Amilcar	TVR
Cioabă Radu	TVR
Chelaru Ioan	TVR
Crețu Mihai	TVR

3 November 2009

**Director CPCEW
Iulian Chifu**

First Workshop Report

Romania's Priorities and NATO's Strategic Concept Casa Titulescu, 21st September, NGO Debate

Director of Workshop: Iulian Chifu
Euro-Atlantic Council Romania facilities.
Casa Titulescu, 40 participants

Romania's priorities for NATO's Strategic Concept

- NATO as a security provider in the 21st century: facing the new threats, missile defense, energy security and cyber security;
- Managing challenges and opportunities in the extended vicinity of the Alliance. The role of the partnership network as an investment in the trans-Atlantic and international security; the Balkans and the Black Sea-Caspian Sea regions;
- Balancing the collective-territorial defense, operations in the vicinity and the need for actions at a strategic distance, rethinking the territorial defense after the era of operations out of area.

Program

14.00-16.00 Agenda presentation:

- Iulian Chifu, CPCEW – introductory remarks
- Iulian Fota, National Security Adviser of the President – welcome address
- Liviu Mureșan, Euro-Atlantic Council Romania – agenda of the debates

Debate

16.00-16.30 Coffee Break

16.30-18.30 Presentations and ideas

- Alex Șerban, vice-president Atlantic Treaty Association
- Iulian Chifu CPCEW – methodology of the study and steps for the policy paper

Debate

19.00 Working dinner for the participants. Debates.

Debate report

The debate “*Romania’s priorities and the NATO Strategic Concept*” represents a first step in a series of events with the purpose of defining Romania’s position inside NATO, and to bring a contribution, through the results of debates held by a group of experts, to establishing a New Strategic Concept of the North Atlantic Alliance.

The Strategic Concept represents the second most important document after the Washington Treaty because it guides the activities of the Alliance regarding the goals and threats, so it needs to benefit of a wider debate. The Strategic Concept is seen as one with substance, in which balance should be the defining element. The clarification of the relations with Russia and a precise determination of the place and role of the new NATO – Russia partnership will have consequences on the EU – Russia relation, etc. The New Strategic Concept must find a solution for the situation in which the relations between the NATO member states can slow EU integration, such as the case of Turkey and Cyprus, and can have repercussions for the Alliance.

The New Strategic Concept has to clarify the future relations with Russia, Even though Russia seems to be in a relative decline (negative demographic trend and low technological performance, problems with keeping in Russia’s sphere of influence states with historic bonds). The quality of the partnership with Russia can represent a contribution to Europe’s stability and security, including energy security.

Article 5 represents a key problem and must be analyzed according to the new international context, one dominated by the world economic crisis, with costs for the Alliance and its member states.

The new international context encourages the implementation of a new Strategic Concept: changes at the White House and in the US new administration; the need for a dialogue with the states that challenge the rules of the Alliance (Russia) and with the ones with growing influence (China); putting in question the Western influence in the states placed geographically between NATO’s borders and Russia’s; the relation with the Muslim world; Iranian case etc.

From the perspective of the interdependence between the major actors, US-Russia and US-NATO relations await for the new decisions of the US administration. In the NATO-UE relation it is expected a mutual evaluation

in order to determine the compatibility of approaches, and regarding the NATO-Russia-EU triangle they expect the answers at Russia's requests and the relevance of NATO's proposal for Russia.

NATO is considered an expression of the Western security, a body which feels the need to cooperate and form new partnerships with the other international players, an organization who needs a common political view about the future roles of the major actors.

There is the issue of avoiding a local/regional NATO, focused on Europe, on parts of it or of the Alliance, and of a global NATO, focused on the major emerging powers. It is recalled the fact that a growth in domestic instability can have an impact over the regional security as it is the case for Central Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.

In what concerns the partnerships, it is important the way in which the Alliance will conceive its relations with the partners, including the governmental organizations, as well as non-governmental and local actors. The participants underlined the need for EU-NATO cooperation, drawing attention over the fact that states with problems, such as Romania, can represent "the weak link" of EU's and even NATO's (political instability, corruption, lack of economical performance, incoherence in foreign policy). From the same perspective, the weak performance of the Romania-EU relations can face the possibility of losing the representation in the EU and NATO.

Regarding the Romania-Russia relations, Russia can become a partner if there are signs that could indicate a change of its attitude.

In the Romania-NATO relation, Article 5 has a great importance, especially after the August 2008 experience with Georgia. There were suggestions to keep the present content of the Concept and final summit declarations, as well as the flexibility through the development of the idea of defense, cyber defense and protection of critical infrastructure.

As far as the Afghanistan issue is concerned, the attention falls on the need of a common military perspective, as well as of a civilian approach. Afghanistan must be engaged in a regional context, using an integrated strategy, which combines security, government, rule of law and economic development, at the same time with the development of this country's capability to assume responsibility for its own destiny.

The New Strategic Concept should take into consideration, first of all the need to provide security for civilians, not only for states (the 9/11th,

Madrid, London cases), as well as the challenge of finding the proper formula for a dialogue with the Muslim world, without neglecting the new security problems such as the one in the space area.

As an invitation to future debates, here are a series of questions to which the New Strategic Concept should come with an answer:

- What kind of security environment will be in 2030?
- How relevant will be the present NATO after two decades?
- How relevant will be the present EU after two decades?
- From a transatlantic NATO to a global NATO?
- From a post Cold War NATO to a NATO as an answer to global warming?
- Which are Romania's expectations towards NATO in the next two decades?
- Which are NATO's expectations from Romania in the next two decades?
- Which is the definition of the Strategic Concept for Romania in the next 10–20 years, taking into consideration that security becomes a more and more complex issue?
- Which are the possible threats for Romania? Natural disasters? Demography? Etc.

The consequences of canceling the anti missile shield and its implications on the Black Sea security were also topics in the debate.

Ideas and statements

Iulian Fota

- The strategic concept lays down NATO's direction and offers information about threats and risks that require solving. We need a strategic concept that does not avoid existing realities. A new strategic concept is a prerequisite for a new international context. Some experts claim that, with Russia's attack on Georgia and the economic crisis, a new stage has emerged, shifts have occurred in the international system. Still, Russia is not of the same opinion. If in the past terrorism took precedence over other threats outlined in the strategic concept, nowadays, it ranks second, if not third.

-
- Romania is uncomfortable with the notion of West, is unable to regard itself as part of the West, even though after the EU accession it is part of it. Even when Russia makes references, it talks about Europe and Romania. NATO is the expression of the Western World's need for security. In Foreign Affairs, Brzezinski raises the question of whether NATO will be the organization that the West needs.
 - It remains still unclear how the new US administration regards international relations, new developments in the Iranian dossier and the relation with Russia. The new strategic concept must be defined by the US in accordance with NATO's agenda. Article 5 should provide a definition of the role NATO should assume in Western Europe. But in order to shed some light on the realities of the international arena, we must compel Russia to disclose its own game.
 - One of the measures that ought to stand at the core of the new strategic concept is related to the reconfirmation of Article 5. Realistically speaking, the issue of balance is very important, collective defense, the balance between common threats and European threats, the balance between geographical regions (why the states surrounding the Adriatic Sea are granted more importance than the ones around the Black Sea).
 - Relations within the Alliance are just as significant for its strategic concept. For instance, NATO's relation with Germany has raised many questions, but, even more unexpected was France's decision to return to NATO military structures.
 - There are two divergent opinions when Europeans try finding a workable European formula in terms of security. The European Right regards Russia as an important state while the European Left considers they should maintain relations with the US without spoiling the relation with Russia. To conclude, Russia's role is not yet clarified as there is no unitary view, which is also caused by a not so hopeful prediction about Russia's future considering the demographic and economic plunge and absence of a soft policy towards the states within its sphere of influence. The US accepts some of Russia's claims, but, when the latter asks for too much, the US opposes. The West's stand is to accept a prospective Russian accession to NATO, since that would solve security matters between the two and generate a higher degree of overall security.

- As far as the relation between Romania and Russia is concerned, it has become clear that Romania should adopt a tougher stand towards Russia which would ensure a stronger partnership between the two than a flexible stand would.

Liviu Mureşanu

NATO in the context of change

Opinions from Karsten Voigt

Topics on which NATO must adapt to the transformation of the international scene:

- cooperation
- vision over a common course of action
- new partnerships
- global power (USA) vs. global value/ aspiration/ideal (EU)
- EU-NATO cooperation
- partnership with Russia
- common perspectives in Afghanistan
- strategic consensus
- human security
- relationship with the Muslim world
- new types of war
- domestic instability
- The partnership with Russia, cooperation with Russia enhances the stability and security for Europe as a whole.
- Human security is NATO's new priority, a European concept adopted by NATO in order to go beyond state security towards individual security.

Sergiu Celac

The new strategic concept should be based on:

1. Strengthening the application of Article 5
2. Concern for a contribution on agency's forum and priorities.
3. Energy security. This confronts with infrastructure security idea that can be solved by the viability of the Energy Charter. Medvedev reconfigured through the energy policies the global energy strategy.

In what Romania's energy security is concerned, it would be useful to have backup plans for the energy sector, including nuclear power.

The energy sector is a weak area of the economic, industrial transactions.

Energy security is an unresolved point between the EU and Russia.

Last week on the Valdai Discussion Club, experts presented a parallel between Russian interests and the interests of the United States from the Russian perspective that denote future policy lines of Russia, but also their strategic lines.

EU is a weak player in terms of energy security, and this pleases Russia because it is easier to work, cooperate with separate parts than with the common interests of countries.

From this presentation it is clear that Russia did not want to make it a tactical move, but was an honest opinion, because the EU has not got a chance to become stronger.

Julian Chifu

What does NATO want to become?

An universal toolbox or an alliance that has some objectives and has to pursue them? To create the new NATO' strategic concept we must have a version of flexibility which contains:

- Expansion, and access to the issue of Article 5, and in addition to that the optional use of it, two months would pass before a validated reaction.
- The wording of Article 5 plus extending the strategic concept's adaptation of cyber defense.

The conflicts between countries that have hampered their integration in the EU as was the case of Turkey and Cyprus could have repercussions in NATO.

NATO approach to solving problems by military means, which in fact could be resolved diplomatically.

Ambassador Ecobescu

He offered the counter of the NATO's weaknesses by setting up a list of main points and priorities that must be pursued to reach their implementation.

Julian Fota

Romania's relationship with Russia is not vital, while the relationship with U.S. is very important.

What is the comfort that Romania has as a NATO member?

How would it have been if Romania was not a NATO country?

What is the prospect of Romania in NATO over 15 years?

How will Romania follow its interests in the new strategic concept?

Romania's closeness to Russia is not favorable. Most wars have had of the cause of the fight for market reasons. What place is there for any interest for market monopoly as long as there are no investments with a real strategic interest?

For Russia to keep their current position, it must create as many problems to be noticed. It is better for us to join the Russians in projects, partnerships, organizations because they bring Europe safety, grace to the lack of tensions in the relations in this area.

NATO has as new priorities - cyber defense and energy security which represent the interest and the need to adopt a new NATO' strategic concept. NATO talks about common defense, not security. A new re-approach of NATO's concept. A defense must be understood not only as military defense.

Sergiu Celac

Russia and China want to transform the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in an Asian NATO, to limit, stop NATO's power in Asia. It is therefore desirable for both to have a permanent collaboration.

Aurel Preda

Europe must decide for itself when it comes to security, and NATO to come to another level.

What follows the new anti-missile system in the relationship between the U.S. and Russia?

Conclusions

There are questions if Turkey and Russia will become NATO members, if NATO will exist anymore, but what are scenarios for NATO in 2030?

Participants, 21st septembrie 2009

1. Doru Frunzuliță - President of the "George C. Marshall" Association Romania
2. Alexandru Șerban - Vice-president ATA /Atlantic Treaty Association

3. Gen. (r) Nicolae Spiroiu - Executive Director, Euro-Atlantic Council Romania
4. Sorin Encuțescu - President, “Manfred Worner” Association, founding member CEAR
5. Răzvan Ionescu, President, Association for Regional Cooperation and Security “ALLIANCE”
6. Constantin Dudu Ionescu, President IDEA Foundation
7. Lavinia Andrei
8. Dorel Șandor
9. Radu Tudor
10. Sever Voinescu
11. Sandra Prolong, President, Synergetica
12. Viorel Mircescu, Executive Director, Center for Assistance to non-Governmental Organisations
13. Radu Filipescu, President Board of Directors, Group for Social Dialogue
14. Cristian Pârvulescu, President, Pro Democracy Association
15. Mircea Toma, Director, Media Monitoring Agency “Cațavencu Academy”
16. Ioana Avădani, Executive Director, Center for Independent Journalism
17. Ilona Mihaieș, President Foundation for an Open Society
18. Alina Inayah, Director, German Marshall Fund Romania
19. Stelian Arion Vice-president ARTS
20. Mircea Botescu Conf. Dr. University Bucharest
21. Iulian Chifu, Director, Center for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning
22. Septimiu Caceu, Director, Homeland Security Center - EURISC
23. Teodor Minodor Chirică, General Director, AMEC NUCLEAR RO
24. Constantin Ciupagea, Director IEM
25. Iulian Fota, Presidential Adviser, Presidential Administration
26. Dumitru Mihu, Project Director, EURISC Foundation
27. Mihai Moia, General Secretary, EURISC Foundation
28. Ing. Doina Nițu
29. Mihail Orzeata, Senior Research Fellow, EURISC Foundation
30. Dorin Prunariu, President, Romanian Space Agency Council
31. Catrinel Reed Tibacu, Researcher, EURISC Foundation
32. Teodor Repciuc, Professor Univ. Dr. Ecological University

33. Ștefan Roseanu, Senior Partner, Railway Club
34. Adrian Vâlcu Phd, Polytechnic University, Bucharest
35. Răsvan Roceanu, IHEDN Alumni Association
36. Gen.(r) Mihaiu Mărgărit, Vice-president, Association of the Officers in Reserves from Romania
37. Ciprian Dediu, EURISC Foundation
38. Ambassador Nicolae Ecobescu
39. Ambassador Nicolae Micu
40. Vasile Cândea, President Academy of Science, Romania
41. Ambassador Sergiu Celac, Senior Advisor, National Center for Sustainable Development
42. Florin Pogonaru, Vice-president Aspen
43. Vasile Ciulava
44. Ion Nițu
45. Radu Dop
46. Cătălin Andronic

Second Workshop Report

Strengthening NATO as a security provider in the 21st century. Article 5 for the 21st century. The need to address the new threats. A special focus on terrorism, missile defense, energy security, cyber defense

National Defense College

Bucharest

The workshop at the academic level took place during the period 5-8th October 2009

The Workshop had 2 parts: in-door debates and a conference

The main speakers have centered their discussions on the following topics:

- Main threats and challenges defining NATO's strategic environment
- Contingency planning for the new members;
- Applying Article 5: balance between conventional and asymmetric threats
- Increasing NATO's role in dealing with cross-border threats and challenges: terrorism, WMD proliferation, energy security, cyber security;
- The role of missile defense;
- Sharing security burdens inside NATO while preserving trans-Atlantic partnership and solidarity;
- Comprehensive approach and sharing security burdens outside NATO, by working with other organizations (UN, EU, etc.): NATO's place in the European and Global Security Architecture.

Indoor debates:

5 October, National Defense College – 100 participants

Presentation: **NATO Strategic Concept Agenda 15–16.30**

Coffee break

17–19 Open Debate

Introductory remarks on NATO's origins and evolution. Comparative analysis of the Alliance strategic concepts – Gen. Lt. Prof. Dr. Teodor Frunzetti

Romania's integration process and her current role in NATO – Gen. Prof. Cornel Codita

The topic addressed in the class regarded both the international context and the institutional evolution of the Alliance. The successive changes of NATO strategic concepts were analyzed depending on the features of the various factors embedded in each circumstance. Also, the Case of Romania benefitted of a particular focus in the debates.

6 October, National Defense College – 100 participants

Presentation: **Where NATO goes: regional or global NATO. 15–16.30.**

Coffee break.

17–19 Open Debate

NATO's present operations and missions analysis - Col. Gheorghe Badea, General Staff Representative

The Transatlantic relations and the relevance of "Berlin Plus" Agreement. Enlargement trends – Col. Dr. George Tibil – Department of Defense Policy and Planning Representative

Both main speakers are top level officers of the Romanian Army, with a solid expertise of the issues they covered. They presented and delivered an in-depth assessment of the current operations and missions of the Alliance, with a special focus on the Romanian contributions in the field. The relationship between EU and NATO was largely discussed and generated a vivid interest within the public.

7 October, National Defense College – 100 participants

Presentation: **New threats: strategic distance, vicinity, at home. 15–16.30.**

Coffee break.

17–19 Debate

The significance of the Bucharest (2008) and Strasbourg – Khel Summit Declarations (2008) – Senior Lecturer PhD. Iulian Chifu, CPC-EW

NATO's current challenges and perspectives. The need for new capabilities – Senior Lecturer PhD. Mireille Rădoi, National Defense College

The relevance of the two Declarations was analyzed in the light of the New Strategic Concept. The importance of each member state's contribution was another interesting issue and the option of developing niche capabilities instead of free riding in the Alliance, in correlation with the new risks and threats.

Main event: **8 October**, National Defense College – 140 participants

CONFERENCE PROGRAMME

Strengthening NATO as a security provider in the 21st century. Article 5 for the 21st century. The need to address the new threats. A special focus on terrorism, missile defense, energy security, cyber defense

16.00: Arrival of the participants

16.10: Welcome speech – col. Mircea MÎNDRESCU, Head of the National Defense College

16.15: Overview of the NATO Project – Iulian CHIFU, Director of Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Center

16.20: Opening address by Mr. Dragos GHERCIOIU – Director of Defense Policy and Planning Department

16.30: NATO PDD official (through VCR) Antonio ORTIZ

16.45: Q&A

17.00: Senator Theodor MELEȘCANU, President of the Defense, Security and Public Order Commission of the Romanian Senate

17.15: H E Wojciech ZAJACZKOWSKI Polish Ambassador to Romania – View from a country with similar challenges**17.45: col. Mircea MÎNDRESCU, Q&A Session****18.00: Coffee Break****18.10-19.00: Open Debate and Conclusions**

On the 8th of October 2009, the Workshop no. 2 on “Strengthening NATO as a security provider in the 21st century. Article 5 for the 21st century. The need to address the new threats. A special focus on terrorism, missile defense, energy security, cyber defense” was held at the National Defense College, under the aegis of Romanian National Defense College and Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Centre and supervised by the NATO PDD. The workshop took place in the amphitheatre “Gen. Emanoil Ionescu“, between 16,00 and 19,00 h, with the participation of the following guests:

1. H E Wojciech ZAJACZKOWSKI, Polish Ambassador to Romania;
2. Senator Theodor MELEȘCANU, President Defense, Security and Public Order Commission of the Romanian Senate;
3. Mr. Gabriel GHERCIOIU, General Director of the Planning and Defense Policy Directorate, MoD;
4. Iulian CHIFU, Director of Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Center;
5. Col. Mircea MÎNDRESCU, Head of the National Defense College;
6. Mr. Antonio ORTIZ, counselor, Policy Planning Division, NATO PDD;

and other 86 participants from institutions and academic areas involved in security and defense issues.

Based on the fact that the “New Strategic Concept” should be discussed and agreed as soon as possible and in order to ensure maximum transparency, each NATO member should address the new strategy within the next year, at a time when the world faces its most challenging security environment since the end of the Second World War. The New Strategic Concept is to be adopted at the Lisbon Summit, at the end of 2010.

The first working session started with Col. Mircea MINDRESCU as moderator. He gave a welcome speech, introduced all speakers to the audience and presented the agenda of the day.

Mr Iulian Chifu presented the project, highlighting that this was the second WG within in, taking place at academic level soon to be followed by other similar ones.

All speakers centered their interventions on NATO's role in the international and internal security environment, the relations with main actors on the security stage and the need to address the new challenges.

NATO must be an Alliance that provides both immediate protection against threats and an instrument to shape the strategic environment in a way that is conducive to the alliance's interests and values.

Globalization will continue to change the security dynamics in many ways. Climate change will put key resources like food, water and land under considerable stress. The global competition for energy and natural resources will re-define the relationship between security and economics. Information technology will make the societies more vulnerable to cyber warfare. Proliferation of WMD technology and know-how raises the specter of terrorist non-state actors acquiring means of mass destruction. At the same time, collective defense, NATO's core function, will and must remain a precious commodity.

Article 5 remains the core of the Alliance's purpose. The idea that providing security outside NATO's boundaries somehow competes with, or detracts from, our responsibilities in this respect is misguided. So we need to look deeper into the meaning of collective defense and Allied solidarity in the new security environment, while the new Strategic Concept should be the opportunity for a broader discussion. Many of these new types of challenges (the recurrence of massive cyber attacks, global warming, competition for energy resources, terrorist activity and energy security) will not trigger a classical military response. But they will require the Allies to support each other politically, economically, and perhaps also militarily. The discussions are not about the present, but the future. There is a need to look at which additional capabilities the alliance will need in order to protect countries against missile proliferation or threats to our critical

energy infrastructure. What may currently look like the preoccupation of only a few Allies may soon affect all of them. That is why debates about the meaning of collective defense and about Allied solidarity, has become not only inevitable but also necessary.

A New Strategic Concept must firmly embed the logic of the so-called Comprehensive Approach. In order to be successful, we must increasingly coordinate with other civilian actors and other organisations involved in security and defense. This type of coordination without a clear framework runs up the risk to squander valuable time and resources. The need for a structured cooperation with the UN and the EU on the strategic level and to coordinate much more closely on the tactical level as well, including with NGOs, is obvious. There is still a substantial gap between the military and the civilian aspects of crisis management. As a result, risk duplication or, worse, working at cross-purposes may not be unavoidable. A new Strategic Concept should make this point squarely and forcefully: in today's security environment, NATO is no longer a solo-player. The Alliance works best when it is working with others. It has neither the means nor the ambition to tackle each and every challenge on its own.

In the new Strategic Concept it should be made clear that the alliance would increasingly need to act with global partners, in a global partnership and not as a global policeman.

NATO's mission of consolidating Europe must continue. The new Strategic Concept will have to make clear how to put that open door principle into practice, as Europe's eastern most countries start knocking at NATO's door. The Strategic Concept may also have to say something about the conditions that have to be met before more countries are admitted in the future.

As long as there is a gap between where countries are and where they want to be, the unification of Europe will not be complete. This is as relevant for the EU as it is for NATO.

As a political-military organisation, NATO must become more effective. And a New Strategic Concept should be crystal clear about this. Given the increasing demands upon NATO, all its activities must be less process-oriented and more results-oriented. Resources have to better match

priorities; and you cannot reconcile forever improved performance with a zero-growth budget. NATO nations are soon going to have to increase NATO's budget, to match a growing list of responsibilities. Also a defense planning system is needed that is more responsive to nations' needs.

Taking NATO reform seriously means also to look for more synergies with the European Union. All allied countries have only one set of national military forces and national defense budgets. So it is absolutely critical that all of the capabilities that they are able to generate from this pool of forces are equally available to both NATO and the EU. If they duplicate, or go off in different directions, both will fail. It is why a new Strategic Concept should be about the need for more NATO-EU cooperation and should take into account EU's efforts to update its own European Security Strategy and vice versa. The scope of consultations on the New Strategic Concept must deepen and broaden. The challenges today are multi-faceted, interlinked and can arise from anywhere in the world. NATO cannot be just reactive but proactive as well.

LIST OF INVITED PERSONS
To the Workshop no. 2 organised at Romanian NDC
on 8th October, 2009

Rank	Surname, Name	PLACE OF WORK
	Iulian FOTA	Presidential Advisor
	Georgeta GAVRILĂ	General Secretary Ministry of Defense
Lt.Gen. professor PhD	Teodor FRUNZETI	Commander (Rector) National Defense University "Carol I"
	Ioana TIMOFTE	Dir.adj. DRIPR
Brig.Gen.PhD	Floarea ȘERBAN	Head of Directorate for relations with Parliament and legal assistance
Brig.Gen.	Dan GHICA-RADU	Chief of Staff of Land Forces
Maj.Gen.PhD eng.	Gheorghe SAVU	General Director of the Directorate General Information
Brig.Gen.PhD	Visarion NEAGOE	Chief Joint Operational Command
Maj.Gen. professor PhD	Cătălin ZISU	Chief Joint Logistics Command
Col.PhD eng.	Mihail CIUPERCEANU	Head of Internal Audit
	Constantin DEGERATU	State CounselorMaj.Gen.(ret.)
	Mihail IONESCU	Head of IDPSMH
Col.PhD eng.	Adrian PÂRLOG	Deputy Head of Operations for DIM
<i>Maj.Gen. eng.</i>	<i>Marcel OPRIȘ</i>	<i>Director of Special Telecommunications</i>
Chestor de poliție	<i>Petre TOBĂ</i>	<i>Inspector General of Police Headquarters</i>
Brig.Gen.	<i>Dan TUCAN</i>	<i>GOVERNMENT OF ROMANIA</i>
Col.assoc. prof. PhD	Gheorghe Teodoru ȘTEFAN	ANI
Brig.Gen.professor PhD	Toma GHEORGHE	ANI
Gl.professor PhD	Eugen BĂDĂLAN	

Maj.Gen. PhD	Olimpiodor ANTONESCU	First Deputy Inspector General and Chief of Staff of the Romanian Gendarmerie
Gl.(ret) Professor PhD	Ion ANDREESCU	
Chestor Professor PhD	Costică VOICU	Police Academy “A.I.Cuza”Gl.(ret)
Professor PhD	Mircea MUREȘAN	NDU
	Costică ȚENU	NDU
	Constantin MOȘTOFLEI	NDU
Professor PhD	Augustin FUEREĂ	
Professor PhD	Vasile CÂNDEA	President of the Association of Scientists
Brig. Gen. (ret) Professor PhD	Sergiu MEDAR Cornel CODIȚĂ	NSAPS
	Vasile SECĂREȘ	
	Laurențiu ȘTEFAN	U.S. Embassy
	Harry BUCUR	
Col. Professor PhD PhD	Adrian FULEA	University of Bucharest Professor
	Adrian POP	SNSPA
Col.	NICOLAESCU Ioan Technical Academy	Ministry of Defense, Military
LTC	ALMĂJAN	Marian Ministry of Defense, National Military Command Center, General Staff
Cms. Pol.	CRISTESCU Vladimir	MINISTRY OF ADMINISTRATION AND INTERIOR
	Capt. PARASCHIV Marin	Guard and Protection Service
Insp. Pol.	DAJBOG Monica	MINISTRY OF ADMINISTRATION AND INTERIOR
Subinsp. Pol.	BUCUR Oana	MINISTRY OF ADMINISTRATION AND INTERIOR
Subinsp. Pol.	ȚENE Rodica	MINISTRY OF ADMINISTRATION AND INTERIOR
P.C.C.	ANCUȚ Mariana	MApN, SMFT

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	BOBARU Dan	RoNDC Student
	BURLEA Ștefan	RoNDC Student
	CATANA Aida	RoNDC Student
	CHIȚESCU Bogdan	RoNDC Student
	CIORIIA Emil	RoNDC Student
	CIUPERCEANU Radu	RoNDC Student
	COMAN Dragoș	RoNDC Student
	CONSTANTIN Eugen	RoNDC Student
	CONSTANTIN Nicolae	RoNDC Student
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	DRAGOMIR Gigi	RoNDC Student
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4.	RADU GABRIELA
5.	SAULIUC ADRIANA
6.	BĂLĂȘOIU NARCIZ
7.	ROMER WALTER
8.	NEDEA BOGDAN
10.	CSAKI ALEXANDRU
11.	ABDISA SEILA
12.	ARGHIR RADU
13.	TARBAN CARMEN
14.	MARIN FLORENTINA
15.	OPROIU MONICA
16.	PORDEA ALINA

Project
NATO AND THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT.
ROMANIA'S PRIORITIES

8 October 2009

Press Report

Director of Program: Iulian Chifu, CPCEW

**Co-director of Project: Doina MUREȘAN, Romanian National
Defense College**

On the 8th October the National Defense College hosted the workshop focused on “Straightening NATO’s capabilities in an energy supplier in the 21st century. The activity was part of the project “NATO and the new strategic concept. Romania’s responsibilities”, organized by the National Defense College, Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Center, NATO PDD Public Division and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

On the 7th October there was a press release that announced the event and encouraged journalists to attend the workshop. It appeared in various newspapers and news portals, such as AMOSNEWS:

(http://amosnews.ro/Atelier_de_lucru_pentru_noul_concept_strategic_al_NATO_la_Colegiul_National_de_Aparare-289213),
stiri.ROl.ro (<http://stiri.rol.ro/content/view/445380/3/>),
ziarul Constanta: (<http://www.ziuconstantina.ro/categorie/ministerul-apararii-nationale.html>),
stiriaz.ro : <http://magazinmilitar.blogspot.com/2009/10/atelier-de-lucru-pentru-noul-concept.html>, a Romanian military magazine:
<http://magazinmilitar.blogspot.com/2009/10/atelier-de-lucru-pentru-noul-concept.html> and the site of the Ministry of Defense:
http://www.mapn.ro/cpresa/13190_Atelier-de-lucru-pentru-noul-concept-strategic-al-NATO-la-Colegiul-Na%C5%A3ional-de-Ap%C4%83rare

The day after the conference the journalists of MoND published an article on the site of MoND, a photo gallery: <http://www.mapn.ro/fotodb/20091009> and a short movie released on armataTV:
<http://www.mapn.ro/fotodb/20091009>.

Third Workshop Report

**“Getting security right in NATO’s wider neighbourhood:
does this still matter?”**

The future of NATO’s partnership network.

**A special focus on the Balkans and Wider Black Sea-Caspian
region”**

Program

- 9,30 -10.00: Registration of the participants
- 10.00-11.30: Session I *“New perspectives on NATO’s wider neighbourhood”* (media allowed)
• moderator Iulian Chifu, director of CPCEW
- 10.00-10.30: Opening Statement by Cătălin Predoiu, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Message of the NATO Deputy Secretary General, Ambassador Claudio Bisogniero (transmitted through VTC)
- 10.30-11.30: Forward address of Mr. Iulian Fota, Presidential Advisor for Security;
- 11.00-11.30: Debate

Topics:

- The role of the Eastern Partnership countries and of the Black Sea for the Euro-Atlantic security; NATO’s role in the region;
- The hypothesis of a “win-win” approach of NATO-Russia relation;
- NATO and the security in the vicinity of the Alliance: from the false dilemma of regional instability to the transborder threat assesment and countering.

- 11.30: Coffee break
- The press is leaving the room
- 12.00 -13.30: Session II: “*The future of NATO’s partnership network*” (closed-door debate, media not allowed)
- moderator Bogdan Aurescu, State Secretary for Strategic Affairs MFA

Positions:

- Ambassador Kim Traavik, Permanent Representative of Norway to NATO
- Ambassador Sorin Ducaru, Permanent Representative of Romania to NATO.

Topics for debate:

- Importance of regional stability;
- Defining the Partnerships (from EAPC to the Mediterranean Dialogue and Global Partnerships);
- NATO’s enlargement policy

- 13.30 -13.45: Session III: Conclusions
- Presentation Iulian Chifu, director of CPCEW

Debates

1. On October the 15th, 2009, the workshop “*Getting right security in NATO’s wider neighbourhood: does this still matter? The future of NATO’s partnership network. A special focus on the Balkans and Wider Black Sea-Caspian region*” took place at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, co-organized with the Center for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning. The workshop was part of the project “NATO and the New Strategic Concept. Romania’s Priorities”, realized with the support of NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division.
2. In the opening statement, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, H.E. Mr. Cătălin Predoiu, highlighted the fact that the major stakes pursued by Romania with respect to the strategic thinking on NATO’s wider neighbourhood refer inter alia to the preservation of values,

principles and commitments as the basis for NATO's cooperation with partners. They also refer to the continuation of the "open door" policy with emphasis on compliance with membership criteria as well as to strengthening NATO's partnerships and cooperation with the EU, UN, and the OSCE and to specific contributions to the building of defense and security institutions of states and/or organizations. The Minister underlined that Romania has no interest in remaining the Eastern border of the Alliance.

He also stressed that the issue of "a global NATO versus a regional NATO" is only a false dilemma. In terms of geography, the main security challenges for NATO originate from its wide neighbourhood.

Under this logic, the wider Black Sea region is an integral part of the European project of consolidating stability throughout Europe through democracy, cooperation and integration. This region is an indispensable component of the Euro-Atlantic community of security, democracy and prosperity. It is also important in terms of diversification of energy supply sources and transport routes. Furthermore, it has also an important stake for the new approach on missile defense.

During a VTC link from NATO HQ in Brussels, **Ambassador Claudio Bisogniero**, Deputy Secretary General of NATO, pointed out the need for a new Strategic Concept, underlining both the internal transformations of the Alliance and the changes in the strategic environment that occurred since the adoption of the current Strategic Concept. The involvement of the civil society in drafting the guidelines of the new concept will bring added value in terms of legitimacy.

In terms of substance, the NSC will have to address the following issues:

- the need to keep the right balance between Article 5 and non-Article 5 contingencies;
- the meaning of solidarity in an environment that allows countries to be destabilized by non-conventional threats (e.g. cyber attacks, energy insecurity);
- the need for a comprehensive approach, including the cooperation with other international organizations and the private sector;

- the need for NATO to contribute to the general goal of a free and stable Europe, through the continuation of the enlargement process and the strengthening of its partnerships;
- the relation with Russia will continue to be marked by controversies, but it must not be kept hostage to them. It will have to be developed along the lines of the common interests.

Mr. Iulian Fota, Presidential Advisor for National Security, reminded that NATO has been and continues to be a factor that decisively contributes to the unification of Europe. NATO continues to be a credo for a strong transatlantic relation. He expressed the opinion that the new Strategic Concept must also contribute to a greater goal: to help NATO “keep the West united”. In this respect, although the security environment has become more complicated, no one nation should be left alone in tackling the problems triggered by the globalization process. The issue of complementarity of tasks is also important: we should not expect a “global NATO”, but a “NATO with global partners”.

At the end of the first session, the questions and comments of the participants underlined that:

- NSC must cover the new meanings of “solidarity” concept, to include the answer to new threats. Cyber attacks and energy insecurity are most obvious, likely to paralyze a country without moving a single soldier. The cooperation with other international organizations is also of paramount importance.
- The issue of public support is very important, both in the member states and in the partner countries. In this respect, the elaboration of the NSC is going to be one of the most inclusive processes in the history of the Alliance.
- NATO and the EU should both contribute in complementarity to the stability and democracy in Europe and in the neighbourhood. Both the competition and the overlaps would be counter-productive. Multidimensional and multi-layer partnerships can help the Alliance to better perform its tasks.

3. The second session (with closed doors) was moderated by Mr. Bogdan Aureescu, State Secretary for Strategic Affairs, Romanian MFA.

The presentations and the discussions underscored several main ideas:

- One of the important challenges of the Alliance is finding the right balance between the security of the members' territory and the out-of-area operations. NATO needs essentially the same capabilities for expeditionary missions as those available to act on the territory of the Alliance.
- NATO's core remains the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.
- The partnerships proved their usefulness as instruments to project stability outside the territory of the Alliance, as well as an important contribution to the fulfillment of NATO's tasks. One should remember that 15 countries out of those contributing to ISAF are not NATO members. The principle of self-selection in partnerships should be maintained and strengthened.
- Inside NATO, it was mentioned, the interest for, and awareness of, different geographical regions are uneven. Certain challenges are specific to certain areas. Therefore the focus of some nations on their regions of interest brings an important contribution to the general situational awareness of NATO, which is in the interest of all Allies.
- Despite persistent disagreements, NATO's relation with Russia is now on a positive trend. NATO should maintain its dual-track approach. In this respect, the relation should be focused both on pragmatic approach of common security threats and challenges and on upholding common values.
- Strategic partnerships with other organizations, such as the EU and the UN, should be further developed. The participation of the president of the EU Commission and the UN Secretary General at the Bucharest NATO Summit created a good political momentum in this sense.

4. Conclusions:

- The process of developing the New Strategic Concept should be both a NATO internal exercise and an opportunity for better informing the public on NATO's future role. It will have to determine the manner in which the Alliance will interact and cooperate with other actors and the way NATO will adjust its ideas, processes and capabilities, in order to be compatible with other organizations.
- The process of upgrading NATO's Strategic Concept provides an opportunity for underscoring the profile of NATO's partnerships and for highlighting the need for NATO to contribute more to strengthening security in its neighbourhood - the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, the wider Black Sea-Caspian region, Central Asia, Mediterranean and others.
- The Black Sea region is part of the European project of consolidating stability throughout Europe through democracy, cooperation and integration. It is an indispensable component of the Euro-Atlantic community of security, democracy and prosperity, also important in terms of diversification of energy sources and transport routes and with a special stake for the new approach on missile defense.
- NATO enlargement to countries of Central and Eastern Europe was a remarkable success for the transatlantic Alliance. It proved to be a very powerful tool in stabilizing regions, encouraging reforms and consolidating Europe. Due to this process, NATO continues to play a special role in unifying a continent divided for nearly half a century. And that is why NATO should continue to promote tailored partnerships to foster greater stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area.
- The allied countries situated, in geographical terms, at the border of the Alliance might be more aware of certain challenges. Their regional focus on High North, Strategic South or the Black Sea area contribute to a better answer of the Alliance to specific threats and, at the same time, provide opportunities for strengthening cooperation in those particular regions.

- Security in the Black Sea region is part of the Euro-Atlantic security. The area is not immune to new risks and their potential for proliferation. That is why due attention should be paid to reflecting new challenges in this area, and NATO should continue to support, as appropriate, efforts based on regional priorities and dialogue among the Black Sea states and with the Alliance.

17 octombrie 2009

Project, 17 September 2009

Workshop “Getting right security in NATO’s wider neighbourhood: does this still matter?”

The future of NATO’s partnership network.

A special focus on the Balkans and Wider Black Sea-Caspian region.”

*Organised by the Center for Conflict Prevention
and Early Warning and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs*

15 October 2009

**LIST OF ROMANIAN GUESTS
GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS, NGO’S, ACADEMICS**

NR. CRT.	NAME	POSITION	INSTITUTION	SITUATION PARTICI- PATION	CONTACT	OBS.
PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION						
1.	IULIAN FOTA	PRESIDENTIAL Security Advisor	PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION			
2.	ANCA ILINOIU	PRESIDENTIAL Foreign Policy Advisor	PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION			
3.	CONSTANTIN DEGERATU	State counsellor	PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION			

4.	VALENTIN BUDĂU	Expert, Department International Relations	PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION			
GOVERNMENT						
5.	CĂTĂLIN VĂTAFU	Personal counsellor of the Prime Minister for Foreign Policy	GOVERNMENT			
6.	ȘTEFANIA FERENCZ	State Secretary	GOVERNMENT			
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE						
7.	VIOREL OANCEA	State Secretary Department for Defense Policy and Planning, chief of the Direction for International Cooperation in the Defense field	MINISTRY OF DEFENSE			
8.	AUREL IONEL LASCU	State secretary, chief of Arms Department	MINISTRY OF DEFENSE			

9.	DAN TĂTARU	State secretary for the relations with the Parliament and public informations	MINISTRY OF DEFENSE			
10.	DRAGOȘ GABRIEL GHERCIOIU	General Director Department for Defence Policy and Planning	MINISTRY OF DEFENSE			
11.	ELENA FRUNZETI	Deputy Director adjunct, Defense Policies Direction	MINISTRY OF DEFENSE			
12.	Gen. brigadier ing. ALEXANDRU COTOARĂ NICOLAE Cooperation for Defense	Chief Directorate for International	MINISTRY OF DEFENSE			
13.	Gen. Lt. prof. univ. dr. TEODOR FRUNZETI	Comandant (Rector) NDU	National Defense University "Carol I"			
14.	Col. MIRCEA MÎNDRESCU	Deputy Director National Defense College	National Defense University "Carol I"			

15.	Gen. major (ret) dr. MIHAIL IONESCU	Director	Institute for Political Studies, Defense and Military History			
16.	Gen. brigadier VIRGIL BĂLĂCEANU	Chief Direction Strategic Planning	General Staff			
MINISTRY OF ADMINISTRATION AND INTERNAL AFFAIRS						
17.	RADU STANCU	State secretary for the Relation with the Parliament and European Affairs	MINISTRY OF ADMINISTRATION AND INTERNAL AFFAIRS			
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES						
18.	General lt. SILVIU PREDOIU	Deputy Director FIS	FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE			
19.	General brigadier FLORIAN COLDEA SERVICE	First Deputy Director RIS	ROMANIAN INTELLIGENCE			
NGO REPRESENTATIVES, ACADEMIC COMMUNITY						
20.	Dr. DORU FRUZULICĂ	PRESIDENT	GEORGE C. MARSHALL FOUNDATION ROMANIA			

21.	Prof. Univ. Dr. VLAD NISTOR	DIRECTOR	ROMANIAN DIPLOMATIC INSTITUTE				
22	GEORGE POTRA	DIRECTOR	NICOLAE TITULESCU FOUNDATION				
23.	Conf. Univ. Dr. DAN PETRE		ROMANIAN DIPLOMATIC INSTITUTE				
24.	RADU DUDĂU		ROMANIAN DIPLOMATIC INSTITUTE				
25.	CORNEL CODIȚĂ	PROFESOR, POLITICAL ANALIST	REDACȚIA BURSA				
26.	CRISTIAN PĂRVULESCU	PRESIDENT	PRO - DEMOCRAȚIA ASSOCIATION				
27.	ALEXANDRU ȘERBAN	PRESIDENT	EURO-ATLANTIC COUNCIL ROMANIA - CASA NATO				
28.	Prof. Univ. Dr. CONSTANTIN BUȘE	DIRECTOR	EURO-ATLANTIC STUDIES CENTER BUCHAREST UNIVERSITY				
29.	LILIANA POPESCU	PRESIDENT	FOUNDATION FOR CIVIC EDUCATION AND ACADEMIC DEVELOPMENT				

30.	SORIN ENCUȚESCU			MANFRED WORNER FOUNDATION ROMANIA				
31.	LIVIU MUREȘAN	EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR		EURISC FOUNDATION				
32.	RADU TUDOR	POLITIC ANALIST						
33.	EMIL HUREZEANU	POLITICAL ANALIST						
34.	BOGDAN CHIRIAC	POLITICAL ANALIST						
35.	IULIAN CHIFU	DIRECTOR		CONFLICT PREVENTION AND EARLY WARNING CENTER				
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS								
36.	CRISTIAN DIACONESCU	Minister		MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS				
37.	BOGDAN AURESCU	State secretary for Strategic Affairs		MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS				
38.	DORU COSTEA	State secretary for Global Affairs		MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS EXTERNE				

39.	BOGDAN MAZURU	State secretary for European Affairs	MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS			
40.	NATALIA INTOTERO	State secretary for the Relation with the Parliament	MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS			
41.	MIHNEA CONSTANTINESCU	Ambassador with special assignments, General Director	MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS			
42.	ȘTEFAN TINCA	General Director General Direction for Political Affairs	MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS			
43.	CĂLIN STOICA	General Director General Direction Strategic Affairs	MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS			
44.	GHEORGHE MAGHERU	General Director General Direction Bilateral Relations	MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS			

45.	IRINA ZIDARU	General Director General Direction for Regional Cooperation	MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS				
46.	OANA MARINESCU	General Director General Direction for Public Diplomacy	MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS				
	MFA representatives involved in security matters (DPS, DAP, DPP)						

FOREIGN INVITEES FROM ROMANIA: NATO COUNTRIES AMBASSADORS

Nr. Crt.	COUNTRY	NAME	PARTICIPATION
1.	Albania	E.S. Dl. Dashnor Dervishi	
2.	Belgium	E.S. Dl. Leo D'aes	
3.	Bulgaria	E.S. Dl. Metodiev Radomirski	
4.	Canada	E.S. Dl Philippe Beaulne	
5.	Croatia	E.S. Dl. Ivica Maštruko	
6.	Czech Rep	E.S. Dl. Petr Dokladal	
7.	Denmark	E.S. Dl. Ulrik Helweg-Larsen	
8.	France	E.S. Dl. Henri Paul	
9.	Germany	E.S. Dl. Andreas von Mettenhein	
10.	Greece	E.S. Dl. Georgios Poukamissas	
11.	Hungary	E.S. Dl. Fúzes Oszkár Lászlo	
12.	Italy	E.S. Dl. Mario Cospito	
13.	Lithuania	E.S Dl. Vladimir Jarmolenko	
14.	Netherlands	E.S. Maria Wilhelmina Josepha Antonia van Gool	
15.	Norway	E.S. Dl. Øystein Hovdkinn	
16.	Poland	E.S. Dl. Wojciech Zajackowski	
17.	Portugal	E.S. Dl. Alexandre Maria Lindim Vassalo	
18.	Slovakia	E.S. Dna. Dagmar Repcekova	
19.	Slovenia	E.S. Dl. Marcel Koprol	
20.	Spain	E.S. Dl. Carlos Ruiz Gonzales	
21.	Turkey	E.S. Dna. Ayse Siniirlioglu	
22.	United Kingdom	E.S. Dl. Robin Barnett	
23.	United States	E.S. Dl. Mark Henry Gitenstein	

Fourth Workshop Report

“Protecting the Alliance’s security at strategic distance or closer to home: right balance and false dilemmas“

Timeline: 19th of October 2009

Forth Workshop: Military Level

1. **Participants:** 62 (Defense policy experts, military personnel, veterans, experts, military media).
2. **Goal:** Debates on political-military aspects of the future NATO strategic concept and performing a substantial contribution to the national effort oriented to strengthening the Romanian position regarding the features of the new strategic concept.
3. **Suggested topics:**
 - How to do collective defense effectively in the 21st century? (capabilities/resources);
 - Contingency planning for the new members;
 - Managing Afghanistan – like operations: what lessons learnt for the new strategic concept? ;
 - Striking the balance between territorial defense and “out of area operations“: doctrine, capabilities and resource requirements;
 - The role of missile defense in the new strategic concept;
 - Defining a NATO role for maritime security.
4. **The works were in the Romanian language**, except for the presentation by the Chief of NATO’s Military Committee, Admiral Gianpaolo di Paola.
5. **The Program of the Workshop (project):**

INTRODUCTORY SESSION

14,00-14,05 Opening address by Viorel Oancea, State Secretary for Defense Policy and Planning

- 14,05-14,15 Presentation by Admiral Gianpaolo di Paola, Chairmen of NATO Military Committee-VCR
- 14,15-14,25 Presentation by Brig. Gen. Valeriu Nicut, Deputy for Operations and Training within the General Staff;
- 14,25-14,40 Discussions;
- 14,40-14,50 Presentation by Mr. Iulian CHIFU, Director of the Center for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning;
- 14,50-14,55 Remarks by the Head of the National Defense College

SESSION 1, dedicated to the political-military aspects of the Topics in section 3 above. Political-military elements to be included in the future NATO strategic concept

Moderator: Colonel Mircea MÎNDRESCU, Acting Head of the National Defense College.

- 14,55-15,15 Presentation by Viorel Oancea, State Secretary for Defense Policy and Planning;
- 15,15-15,35 Presentation by Brig.Gen. Ion Grosu, Romanian Intelligence Service representative;
- 15,35-16,15 Debates;
- 16,15-16,30 Coffee-break

SESSION 2, dedicated to military aspects of the Topics in section 3 above. Military elements to be included in the future NATO strategic concept

Moderator: Bg.Gen Valeriu NICUT.

- 16,30-16,50 Presentation by Brig.Gen. Virgil Bălăceanu, Strategic Planning Directorate (J5)/ General Staff;
- 16,50-17,10 Presentation by Brig.Gen. Dan Plăvițu, Chief of the Military Intelligence Directorate;
- 17,10-17,50 Debates.

CONCLUSION

- 17,50-18,00 Concluding remarks by Dragoș Ghercioiu, General Director for Defense Policy and Planning at the end of the works

On 19th October 2009, the Workshop no. 4 on “*Protecting Alliance security at strategic distance or closer to home: right balance and false,*

dilemmas” was organized at the Ministry of National Defense, between 14.00 and 19.00. It was co-organized by the Romanian National Defense College and the Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Centre and sponsored by the NATO, with the participation of the following guests:

- Admiral Gianpaolo di Paola, Chairman of NATO Military Committee-(through VCR);
- Viorel Oancea, State Secretary for Defense Policy and Planning, MoD;
- Dragoş Ghercioiu, General Director for Defense Policy and Planning;
- Colonel Mircea MINDRESCU, Acting Head of National Defense College;
- Mr. Iulian CHIFU, Director of the Center for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning;
- Brig. Gen. Valeriu Nicut, Deputy for Operations and Training within the General Staff
- Brig. Gen. Ion Grosu, Romanian Intelligence Service representative;
- Brig. Gen. Virgil Bălăceanu, Strategic Planning Directorate (J5)/ General Staff;
- Brig. Gen. Dan Plăviţu, Chief of the Military Intelligence Directorate and other 57 participants from institutions and agencies involved in security and defense issues.

The dynamics of the politico-military international scene, the permanent improvement of the tactics used by terrorist organizations and insurgent groups and the security and economic interests of the Alliance member states demand that NATO adopt a more flexible and feasible policy, both at political-strategic level and operational-tactical one.

Taking the suggested topics as baseline, the following ideas have been expressed:

**1. How to do collective defense effectively in the 21st century?
(capabilities/resources)**

The new strategic concept should accomplish at least two major objectives: strengthening the common security and initiating NATO’s transformation regarding the planning, the acquisitions and the future expeditionary missions. Therefore, a feasible, quick, expeditionary reaction force that

meets the requirements of a new NATO security strategy will be needed. Moreover, in order to avoid the replication of efforts and costs, the transformation process and the training system (through the educational process and common exercises) should be coordinated.

Romania appreciates and works for maintaining the concept of collective defense as a fundamental pillar of the Alliance. Experience has shown that nations must constantly reconfigure the balance of forces needed both for national defense and for the deployment of these forces in remote areas of crisis in NATO operations. This is an additional reason for setting the real needed forces and capabilities required for the full range of military operations, both domestic and beyond, from peacekeeping to combat actions.

Collective defense is and must remain the basic mission of the Alliance and the main component of the operational planning process, while engaging in military operations in response to crisis will be done when the security situation requires and with the available forces. The new Strategic Concept must clearly establish the purpose, objectives and functions of the Alliance, define the challenges and threats to its security and indicate the means and capabilities required for confrontation with these threats, but it must define also measures of institutionalization of Article 5, establish rules of engagement and the principles of achieving collective defense and cooperation within it.

2. Contingency planning for the new members

NATO defense planning system (NDPP) is in transition to the new model recently adopted. The onset of the first full cycle taking into account the new model will be marked by the development of the new Strategic Concept (SC), which will be taken directly to planning. Today at NATO HQ is considered that the document “Comprehensive Political Guidance”, endorsed at the Riga summit, is still valid and, therefore, key issues referring to defense planning can be taken in the New Strategic Concept.

Romania must militate for a balanced presentation within the New Strategic Concept of the two strategic objectives: involvement in actual crisis

management and transformation of capabilities, meaning to accustom oneself to requirements of previewed security environment. The efficient use of resources in the process of capabilities development, which in our opinion is extended beyond defense planning, for many allied states is also influenced by the EU needs for specific capabilities evolution. Consequently a clearer expression of NATO's desire for cooperation, at least in the field of defense planning, is imperative.

3. Managing Afghanistan – like operations: what lessons learnt for the new strategic concept?

Estimating the influence upon the New Strategic Concept of the lessons learned following NATO operations in Afghanistan, NATO can be defined as one of the main actors' participants to the global management of the civil and military crisis. A new approach is the concept on unification of the main actors' efforts under the same goal during their involvement in a conflict or crisis. This concept has multiple meanings and a common definition is unlikely to be agreed on a short and medium term. NATO must coordinate its own actions with this community in non-Article 5 crisis, such as:

- unity of efforts, provision of integrated estimate and planning of the processes without any restriction regarding the information exchange;
- military activity integration with multiple actors and achievement of synchronic work in cooperation;
- provision of essential directions and of a coherent strategy

The present military strategy in Afghanistan is exclusively focused on security and economy and pay attention to the possibility of capitalizing success from a possible progress in the cultural domain able to support the efforts for population's protection by Taliban's` isolation. In Afghanistan two of the three fundamental pillars of the participation by a contingent in a mission out of own country's borders (determining factors specific to any counter-insurgency operation) have become fragile: international force credibility against the insurgents' wish and the population's support /confidence.

In order to consolidate the affected pillars some actions aiming at obtaining the population's support/trust simultaneously with insurgents' neutralization are in progress.

4. Striking the balance between territorial defense and “out of area operations“: doctrine, capabilities and resource requirements

Although the Alliance proved after the Cold War a great capacity for adaptation, by admitting new members, reorganizing the command structure and the missions, which permitted the dislocation of forces beyond the traditional area of responsibility, a range of factors have led to additional obstacles in developing and implementing a coherent strategy of the Alliance. These factors are due mainly to the lack of a common perception of the risks and threats or the inability of the European Allies to allocate enough resources for the on-going missions.

Engagement in out of area operations as a consequence of the need to combat the threats has determined a modification of the strategic operations organization and planning profile. This fact must not induce to the small states of the Alliance the perception of a deeper tendency to marginalize their own national interests in the field of security.

The debates concerning the new NATO strategic concept have as a background the increase of a certain internal criticism regarding the non-fulfillment of the objectives assumed at the RIGA Summit (2006). This led to the reluctance of certain member states to support NATO with forces, especially for the ISAF operations. Some others think that NATO should focus not only on the asymmetrical threats but also on the classical ones. The next Strategic Concept must involve NATO in regions of great economical-strategic interest, like the Arctic region.

Following an intense and permanent dialogue with the nations, NATO military authorities recommended the main development guidelines for the elaboration of the new strategic concept on different levels: operational; capabilities and transformation; partnerships. From the military point of view one can conclude that some components regarded as highly important need to be part of the new strategic concept.

For the operational field the following can resume the main guidelines: reanalyzing Article 5 through the common understanding of the configuration of a possible future attack; clarifying the relation between

common defense and common security (here we can find energy security, cyber defense, diminishment of the international criminality); ensuring a unique perspective about taking on common risks in the operations, which means participating with troops and/or financial compensation of those costs; maintaining a balance between the missions under or beyond the incidence of Article 5.

For the field of capabilities and transformations: developing transformation programs and/or building the capabilities the Alliance will need in order to respond to the estimated risks and threats: to reorganize the capabilities in order to ensure a quick response in crisis situations; to prepare the operations carried out together with other organizations/international actors; to improve the strategic communication to deliver a convincing political message; to harmonize inside the Alliance the command and forces structures that are responsible also for the costs covering the actual deficits from the common fund; to coordinate the construction of a quick reaction force that has to be correlated to the EU requirements and to NATO training and instruction system.

For the field of partnerships the New Strategic Concept must take into account: the intensification of the interaction with international actors: UN, EU, OSCE; (re) establishing cooperation relations with Russia; continuing the partnership programs (PfP, MD, ICI); strengthening the relations with non-NATO states and with other international actors in order to extend NATO's role in ensuring security and stability beyond the traditional regions of interest; developing the relation with the EU for a better cooperation, as the two organizations are complementary: the forces are the same for both organizations, the procedures and techniques has to be identical, and the priorities should be harmonized as they have the same type of deficits.

5. The role of missile defense in the new strategic concept

The background of Romania's participation within NATO MD initiative comprises the interest of being connected to the allied efforts, the development of an allied anti-missile system and the guarantee that it

covers its whole national territory. Romania's position is based on two essential principles: the indivisibility of security within NATO and collective solidarity towards the countries vulnerable to missile attacks.

The contemporary strategic environment, development and proliferation of ballistic missiles, including the possibility of using loads capable of mass destruction constitutes a significant threat to NATO's territory and population. This threat is magnified by more sustained efforts of nations to develop weapons of mass destruction and delivery capacities with increasing range of action. NATO missile defense program was designed precisely to protect the territory, population and forces (including those deployed in theaters of operations) against these types of weapons.

NATO must continue dialogue on security implications of missile systems, both in consultations with other allies and with partner countries.

In particular, when it comes to the relationship with Russia, NATO can decide in favor of promoting an open dialogue on this subject and identify concrete ways of cooperation depending on the evolution of the project, and Russia's interest in this respect, starting with the idea that Black Sea security is impossible without a strong commitment of this country.

6. Defining a NATO role for maritime security

NATO represents an Alliance composed of nations with broad coastland, old maritime traditions, great naval capabilities and strong commercial interests, who supposes and imposes that NATO should play an active role in ensuring and maintaining the Allies' maritime security. NATO's role in the maritime security should be complementary to the tasks fulfilled by maritime authorities and by civil national and international agencies responsible for imposing the law.

The new strategic concept will have to specify which are the maritime missions that need to be taken into account by the Alliance, what will be the role of nations' navy forces, the distribution of responsibilities between the nations, the definition of the borders between defense and security, the limits of participation in case of supportive actions of the authorities responsible for imposing the law.

The strategic interests of the Alliance from the perspective of the maritime security can be spotted out as follows:

- the protection of the territorial integrity and maritime coast of the member states;
- ensuring the population, equipment and infrastructure protection in the maritime area;
- preventing the proliferation of mass destruction arms;
- protection of the critical and energy infrastructure;
- ensuring the freedom of navigation and the access to resources (at the surface or sub aquatic).

The identified or expected maritime risks and threats to the Alliance can be included in two categories: current threats (attacks against ships, using ships charged with chemical or radiological material as weapons, transporting WMD, etc), and future threats (threats to the stability and the security of the Arctic region, migration due to the rise of seas' and oceans' level, natural calamities, lack of resources, intensification of the competition for natural resources etc).

The success of ensuring and maintaining maritime security depends largely on the good cooperation regarding the exchange of intelligence between civil agencies that impose the law, international organizations (UN, EU, IMO), NGOs, etc. The cooperation is thus the key for success.

In the context of multidimensional important changes of the international geo-strategic environment, nations are waiting that the New Strategic Concept synthesize all elements which have not only to include and to represent the Allies interests, but also to set, in enough flexible terms, the NATO way in the military, diplomatic, communication spectrum, at least for the next decade. The solution, even a partial one, leads to the conclusion that the Alliance is and will be not only a global security exporter but also a security builder.

LIST OF INVITED PERSONS

**To the Workshop no. 4 of 19th October 2009
organized at the Ministry of National Defense,
conference room 128, on:**

“Protecting Alliance security at strategic distance or closer to home: right balances and false dilemmas”

- Mihai STĂNIȘOARĂ, Minister of National Defense (or his personal representative);
- Admiral Gianpaolo di Paola (through VTC), Chief of NATO Military Committee.

MoD Department for Defense Policy and Planning:

- Viorel OANCEA, Secretary of state for Defense Policy and Planning (representative);
- Brig. Gen. Eng. Alexandru COTOARĂ-NICOLAE, Chief of International Co-operation in the Field of Defense Directorate (representative) and a specialist;
- Șerban LUNGU, Director of the Integrated Planning Directorate (representative) and a specialist;
- Mrs. Elena FRUNZETI, Deputy Director of Defense Policies Directorate (representative) and a specialist.

MoD Department of Armaments

- Brig. Gen. Eng. Cătălin MORARU, Deputy Secretary of State for Armaments and a specialist.

General Staff:

- Brig. Gen Valeriu NICUȚ, Deputy for Operations and Training;
- Brig. Gen. Alexandru RUS PhD, Chief of J 3 Directorate and two specialists;
- Brig. Gen. Virgil BĂLĂCEANU PhD, Chief of J 5 Directorate and two specialists;
- Brig. Gen. Mihai CHIRIȚĂ, PhD, Chief of J 7 Directorate and two specialists;

Land Forces Staff:

- Maj. Gen. Ion PALSOIU PhD, Deputy Chief of Staff (representative) and a specialist.

Air Forces Staff:

- Air Flotilla Gen. Virgil RISTEA, Deputy Chief of Staff (representative) and a specialist.

Navy Staff:

- Rear-Admiral Nicolae VALSAN Deputy Chief of Staff (representative) and a specialist.

MoD Defense Intelligence General Directorate:

- Maj. Gen. Ilie BOTOȘ PhD, Deputy General Director (representative);
- Brig. Gen. Dan PLĂVIȚU, Chief of Military Intelligence Directorate (representative) and two specialists;
- Col. Marian HAPAU, Chief of Counterintelligence and Military Security Directorate (representative) and two specialists.

Military Mass-media:

- one representative of the MoD Information and Public Relations Directorate;
- one representative of the General Staff Information and Public Relations Section.

Institute for Defense Policy Studies and Military History:

- Maj. Gen. (R) Mihail IONESCU, Director of the Institute.

National Defense University „Carol I“:

- Lieutenant-General Teodor FRUNZETI. Commandant (Rector) of the National Defense University „Carol I“ (representative);
- Colonel Prof. Constantin MOSTOFLEI PhD, Director of the Center for Strategic, Defense and Security Studies.

National Defense College

- Colonel Mircea MÎNDRESCU, Acting Head of the National Defense College.

Romanian Intelligence Service:

- George Cristian MAIOR, Director of Romanian Intelligence Service (or his Deputy) and 4-7 specialists.

Conflicts Prevention and Early Warning Center:

- Assoc. Prof. Iulian CHIFU, Director of the Center and 4–7 specialists;

Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

- Căndeia Ion, 2nd Secretary, Security Policy Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- Ana Tinca, director, 1st Secretary, Security Policy Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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